JUDGMENT Hon’ble Sanjay Misra, J.—The committee of management Marwar Intermediate College, Nasirabad, Buxipur, Gorakhpur through its manager has filed this contempt petition under Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act alleging that the Opposite Parties namely Sri Ravindra Singh, District Inspector of Schools, Gorakhpur, Sri Satish Chandra Srivastava, Joint Director of Education VIIth Region, Gorakhpur (also holding charge of Dy. Director Education VIIth Region, Gorakhpur) and Sri Sanjay Shukla, Assistant District Inspector of Schools have wilfully and deliberately disobeyed the judgment and order dated 8.4.2008 passed by a Division Bench of this Court in Special Appeal No. 507 of 2008, Committee of Management, Marwar Intermediate College v. State of U.P. and others. 2. Notices were issued to the Opposite Parties by this Court on 22.5.2008 whereafter all the Opposite Parties filed affidavit of compliance along with applications dated 15.7.2008. 3. This Court upon considering the affidavit of compliance filed by all the three Opposite Parties was of the opinion that they have wilfully and deliberately disobeyed the order of the Court and deliberately delayed the matter in complying with the order of the Court. The Court found a prima facie case of wilful disobedience made out against the Opposite Parties No. 1, 2 and 3 and framed charges against all the three Opposite Parties by the order dated 15.7.2008 and allowed them time to file reply to the charges framed. 4. The charges framed against the Opposite Parties No. 1, 2 and 3 are quoted hereunder : “(1) You, Ravindra Singh, opposite party No. 1 wilfully and deliberately did not comply with the order of the Court dated 8th April, 2008 in not issuing a consequential order immediately to the Authorized Controller to handover the charge to the Committee of Management and instead issued an order dated 2nd May, 2008 directing payment of salary to the teachers by single operation method which order constitutes contempt by itself. (2) You, Satish Chandra Srivastava, opposite Party No. 2 have wilfully and deliberately disobeyed the order of the Court dated 8th April, 2008 in sitting over the matter and deliberately delayed in issuing consequential direction to the subordinate authority for compliance of the order of the Appellate Court and not taking any action within a reasonable time. (2) You, Satish Chandra Srivastava, opposite Party No. 2 have wilfully and deliberately disobeyed the order of the Court dated 8th April, 2008 in sitting over the matter and deliberately delayed in issuing consequential direction to the subordinate authority for compliance of the order of the Appellate Court and not taking any action within a reasonable time. (3) You, Sanjay Shukla, the opposite party No. 3 functioning as an Authorized Controller have wilfully and deliberately disobeyed the order of the Appellate Court dated 8th April, 2008 by continuing to function as the Authorized Controller in spite of knowing the judgment dated 8th April, 2008 by which your appointment as an Authorized Controller had been quashed.” 5. All the three Opposite Parties have filed their replies separately to the charges framed against them along with their applications for discharge which is available on record. 6. The circumstances before the writ Court, as have been averred in the application supported with affidavit in this contempt petition are that the petitioner institution is recognized under the U.P. Intermediate Education Act and salary of its teaching and non-teaching staff is paid by the State Government under U.P. Act No. 24 of 1971. The Opposite Party Nos. 1 and 2 (herein) as a regional committee issued orders on 22/25.2.2008 superseding the committee of management of the petitioner institution. The said order was challenged in a writ petition No. 15117 of 2008 which was dismissed by the learned Single Judge by order dated 19.3.2008. The committee of management of the institution preferred an Intra Court Special Appeal No. 507 of 2008 which was allowed by the judgment and order dated 8.4.2008. The Special Appeal was allowed, the order appointing authorized controller was quashed and a further direction was issued to the respondents therein not to interfere in the functioning of the committee of management of the institution. The Opposite Party No. 1 was arrayed as respondent No. 4 in the Special Appeal and Opposite Party No. 2 was arrayed as respondent No. 3 in the Special Appeal. 7. It has been averred in this contempt petition that the judgment dated 8.4.2008 passed in the Special Appeal was served on the respondents on 15.4.2008 and receipt was obtained of the service. 7. It has been averred in this contempt petition that the judgment dated 8.4.2008 passed in the Special Appeal was served on the respondents on 15.4.2008 and receipt was obtained of the service. According to the applicant, the Opposite Parties did not comply with the judgment of the Court and did not permit the committee of management to function and on the other hand an order dated 2.5.2008 (Annexure 4) was issued by the District Inspector of Schools ordering single operation of the account of the institution under the provisions of U.P. Act No. 24 of 1971. It is also averred that the Opposite Party No. 3 who was appointed as authorized controller of the institution earlier did not hand over charge to the committee of management inspite of repeated requests and therefore has also disobeyed the directions of the Court. 8. In the compliance affidavit filed along with application dated 15.7.2008, all the three Opposite Parties have stated that the order dated 8.4.2008 passed by this Court in Special Appeal No. 507 of 2008 has been complied by the order dated 9.7.2008 duly communicated to the petitioner wherein in pursuance of the directions of the Opposite Party No. 2 dated 7.7.2008, the District Inspector of Schools has cancelled his earlier order dated 2.5.2008 and authorized the management for the purpose of payment of salary to the teaching and non-teaching staff of the institution. 9. After framing of charges, the Opposite Parties have filed their replies which are in substance as under : (1) Opposite Party No. 1 Sri Ravindra Singh, District Inspector of Schools, Gorakhpur.