JUDGMENT By the Court.—The petitioners have filed the present writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, inter alia, praying for issuance of writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus commanding and directing the respondents to pay three months’ salary alongwith the allowances and interest thereon to the petitioners, and further for issuance of writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus commanding and directing the respondents to pay interest on the amount concerning gratuity, earned leave and encashment to the petitioners for delay period. 2. As per the averments made in the Writ Petition, the petitioners were senior employees/officers of M/s Project and Development India Ltd. (hereinafter also referred to as “the said Company” or “the PDIL”) at its NOIDA Office, District-Gautambudh Nagar; and that all the petitioners have served the said Company for about 30 years or more. 3. The respective posts held by the petitioners are mentioned in paragraph 3 of the Writ Petition while the respective Dates of Birth of the petitioners are mentioned in paragraph 4 of the Writ Petition. 4. It is, inter alia, further averred in the Writ Petition that the said Company is a Government of India undertaking and is under the administrative control of Ministry of Chemical and Fertilizer, Department of Fertilizer, Government of India; and that 100% shares of the said Company are owned by the President of India and the said Company is managed by the Chairman and Managing Director and Board of Directors appointed by the Government of India. 5. It is, inter alia, further averred in the Writ Petition that the said Company adopted the Rules and Regulations of the Fertilizer Corporation of India; and that as per Rule N0. 23, normal age of superannuation of the employees was 58 years. 6. 5. It is, inter alia, further averred in the Writ Petition that the said Company adopted the Rules and Regulations of the Fertilizer Corporation of India; and that as per Rule N0. 23, normal age of superannuation of the employees was 58 years. 6. It is, inter alia, further averred in the Writ Petition that the Government of India raised the retirement age of its employees (Central) from 58 years to 60 years; and that the said Company by its Circular dated 25.8.1998 adopted the said directive of the Government of India in the meeting of the Board of Directors held on 28/29.5.1998 and raised the retirement age of its employees from 58 years to 60 years; and that accordingly, the aforesaid Rule No. 23 of the Fertilizer Corporation of India Services Rules as adopted by the Board of Directors of the said Company stood deleted, and the same was substituted by a new Rule No. 23 wherein, it was, inter alia, provided that the normal age of superannuation of the employees would be 60 years. 7. Copy of the said Circular dated 25.8.1998, which also contained the substituted Rule No. 23, has been filed as Annexure-1 to the Writ Petition. 8. It is, inter alia, further averred in the Writ Petition that the said substituted Rule No. 23 came into effect with effect from 28/29.5.1998; and that accordingly in the case of all the employees of the said Company working on 28/29.5.1998, their retirement age was raised from 58 years to 60 years; and that all the petitioners on 28/29.5.1998 were less than 58 years of age, and hence their superannuation age was automatically revised from 58 years to 60 years. 9. It is, inter alia, further averred in the Writ Petition that the said Company revised its policy with respect to the retirement age of its employees by its Circular No. PDIL/CPA/23/Govt. dated 30.3.2001 and reverted back again to its old policy of the retirement age on the attainment of the age of 58 years with effect from 2.4.2001. Accordingly, the aforesaid substituted Rule No. 23 was again amended, and it was provided that the normal superannuation age of the employees would be 58 years. 10. Copy of the said Circular dated 30.3.2001 containing the said amended Rule No. 23 also has been filed as Annexure-2 to the Writ Petition. 11. Accordingly, the aforesaid substituted Rule No. 23 was again amended, and it was provided that the normal superannuation age of the employees would be 58 years. 10. Copy of the said Circular dated 30.3.2001 containing the said amended Rule No. 23 also has been filed as Annexure-2 to the Writ Petition. 11. It is, inter alia, further averred in the Writ Petition that on the basis of the said Circular dated 30.3.2001 the said Company issued a Memorandum No. PD/PERS/Ret.(2001)/752 dated 5.4.2001, inter alia, intimating the employees mentioned in the said Memorandum including the petitioners that they would be relieved of their duties with effect from 30.4.2001 on attaining the age of superannuation of 58 years. 12. Copy of the said Circular dated 5.4.2001 has been filed as Annexure-3 to the Writ Petition. 13. It is, inter alia, further averred in the Writ Petition that the intimation/notice given to the petitioners by the said Memorandum dated 5.4.2001 was of less than one month; and that the petitioners made representations to the said Company that if an employee was to be given premature retirement, he was to be given three months’ notice, or in lieu of notice, he was to be given three months’ salary alongwith the allowances. 14. Copies of the said representations have been filed as Annexures 4 and 5a to 5d to the Writ Petition. 15. The Writ Petition also makes reference to Rule 27-A of the PDIL Employees (Conduct, Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1987, which provides for premature retirement. 16. A Supplementary Affidavit, sworn on 25.5.2004, was also filed on behalf of the petitioners. Counter affidavit on behalf of the respondent Nos. 2 and 3 and the rejoinder affidavit on behalf of the petitioners have also been filed. 17. In the counter affidavit, filed on behalf of the respondent Nos. 16. A Supplementary Affidavit, sworn on 25.5.2004, was also filed on behalf of the petitioners. Counter affidavit on behalf of the respondent Nos. 2 and 3 and the rejoinder affidavit on behalf of the petitioners have also been filed. 17. In the counter affidavit, filed on behalf of the respondent Nos. 1 and 2, it is, inter alia, stated that there is no question of premature retirement involved in the present Writ Petition; and that the present case is a case of normal retirement after attaining the age of superannuation; and that under Rule 27-A of the Employees (Conduct, Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1987, the said Company has absolute right to retire any employee on attaining the age of 50/55 years by giving him three months’ notice or three months’ pay and allowances in lieu of such notice; and that the petitioners were not coming under the purview of the said age group, and the said Rules, 1987; and that in fact, the petitioners stood automatically retired on attaining the age of normal superannuation, i.e., 58 years by virtue of the amendment in the aforesaid Rule 23 of the Service Rules of the said Company; and that the provision of Rule 27-A of the said Rules, 1987 was not applicable and the petitioners were not entitled to any notice or pay in lieu of the notice. 18. It is, inter alia, further stated in the counter affidavit that the extension of age made earlier was not beneficial and the Services Rules of the said Company were amended in accordance with the policy of the said Company and as per the guidelines of the Government of India; and that by Circular dated 30.3.2001, the said Company rolled-back again to its old policy of retirement age on attaining the age of 58 years with effect from 2.4.2001. 19. It is, inter alia, further stated in the said counter affidavit that over a period of time when the said Company faced with financial hardship and cash crunch problems, the Management of the said Company started facing severe criticism on account of enhancement of age of retirement of the employees from 58 years to 60 years ; and that the aforesaid amendment of rolling-back from 60 years to 58 years was made due to popular demands of various Unions and Associations viz. All India PDIL Coordination Committee; Sindri- NOIDA - Baroda - Calcutta, PDIL Employees’ Union and PDIL Officers’ Association, NOIDA; and that the said decision was in the general interest of the said Company as well as its employees. 20. In reply to the said counter affidavit, rejoinder affidavit has been filed on behalf of the petitioners. 21. We have heard Shri A.B.L. Gaur, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners, and perused the record. None appeared on behalf of the respondents. 22. Shri A.B.L. Gaur has made the following submissions : (1) The amendment in Rule 23 reducing the age from 60 years to 58 years could not be given retrospective operation. Reliance has been placed on the following decisions : (i) P.D. Aggarwal and others v. State of U.P. and others, AIR 1987 SC 1676 . (ii) Ex-Capt. K.C. Arora and another v. State of Haryana and others, AIR 1987 SC 1858 . (iii) K. Narayanan and others v. State of Karnataka and others, AIR 1994 SC 55 . (2) In case the respondents wanted to retire the petitioners, they could do so only after following the procedure prescribed in Rule 27-A regarding premature retirement. This having not been done, the order of retirement in respect of the petitioners is vitiated. 23. In order to appreciate the submissions made by Shri A.B.L. Gaur, learned Senior Counsel, it is necessary to refer to the relevant Rules applicable to the employees of the said Company. 24. Rule No. 23, as it stood at the time of its adoption, is reproduced below : “Rule No. 23 : The normal superannuation age of all regular employees of the Corporation will be 58 years. However, extension upto 60 (sixty) years will be permissible at the discretion of the Management subject to the medical fitness. The extension upto 60 years will be granted on year to year basis. General Managers will have the power to grant extension in case of all employees in the scale maximum of which does not exceed Rs. 1870/- while in other cases the extension shall be granted by the Managing Director only.” 25. It will, thus, be seen that under the said Rule No. 23, as it stood at the time of its adoption, the normal superannuation age of all regular employees of the said Company (PDIL) was 58 years. 1870/- while in other cases the extension shall be granted by the Managing Director only.” 25. It will, thus, be seen that under the said Rule No. 23, as it stood at the time of its adoption, the normal superannuation age of all regular employees of the said Company (PDIL) was 58 years. However, extension upto 60 years was permissible at the discretion of the Management subject to the medical fitness. 26. The aforesaid Rule No. 23 was substituted by a new Rule No. 23 with effect from 28/29.5.1998 when the said Company adopted the directive of the Government of India in the meeting of the Board of Directors held on 28/29.5.1998 and raised the normal age of superannuation of its employees from 58 years to 60 years. Circular dated 25.8.1998 issued in this regard, as noted above, has been filed as Annexure-1 to the Writ Petition. The said substituted Rule No. 23, as contained in the said Circular dated 25.8.1998, is quoted below : “Rule No. 23.—Age of superannuation.—The normal superannuation age of employees will be 60 years. There shall be no extension beyond the age of 60 years of superannuation under any circumstances whatsoever.” 27. It will, thus, be seen that under the newly substituted Rule No. 23, the normal age of superannuation of the employees was 60 years. It was further provided that there would be no extension beyond the age of 60 years of superannuation under any circumstances whatsoever. 