JUDGMENT Hon’ble Barkat Ali Zaidi, J.—As both the petitions relate to the same incident they are being taken up together for consideration. 2. On 19.8.2007 around 7.45 O’clock in the morning in village Gurauli, Police Station Kaushambi District Kaushambi there was violent conflict between two warring groups, in which fire arms were used from both sides in consequence whereof, one life was lost and 5 persons sustained injuries from the petitioners’ side while two persons died from the other party. 3. On the basis of this incident, the police of police station Kaushambi thought that the acts of the petitioners were prejudicial to the maintenance of public order and they should, therefore, be detained under the provisions of The National Security Act, 1980 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’). The police forwarded a report, copy of which is Annexure-12 alongwith relevant annexures, to the District Magistrate Kaushambi for passing a detention order. The District Magistrate, thereafter, passed an order of detention I under Section 3(2) of the Act, vide order dated 24.11.2007, copy of which is Annexure -14 on the record. 4. The petitioners thereafter filed a representation under Section 8 read with Section 10 of the Act, Annexure-15 on the record, before the District Magistrate. The District Magistrate, dismissed their representation by order dated 6.1.2008, copy whereof is Annexure-16 on the record, which the Government has also confirmed on the report of the Advisory Board as provided under Section 12 (1) of the Act by order dated 17.1.2008. copy whereof is Annexure-17 on the record. 5. The aforenoted petitioners have come here under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, seeking their release from detention under Section 3 (2) of the Act 6. We have heard Sri U.K. Saxena, Counsel for the petitioners and Sri Gaurav Srivastava, Addl. Government Advocate for the State. 7. One of the arguments advanced from the side of the petitioners is, that the report of Thana police and the forwarding note of Superintendent of Police to the District Magistrate and his order thereon, for detention, were passed the same day, and on the same day the petitioners were sent to jail. The Counsel finds something fishy in this hot hurry, but his suspicions are unfounded. The Counsel finds something fishy in this hot hurry, but his suspicions are unfounded. If all this work has been completed in a day, there is nothing unusual, and the bulk of the work was not such, as could not have been accomplished in a day. The argument is wholly sterile. 8. The other ground of the petitioners is, that, their involvement under Section 3 (2) of the Act is unwarranted and unjustified, not only because it has been slapped; on the basis of a single incident, but also because, there were cross cases and this fact was not considered while passing the order of detention. 9. As regards the argument of the petitioners’ Counsel that the National Security Act has been slapped upon the petitioners only on the basis of this simple incident, there is no dearth of authorities on the proposition that a single incident can suffice, for imposition of National Security Act. Reference may be made to the case of Ramveer Jatav v. State of U.P., AIR. 1987 SC 63. It is little surprising that this argument still finds mention at the bar. 10. The Counsel for the petitioners argued that there has been discrimination as such, as the National Security Act was used against the petitioners, and not. against their adversaries in the case, despite the fact that the adversaries were the aggressors, as can be seen from the site plan of the occurrence filed by the petitioners. The question as to who was the aggressor, is to be decided by the Trial Court after the evidence and the plea is, therefore, premature. So far as the plea of discrimination is concerned, because the National Security Act was not invoked against the adversaries of the petitioners, the plea of discrimination does not find mention anywhere in the petition, and has been urged only at the time of arguments. We will therefore, refuse to entertain this argument, because respondents had no opportunity, to meet this point in their reply. 11. The last argument of the Counsel for the petitioners is that there was a gun fight between the two groups and there were fatalities from both sides, two from the side of the complainant party, and one, from the side of the petitioners’ party. 11. The last argument of the Counsel for the petitioners is that there was a gun fight between the two groups and there were fatalities from both sides, two from the side of the complainant party, and one, from the side of the petitioners’ party. It was pointed out that while a cross case Crime No. 71-A of 2007 with regard to the same incident, at the instance of petitioners was also registered under Sections 147, 148, 149, 302, 307, 323, 324, I.P.C. against their adversaries, and admittedly placed before the District Magistrate, there is not a word in the order of the District Magistrate about their cross case or of any incident relating thereto, and it must, therefore, be assumed, that, the District Magistrate did not consider repercussions of the cross case. 12. The Counsel for the petitioners referred to the following cases, wherein, it has been held that if, the aspects of the cross case were not considered by the authority concerned dealing with the representation of the detenue, the order of detention would stand vitiated. (i) Ram Khelawan v. State of U.P. and others, 1998 U.P. Cr. LJ. 95; (ii) Ayya alias Ayub v. State of U.P. and another, A.I.R. 1989 S.C. 36 13. The Counter argument from the side of the State Counsel, was, that the mere fact, that the District Magistrate in his order, dealing with the representation of the petitioners, has not referred to the cross case, will not ipso facto imply that the facts of the cross case, were not considered by the District Magistrate, because, it is not necessary that all matters must be reduced into writing, and the only requirement is that, papers relating to the cross case should be placed before the District Magistrate, and in this case, they were duly placed and should be deemed sufficient. 14. It may be true that all papers relating to the matter need not be referred to in the order or Judgment, but facts and circumstances, which are vital and which have a direct bearing on the evaluation of a case, need certainly to be referred in the order, and if they are not mentioned, it should be unhesitatingly assumed, that those aspects were not considered by the authority concerned. That is the principle while certain judgments are held, to be per incurium. 