—The Opposite Party No. 1 has stated that he received a hotocopy of the judgment of the High Court on 18.4.2008 and on 23.4.2008 he wrote a letter to the Joint Director Education VII Region, Gorakhpur who was the president of the regional level committee seeking appropriate directions from him. The Joint Director, of Education (Opposite Party No. 2) wrote back on 8.5.2008 to the District Inspector of Schools for obtaining certified copy of the order of the High Court. The Opposite Party No. 1 wrote to the Manager of the institution to supply a certified copy of the order of the High Court which was made available to him on 17.5.2008. The Opposite Party No. 1 wrote to the Manager of the institution to supply a certified copy of the order of the High Court which was made available to him on 17.5.2008. The affidavit states that the certified copy of the High Court order was forwarded to the Joint Director Education (Opposite Party No. 2) by the District Inspector of Schools along with letter dated 21.5.2008. It is stated that on 24.4.2008, the teaching and non-teaching staff of the institution made a representation to him for ensuring payment of salary for the month of March and April 2008. Such representation was made by the District Secretary of U.P. Madhyamik Shiksha Sangh. Since the salary of teaching and non-teaching staff of the institution had not been paid for the months of March and April 2008, the DIOS passed an order dated 2.5.2008 for single operation of the account in exercise of his powers under U.P. Act No. 24 of 1971 particularly when no directions had been received by the District Inspector of Schools from the office of Joint Director of Education upon the query made by him on 23.4.2008. According to the DIOS, the Joint Director by his letter dated 7.7.2008 directed him to comply with the judgment dated 8.4.2008 of the High Court and hold election of the committee of management in accordance with the scheme of the administration and withdraw the order of single operation. It is stated that the DIOS immediately issued an order dated 9.7.2008 cancelling his earlier order dated 25.2.2008. Such letter dated 7.7.2008 issued by the Joint Director and the order dated 9.7.2008 issued by the District Inspector of Schools were filed before the High Court earlier when affidavit of compliance had been submitted. It is stated that after the order dated 8.4.2008 passed by the High Court, the consequential orders were to be issued by the Joint Director which were ultimately issued on 7.7.2008 and prior to such date, he had passed the order dated 2.5.2008 only for the payment of salary to the teaching and non-teaching staff of the institution for the month of March and April 2008. It is stated that no interference was made by the DIOS in the managerial functions of the committee of management during the aforesaid period. It is stated that no interference was made by the DIOS in the managerial functions of the committee of management during the aforesaid period. It has been stated that there was no ill will or malice on behalf of the DIOS when he issued the order dated 2.5.2008 for single operation. In Paragraph 18, Sri Ravindra Singh has tendered unconditional and unqualified apology and that he has highest regards for the Court and any disobedience or delay that may have occurred in compliance of the judgment dated 8.4.2008 was unintentional and not wilful. (2) Opposite Party No. 2 Sri Satish Chandra Srivastava, Joint Director of Education VII Region, Gorakhpur—It has been stated in the affidavit of the Opposite Party No. 2 that the regional committee had passed an order dated 25.2.2008 appointing authorized controller for the institution. A photocopy of the judgment dated 8.4.2008 passed in Special Appeal No. 507 of 2008 was served in the office of the District Inspector of Schools on 15.4.2008, although the letter was addressed to the Joint Director of Education, a copy of which was served upon him on 18.4.2008. The Opposite Party No. 2 confirms that the District Inspector of Schools wrote to him on 23.4.2008 seeking appropriate directions in the matter pursuant to the order dated 8.4.2008 of the High Court. He states that since certified copy of the judgment of the High Court had not been served, he wrote on 8.5.2008 to the District Inspector of Schools to obtain a certified copy of the judgment and submit the same. On 17.5.2008, the District Inspector of Schools required the management to submit the certified copy of the judgment of the High Court and the Manager supplied the same to the District Inspector of Schools on 17.5.2008. The Opposite Party No. 2 in this affidavit has stated that the District Inspector of Schools submitted the certified copy of the order of the High Court on 21.5.2008. Since the Opposite Party was under great mental and physical strain due to illness of his daughter at Lucknow, he could not devote substantial time to discharge his functions in a normal manner. According to Paragraph 12 of the affidavit filed by the Opposite Party No. 2, he was transferred from Gorakhpur to Azamgarh region on 26.6.2008 and hence he could not dispose of the matter during the aforesaid period. According to Paragraph 12 of the affidavit filed by the Opposite Party No. 2, he was transferred from Gorakhpur to Azamgarh region on 26.6.2008 and hence he could not dispose of the matter during the aforesaid period. It has been stated in Paragraph 14 of the affidavit by the Opposite Party No. 2 that his transfer order dated 26.6.2008 was cancelled by the Government on 4.7.2008 and he joined duties as Joint Director of Education, Gorakhpur Region, Gorakhpur on 5.7.2008. Upon joining again, he immediately on 7.7.2008 directed the District Inspector of Schools to comply with the judgment dated 8.4.2008 passed by the High Court. He states that the District Inspector of Schools promptly on 9.7.2008 passed the consequential order whereafter the compliance affidavit was filed before this Court. It has been stated by him that the delay if any in issuance of consequential orders for complying with the judgment of the Court occurred in exercise of due diligence coupled with the circumstance that the certified copy of the order of the High Court was made available to the Opposite Party No. 2 only on 21.5.2008 whereafter for the period 26.6.2008 till 4.7.2008 he was not working as Joint Director of Education. It has been stated that upon joining his post on 5.7.2008, there has been no delay on his part in complying with the directions of the High Court. The Opposite Party No. 2 has also submitted his unqualified and unconditional apology stating that he holds the High Court in the highest esteem and cannot dream to flout or disobey the order of the High Court. (3) Opposite Party No. 3 Sri Sanjay Shukla, Assistant District Inspector of Schools, Gorakhpur.—The Opposite Party No. 3 has stated in his affidavit that the regional committee by order dated 25.2.2008 had appointed an authorized controller for the institute in question. One Sri Om Dutt Singh was appointed authorized controller by the said order. Subsequently by an order dated 1.4.2008 passed by the Joint Director of Education, the Opposite Party No. 3 was appointed as authorized controller and he took charge in the evening of 3.4.2008. According to Opposite Party No. 3, a photostat copy of the order dated 8.4.2008 passed by the High Court was served upon him on or about 18.4.2008. Subsequently by an order dated 1.4.2008 passed by the Joint Director of Education, the Opposite Party No. 3 was appointed as authorized controller and he took charge in the evening of 3.4.2008. According to Opposite Party No. 3, a photostat copy of the order dated 8.4.2008 passed by the High Court was served upon him on or about 18.4.2008. He states that he forthwith stopped discharging function as authorized controller and has taken no action or decision nor he has passed any order in his capacity of authorized controller after receipt of the order of the High Court. It is stated that he approached the District Inspector of Schools for appropriate directions and was informed that the District Inspector of Schools had already written to the Joint Director of Education who was head of