28. The aforesaid newly substituted Rule No. 23 was again amended with effect from 2.4.2001 pursuant to the decision of the Board of Directors for rolling back the normal age of superannuation from 60 years to 58 years as contained in the Circular dated 30.3.2001 (Annexure-2 to the Writ Petition). Relevant portion of the said Circular dated 30.3.2001 which also contains the amended Rule No. 23, is quoted below : “C I R C U L A R Sub : Rolling back of age of retirement of below Board level employees of the company from 60 to 58 years. PDIL Board in its 153rd meeting held on 15.3.2000 and 161st meeting held on 24th March, 2001 has approved rolling back of the age of retirement of below Board level employees of PDIL from 60 to 58 years with effect from 2nd April, 2001. PDIL Board in its 153rd meeting held on 15.3.2000 and 161st meeting held on 24th March, 2001 has approved rolling back of the age of retirement of below Board level employees of PDIL from 60 to 58 years with effect from 2nd April, 2001. Accordingly, Rule No. 23 of FCI Service Rules as adopted by Board of Directors of PDIL vide Item No. 4 in its 6th meeting held on 30.6.1978, and substituted vide Circular No. PDIL/CPA/23/Govt. dated 25th August, 1998, hereby stand amended to be read as under : “Rule No. 23- Age of Superannuation The normal superannuation age of employees will be 58 years.” The above decision comes into force with effect from 2nd April, 2001 for all the below Board level employees of the company and shall be implemented as under : (1) The employees who have already attained or will be attaining 58 years of age on or after 2nd April, 2001 i.e. during the month of April, 2001 shall retire from the services of the company on 30.4.2001. (2) The employees who will be attaining normal superannuation age of 58 years on 1st of any month on or after 1.5.2001, shall retire on the last day of the previous month. (3) The employees who will be attaining normal superannuation age of 58 years between 2nd and the last day of any month (both days inclusive) on or after 2.5.2001 shall retire on the last day of the respective month. This issues with approval of the competent authority.” Thus, under the amended Rule No. 23, the normal superannuation age of the employees of the said Company would be 58 years. Clause-1 of the said Circular provides that “the employees who have already attained or will be attaining 58 years of age on or after 2nd April, 2001 i.e. during the month of April, 2001 shall retire from the services of the company on 30.4.2001”. From the averments made in paragraph 4 of the Writ Petition regarding the respective dates of birth of the petitioners, it is evident that the petitioners attained the age of 58 years on various dates during the period from June, 1999 to April, 2001. Hence, in view of the aforesaid amended Rule No. 23, the petitioners retired from the services of the said Company on 30.4.2001. Hence, in view of the aforesaid amended Rule No. 23, the petitioners retired from the services of the said Company on 30.4.2001. Rule 27-A of the PDIL Employees (Conduct, Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1987 deals with premature retirement, and the said Rule is as under : “27-A. Premature Retirement.—The Competent authority, shall, if it is of the opinion that it is in the public interest so to do, have the absolute right to retire any employee(s) of the Company on attaining the age of 50/55 years by giving him notice of not less than 3 months in writing or 3 months’ pay and allowances in lieu of such notice.” 29. Thus, Rule 27-A deals with the absolute right of the competent authority to retire any employee(s) of the Company on attaining the age of 50/55 years by giving him notice of not less than three months in writing or 3 months’ pay and allowances in lieu of such notice. The competent authority may exercise this power if it is of the opinion that it is in the public interest so to do. 30. A bare reading of Rule 27-A shows that it applies where the competent authority of the Company decides to exercise its right to retire any employee of the Company on attaining the age of 50/55 years. The said Rule 27-A has no application where an employee retires on attaining the normal age of superannuation. The retirement on attaining the normal age of superannuation is automatic, and is dealt with in the aforesaid Rule No. 23 of the Service Rules. 31. In our opinion, the words ‘premature retirement’ occurring in Rule 27-A of the said Rules, 1987, clearly show that the retirement is being done prior to attaining the normal age of superannuation, and in such a case, the requirement of giving three months’ notice in writing or paying three months’ pay and allowances in lieu of such notice, is to be fulfilled. Rule No. 27-A of the said Rules, 1987 has no application when an employee automatically retires on attaining the normal age of superannuation as per his date of birth. The normal age of superannuation of the employees of the PDIL has been provided for in the aforesaid Rule No. 23 of the Service Rules. Rule No. 27-A of the said Rules, 1987 has no application when an employee automatically retires on attaining the normal age of superannuation as per his date of birth. The normal age of superannuation of the employees of the PDIL has been provided for in the aforesaid Rule No. 23 of the Service Rules. In case of such an automatic retirement on attaining the age of superannuation, there is no question of giving three months’ notice in writing or three months’ pay and allowances in lieu of such notice as provided in Rule 27-A of the said Rules of 1987. 32. Accordingly, we are of the opinion that in view of the amended Rule No. 23 of the Service Rules, which was made effective with effect from 2.4.2001, the petitioners retired on attaining the age of superannuation on 30.4.2001 in view of Clause-1 of the said Circular dated 30.3.2001, and the said Company was not required to give any notice or salary and allowances in lieu of such notice, as provided in Rule 27-A of the said Rules, 1987 to the petitioners. The submissions made by Shri A.B.L. Gaur, learned Senior Counsel in this regard, cannot, in our view, be accepted. 33. Coming now to the submission made by Shri A.B.L. Gaur, learned Senior Counsel that the amendment in Rule No. 23 reducing the age of superannuation from 60 years to 58 years, could not be given retrospective effect, it will be relevant to mention that the petitioners have not challenged the validity of the amended Rule No. 23 which was made effective with effect from 2.4.2001 rolling back the age of superannuation from 60 years to 58 years. What is being contended by the petitioners in the Writ Petition is that their retirement under the amended Rule No. 23 amounted to premature retirement under Rule 27-A of the PDIL Employees (Conduct, Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1987, and, therefore, they were entitled to three months’ notice or three months’ pay and allowances in lieu of such notice as provided in the said Rule No. 27-A. Accordingly, the petitioners have, inter alia, sought reliefs for three months’ salary alongwith the allowances and interest thereon and for payment of interest on the amount concerning gratuity, earned leave and encashment for the delay period. 34. 34. It is submitted by Shri A.B.L. Gaur, learned Senior Counsel that in view of the enhancement of age of superannuation from 58 years to 60 years with effect from 28/29.5.1998 by substituting new Rule No. 23 in the Service Rules, the petitioners got a vested right to continue upto the age of 60 years, and the said right could not be taken away by amending Rule No. 23 with effect from 2.4.2001 by giving the said amendment retrospective effect and making the same applicable to the petitioners. 35. We have considered the submissions made by Shri A.B.L. Gaur, learned Senior Counsel. The submissions give rise to the following questions : Question No. 1 : Whether the amended Rule No. 23, as contained in the Circular dated 30.3.2001, was retrospective in operation? Question No. 2 : Whether the petitioners had acquired any vested right to continue upto the age of 60 years in view of the new Rule No. 23 as substituted with effect from 28/29.5.1998 raising the normal age of superannuation from 58 years to 60 years? Question No. 3 : Even assuming that the amended Rule No. 23 was retrospective in operation and the petitioners had acquired any vested right to continue upto the age of 60 years, was the said right taken away in view of the clear intendment expressed in the Circular dated 30.3.2001? Question No. 1: As noted above, the amended Rule No. 23 as contained in the said Circular dated 30.3.2001 was made effective with effect from 2.4.2001, and the same was made applicable to the employees who had already attained 58 years of age before 2.4.2001 as well as the employees who would be attaining the age of 58 years on or after 2.4.2001, i.e., during the month of April, 2001, and all the said employees were to retire from the services of the Company on 30.4.2001. 36. It will, thus, be seen that no element of retrospectivity is involved in the said amendment made in Rule No. 23. 37. Reference in this regard may be made to certain judicial decisions. 38. In Bishun Narain Mishra v. State of U.P. and others, AIR 1965 SC 1567 , the appellant was in the service of the State of U.P. as Sub-Registrar. He was born on December 11, 1905 and was recruited in service in July, 1933. 37. Reference in this regard may be made to certain judicial decisions. 38. In Bishun Narain Mishra v. State of U.P. and others, AIR 1965 SC 1567 , the appellant was in the service of the State of U.P. as Sub-Registrar. He was born on December 11, 1905 and was recruited in service in July, 1933. At the time of his recruitment the age of retirement (or superannuation) for Government servants of his class was 55 years. Therefore, normally, he should have retired on December 11, 1960. But by a notification dated November 27, 1957, the Government of U.P. raised the age of retirement (or superannuation) to 58 years. This meant that the appellant would have retired on December 11, 1963. However, on May 25, 1961, the Government again reduced the age of retirement (or superannuation) to 55 years by a Notification of that date under Article 319 of the Constitution of India. Further, as this change in the age of retirement would have resulted in immediate retirement of all Government servants above the age of 55 years with consequent dislocation of public service, another order was issued by the Governor on the same date. The effect of this order was that all Government servants who would have retired because of the change in the age of retirement after May 25, 1961 and before December 30, 1961 were retained in service upto December 31, 1961 except those who reached the age of 58 years before December 31, 1961 in which case they were to retire at the age of 58 years. In consequence of this order, the appellant who had crossed the age of 55 years before May 25, 1961 but had not crossed the age of 57 years was retired on December 31, 1961, though if the earlier Rule of November 27, 1957 had continued, he would have retired on December 11, 1963. 39. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court dismissed the Appeal filed by the appellant, and held as under (paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 of the said AIR) : “5. The first question that arises is whether the rule of retirement by which the age of retirement was reduced to 55 years resulting in the retirement of public servants earlier than what was provided by the previously existing rule can be said to amount to removal within the meaning of Art. 311. The first question that arises is whether the rule of retirement by which the age of retirement was reduced to 55 years resulting in the retirement of public servants earlier than what was provided by the previously existing rule can be said to amount to removal within the meaning of Art. 311. Reliance in this connection has been placed on Moti Ram Deka v. General Manager, North Frontier Rly., AIR 1964 SC 600 . That case dealt with a rule in the Railway Code giving power to the Railway Administration to terminate the services of all permanent servants to whom the rule applied merely on giving notice for a specified period or on payment of salary in lieu thereof at any time during the service long before the age of retirement. It was held therein that the termination of a permanent public servant’s tenure which was authorised by the rule in question was nothing more nor less than removal from service within Art. 311 and, therefore, they were entitled to the protection of Art. 311(2). That case in our opinion has no application to the facts of the present case, for that case did not deal with any rule relating to age of retirement. Further it was made clear in that very case that a rule as to superannuation (retirement) or as to compulsory retirement shortly before the age of superannuation resulting in the termination of service of a public servant did not amount to removal. In the present case what has happened is that the Government first raised the age of retirement from 55 years to 58 years in the year 1957 and the appellant got the advantage of that inasmuch as he remained in service after December 11, 1960 on which date he would have otherwise retired on completing the age of 55 years. Thereafter in 1961, the Government seems to have changed its mind as to the age of superannuation and reduced it back again to 55 years. Even so the rule dealt with the age of superannuation and the termination of service on reaching the age of superannuation was held by the majority In Moti Ram Deka’s case, AIR 1964 SC 600 , as out of the application of Article 311. Even so the rule dealt with the age of superannuation and the termination of service on reaching the age of superannuation was held by the majority In Moti Ram Deka’s case, AIR 1964 SC 600 , as out of the application of Article 311. We have not been shown any provision which takes away the power of Government to increase or reduce the age of superannuation and, therefore, as the rule in question only dealt with the age of superannuation and the appellant had to retire because of the reduction in the age of superannuation it cannot be said that the termination of his service which thus came about was removal within the meaning of Article 311. The alteration in the circumstances