15. That is the principle while certain judgments are held, to be per incurium. 15. State Counsel has referred to the case of Rajendra Kumar Sharma v. Superintendent, District Jail, Agra and others, 1985 Cri LJ 999, wherein the following observations were made : “Learned Counsel for the petitioner has argued that in respect of this very incident, there is a cross case also registered as Crime Case No. 97 of 1983 in which the complainant and the witnesses of this case are accused persons. The papers relating to this cross case were not placed before the detaining authority and, therefore, he was deprived of an opportunity to examine the materials pertaining to crime Case No. 97/83 also before forming his subjective opinion about the incident reported to him. Therefore, the order of detention which has been passed without consideration of such a relevant material document relating to that cross case is invalid. A copy of the report of the cross case is Annexure-3 of the rejoinder affidavit. This report is under Sections 147, 395, 397, 302 and 436, I.P.C. and was lodged by Umesh Kumar Lavania containing allegations about some incident which had taken place on 11.6.1983 (not on 12..6.1983) at 10.30 a.m. over a land lying in front of Prabhu Cinema. This report is against 32 persons (which do not include the petitioner Rajendra Kumar Sharma) alleging that they came on that land on the aforesaid date and time armed with lathis, dandas, Pharsas, Knives and Kattas, that they assaulted the complainant’s wife and sons of his Bua, that they with their Kattas fired at them and that they looted their houses and shops. This report was made on 11.6.1983 at P.S. Jagdishpura i.e. day prior to the incident of the report of Crime Case No. 97-A/83. Therefore, the mere fact that this report of the incident of 12.6.1983 was registered as Crime No. 97-A/83 does not for purposes of the disposal of this petition necessarily lead to an inference that the two incidents of the said two reports relate to the same transaction containing different versions of the same incident. Therefore, it is difficult to agree with the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the report of the so-called cross case was material, which the detaining authority was bound to consider. Therefore, it is difficult to agree with the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the report of the so-called cross case was material, which the detaining authority was bound to consider. However, even if it is assumed that the two reports contained different versions of the same incident, it is impossible to conceive that the non-consideration of the report of Crime Case No. 97/83 had in any way prejudiced the petitioner, because if the facts disclosed in the report, pertaining to crime Case No. 97-A/83 were sufficient to satisfy the detaining authority, about the potentiality of disturbances of public order by the activities of the petitioner, his subjective satisfaction would not be vitiated, merely because, the complainant and witnesses of this incident are accused of similar activities. The object of preventive detention under Section 3 (2) of the National Security Act, is to prevent a person, from disturbing public tranquillity, if the activities of a person, which are considered by the detaining authority to form an opinion, whether the same are indicative of inclination of that person, regarding his future activities, which are necessary to be prevented for maintenance of public order. If the activities of the person reported by the reporting authority, satisfy the detaining authority, that the reported activities of such a person, are affecting public order, and that, it is necessary to prevent him, from acting in a prejudicial manner in future, the detaining authority will act upon his such subjective satisfaction and exercise his powers under Section 3(2) of the National Security Act. The power of detention under this section, is a preventive measure, taken by way of prosecution, to prevent mischief to the community. Therefore, if the activities of the petitioner as reported by the reporting authority, satisfies the detaining authority, that the petitioner should be prevented from indulging in similar activities in future, it is competent to do so, even if, some other version of the incident, reported, is not before him while considering his activities. It is not a hard and fast rule, that a report of the incident, containing a counter version, must in all cases be placed before the detaining authority. In some case, it may be material, in other, it may not be so. Every case is decided on the facts and circumstances, pepuliar to it. It is not a hard and fast rule, that a report of the incident, containing a counter version, must in all cases be placed before the detaining authority. In some case, it may be material, in other, it may not be so. Every case is decided on the facts and circumstances, pepuliar to it. In the instant case, the report of the Crime Case No. 97/83 is not a document which would invalidate the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority about the future activities of the petitioner vis-a-vis maintenance of public order after considering his activities as reported by the reporting authority.” 16. It will be seen that even in this case it has been mentioned that the facts of each case are different, and each case depends upon it’s own peculiar facts. In the portion underlined in the aforesaid case, it has also been observed, that, there may be cases where the presentation of the cross version may be material and will consequently effect the decision of the authority concerned. In the present case, it will be seen that one person lost his life and 5 persons were injured from the side of the petitioners, there was intensive violence from both sides and the facts and circumstances of the cross case were therefore, vital material which ought to have been taken into account, and should have been referred to, in the order. 17. In view of non mention of the cross case in the order of detention passed by the District Magistrate under Section 3 (2) of the Act, it should therefore be held that both the orders of detention are vitiated and are accordingly set aside and the petitioners are, therefore, entitled to be released. 18. Both the petitions are accordingly allowed. Both the detention order passed by the District Magistrate dated 24.11.2007 are, therefore, set aside. The petitioners be set at liberty forthwith, from detention, if not required in some other case. ————