the regional committee for appropriate directions. According to Opposite Party No. 3, the District Inspector of Schools has issued an order dated 9.7.2008 cancelling his earlier order dated 25.2.2008 appointing the authorized controller. He states that he was arrayed as Opposite Party in this contempt petition but he was not a party either in the writ petition or in the Special Appeal No. 507 of 2008. According to him, he has not discharged a single function as authorized controller after the order dated 8.4.2008 passed by the High Court and in fact the salary bill for the month of March and April 2008 have been submitted by the Manager and Principal of the institution and hence he has been arrayed as an Opposite Party in this contempt petition with ulterior motive for purpose of harassment. In Paragraph 17 and 18, it has been stated that the Opposite Party No. 3 holds the High Court in highest regard and he cannot even imagine for committing contempt of Court and he has further tendered unconditional and unqualified apology in the affidavit of compliance for any delay or disobedience which may have occurred which is reiterated in the present affidavit. 10. No rejoinder affidavit or any reply to the aforesaid affidavits have been filed on behalf of the applicant. 11. 10. No rejoinder affidavit or any reply to the aforesaid affidavits have been filed on behalf of the applicant. 11. From the aforesaid pleas taken by the applicant and the Opposite Parties No. 1, 2 and 3, the fact which is not denied and admitted between the parties is that after passing of the judgment dated 8.4.2008 the Opposite Party No. 2 has issued directions to the Opposite Party No. 1 on 7.7.2008 for compliance of the directions of the High Court. It is also not disputed that in pursuance of the directions of the Opposite Party No. 2 given on 7.7.2008, the Opposite Party No. 1 has passed an order on 9.7.2008 cancelling the order of appointment of authorized controller and authorizing the management of the institution to submit the salary bill of the teaching and non-teaching staff by cancelling his own order dated 2.5.2008 directing single operation of the account for the purpose of paying the salary to the teaching and non-teaching staff of the institution for the months of March and April 2008. 12. In view of the aforesaid admitted circumstances of the parties, it has to be seen whether the Opposite Parties are liable to be punished under the Contempts of Court Act on the charges framed by this Court against them on 15.7.2008. 13. The main defence taken by the Opposite Party No. 1 and 2 in their affidavits is that they have not wilfully and deliberately disobeyed the order dated 8.4.2008 passed in Special Appeal No. 507 of 2008. According to them, there was a delay in compliance and in any case the Opposite Party No. 2 has issued directions for compliance on 7.7.2008 and the Opposite Party No. 1 has made compliance on 9.7.2008. Aforesaid delay has been explained by the Opposite Party No. 1 to be on account of his not having received appropriate directions from the Opposite Party No. 2. The Opposite Party No. 2 attributes the delay taken by him for issuing appropriate directions on 7.7.2008 to his personal difficulties due to his daughter’s illness at Lucknow and for the period from 26.6.2008 to 5.7.2008 on account of his transfer from Gorakhpur to Azamgarh and subsequent cancellation of the transfer order and his joining at Gorakhpur again on 5.7.2008. 14. 14. The Opposite Party No. 3 who was working as authorized controller has defended himself by saying that after the order dated 8.4.2008 passed by the High Court, he has not performed a single function or passed any order in his capacity as authorized controller till the order dated 9.7.2008 passed by the District Inspector of Schools cancelling his appointment. He states that since he has not performed any act as authorized controller hence it cannot be said that the element of disobedience of the order of the High Court can be attributed to him. 15. In the case of Aligarh Municipal Board and others v. Ekka Tonga Mazdoor Union and others, AIR 1970 SC 1767 , it was held that contempt proceedings against a person who has failed to comply with the Court’s order has a dual purpose (1) vindication of the public interest by punishment of the contemptuous conduct and (2) coercion to compel the contemners to do what the law requires of him. 16. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Anil Ratan Sarkar and others v. Hirak Ghosh and others, (2002) 4 SCC 21 has held that mere disobedience of the order could not be sufficient to be a civil contempt within the meaning of Section 2(b) of the Act and the element of willingness is an indispensable requirement to bring home the charge within the meaning of the Act. 17. It was held in Nyaz Mohammad and others v. State of Haryana, (1994) 6 SCC 332 that wilful disobedience and disobedience which was wilful and intentional can only be brought within the meaning of civil contempt but where in the facts of a case, it is found that there was no willful or intentional disobedience, the contempt could not be made out. 18. In the case of Kapildeo Prasad Sah and others v State of Bihar and others, (1999) 7 SCC 569 , it was held that to hold that a civil contempt has been committed, it has to be shown that there has been wilful disobedience of the judgment of the Court and the powers under the Contempt of Court Act should be invoked only when a clear case of willful disobedience of the Court’s order has been made out. Even negligence and carelessness can amount to disobedience particularly when the attention of the person is drawn to the Court’s order and its implications. The Hon’ble Supreme Court clearly laid down that willful would exclude casual, accidental, bona fide or unintentional acts or genuine inability to comply with the terms of the order. 19. In the case of Suresh Chandra Poddar v. Dhani Ram and others, (2002) 1 SCC 766 , it has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the Court must not be over sensitive while using the power of contempt. Such power should not be exercised as a matter of course and if the Court is told that the direction or order of the Court has been complied with subsequently, even after receipt of notice of contempt, the Court should show judicial grace and magnanimity in dealing with the action for contempt. 20. In the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of T.N. Godaverman Thirumulpad (102) through the amicus curiae v. Ashok Khot and another, (2006) 5 SCC 1 in Para 1, it was quoted as under : “The “King is under no man, but under God and the law”—was the reply of the Chief Justice of England, Sir Edward Coke when James I once declared, “Then I am to be under the law. It is treason to affirm it”- so wrote Henry Bracton who was a Judge of the King’s Bench.” 21. In view of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court, the facts and circumstances of each case, as are on record of the contempt petition, are relevant for the Court to record a finding whether the disobedience alleged is wilful and intentional so as to be brought within the ambit of Section 2(b) of the Contempt of Courts Act, or that the disobedience is due to other reasons but not for the reason of its being wilful or intentional. 