of this case at least cannot be regarded as unreasonable. The argument that the termination of service resulting from change in the age of superannuation amounts to removal within the meaning of Art. 311 and, therefore, the necessary procedure for removal should have been followed is negatived by the very case on which the appellant relies. We, therefore, hold that Art. 311 has no application to the termination of service of the appellant in the present case. 6. The next contention on behalf of the appellant is that the rule is retrospective and that no retrospective rule can be made. As we read the rule we do not find any retrospectivity in it. All that the rule provides is that from the date it comes into force the age of retirement would be 55 years. It would, therefore, apply from that date to all Government servants, even though they may have been recruited before May 25, 1961 in the same way as the rule of 1957 which increased the age from 55 years to 58 years applied to all Government servants even though they were recruited before 1957. But it is urged that the proviso shows that the rule was applied retrospectively. We have already referred to the proviso which lays down that Government servants who had attained the age of 55 years on or before June 17, 1957 and had not attained the age of 58 years on May 25, 1961 would be deemed to have been retained in service after the date of superannuation, namely 55 years. We have already referred to the proviso which lays down that Government servants who had attained the age of 55 years on or before June 17, 1957 and had not attained the age of 58 years on May 25, 1961 would be deemed to have been retained in service after the date of superannuation, namely 55 years. This proviso in our opinion does not make the rule retrospective; it only provides as to how the period of service beyond 55 years should be treated in view of the earlier rule of 1957 which was being changed by the rule of 1961. Further the second order issued on the same day also clearly shows that there was no retrospective operation of the rule for in actual effect no Government servant was retired before the date of the new rule, i.e., May 25, 1961 and all of them were continued in service up to December 31, 1961 except those who completed the age of 58 years between May 25, 1961 and December 31, 1961 and were therefore, to retire on reaching the age of superannuation according to the old rule. We are, therefore of opinion that the new rule reducing the age of retirement from 58 years to 55 years cannot be said to be retrospective. The proviso to the new rule and the second notification are only methods to tide over the difficult situation which would arise in the public service if the new rule was applied at once and also to meet any financial objection arising out of the enforcement of the new rule. The new rule, therefore cannot be struck down on the ground that it is retrospective in operation. 7. The last argument that has been urged is, that the new rule is discriminatory as different public servants have in effect been retired at different ages. We see no force in this contention either. So far as the rule is concerned it applies equally to all public servants and fixes the age of retirement at 55 years. There is no discrimination in the rule itself. We see no force in this contention either. So far as the rule is concerned it applies equally to all public servants and fixes the age of retirement at 55 years. There is no discrimination in the rule itself. It is, however, urged that the second notification by which all public servants above the age of 55 years were required to retire on December 31, 1961 except those new who completed the age of 58 years between May 25, 1961 and December 31, 1961 shows that various public servants were retired at various ages ranging from 55 years and one day to upto 58 years. That certainly is the effect of the second order. But it is remarkable that the order also fixed the same date of retirement namely December 31, 1961 in the case of all public servants who had completed the age of 55 years but not the age of 58 years before December 31, 1961. In this respect also, therefore, there was no discrimination and all public servants who had completed the age of 55 years which was being introduced as the age of superannuation by the new rule by way of reduction were ordered to retire on the same date, namely, December 31, 1961. The result of this seems to be that the affected public servants retired at different ages. But this was not because they retired at different ages but because their services were retained for different periods after the age of fifty-five. Now it cannot be urged that if Government decides to retain the services of some public servants after the age of retirement it must retain every public servant for the same length of time. The retention of public servants after the period of retirement depends upon their efficiency and the exigencies of public service, and in the present case the difference in the period of retention has arisen on account of exigencies of public service. We are, therefore, of opinion that the second notification of May 25, 1961 on which reliance is placed to prove discrimination is really not discriminatory, for it has treated all public servants alike and fixed December 31, 1961 as the date of retirement for those who had completed 55 years but not 58 years up to December 31, 1961. The challenge, therefore, to the two notifications on the basis of Art. 14 must fail.” (Emphasis supplied) 40. The challenge, therefore, to the two notifications on the basis of Art. 14 must fail.” (Emphasis supplied) 40. The facts of the above case are thus similar to those of the present case. In the present case also the amended Rule No. 23 reducing the age of superannuation from 60 years to 58 years with effect from 2.4.2001 was made applicable to the employees who had already attained the age of 58 years on or after 2.4.2001 i.e. during the month of April, 2001, and all such employees were to retire from the services of the Company on 30.4.2001. Thus in actual effect all the employees of the said Company who had already attained the age of 58 years before the date on which the amended Rule No. 23 came into effect i.e. with effect from 2.4.2001 and who would have retired on 2.4.2001, were retained in service, and they were continued in service upto 30.4.2001. Therefore, in view of the above decision of the Supreme Court, the amended Rule No. 23 could not be said to be retrospective. 41. Further, the amended Rule No. 23 applied equally to all the employees of the said Company and fixed the age of retirement as 58 years. There was, thus, no discrimination in the Rule itself. Further, all the employees who had already attained the age of 58 years prior to 2.4.2001 were ordered to retire on the same date, namely, 30.4.2001. Again, all the employees who would be attaining 58 years’ of age on or after 2.4.2001 i.e. during the month of April, 2001 were ordered to be retired on the same date, namely, 30.4.2001. 42. In the circumstances, the amended Rule No. 23 could not be said to offend Article 14 of the Constitution of India in view of the decision of the Supreme Court. 43. In Punjab University v. Subhash Chander and another, AIR 1984 SC 1415 , Subhash Chander (respondent No. 1 in the Appeal before the Supreme Court) joined MBBS Course in 1965 when Regulation 25 of the Punjab University was in force. That Regulation required a minimum of 50% of marks to pass in each subject. 43. In Punjab University v. Subhash Chander and another, AIR 1984 SC 1415 , Subhash Chander (respondent No. 1 in the Appeal before the Supreme Court) joined MBBS Course in 1965 when Regulation 25 of the Punjab University was in force. That Regulation required a minimum of 50% of marks to pass in each subject. However, Rule 7.1, which was in force in 1965, provided that “a candidate who fails in one or more papers/subjects and/or aggregate may be given grace marks up to 1 per cent of the total aggregate marks (including marks for practical and internal assessment) to his best advantage in order to be declared to have passed the examination.” 44. In May, 1970 an amendment was made by the University in the form of an exception to Rule 2.1 which corresponded to Rule 7.1 (which was in force in 1965) in the following terms : “A candidate who appears, in all subjects of the examination and who fails in one or more subjects (written, practical, sessional or viva voce and/or aggregate (if there is a separate requirement of passing in the aggregate) shall be given grace marks up to 1% of the total aggregate marks, (excluding marks for internal assessment) to make up for the deficiency if by such addition the candidate can pass the examination. While awarding grace marks fraction working to 1/2 or more will be rounded to a whole.” 45. Subhash Chander appeared for the final MBBS examination in 1974 and secured the following marks and remarks : Medicine ..................................202 out of 400 P. Surgery ....................................225 out of 400 P. Eye and ENT.............................204 out of 400 P. Midwifery : (i) Theory .................95 out of 200 Reappear (ii) Practical...............106 out of 260 46. According to Regulation 25 read with Rule 7.1 which was in force when Subhash Chander joined the course in 1965, he would be eligible for grace marks at 1 per cent of the aggregate marks of 1600 for all the above four subjects, which will be 16, and he would have passed in Midwifery also. According to Regulation 25 read with Rule 7.1 which was in force when Subhash Chander joined the course in 1965, he would be eligible for grace marks at 1 per cent of the aggregate marks of 1600 for all the above four subjects, which will be 16, and he would have passed in Midwifery also. But he was given only 1 per cent of the total marks of 400 for Midwifery, as per the amended Regulation 25 read with Rule 2.1 of the Punjab University Calendar, 1974, namely four as grace marks and held to have failed in Midwifery as the total of 95 marks which he actually secured and the 4 grace marks in the theory in that subject fell short of 50 per cent by 1 mark. 47. The contention of Subhash Chander was that the old Regulation 25 read with the old Rule 7.1 which was in force when he joined the course in 1965 should be made applicable to him and he should be declared to have passed the final examination in full including Midwifery. 48. The Full Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court opined that there was nothing in Section 31 of the Punjab University Act which would clothe the Senate, explicitly or impliedly, with the power to frame regulations retrospectively and held that the regulation, as amended in 1970, has retrospectively altered the condition of Subhash Chander, taking the examination to his detriment and could not apply to him and that he was governed only by Regulation 25 read with Rule 7.1 as it was in force when he joined the course in 1965. 49. The Full Bench rejected the submission made on behalf of the Punjab University that the change in the regulation made in 1970 by the addition of an exception to Rule 2.1 related to examinations to be held only in future and there was no question of the rule having retrospective operation and held that when Subhash Chander joined the course in 1965 he obviously did so with the intention of obtaining the degree in Medicine and Surgery and that it was a single integrated composite course. The Full Bench held that the change in the regulation by way of addition of the exception to Rule 2.1 was a change in the course of that single integrated course and was retrospective in nature. The Full Bench held that the change in the regulation by way of addition of the exception to Rule 2.1 was a change in the course of that single integrated course and was retrospective in nature. The Full Bench accordingly directed the Punjab University to declare the result of Subhash Chander, afresh after affording him the benefit of 16 grace marks in accordance with the old Regulation 25 read with Rule 7.1 which was in force at the time of his admission to the course in 1965 and not only 4 marks as per the amended regulation. 50. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court did not agree with the learned Judges of the Full Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court, and held as under (paragraphs 9, 10, 11 and 12 of the said AIR) : “9. We are of the opinion that this appeal has to succeed. Section 31 (1) of the Punjab University Act extracted above enables the Senate of the Punjab University, with the sanction of the Government, to make, from time to time, regulations, consistent with the provisions of that Act to provide for all matters relating to the University. Section 31 (2) (n) provides that in particular and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing power such regulation may provide for the courses of study to be followed and the conditions to be complied with by candidates for any University examination and for degrees, diplomas, licences, titles, marks of honour, scholarships and prizes conferred or granted by the University. Obtaining the requisite percentage of marks in the subject of the examination falls under the clause “conditions to be complied by candidates for any University examination” occurring in sub-clause (n) of Section 31(2) of the Act. Therefore, the Senate had the power to award some percentage of marks as grace marks to candidates appearing in University examinations in considering whether they are eligible to pass the examination in the subject or subjects in which they had appeared. There is no dispute that the minimum number of marks required for passing the examination in a paper I subject is 50 per cent of marks. There is no dispute that the minimum number of marks required for passing the examination in a paper I subject is 50 per cent of marks. When Subhash Chander, respondent 1, was admitted to the M.B.B.S. Course in 1965, Rule 7.1 as stood then and extracted above provided that the candidate who fails in one or more papers/subjects /or aggregate may be given grace marks up to 1 per cent of the total aggregate marks excluding for practical and internal assessment to his best advantage in order to have him declared to have passed the examination. Subhash Chander, respondent 1, who appeared for the final M.B.B.S. examination only nine years’ later in 1974 had to pass in four subjects, namely, Medicine, Surgery, Eye and ENT and Midwifery for each of which the aggregate was 400 marks. He secured 200, 225 and 204 marks in Medicine, Surgery and Eye and ENT respectively and was declared to have passed the examination in those subjects. Midwifery consists of two parts, namely, theory and practical for each of which the aggregate was 200 marks. Subhash Chander, respondent 1, secured 106 out of 200 in the practical examination and only 95 out of 200 in the theory examination. Since the total aggregate of all the four subjects for which he appeared in 1974 was 1600 marks, under the old Regulation 25 read with Rule 7.1 as it stood at the time of his admission to the course in 1965 he would be entitled to 16 grace marks and would have been declared to have passed the examination as the addition of 16 grace marks to the 95 marks actually secured by him in the practical (theory?) examination in Midwifery would satisfy the required minimum of 50 per cent. But long before Subhash Chander appeared for the final M.B.B.S. examination. In 1974 the rule relating to award of grace marks to M.B.B.S. and B.D.S. students was changed by the Senate of the University in 1970 by the addition of an exception to Rule 2.1 as mentioned above. It is not contended that the sanction of the Government had not been obtained for making this change. In 1974 the rule relating to award of grace marks to M.B.B.S. and B.D.S. students was changed by the Senate of the University in 1970 by the addition of an exception to Rule 2.1 as mentioned above. It is not contended that the sanction of the Government had not been obtained for making this change. The exception, says that in the case of M.B.B.S. and B.D.S. examinations however the grace marks shall be given up to 1 per cent of the total marks of each subject and not up to 1 per cent of the aggregate marks of all the subjects; in other words each subject will be, for this purpose, a separate unit and a candidate who falls in a subject by not more than 1 per cent may be given the required number of marks in order to pass in that subject. Under this rule as amended in 1970 Subhash Chander, respondent 1, was entitled to only 4 marks as grace marks being 1 per cent of the aggregate of 400 marks for Midwifery alone. As the addition of 4 grace marks to 95 marks actually secured by him in the practical (theory ?) examination in Midwifery for which the aggregate was 200 out of that total aggregate of 400 marks for that subject makes only 99 out of 200 it was less than 50 per cent, and he was declared to have failed in Midwifery and asked to reappear for that subject. 10. The minimum prescribed for passing in each subject is 50 per cent. Under the old rule as it stood prior to 1970, Subhash Chander could have passed by getting 16 grace marks being 1 per cent of the aggregate of all the four subjects, namely, Medicine, Surgery, Eye and ENT and Midwifery even if he had secured only 84 marks out of 200 in the practical (theory ?) examination in Midwifery which comes to only 42 per cent and he had secured more than 50 per cent in the other subjects/papers. The Senate thought it fit to remedy this glaring defect so far as M.B.B.S. and B.D.S. examinations are concerned by adding the exception to Rule 2.1 in 1970 under which the grace marks would be only 1 per cent of the aggregate marks in the particular subject. The Senate thought it fit to remedy this glaring defect so far as M.B.B.S. and B.D.S. examinations are concerned by adding the exception to Rule 2.1 in 1970 under which the grace marks would be only 1 per cent of the aggregate marks in the particular subject. We do not think that the Senate did not have the necessary power to effect that change or had acted unreasonably in making the change. We think that the Senate had the necessary power under Section 31 (2) (n) of the Act to fix, from time to time, the percentage of marks required for passing the examination and to grant or to refuse to grant grace marks or to enhance or reduce the quantum of grace marks. It has not been contended before us that there was any mala fides on the part of the Senate in making this change. It could not be contended that Subhash Chander who appeared for the final examination in 1974 did not have sufficient notice of the change brought about in 1970 in the rule relating to award of grace marks or that he was prejudiced by the change. 11. We do not agree with the learned Judges of the Full Bench of the High Court that there is any element of retrospectivity in the change brought about by the addition of the exception to Rule 2.1 of the Calendar for the year 1970. “Retrospective” according to the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, Third Edition, in relation to Statutes etc. means “Operative with regard to past time”. The change brought about by the addition of the exception to Rule 2.1 does not say that it shall be operative with effect from any earlier date. It is obviously prospective. It is not possible to hold that it is retrospective in operation merely because though introduced in 1970 it was applied to Subhash Chander, respondent 1, who appeared for the final examination in 1974, after he had joined the course earlier in 1965. It is obviously prospective. It is not possible to hold that it is retrospective in operation merely because though introduced in 1970 it was applied to Subhash Chander, respondent 1, who appeared for the final examination in 1974, after he had joined the course earlier in 1965. No promise was made or could be deemed to have been made to him at the time of his admission in 1965 that there will be no alteration of the rule or regulation in regard to the percentage of marks required for passing any examination or award of grace marks and that the rules relating thereto which were in force at the time of his admission would continue to be applied to him until he finished his whole course. In the Calendar for 1979 we find the following at page 1 : “Notwithstanding the integrated nature of a course spread over more than one academic year, the regulations in force at the time a student joins a course shall hold good only for the examinations held during or at the end of the academic year. Nothing in these regulations shall be deemed to debar the University from amending the regulations subsequently and the amended regulations, if any, shall apply to all students whether old or new.” This is as it should be, though there was no such provision in the Calendar of 1965 when Subhash Chander was admitted to the course. It is admitted that it was introduced only in 1971. The absence of such a provision in the calendar of 1965 is of no consequence. It is necessary to note in this connection what this Court had said in regard to retrospectivity in such matters in B. N. Mishra v. State, (1965) 1 SCR 693 : ( AIR 1965 SC 1567 ). It is this (at pp. 1568-69 of AIR) : “The next contention on behalf of the appellant is that the rule is retrospective and that no retrospective rule can be made. As we read the rule we do not find any retrospectivity in it. All that the rule provides is that from the date it comes into force the age of retirement would be 55 years. As we read the rule we do not find any retrospectivity in it. All that the rule provides is that from the date it comes into force the age of retirement would be 55 years. It would therefore apply from that date to all Government servants, even though they may have been recruited before May 25, 1961 in the same way as the rule of 1957 which increased the age from 55 years to 58 years applied to all Government servants even though they were recruited before 1957. But it is urged that the proviso shows that the rule was applied retrospectively. We have already referred to the proviso which lays down that Government servants who had attained the age of 55 years on or before June 17, 1957 and had not attained the age of 58 years on May 25, 1961 would be deemed to have been retained in service after the date of superannuation, namely 55 years. This proviso in our opinion does not make the rule retrospective; it only provides as to how the period of service beyond 55 years should be treated in view of the earlier rule of 1957 which was being changed by the rule of 1961. Further the second order issued on the same day also clearly shows that there was no retrospective operation of the rule, for in actual effect no Government servant was retired before the date of new rule i.e. May 25, 1961 and all of them were continued in service up to December 31, 1961 and were therefore to retire on reaching the age of superannuation according to the old rule. We are, therefore, of opinion that the new rule reducing the age of retirement from 58 years to 55 years cannot be said to be retrospective. The proviso to the new rule and the second notification are only methods to tide over the difficult situation which would arise in the public service if the new rule was applied at once and also to meet any financial objection arising out of the enforcement of the rule. The new rule therefore, cannot be struck down on the ground that it is retrospective in operation.” 12. The new rule therefore, cannot be struck down on the ground that it is retrospective in operation.” 12. Therefore, we are clearly of the opinion that there is no question of the change in the rule made in the year 1970 having retrospective operation merely because it was applied in 1974 to Subash Chander who had joined the M.B.B.S. course in 1965 when the rule regarding award of grace marks was different. In these circumstances, we affirm the view of D.K. Mahjan and P.C. Jain, JJ. expressed in the Division Bench judgment in Sewa Ram v. Kurukshetra University, L.P. A. No. 97 of 1967, dated 17-7-1968 (supra) and disapprove the view taken by the learned Judges of the Full Bench in the decision under appeal in this case and hold that the University was right in holding that Subash Chander respondent 1, was not entitled to 16 grace marks under the old rule but was entitled to only 4 grace marks under the new rule and had therefore not passed the examination in Midwifery. We allow the appeal, but without any order as to costs. However, this decision will not affect the result of the examination of Subash Chander in Midwifery if it had been declared as per the direction of the learned Judges of the Full Bench in the Letters Patent Appeal. Appeal allowed.” (Emphasis supplied) 51. This decision, thus, lays down that alteration of Rules/Regulations pertaining to examinations of the University to be held in future i.e. after alteration of such Rules/Regulations even if applied to the students already admitted to the course would not make the altered Rules/Regulations retrospective. Such altered Rules/Regulations operate prospectively, and the same cannot be said to be retrospective merely because of their applicability to the students already admitted to the course. Applying the principles of this decision to the service jurisprudence, it follows that alteration in the Rules regarding terms and conditions of service which are made operative for future with effect from the date of alteration of such Rules even if applied to the persons already in service would not make such altered Rules retrospective. Such altered Rules operate prospectively with effect from the dates the same are altered, and the same cannot be said to be retrospective merely because of their applicability to the employees who are already in service since before such alteration. 52. Such altered Rules operate prospectively with effect from the dates the same are altered, and the same cannot be said to be retrospective merely because of their applicability to the employees who are already in service since before such alteration. 