22. Once a finding is recorded by the contempt Court that the disobedience was not wilful or intentional then the Courts would hesitate to punish an alleged contemner only for disobedience of the order of the Court which could be a disobedience for valid reasons such as the order could not be complied with legally or due to negligence, carelessness, bona fide and unintentional. In a case of contempt where wilful and intentional disobedience is alleged, the Opposite Party if he has not complied with the order of the Court will have a valid defence on grounds made available under the Statute and other reasons due to which a finding cannot be recorded that disobedience was wilful and intentional. The contemner seldom would admit wilful and intentional disobedience. Therefore, from the facts of the case, the contempt Court has to record positive finding before punishing a person under the Contempt of Courts Act. 23. In the present case, the order of the High Court has been complied with by the Opposite Party No. 1 on 9.7.2008 and by the Opposite Party No. 2 when he issued directions on 7.7.2008. The element of contempt willful and intentional alleged in this petition is the passing of the order dated 2.5.2008 by the Opposite Party No. 1 in ordering single operation of the account of the institution which is usurpation of the power and authority of the committee of management in the teeth of the directions dated 8.4.2008 passed by this Court. 24. In the Special Appeal No. 507 of 2008 filed by the Committee of Management of the Institution, this Court considered the grievance of the Committee of Management that it had been served with a show cause notice regarding certain grievances of the employees, namely that one of the employee was not being promoted and thereby he was suffering from financial loss. The management stated that it had replied to that notice and in response thereto, an order appointing an Authorized Controller over the Management of the Institution was passed by the authority. The Committee of Management had pleaded that an order appointing Authorized Controller can only be passed if there is violation of provisions of Payment of Salaries Act, 1971 and in case there is no grievance regarding non-payment of salary to the employees, the authority could not have passed an order appointing an Authorized Controller over the management. The Special Appeal Court recorded that surely it was not a matter on which the officers of the Government could have rushed to appoint an Authorized Controller. The Special Appeal Court recorded that surely it was not a matter on which the officers of the Government could have rushed to appoint an Authorized Controller. The respondents therein tried to defend the order of appointment of Authorized Controller by arguing that even in a situation covered under Section 6 of U.P. Act No. 24 of 1971, an order appointing Authorized Controller can be passed. The Court rejected such argument and held that it is not permissible for the authority to pass an order in these circumstances. The provision was to be utilised when salaries are not being paid apart from the provisions of Sections 3 to 5 of the Act. It was specifically recorded by this Court that a grievance that somebody ought to have been promoted and since he is not promoted, he is suffering from financial loss, are not to be brought under Sections 3 to 6 of the U.P. Act No. 24 of 1971. In such circumstance, the Court allowed the appeal, set aside the order of the learned Single Judge and also the order dated 25.2.2008 appointing the Authorized Controller. The Court also restrained the respondents from interfering in the functioning of the Committee of Management of the Institution unless a genuine case or any such requirement is made out. 25. From the aforesaid judgment passed by this Court in the Special Appeal, it is quite apparent that the Court has recorded that in a matter where grievance of an employee of the institution relates to promotion, the provisions of U.P. Act No. 24 of 1971 are not attracted and the authority will have no power to appoint an Authorized Controller in such circumstances while exercising his power under U.P. Act No. 24 of 1971. The Court clearly found that the order dated 25.2.2008 appointing the Authorized Controller under the aforesaid circumstances was clearly illegal and has set aside the said order. Once, the order appointing the Authorized Controller was set aside in the Special Appeal on 8.4.2008, there was no occasion for any authority to insist on the order dated 25.2.2008 to continue to operate and no authority could interfere in the functioning of the Committee of Management of the Institution by virtue of such order dated 25.2.2008. The order of the High Court was very specific and there can be no question of two interpretations possible. 26. The order of the High Court was very specific and there can be no question of two interpretations possible. 26. The O.P. No. 1 Sri Ravindra Singh has clearly stated in his affidavit that he received a copy of the order on 18.4.2008 and a certified copy of the order of the High Court on or about 17.5.2008. From that date, he could not direct or insist upon the Authorized Controller to continue to function in place of the Committee of Management. He could not also take over the functions of the Committee of Management by ordering single operation of the account for the purpose of payment of salary of the employees unless the Committee of Management had failed in its duty to take action for making such payments. The order dated 2.5.2008 was passed by him directing single operation of the account for the reason that the salary of the teaching and non-teaching staff of the Institution for the month of March and April 2008 had not been paid. Admittedly, the salary of such persons for the month of March 2008 was required to be paid by the Authorized Controller who was actually functioning by virtue of his appointment under the order dated 25.2.2008 which has not been set aside prior to 8.4.2008. Therefore, the O.P. No. 1 cannot and has not taken a plea that the Committee of Management had defaulted in making payment of salary to the teaching and non-teaching staff of the institution for the month of March 2008. The fault, if any, was with the Authorized Controller by not taking action for making the payment. Consequently, insofar as the salary for the month of March 2008 was concerned, the same was required to be paid by the authority competent and at that time it was not the Committee of Management which was responsible. When on 8.4.2008, the High Court directed that the respondents will not interfere in the functioning of the Committee of Management of the Institution and quashed the order of appointment of Authorized Controller, the Committee of Management was the only authority under the Act to ensure payment of salary of teaching and non-teaching staff of the institutions. When on 8.4.2008, the High Court directed that the respondents will not interfere in the functioning of the Committee of Management of the Institution and quashed the order of appointment of Authorized Controller, the Committee of