52. Therefore, in the present case, the amended Rule No. 23 which was made effective with effect from 2.4.2001 reducing the age of superannuation from 60 years to 58 years and contemplating retirement on 30.4.2001 in respect of the employees who had already attained the age of 58 years prior to 2.4.2001 as also the employees who would be attaining the age of 58 years on or after 2.4.2001 i.e. during the month of April, 2001, could not be said to be retrospective in operation merely on account of its applicability to the said employees. As is evident, the amended Rule No. 23 though made applicable to the said employees was to be operative in future prospectively. 53. In Dena Bank v. Bhikhabhai Prabhudas Parekh and Co. and others, AIR 2000 SC 3654 , proceedings were being taken by the State of Karnataka for recovery of Sales Tax arrears due and payable by the partnership firm relating to the assessment years 1957-58, 1966-67 to 1969-70 under the State Act and to the assessment years 1958-59 to 1964-65 and 1967-68 to 1969-70 under the Central Act. 54. Section 13 of the Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957 dealt with “payment and recovery of tax”. The said Act came into force on 1.10.1957. With effect from 18.11.1983, the following sub-section (2-A) was inserted into the body of Section 15 of the Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957 by Amending Act No. 23 of 1983 and came into force on the same day : “(2-A) Where any firm is liable to pay any tax or penalty or any other amount under this Act, the firm and each of the partners of the firm shall be jointly and severally liable for such payment.” 55. One of the questions involved in the case was as to whether in view of the aforesaid sub-section (2-A) inserted in Section 15 of the Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957 with effect from 18.11.1983, the property belonging to the partners could be proceeded against for recovery of dues on account of Sales Tax assessed against the partnership firm under the provisions of the Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957. As already noted, the Sales Tax arrears pertained to the assessment years prior to 18.11.1983 when the said sub-section (2-A) came into force. 56. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court held that the amended Section 15 (2-A) of the Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957 would apply, and the property of the partners would also be liable to be proceeded against. Rejecting the argument that sub-section (2-A) of Section 15 of the Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957 could not be given retrospective operation, their Lordships observed as under (paragraphs 16 and 17 of the said AIR) : “16. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that sub-section (2-A) of Section 15 of Karnataka Sales Tax Act could not be given a retrospective operation. This submission is misconceived. A legislation may be made to commence from a back date, i.e. from a date previous to the date of its enactment. To make a law governing a past period on a subject is retrospectivity. A legislature is competent to enact such a law. The ordinary rule is that a legislative enactment comes into operation only on its enactment. Retrospectivity is not to be inferred unless expressed or necessarily implied in the legislation, specially those dealing with substantive rights and obligations. It is a misnomer to say that sub-section (2-A) of Section 15 of the Karnataka Sales Tax Act is being given retrospective operation. Determining the obligation of the partners to pay the tax assessed against the firm by making them personally liable is not the same thing as giving the amendment a retrospective operation. In Principles of Statutory Interpretation (by Justice G.P. Singh, Seventh Edition, 1999, at page 369), it is stated : “The rule against retrospective construction is not applicable to a statute merely “because a part of the requisites for its action is drawn from a time antecedent to its passing.” If that were not so, every statute will be presumed to apply only to persons born and things come into existence after its operation and the rule may well result in virtual nullification of most of the statutes. An amending Act is, therefore, not retrospective merely because it applies also to those to whom pre-amended Act was applicable if the amended Act has operation from the date of its amendment and not from an anterior date." 17. An amending Act is, therefore, not retrospective merely because it applies also to those to whom pre-amended Act was applicable if the amended Act has operation from the date of its amendment and not from an anterior date." 17. There is, therefore, no question of sub-section (2-A) of Section 15 of the Karnataka Sales Tax Act being given a retrospective operation. It is prospective. However, it does not make any difference for the facts of the present case." (Emphasis supplied) 57. This decision, thus, lays down that sub-section (2-A) of Section 15 of the Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957 was prospective in operation with effect from 18.11.1983 and the said provision could not be said to be retrospective merely because the same was being applied for recovery of arrears of Sales Tax pertaining to the assessment years prior to 18.11.1983. The principle laid down in this decision is thus that if the amended Act operates from the date of its amendment and not from an anterior date, such amendment is prospective in operation, and it would not be retrospective merely because it applies to persons and things already in existence at the time of amendment. 58. Applying the principle of this decision to the present case, it is evident that the amended Rule No. 23 was prospective in operation, and the said amended rule could not be said to be retrospective merely because it applied to the employees who had already attained the age of superannuation prior to 2.4.2001 as also to the employees who would be attaining the age of 58 years on or after 2.4.2001 i.e. during the month of April, 2001. In other words, the amended Rule No. 23 was prospective in operation, and it did not become retrospective merely because it was applied to the existing employees. 59. In view of the above, the submission made by Shri A.B.L. Gaur, learned Senior Counsel that the amended Rule No. 23 was retrospective in operation, cannot be accepted. Question No. 2 : 60. The question is as to whether in view of the new Rule No. 23 as substituted with effect from 28/29.5.1998 raising normal age of superannuation from 58 years to 60 years, the petitioners acquired any vested right to continue upto the age of 60 years. 61. Question No. 2 : 60. The question is as to whether in view of the new Rule No. 23 as substituted with effect from 28/29.5.1998 raising normal age of superannuation from 58 years to 60 years, the petitioners acquired any vested right to continue upto the age of 60 years. 61. In our opinion, the enhancement of age of retirement from 58 years to 60 years by the newly substituted Rule No. 23 with effect from 28/29.5.1998 could not be said to have created any vested right in favour of the petitioners for continuing in service upto the age of 60 years. 62. The petitioners had merely hope and expectation under the newly substituted Rule No. 23 with effect from 28/29.5.1998 that they would continue upto the age of 60 years, but they did not acquire any vested right under the said Rule to continue upto the age of 60 years. 63. Therefore, this is not a case where any vested right of the petitioners was taken away by the amendment made in Rule No. 23 with effect from 2.4.2001 by making the same applicable to the employees who had already attained the age of 58 years prior to 2.4.2001. 64. In order to further elucidate the above conclusions, it is relevant to refer to Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 and certain judicial decisions given in regard to the said provision or similar provision. 65. Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 is as follows : “6. 64. In order to further elucidate the above conclusions, it is relevant to refer to Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 and certain judicial decisions given in regard to the said provision or similar provision. 65. Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 is as follows : “6. Effect of repeal.—Where this Act, or any [Central Act] or Regulation made after the commencement of this Act, repeals any enactment hitherto made or hereafter to be made, then, unless a different intention appears, the repeal shall not— (a) revive anything not in force or existing at the time at which the repeal takes effect; or (b) affect the previous operation of any enactment so repealed or anything duly done or suffered thereunder; or (c) affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under any enactment so repealed; or (d) affect any penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred in respect of any offence committed against any enactment so repealed; or (e) affect any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in respect of any such right, privilege, obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture or punishment as aforesaid, and any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced, and any such penalty, forfeiture or punishment may be imposed as if the repealing Act or Regulation had not been passed.” 66. Clause (c) of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 lays down that where any enactment is repealed then, unless a different intention appears, the repeal shall not affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under any enactment so repealed. 67. In Lalji Raja & Sons v. Firm Hansraj Nathoo Ram, AIR 1971 SC 974 , the decree-holders obtained a decree against the respondents in the Court of Sub-Judge, Bankura (West Bengal) for a sum of Rs. 12,000/- on December 3, 1949. On March 28, 1950 they applied to the Court which passed the decree to transfer the decree together with a certificate of non-satisfaction to the Court at Morena in the then State of Madhya Bharat for execution. It was ordered accordingly. The execution proceedings commenced in the Court of Additional District Judge at Morena on September 21, 1950. On March 28, 1950 they applied to the Court which passed the decree to transfer the decree together with a certificate of non-satisfaction to the Court at Morena in the then State of Madhya Bharat for execution. It was ordered accordingly. The execution proceedings commenced in the Court of Additional District Judge at Morena on September 21, 1950. The judgment-debtors resisted the execution on the ground that the Court had no jurisdiction to execute the same as the decree was that of a Foreign Court and that the same had been passed ex-parte. The Additional District Judge, Morena accepted that contention and dismissed the execution petition on December 29, 1950. 68. On April 1, 1951, the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, (Act II of 1951) came into force. As a result of that the Code of Civil Procedure was extended to the former State of Madhya Bharat as well as to various other places. 69. Meanwhile the decree-holders appealed against the order of the Additional District Judge, Morena. The Madhya Pradesh High Court allowed their appeal. As against that the judgment-debtors filed appeal before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal of the judgment-debtors and restored the order of the Additional District Judge. The Supreme Court in its decision (reported in Hansraj Nathu Ram v. Lalji Raja and Sons of Bankura, AIR 1963 SC 1180 ) opined that the transfer ordered by the Bankura Court was without jurisdiction as on that date the Code of Civil Procedure did not apply to the Morena Court. 70. On February 15, 1963, the decree-holders filed another execution case before the Bankura Court. The Bankura Court again ordered the transfer of the decree to the Morena Court. The execution proceedings were started afresh in the Morena Court on August 31, 1963. 71. The executing Court rejected the objections raised by the judgment-debtors. On appeal by the judgment-debtors, the Madhya Pradesh High Court held that the decree was not executable as the Court which passed the decree was a foreign Court. Thereafter, the judgment-debtors filed appeal before the Supreme Court by special leave. 72. One of the questions before the Supreme Court was as to whether the decree under the execution was not executable by Courts situate in the area comprised in the former State of Madhya Bharat. 73. Thereafter, the judgment-debtors filed appeal before the Supreme Court by special leave. 72. One of the questions before the Supreme Court was as to whether the decree under the execution was not executable by Courts situate in the area comprised in the former State of Madhya Bharat. 73. It was contended before the Supreme Court that in view of Section 20, Clause (1) of the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1951 by which the Code of Civil Procedure was extended to Madhya Bharat and other areas, the judgment-debtors’ right to resist the execution of the decree was protected. 