Management was the only authority under the Act to ensure payment of salary of teaching and non-teaching staff of the institutions. In case, the Authorized Controller had not ensured payment of salary for the month of March 2008, then after 8.4.2008, it was only the Committee of Management of the Institution which could legally forward the bills for payment of salary. The non-payment of salary for the month of March 2008 or even for the month of April 2008 was not a default committed by the Committee of Management of the Institution because the opposite parties did not hand over the charge to the Committee of Management immediately upon passing of the judgment dated 8.4.2008 by the Special Appeal Bench. Therefore, the District Inspector of Schools (O.P. No. 1) had no authority to exercise his powers under U.P. Act No. 24 of 1971 for the purpose of paying the salary to the teaching and non-teaching staff of the institution by holding that the Management had committed a default by not paying the salary for the month of March 2008. Any such reason given by O.P. No. 1 in his order of single operation of account passed on 2.5.2008 is clearly not acceptable, nor it is reasonable, nor it is justiciable and is clearly in violation of the directions of the High Court. This was not a genuine case where any such requirement was made out to exercise this power under U.P. Act No. 24 of 1971. 27. As far as the direction issued by the O.P. No. 1 on 2.5.2008 for single operation of the account to pay the salary of the teaching and non-teaching staff of the institution for the month of April 2008 is concerned, it is quite apparent from his affidavit that he received certified copy of the order dated 8.4.2008 passed by the Special Appeal Bench on or about 17.5.2008. Therefore, his defence at the most can be that when on 2.5.2008 the salary of the employees of the institution for the month of April 2008 had not been paid, he was authorized to exercise his powers under U.P. Act No. 24 of 1971. Therefore, his defence at the most can be that when on 2.5.2008 the salary of the employees of the institution for the month of April 2008 had not been paid, he was authorized to exercise his powers under U.P. Act No. 24 of 1971. Such a reason has to be tested in view of the directions issued in the Special Appeal by this Court. Admittedly, the Special Appeal Court quashed the order of appointment of Authorized Controller. The Authorized Controller could not function thereafter. According to the Authorized Controller, he did not function thereafter by passing any orders or taking any action on behalf of the Committee of Management. The High Court also restrained the respondents from interfering in the functioning of the Committee of Management. The opposite parties were required to comply with the directions of the High Court. It is clearly stated by O.P. No. 1 in his affidavit that he received a photostat copy of the judgment dated 8.4.2008 passed in Special Appeal on 18.4.2008 and on 23.4.2008, he wrote to the Joint Director (Education), 7th Region, Gorakhpur seeking appropriate directions. From the aforesaid averments, it is quite clear that O.P. No. 1 received a photostat copy of the order dated 8.4.2008 passed by this Court much prior to issuing the order dated 2.5.2008 directing single operation of the account. In case, O.P. No. 1 was of the view that he cannot act upon only on a photostat copy of the High Court’s order and he required the management to furnish a certified copy of the order of the High Court to him, there was no occasion for him to write to the Joint Director (Education), 7th Region, Gorakhpur on 23.4.2008 because according to him, the certified copy of the order of the High Court was served upon him on or about 17.5.2008. From the aforesaid circumstances stated by O.P. No. 1 in his affidavit, it is abundantly clear that he was in the knowledge of the order dated 8.4.2008 passed by the Special Appeal Bench much prior to the date he issued the order for single operation of the account under U.P. Act No. 24 of 1971. The conduct of O.P. No. 1 has to be seen and found on the aforesaid circumstances stated by him in his affidavit. 28. The conduct of O.P. No. 1 has to be seen and found on the aforesaid circumstances stated by him in his affidavit. 28. This Court finds that O.P. No. 1 was informed about the passing of the judgement dated 8.4.2008 by the High Court. As has already been detailed above that the Committee of Management was not at all in default for making payment of salary of teaching and non-teaching staff of the institution for the month of March 2008 since the Authorized Controller was performing the functions of the Committee of Management by an order passed by the authority concerned and he had not handed over charge till July 2008. The salary for the month of April 2008 fell due only after 30.4.2008 and on 30.4.2008 the order of appointing the Authorized Controller had already been quashed by the High Court by the order dated 8.4.2008. The District Inspector of Schools had no authority to interfere in the functions of the Committee of Management with regard to the powers vested in the Committee of Management under the U.P. Act No. 24 of 1971. The Act provided that an order can be passed for single operation of the account only upon the Committee of Management committing a default in payment of salary. Admittedly, O.P. No. 1 did not require the Authorized Controller to hand over the functions to Committee of Management prior to his order dated 2.5.2008 although the High Court had already quashed the appointment of Authorized Controller on 8.4.2008. The O.P. No. 1 appears to have exercised the power under U.P. Act No. 24 of 1971 without any default committed by the Committee of Management of the Institution and it was not a case where a genuine requirement was made out to exercise such power. In fact, in the circumstances which have come on record, it was O.P. No. 1 himself who insisted on not handing over charge to the Committee of Management by his conduct of taking shelter by saying that he had sought appropriate directions from the higher authorities. In fact, in the circumstances which have come on record, it was O.P. No. 1 himself who insisted on not handing over charge to the Committee of Management by his conduct of taking shelter by saying that he had sought appropriate directions from the higher authorities. The aforesaid conduct of O.P. No. 1 appears to clearly indicate without any element of doubt that he would not act upon the directions of the High Court but would seek appropriate directions from his senior authorities and the order dated 2.5.2008 passed by him clearly indicates that since the Joint Director (Education), 7th Region, Gorakhpur has not responded to his queries regarding the order of the High Court, he is exercising his power under U.P. Act No. 24 of 1971 for ordering single operation of the account of the institution. The aforesaid reasons are clearly the firm view taken by the District Inspector of Schools (O.P. No. 1) and his action subsequent to the directions issued by the Special Appeal Bench have to be assessed on that basis for the purpose of recording a finding as to whether he has committed wilful and deliberate disobedience of the order of the High Court or it is a disobedience which is unintentional due to carelessness, negligence or bonafide. 29. When an authority is in the knowledge of directions issued by the High Court and it is required to comply with the directions issued by the High Court it has to read the order of the High Court and understand its meaning. In case by going through the order of the Court there are two views possible which can be taken, then, one such view taken by the authority can be a ground for making a defence in reply to the notice issued under the Contempt of Courts Act. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has laid down the law that where two views are possible and one view has been taken by the authority, then it cannot be said that there was a wilful or deliberate disobedience of the order of the Court by the said authority. 30. In the present case, the directions issued by the Special Appeal Bench are quite clear. The order dated 25.2.2008 appointing the Authorized Controller has been set aside. There can be no two views possible in reading the said direction where the order has been set aside. 30. In the present case, the directions issued by the Special Appeal Bench are quite clear. The order dated 25.2.2008 appointing the Authorized Controller has been set aside. There can be no two views possible in reading the said direction where the order has been set aside. There can be no other view taken by the authority to plead that although the order appointing the Authorized Controller has been set aside by the High Court, the Authorized Controller can continue to function even thereafter for any reason whatsoever. The reasons for permitting the Authorized Controller to function even after his appointment had been quashed by the High Court can be varied. There can be a plea that handing over and taking over charge involves legitimacy of such action and it takes time. But that reason cannot be held to be one of the two views possible upon the quashing of the order appointing the Authorized Controller. Therefore, there can be no successful defence by the opposite parties by stating that when the Special Appeal Bench quashed the order dated 25.2.2008 whereby the Authorized Controller had been appointed, he could take another possible view for not obeying the direction of the High Court. The direction of the High Court also was that the authority shall not interfere in the functioning of the Committee of Management. The said direction was passed on 8.4.2008 by the Special Appeal Bench. The functions of the Committee of Management of the Institution is to be carried out in accordance with law. Admittedly, the High Court found that superceding of the Committee of Management by the order dated 25.2.2008 was without the authority of law. The High Court recorded that any grievance of an employee relating to his non-promotion is not a ground for exercising powers by the authority under U.P. Act No. 24 of 1971. The Committee of Management was required to function and the opposite party was restrained from interfering therein. Can there be two views possible on the said direction? The answer to this question is an empathetic ‘No’. The O.P. No. 1 has deliberately not complied with the aforesaid direction of the High Court and no defence much less a valid defence has been taken by him even on the ground that two views were possible. 31. Can there be two views possible on the said direction? The answer to this question is an empathetic ‘No’. The O.P. No. 1 has deliberately not complied with the aforesaid direction of the High Court and no defence much less a valid defence has been taken by him even on the ground that two views were possible. 31. The explanation given in the affidavit by O.P. No. 1 appears to be is a routine action taken by him seeking approval of his higher authorities. The order of the High Court has to be complied and it cannot be disobeyed unless set aside, recalled or modified. Admittedly, no appeal was filed against the order dated 8.4.2008 passed in Special Appeal No. 507 of 2008. Admittedly, there was no restraint for enforcing of the order dated 8.4.2008 passed by the Special Appeal Bench. The order required compliance. The order, if not complied with, would invite issue of notice under the Contempt of Courts Act. Non-compliance of the directions of the High Court would be a disobedience and whether it will be a simpliciter disobedience due to valid explanations or it will be wilful and deliberate disobedience, has to be recorded by the Court in its contempt jurisdiction. 32. In the facts and circumstances of the present case and on the basis of the affidavit filed by O.P. No. 1, it is quite clear that he was aware of the passing of the order dated 8.4.2008 in Special Appeal No. 507 of 2008 on 18.4.2008 when a photostat copy of the said order was served upon him. If he doubted the genuineness of the photostat copy of the order of the High Court, there was no occasion for him to seek appropriate directions from his senior authorities forthwith on 23.4.2008. The said action of the opposite party clearly indicates that he believed the applicant when photostat copy of the order of the High Court was produced before him. O.P. No. 1 proceeded in pursuance of the photostat copy of the order of the High Court. It therefore, cannot be said in his defence that since certified copy of the order was not supplied by the parties, he was not required to take any action only on the basis of a photostat copy of the order of the High Court. It therefore, cannot be said in his defence that since certified copy of the order was not supplied by the parties, he was not required to take any action only on the basis of a photostat copy of the order of the High Court. The aforesaid averments made in the affidavit of O.P. No. 1 clearly indicates that he took steps in pursuance of the photostat copy of the order of the High Court supplied to him. Once he was of the firm view that he should take directions from his higher authorities on the said order of the High Court, he was also required to form his opinion regarding compliance of such order. According to him, the certified copy of the order was served upon him on 17.5.2008 prior to which he had passed the order dated 2.5.2008 ordering single operation of the account. In case his defence was that the photostat copy of the order of the High Court did not require him to take notice of it, then he should not have proceeded to seek appropriate directions from the senior authorities by his letter dated 23.4.2008. This admitted circumstance proves that he had knowledge of the contents of the order dated 8.4.2008 passed by the High Court and eve then he defied it by passing the order dated 2.5.2008. The aforesaid conduct of O.P. No. 1 clearly establishes that the passing of the order dated 2.5.2008 by O.P. No. 1 was not only a disobedience of the directions issued by the High Court but it was a conscious decision taken by him which would come within the definition of Section 2(b) of the Contempt of Courts Act and would be a wilful and deliberate disobedience of the directions of the High Court. 