74. Section 20(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1951, to the extent relevant, provided as follows : “If immediately before the date on which the said Code comes into force in any part B State corresponding to the said Code, that law shall on that date stand repealed. Provided that the repeal shall not affect— (b) any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under any law so repealed......as if this Act had not been passed.” 75. After noticing the above provision, their Lordships of the Supreme Court rejected the above contention raised on behalf of the judgment debtors. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court held as follows (paragraphs 18 and 19 of the said AIR) : “18. This provision undoubtedly protects the rights acquired and privileges accrued under the law repealed by the amending Act. Therefore the question for decision is whether the non-executability of the decree in the Morena Court under the law in force in Madhya Bharat before the extension of ‘the Code’ can be said to be a right accrued under the repealed law. We do not think that even by straining the language of the provision it can be said that the non-executability of a decree within a particular territory can be considered as a privilege. Therefore the only question that we have to consider is whether it can be considered as a ‘right accrued’ within the meaning of Section 20 (1) (b) of the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1951. In the first place, in order to get the benefit of that provision, the non-executability of the decree must be a right and secondly it must be a right that had accrued from the provisions of the repealed law. In the first place, in order to get the benefit of that provision, the non-executability of the decree must be a right and secondly it must be a right that had accrued from the provisions of the repealed law. It is contended on behalf of the judgment-debtors that when the decree was passed, they had a right to resist the execution of the decree in Madhya Bharat in view of the provisions of the Indian Code of Civil Procedure (as adapted) which was in force in the Madhya Bharat at that time and the same is a vested right. It was further urged on their behalf that that right was preserved by Section 20 (1) (b) of the Code of Civil Procedure Amendment Act, 1951. It is difficult to consider the non-executability of the decree in Madhya Bharat as a vested right of the judgment-debtors. The non-executability in question pertains to the jurisdiction of certain Courts and not to the rights of the judgment-debtors. Further the relevant provisions of the Civil Procedure Code in force in Madhya Bharat did not confer the right claimed by the Judgment-debtors. All that has happened in view of the extension of ‘the Code’ to the whole of India in 1951 is that the decrees which could have been executed only by Courts in British India are now made executable in the whole of India. The change made is one relating to procedure and jurisdiction. Even before ‘the Code’ was extended to Madhya Bharat the decree in question could have been executed either against the person of the judgment-debtors if they had happened to come to British India or against any of their properties situate in British India. The execution of the decree within the State of Madhya Bharat was not permissible because the arm of ‘the Code’ did not reach Madhya Bharat. It was the invalidity of the order transferring the decree to the Morena Court that stood in the way of the decree-holders in executing their decree in that Court on the earlier occasion and not because of any vested rights of the judgment-debtors. Even if the judgment-debtors had not objected to the execution of the decree; the same could not have been executed by the Court at Morena on the previous occasion as that Court was not properly seized of the execution proceedings. Even if the judgment-debtors had not objected to the execution of the decree; the same could not have been executed by the Court at Morena on the previous occasion as that Court was not properly seized of the execution proceedings. By the extension of ‘the Code’ to Madhya Bharat, want of jurisdiction on the part of the Morena Court was remedied and that Court is now made competent to execute the decree. 19. That a provision to preserve the right accrued under a repealed Act “was not intended to preserve the abstract rights conferred by the repealed Act....It only applies to specific rights given to an individual upon happening of one or the other of the events specified in statute”: see Lord Atkin’s observations in Hamilton Gell v. White, (1922) 2 KB 22. The mere right, existing at the date of repealing statute, to take advantage of provisions of the statute repealed is not a “right accrued” within the meaning of the usual saving clause: see Abbot v. Minister for Lands, (1895) AC 425 and G. Ogden Industries Pvt. Ltd. v. Lucas, (1969) 1 All ER 121.” (Emphasis supplied) 76. This decision, thus, lays down that a provision to preserve the right accrued under the repealed Act was not intended to preserve the abstract rights conferred by the repealed Act. It only applies to specific rights given to an individual upon happening of one or the other of the events pecified in statute. The mere right, existing at the date of repealing statute, to take advantage of the provisions of the statute repealed is not a ‘right accrued’ within the meaning of the usual saving clause. 77. Applying the principles laid down in the above decision to the present case, it is evident that the newly substituted Rule No. 23 with effect from 28/29.5.1998 merely conferred an abstract right upon the employees of the said Company to continue upto the age of 60 years. No specific right was given to the petitioners as individuals under the newly substituted Rule No. 23 with effect from 28/29.5.1998 that they would continue to the age of 60 years. Hence, no right accrued to the petitioners to continue upto the age of 60 years. Therefore, the provisions of clause (c) of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 were not applicable to the present case. 78. Hence, no right accrued to the petitioners to continue upto the age of 60 years. Therefore, the provisions of clause (c) of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 were not applicable to the present case. 78. In M.S. Shivananda v. Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation and others, AIR 1980 SC 77 , the question for consideration before the Supreme Court was as to whether the employees of the erstwhile contract carriages operators in the State of Karnataka acquired a vested right of absorption in service with the Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation under sub-clause (3) of Clause 20 of the Karnataka Contract Carriages (Acquisition) Ordinance, 1976. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court held as under (paragraphs 12, 13, 14, 15 and 16 of the said AIR) : “12. In considering the effect of an expiration of a temporary Act, it would be unsafe to lay down any inflexible rule. It certainly requires very clear and unmistakable language in a subsequent Act of the legislature to revive or re-create an expired right. If, however, the right created by the statute is of an enduring character and has vested in the person, that right cannot be taken away because the statute by which it was created has expired. In order to ascertain whether the rights and liabilities under the repealed Ordinance have been put to an end by the Act, ‘the line of enquiry would be not whether’, in the words of Mukher-jea J. in State of Punjab v. Mohar Singh, (1955) 1 SCR 893 , the new Act expressly keeps alive old rights and liabilities under the repealed Ordinance but whether it manifests an intention to destroy them’. Another line of approach may be to see as to how far the new Act is retrospective in operation. 13. It is settled both on principle and authority, that the mere right existing under the repealed Ordinance, to take advantage of the provisions of the repealed Ordinance, is not a right accrued. Sub-section (2) of Section 31 of the Act was not intended to preserve abstract rights conferred by the repealed Ordinance. The legislature had the competence to so re-structure the Ordinance as to meet the exigencies of the situation obtaining after the taking over of the contract carriage services. It could re-enact the Ordinance according to its original terms, or amend or alter its provisions. 14. The legislature had the competence to so re-structure the Ordinance as to meet the exigencies of the situation obtaining after the taking over of the contract carriage services. It could re-enact the Ordinance according to its original terms, or amend or alter its provisions. 14. What were the ‘things done’ or ‘action taken’ under the repealed Ordinance ? The High Court rightly observes that there was neither anything done nor action taken and, therefore, the petitioners did not acquire any right to absorption under sub-cl. (3) to Cl. 20. The employees of the former contract carriage operators in normal course filled in the pro forma giving their service particulars and reported to duty. This was in the mere ‘hope or expectation’ of acquiring a right. The submission of these ‘call reports’ by the employees did not subject the Corporation to a corresponding statutory obligation to absorb them in service. As a matter of fact, nothing was done while the Ordinance was in force. The Act was published on March 12, 1976. On May 29, 1976, the Corporation sent up proposals for equation of posts to be filled in by the employees of the former contract carriage operators. The meeting of the Committee set up by the Government for laying down the principles for equation of posts and for determination of inter se seniority, met on June 2, 1976. The Committee decided that even in the case of helpers-cleaners, there should be a ‘trade test’ and the staff cleared by the Committee for the post of helper ‘B’, helper ‘A’ and assistant artisans should be on the basis of their technical competence, experience, ability etc. The Committee also decided that all other employees of contract carriage operators, who were eligible for absorption, should be interviewed by that Committee for the purpose of absorption on the basis of experience, ability, duties and responsibilities. These norms were not laid down till June 2, 1976. Till their actual absorption, the employees of the erstwhile contract carriage operators had only an inchoate right. 15. The distinction between what is, and what is not a right preserved by the provisions of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act is often one of great fineness. These norms were not laid down till June 2, 1976. Till their actual absorption, the employees of the erstwhile contract carriage operators had only an inchoate right. 15. The distinction between what is, and what is not a right preserved by the provisions of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act is often one of great fineness. What is unaffected by the repeal of a statute is a right acquired or accrued under it and not a mere ‘hope or expectation of’, or liberty to apply for, acquiring a right. In Director of Public Works v. Ho Po Sang, (1961) 2 All ER 721 (PC) Lord Morris speaking for the Privy Council, observed : “It may be, therefore, that under some repealed enactment, a right has been given, but that, in respect of it, some investigation or legal proceeding is necessary. The right is then unaffected and preserved. It will be preserved even if a process of quantification is necessary. But there is a manifest distinction between an investigation in respect of a right ‘and an investigation which is to decide whether some right should be or should not be given. On a repeal the former is preserved by the Interpretation Act. The latter is not.” (Emphasis supplied). It must be mentioned that the object of Section 31 (2) (i) is to preserve only the things done and action taken under the repealed Ordinance, and not the rights and privileges acquired and accrued on the one side and the corresponding obligation or liability incurred on the both side, so that if no right acquired under the repealed Ordinance was preserved, there is no question of any liability being enforced. 