33. When a wilful and deliberate disobedience is found to have been committed by a party, then whether a unconditional apology given in the affidavit can be considered by the Contempt Court for the purpose of not punishing such a contemner under the Act? The Hon’ble Apex Court has held that even after contempt notice is issued and the authority thereafter complies with the directions of the Court, then the Courts should show grace and hesitate to punish the person. 34. The Hon’ble Apex Court has held that even after contempt notice is issued and the authority thereafter complies with the directions of the Court, then the Courts should show grace and hesitate to punish the person. 34. In the case of L.D. Jaikwal v. State of U.P., (1984) 3 SCC 405 the Honble Supreme Court laid down that an apology tendered by a contemner should be accepted as an exception and not as a rule in every case. There is a distinction between a formal paper apology and an apology where remorse has genuinely been shown by the contemner. 35. In Prairu C. Shah v. K.A. Mohd. Ali and another, (2001) 8 SCC 650 it was held that in order for the contemner to purge himself, it would involve a cleaning process as of made through an expression of sincere remorse coupled with penance requited. Even if a person is convicted and undergoes punishment or pays fine, the process of purging himself of contempt would not be complete unless the expression of remorse is sincere. 36. In Rajendra Sail v. M.P. High Court Bar Association and another, (2005) 6 SCC 109 it was laid down that the principles relating to law of contempt exercise of this power is not to vindicate the dignity and honour of the individual judge but it is to uphold the majesty of the law and of the administration of justice. 37. The law is therefore quite clear that when a wilful and deliberate contempt has been committed and a finding is recorded by the Court against a person, then the circumstance that contemner has complied with the direction after issue of contempt notice would not in any way require the Courts to show grace and magnanimity. Compliance of the order of the Court after issue of contempt notice or delayed compliance may not invite penal action under the Act but wilful and deliberate disobedience committed and then compliance is made would not be on the same footing. Awarding of inadequate punishment or no punishment at all in proved cases of wilful and deliberate contempt would amount to a failure of the justice delivery system. 38. Having found that O.P. No. 1 has wilfully and deliberately disobeyed the directions issued by this Court on 8.4.2008 in Special Appeal No. 507 of 2008, the question of apology requires to be considered. 38. Having found that O.P. No. 1 has wilfully and deliberately disobeyed the directions issued by this Court on 8.4.2008 in Special Appeal No. 507 of 2008, the question of apology requires to be considered. The only circumstance which has been given in the affidavit filed by O.P. No. 1 is that subsequent to issue of notice by the Contempt Court, he has complied with the directions of the High Court by his order dated 9.7.2008. The reason for passing the order dated 9.7.2008 as given by the O.P. No. 1 in his affidavit is that he received appropriate directions from the Joint Director (Education), 7th Region, Gorakhpur on 7.7.2008. The aforesaid reason clearly indicates that the order dated 9.7.2008 was passed by him on the directions issued by his senior authorities. The order dated 9.7.2008 was not passed in obedience of the High Court’s directions since he himself states that upon appropriate directions being received from his senior authorities, he has passed the said order. Under these circumstances, is it a compliance of the directions of the High Court by the O.P. No. 1 or is it compliance of the directions of the High Court by the O.P. No. 1 only on the appropriate directions issued by his senior authorities? It is quite clear from the record that prior to receiving the the appropriate directions from the senior authorities, the O.P. No. 1 was not obeying the order of the High Court. Therefore, although it has been recorded that the O.P. No. 2, for the reasons given by him in his affidavit, has not disobeyed the directions of the High Court, it has to be recorded that the O.P. No. 1 was obstinate, firm and deliberate in not complying with the directions of the High Court till he received green signal from his senior authorities. These facts indicate that the O.P. No. 1 does not hold the High Court in high esteem as has been claimed by him in his affidavit. The O.P. No. 1 appears to be of the firm view to follow the directions of his higher authorities in the hierarchy of officers above him or at least to take shelter from them to violate Court orders and the High Court may keep on passing orders, but he would not comply with them unless his senior officer gives directions. The O.P. No. 1 appears to be of the firm view to follow the directions of his higher authorities in the hierarchy of officers above him or at least to take shelter from them to violate Court orders and the High Court may keep on passing orders, but he would not comply with them unless his senior officer gives directions. This is exactly what has happened in the present case. 39. Under such circumstances, the unconditional apology tendered by the O.P. No. 1 is only cosmetic, it has no element of moral rectification or sincere remorse in his attitude and is not a sincere apology given to the High Court. This Court cannot accept such a shallow paper apology given in the affidavit as a routine manner when the conduct in itself indicates that the O.P. No. 1 has deliberately and wilfully disobeyed the directions of the High Court. Civil contempt can be made out only if there is an element of deliberate, wilful and intentional disobedience. The ingredients to record a finding of civil contempt are quite different from the ingredients required to record finding of criminal contempt. This Court is dealing with civil contempt alleged to have been committed by the opposite parties. The finding is that the O.P. No. 1 has wilfully, deliberately and intentionally disobeyed the judgment dated 8.4.2008 passed in Special Appeal No. 507 of 2008. For the aforesaid reasons, the apology, unconditional or otherwise tendered by O.P. No. 1 cannot be accepted and he requires to be punished under the Contempt of Courts Act. 40. In so far as the Opposite Party No. 2 is concerned, the facts of this case indicate that there has been a delay of his part to issue the necessary directions to the Opposite Party No. 1 for compliance of the order dated 8.4.2008 passed by this Court. There is no material on record to indicate that the Opposite Party No. 2 had at any stage even shown any intention, much less willful or deliberate, not to comply with the directions of this Court. There is no material on record to indicate that the Opposite Party No. 2 had at any stage even shown any intention, much less willful or deliberate, not to comply with the directions of this Court. The Opposite party No. 2 was required by the Opposite Party No. 1 to issue suitable directions in light of the order of the High Court since the Opposite Party No. 2 was the Chairman of the regional level committee which had issued the direction for superseding the committee of management of the institution and appointing authorized controller. The Opposite Party No. 2 appears to have been the competent authority for passing of such an order. Naturally since the Opposite Party No. 1 was not the competent authority or even a superior authority to the Opposite Party No. 2, he could not supersede any order passed by the Opposite Party No. 2. Of course, the directions of the Opposite Party No. 2 issued on 7.7.2008 were irrelevant since the High Court in its judgment dated 8.4.2008 had already quashed the order dated 25.2.2008 passed by the Opposite Party No. 2 in his capacity as head of the regional committee. Therefore when the order dated 25.2.2008 had been quashed by the High Court, there was no occasion for the Opposite Party No. 2 to issue any clarificatory direction to the District Inspector of Schools relating to the order dated 25.2.2008 passed by the Opposite Party No. 2. As such in so far as the Opposite Party No. 2 is concerned, the defence taken by him in his reply to the charge as also in view of the contents of his letter dated 7.7.2008, it cannot be said that he had in any manner wilfully or deliberately not complied with the order dated 8.4.2008 passed by this Court. As such in so far as the Opposite Party No. 2 is concerned, the defence taken by him in his reply to the charge as also in view of the contents of his letter dated 7.7.2008, it cannot be said that he had in any manner wilfully or deliberately not complied with the order dated 8.4.2008 passed by this Court. The charge that he was sitting over the matter and deliberately delayed in issuing consequential direction to the subordinate authority and not taking any action within a reasonable time has been explained by him in his affidavit to state that the certified copy of the order of the High Court was made available to him on 21.5.2008 and according to his explanation given in Paragraph 11 of his affidavit, his daughter was to undergo surgery at Lucknow and he had to devote substantial time to his daughter and hence could not discharge his function in a normal manner because of mental and physical strain, appears to be a defence taken which can be believed. Admittedly from 26.6.2008, he was on transfer from Gorakhpur to Azamgarh and upon cancellation of his transfer order he joined at Gorakhpur again on 5.7.2008. Therefore the period between 26.6.2008 to 5.7.2008, he did not function as a competent authority at Gorakhpur. He has issued the directions immediately thereafter on 7.7.2008 and brought it to the notice of the contempt Court in his first affidavit of compliance filed on 15.7.2008. In view of the aforesaid circumstances, this Court cannot record a finding or hold that the Opposite Party No. 2 has wilfully and deliberately delayed issuing appropriate directions and hence it cannot be said that he is liable to be punished for contempt in these proceedings. 41. In so far as the Opposite Part No. 3 Sri Sanjay Shukla is concerned, he was appointed as authorized controller of the institution by the order of the Opposite Party No. 2 on 1.4.2008. In his affidavit, he has clearly stated that he has not taken any action, decision or passed any order in his capacity as authorized controller after receipt of the order of the High Court by him. In his affidavit, he has clearly stated that he has not taken any action, decision or passed any order in his capacity as authorized controller after receipt of the order of the High Court by him. He has stated that even the payment of salary for the months of March and April 2008 of teaching and non-teaching staff of the institution was not made by him but it was the Opposite Party No. 1 (District Inspector of Schools) who had passed the order dated 2.5.2008 for single operation of account for the aforesaid purpose. There is no material on the record to indicate that the Opposite Party No. 3 continued to perform the functions as authorized controller by passing any orders or taking any action in his capacity as authorized controller after 8.4.2008. It therefore appears that if he has not performed any function of authorized controller during the said period, the only act of disobedience that can be alleged against him is of not handing over charge to the committee of management immediately after coming to know about the order dated 8.4.2008 passed by the High Court. The appointment of the authorized controller was made under the provision of U.P. Act No. 24 of 1971 and therefore once such order made under the said Act was quashed by the High Court the Opposite Party No. 3 could not perform any function as authorized controller and since he has not performed any such function after passing of the order of the High Court, he cannot be held to be guilty of committing wilful and deliberate disobedience of the High Court’s order. Handing over charge to the committee of management is to be done in accordance with law since it requires legitimacy of charge being handed over in the proper manner and it cannot be said that after the directions of the High Court on 8.4.2008 and its service on the Opposite Party No. 3, he was required to silently walk away without handing over all the relevant charges taken by him by virtue of his appointment. The process of handing over charge is to be performed legitimately and in accordance with law. Therefore it cannot be said that by not handing over charge immediately to the committee of management, the Opposite Party No. 3 has wilfully and deliberately disobeyed the directions/order dated 8.4.2008 passed by this Court. 42. The process of handing over charge is to be performed legitimately and in accordance with law. Therefore it cannot be said that by not handing over charge immediately to the committee of management, the Opposite Party No. 3 has wilfully and deliberately disobeyed the directions/order dated 8.4.2008 passed by this Court. 42. For the aforesaid reasons, the notices issued to O.P. Nos. 2 and 3 are discharged, the charge framed against O.P. Nos. 2 and 3, namely, Sri Satish Chandra Srivastava and Sri Sanjay Shukla are dropped. 43. The O.P. No. 1 Sri Ravindra Singh is held liable to be punished under the Contempt of Courts Act and is awarded the punishment of seven days civil imprisonment and a penalty of Rs. 2,000/- which he shall deposit before the Registrar General of this Court within one month. The deposit so made will be released in favour of the applicants i.e. Committee of Management, Marwar Intermediate College, Gorakhpur. 44. The sentence however, shall remain suspended for a period of one month in view of his right to appeal against this order and in case this order is operative after expiry of one month from today, the O.P. No. 1 shall surrender before the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Gorakhpur who shall take him into custody to serve out his sentence. 45. This contempt petition is finally disposed of as above. 46. Let a copy of this order be placed before the Registrar General of this Court and a copy be sent to the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Gorakhpur. Certified copy of this order be made available to the parties on payment of charges as per rules within three days. ———