16. Further, it is significant to notice that the saving clauses that we are considering in Section 31 (2) (i) of the Act, saves things done while the Ordinance was in force; it does not purport to preserve a right acquired under the repealed Ordinance. It is unlike the usual saving clauses which preserve unaffected by the repeal, not only things done under the repealed enactment but also the rights acquired thereunder, it is also clear that even Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, the applicability of which is excluded is not intended to preserve the abstract rights conferred by the repealed Ordinance. It is unlike the usual saving clauses which preserve unaffected by the repeal, not only things done under the repealed enactment but also the rights acquired thereunder, it is also clear that even Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, the applicability of which is excluded is not intended to preserve the abstract rights conferred by the repealed Ordinance. It only applies to specific rights given to an individual upon the happening of one or other of the events specified in the statute." (Emphasis supplied) 79. This decision, thus, lays down that mere right existing under the repealed Ordinance, to take advantage of the provisions of the repealed Ordinance, is not a right accrued. No right to absorption was acquired under sub-clause (3) to Clause 20 of the Ordinance. This was mere “hope or expectation” of acquiring a right . What is unaffected by the repeal of a statute is a right acquired or accrued under it and not a mere hope or expectation of, or liberty to apply for acquiring a right. 80. Applying the principles laid down in the above decision to the present case, it is evident that the petitioners had merely hope or expectation under the newly substituted Rule No. 23 with effect from 28/29.5.1998 that they would continue upto the age of 60 years, but no right was acquired by them or accrued to them under the said Rule to continue upto the age of 60 years. The provisions of clause (c) of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 were, therefore, not applicable to the present case. 81. In Wing Commander J. Kumar v. Union of India and others, AIR 1982 SC 1064 , their Lordships of the Supreme Court considered the validity of Rule 16 of the Rules framed under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India by the Ministry of Defence of the Government of India. The said Rule 16 dealt with the seniority of permanent secondment. It was held as under (Head-Notes A and F of the said AIR): “(A)....... The said Rule 16 dealt with the seniority of permanent secondment. It was held as under (Head-Notes A and F of the said AIR): “(A)....... Rule 16 laying down the principle that the seniority of service officers permanently absorbed and seconded to the Defence Research and Defence Organisation is to be reckoned with reference to the date of attainment of the rank of substaintive Major/equivalent does not divest a service officer, seconded in the Organisation prior to coming into force of the Rules, any of his vested right to seniority and promotion. He could not claim that he had acquired a vested right to have his reference in the Organisation reckoned with reference to the date of his permanent secondment and to have all officers joining the Organisation on subsequent dates ranked only below him, firstly because prior to commencement of the Rules the policy and practice followed In the Defence Research Development and Inspection Organisation and later in the Defence Research and Development Organisation was to fix the seniority of permanently seconded officers with reference to the date of attainment of the rank of substantive Major/equivalent, and by framing Rule 16 the same policy and practice followed by the Organisation is now statutorily recognised, secondly, it is settled law that the service conditions pertaining to seniority are liable to alteration by subsequent changes that may be introduced in the rules and except to the extent of protecting promotions that have already been earned under the previous rules, the revised rules will operate to govern the seniority and future promotion prospects of all the persons in the concerned service. It is therefore, open to the Government of India to introduce a new principle of seniority by promulgation of the rules so as to affect rights for future promotion. (F)....... It cannot be said that Rule 16 not having been specifically declared to be retrospective in operation, its provisions cannot be applied to the Service Officer who had been included into the Defence Research and Development Organisation Cadre long prior to the promulgation of the new rules. When a Statutory rule governing seniority is issued in respect of a service, the said rule would govern the personnel in the service with effect from the date of its promulgation and in so plying effect to the rule in future, there is no element of retroactivity involved. When a Statutory rule governing seniority is issued in respect of a service, the said rule would govern the personnel in the service with effect from the date of its promulgation and in so plying effect to the rule in future, there is no element of retroactivity involved. Of course, the rules will not operate to deprive any person of promotions already earned in the past, but, for purposes of future promotions and seniority in the department, the principles laid down in the rule will necessarily govern all the personnel alike” (Emphasis supplied) 82. Thus, in the above decision, their Lordships of the Supreme Court opined that the said Rule 16 did not divest a Service Officer, seconded in the Organization prior to coming into force of the Rules, any of his vested right to seniority and promotion. He could not claim that prior to commencement of the Rules he had acquired a vested right to have his seniority in the Organization reckoned with reference to the date of his permanent secondment and to have all officers joining the Organization on subsequent dates reckoned only below him. Their Lordships held that the Rules regarding service conditions pertaining to seniority were liable to alteration by subsequent changes that might be introduced in the Rules and except to the extent of protecting promotions that had already been earned under the previous Rules, the revised Rules would operate to govern the seniority and future promotion prospects of all the persons in the concerned service. Such alteration in the Rules would govern the personnel in the service with effect from the date of promulgation of such alteration and in so giving effect to the alteration in future, there was no element of retroactivity involved. However, such alteration in the Rules would not operate to deprive any persons of promotions already earned in the past, but, for purposes of future promotions and seniority in the department, the principles laid down in the altered rule would necessarily govern all the personnel alike. 83. However, such alteration in the Rules would not operate to deprive any persons of promotions already earned in the past, but, for purposes of future promotions and seniority in the department, the principles laid down in the altered rule would necessarily govern all the personnel alike. 83. Applying the principles laid down in the above decision to the present case, it is evident that Rule No. 23 as substituted with effect from 28/29.5.1998 whereby the age of superannuation was enhanced from 58 years to 60 years, was an alteration made in the service conditions of the employees of the said Company as regards the age of superannuation, and the same did not create any vested right in the employees for continuance upto the age of 60 years. Similarly, when the said substituted Rule No. 23 was amended with effect from 2.4.2001 reducing the age of superannuation from 60 years to 58 years, the same was again an alteration in the service conditions of the employees of the said Company in regard to the age of superannuation, and the same did not divest the employees of any vested right. 84. In Mohinder Kumar etc. etc. v. State of Haryana and another, AIR 1986 SC 244 , the constitutional validity of Section 1(3) of the Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973, as amended by the Amending Act 16 of 1978, was involved. It was held as under (Head Note of the said AIR) : “The classification of building with reference to the date of commencement of the Act namely, building constructed before the commencement of the Act and building the construction of which was completed on or after the date of the commencement of the Act for giving exemption from the provisions of the Act has a rational basis and has a clear nexus with the object to be achieved i.e. encouraging construction of new buildings. As such, the classification is not arbitrary and is not violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution. Further Section 1(3) cannot be said to be bad on the ground that the provision operates retrospectively and seeks to take away the vested rights of the tenants under the Act. Prior to the amendment of Section 1(3) by the Amending Act of 1978, the provision as it originally stood cannot be said to have conferred any vested right on the tenants. Prior to the amendment of Section 1(3) by the Amending Act of 1978, the provision as it originally stood cannot be said to have conferred any vested right on the tenants. The provision as it originally stood prior to its amendment might not have been constitutionally valid as the exemption sought to be granted was for an indefinite period. That does not necessarily imply that any vested right in any tenant was thereby created. The right claimed is the right to be governed by the Act prior to Its amendment. If the Legislatures had thought it fit to repeal the entire Act, could the tenant have claimed any such rights? Obviously, they could not have. The question of acquiring any vested rights really does not arise. Even if it could be said that the tenants had acquired any right because of any invalidity of the earlier provision before amendment, it Is always open to the Legislature to remove any defect to make it valid. It is well settled that if any provision made by the Legislature is found constitutionally invalid for some lacunae or otherwise such provision can always be validated by removing the defect or lacuna by passing a validating Act." (Emphasis supplied) 85. This decision, thus, lays down that prior to the amendment in 1978, the tenants had not acquired any vested right. There was no vested right in the tenants to be governed by the Act as it stood prior to its amendment. The Legislature was fully competent to make amendments for removing the defect or lacunae in existing provision. 86. Applying the principles of the above decision to the present case, it is evident that the employees could not claim any vested right for continuance upto the age of 60 years in view of Rule No. 23 as substituted with effect from 28/29.5.1998, and as such, there was no question of any vested right being taken away by the amendment made in Rule No. 23 with effect from 2.4.2001. 87. The question may be examined from another angle also. In R. Venkata Rao v. Secretary of State, AIR 1937 PC 31 (at page 34), it has been laid down that the service rules “are all capable of change”. 88. 87. The question may be examined from another angle also. In R. Venkata Rao v. Secretary of State, AIR 1937 PC 31 (at page 34), it has been laid down that the service rules “are all capable of change”. 88. From this decision it follows that as the service rules are subject to change at any time, no vested right in the age of superannuation is created in an employee by such rules. 89. In B.S. Vadera v. Union of India and others, AIR 1969 SC 118 , their Lordships of the Supreme Court held as follows : (paragraphs 24 and 25 of the said AIR) “24. It is also significant to note that the proviso to Article 309, clearly lays down that ‘any rules so made shall have effect, subject to the provisions of any such Act’. The clear and unambiguous expressions, used in the Constitution, must be given their full and unrestricted meaning unless hedged-in, by any limitations. The rules, which have to be ‘subject to the provisions of the Constitution’, shall have effect, ‘subject to the provisions of any such Act’. That is, if the appropriate Legislature has passed an Act, under Article 309, the rules, framed under the Proviso, will have effect, subject to that Act; but, in the absence of any Act, of the appropriate Legislature, on the matter, in our opinion, the rules, made by the President or by such person as he may direct, are to have full effect, both prospectively and retrospectively. Apart from the limitations, pointed out above, there is none other imposed by the proviso to Article 309, regarding the ambit of the operations of such rules. In other words, the rules, unless they can be impeached on grounds such as breach of Part III, or any other Constitutional provision, must be enforced, if made by the appropriate authority. 25. In the case before us, the Indian Railway Establishment Code has been issued, by the President, in the exercise of his powers, under the proviso to Article 309. Under Rule 157, the President has directed the Railway Board, to make rules, of general application to non-gazetted railway servants, under their control. 25. In the case before us, the Indian Railway Establishment Code has been issued, by the President, in the exercise of his powers, under the proviso to Article 309. Under Rule 157, the President has directed the Railway Board, to make rules, of general application to non-gazetted railway servants, under their control. The rules, which are embodied in the Schemes framed by the Board, under Annexures 4 and 7, are within the powers, conferred under Rule 157; and, in the absence of any Act, having been passed by the ‘appropriate’ Legislature, on the said matter, the rules, framed by the Railway Board, will have full effect and, if so indicated retrospectively also. Such indication, about retrospective effect, as has already been pointed out by us, is clearly there, in the impugned provisions." (Emphasis supplied) 91. This decision, thus, lays down that subject to the limitation that there is no breach of Part-III of the Constitution of India or other constitutional provisions, the rules framed under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India may have effect, both prospectively and retrospectively. It follows, therefore, that service rules may be altered at any point of time, even retrospectively. Evidently, therefore, there is no vested right in regard to the age of superannuation as provided in the service rules, and it is open to make alteration in such age of superannuation, provided there is no breach of Part III of the Constitution of India or other constitutional provisions. 92. In Raj Kumar v. Union of India and others, AIR 1975 SC 1116 , their Lordships of the Supreme Court held as follows (Head Note ‘A’ of the said AIR): “(A) The amendment of the proviso to Rule 5 (1) with retrospective effect from 1-5-1965 is valid because these Rules made under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution are legislative in character and therefore can be given effect to retrospectively. The effect of the amendment is that even though the Government has ‘forthwith’ terminated the services of a temporary employee by an order passed in 1971 (i.e. after 1-5-1965) it is not obligatory on the Government to pay him a month’s emoluments in view of notice in spite of its direction to pay in the order of termination and the Government servant is only entitled to claim them but cannot maintain a writ petition to challenge the validity of the order on the basis of Supreme Court decision in AIR 1972 SC 1487 which is no longer good law in view of the amendment. (Para 2) Once a law is given retrospective effect as from a particular date all actions taken under the Act after that date but before the amendment was made would be deemed to have been taken under the Act as amended and there could be really no question of having to validate any action already taken. The question of the particular form of the validation would always depend on the circumstances of a case and no general formula can be devised for all circumstances. In the present case the action taken being in accordance with the amended rule was legally a valid action and there was no need to have a validating provision in respect thereof. AIR 1970 SC 192 Ref. (Para 3).” (Emphasis supplied) 93. This decision, therefore, lays down that the rules made under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India can be given effect to retrospectively. Hence, it follows that the rules made under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India can be altered at any point of time, even retrospectively. In view of this, service rule providing for the age of superannuation may be altered at any point of time and the employee cannot claim any vested right in regard to the age of superannuation as contained in the unaltered service rule. 94. In T.R. Kapoor and others v. State of Haryana and others, AIR 1987 SC 415 , their Lordships of the Supreme Court held as follows (paragraphs 8,16 and 17 of the said AIR) : “8. 94. In T.R. Kapoor and others v. State of Haryana and others, AIR 1987 SC 415 , their Lordships of the Supreme Court held as follows (paragraphs 8,16 and 17 of the said AIR) : “8. There is a long line of decisions starting from Mohammad Bhakar v. Y. Krishna Reddy, 1970 Serv LR 768 (SC) down to Mohammad Shujat Ali v. Union of India, (1975) 1 SCR 449 : ( AIR 1974 SC 1 631 ) while construing the analogous provision contained in the proviso to Section 115(7), States Reorganisation Act, 1956 laying down that any rule made under the proviso to Art. 309 of the Constitution which seeks to vary or alter the conditions of service without the previous approval of the Central Government would be void and inoperative being in violation of the proviso to sub-section (7) of Section 115 of the Act. It is a trite proposition that any rule which affects the right of a person to be considered for promotion is a condition of service, although mere chances of promotion may not be. As laid down by this Court in A.S. Parmar’s case, ( AIR 1984 SC 643 ), the petitioners like other members of Class II service who are diploma-holders and satisfy the eligibility test of eight years’ service in that class were eligible for being considered for promotion to the post of Executive Engineer in Class I service without having a degree in Engineering. Admittedly, the impugned notification which seeks to amend Rule 6(b) with retrospective effect from July 10, 1964 clearly operates to their disadvantage as it purports to make them ineligible for promotion being diploma-holders. 16. It is well settled that the power to frame rules to regulate the conditions of service under the proviso to Art. 309 of the Constitution carries with it the power to amend or alter the rules with a retrospective effect : B. S. Vadhera v. Union of India, (1968) 3 SCR 575 : ( AIR 1969 SC 118 ); Raj Kumar v. Union of India, (1975) 3 SCR 963 : ( AIR 1975 SC 1116 ); K. Nagaraj v. State of A. P., (1985) 1 SCC 523 : ( AIR 1985 SC 551 ) and State of J.&K. v. Triloki Nath Khosla, (1974) 1 SCR 771 : ( AIR 1974 SC 1 ). It is equally well settled that any rule which affects the right of a person to be considered for promotion is a condition of service although mere chances of promotion may not be. It may further be stated that an authority competent to lay down qualifications for promotion, is also competent to change the qualifications. The rules defining qualifications and suitability for promotion are conditions of service and they can be changed retrospectively. This rule is however subject to a well recognised principle that the benefits acquired under the existing rules cannot be taken away by an amendment with retrospective effect, that is to say, there is no power to make such a rule under the proviso to Art. 309 which affects or impairs vested rights. Therefore, unless it is specifically provided in the rules, the employees who are already promoted before the amendment of the rules cannot be reverted and their promotions cannot be recalled. In other words, such rules laying down qualifications for promotion made with retrospective effect must necessarily satisfy the test of Arts. 14 and 16(1) of the Constitution : State of Mysore v. M. N. Krishna Murty, (1973) 2 SCR 575 : ( AIR 1973 SC 1146 ); B. S. Yadav v. State of Punjab, (1981) 1 SCR 1024 :( AIR 1981 SC 561 ); State of Gujarat v. Ramanlal Keshavlal Soni, (1983) 2 SCR 287 : ( AIR 1984 SC 161 ) and K. C. Arora v. State of Haryana, (1984) 3 SCR 623 : (1984 Lab IC 1015). 17. A Constitution Bench of this Court in State of Gujarat v. Ramanlal Keshavlal Soni (supra) had to consider the constitutional validity of the proviso to Section 102(1)(a) of the Gujarat Panchayat Act, 1961, as introduced by the Gujarat Panchayat (Third Amendment) Act, 1978, with retrospective effect and sought to extinguish the status of secretaries, officers and servants of the Gram and Nagar Panchayats who became members of a service under the State on being allocated to the panchayat service. The Court speaking through Chinnappa Reddy, J. observed : “Now, in 1978 before the Amending Act was passed thanks to the provisions of the Principal Act of 1961, the ex-municipal employees who had been allocated to the Panchayat Service as Secretaries, Officers and servants of Gram and Nagar Panchayats, had achieved the status of government servants. The Court speaking through Chinnappa Reddy, J. observed : “Now, in 1978 before the Amending Act was passed thanks to the provisions of the Principal Act of 1961, the ex-municipal employees who had been allocated to the Panchayat Service as Secretaries, Officers and servants of Gram and Nagar Panchayats, had achieved the status of government servants. Their status as Government servants could not be extinguished, so long as the posts were not abolished and their services were not terminated in accordance with the provisions of Art. 311 of the Constitution. Nor was it permissible to single them out for differential treatment. That would offend Art. 14 of the Constitution.” “The learned Judge observed that the Amending Act was sought to be given retrospective effect to get over the constitutional safeguards of Arts. 311 and 14 by reverting to a situation that existed some 17 years ago. He said that there was no power to do so and observed : “The legislation is pure and simple, self deceptive, if we may use such an expression with reference to a legislature-made law. The legislature is undoubtedly competent to legislate with retrospective effect to take away or impair any vested right acquired, under existing laws but since the laws are made under a written Constitution, and have to conform to the do’s and dont’s of the Constitution neither prospective nor retrospective laws can be made so as to contravene Fundamental Rights. The law must satisfy the requirements of the Constitution today taking into account the accrued or acquired rights of the parties today. The law cannot say, twenty years ago the parties had no rights, therefore, the requirements of the Constitution will be satisfied if the law is dated back by twenty years. We are concerned with today’s rights and not yesterday’s. A legislature cannot legislate today with reference to a situation that obtained twenty years ago and ignore the march of events and the constitutional rights accrued in the course of the twenty years. We are concerned with today’s rights and not yesterday’s. A legislature cannot legislate today with reference to a situation that obtained twenty years ago and ignore the march of events and the constitutional rights accrued in the course of the twenty years. That would be most arbitrary, unreasonable and a negation of history.” The learned Judge relied with approval on the following observations of Chandrachud, C.J. speaking for a Constitution Bench in B. S. Yadav v. State of Punjab, ( AIR 1981 SC 561 ) (supra) : “Since the Governor exercises the legislative power under the proviso to Art. 309 of the Constitution, it is open to him to give retrospective operation to the rules made under that provision. But the date from which the rules are made to operate must be shown to bear either from the face of the rules or by extrinsic evidence, reasonable nexus with the provisions contained in the rules, especially when the retrospective effect extends over a long-period, as in this case.” and summed up : “Today’s equals cannot be made unequal by saying that they were unequal twenty years ago and we will restore that position by making a law today and making it retrospective. Constitutional rights, constitutional obligations and constitutional consequences cannot be tampered with that way. A law which if made today would be plainly invalid as offending constitutional provisions in the context of the existing situation cannot become valid by being made retrospective. Past virtue (constitutional) cannot be made to wipe out present vice (constitutional) by making retrospective laws. We are, therefore, firmly of the view that the Gujarat Panchayats (Third Amendment) Act, 1978 is unconstitutional, as it offends Arts. 311 and 14 and is arbitrary and unreasonable.” (Emphasis supplied) 95. This decision, thus, reiterates that power to frame rules to regulate the conditions of service under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India carries with it the power to amend or alter the rules with a retrospective effect. It follows, therefore, that no vested right is acquired by an employee in regard to the age of superannuation as provided in the service rules, and such age of superannuation may be altered at any time, provided there is no violation of the Fundamental Rights guaranteed under Part III of the Constitution of India or other constitutional provisions. 96. It follows, therefore, that no vested right is acquired by an employee in regard to the age of superannuation as provided in the service rules, and such age of superannuation may be altered at any time, provided there is no violation of the Fundamental Rights guaranteed under Part III of the Constitution of India or other constitutional provisions. 96. In P.D. Aggarwal and others v. State of U.P. and others, AIR 1987 SC 1676 , their Lordships of the Supreme Court held as follows (paragraphs 16, 17 and 19 of the said AIR) : “16. ‘It is well settled that the power to frame rules to regulate the conditions of service under the proviso to Art. 309 of the Constitution carries with it the power to amend or alter the rules with a retrospective effect : B.S. Vadhera v. Union of India, (1968) 3 SCR 575 : ( AIR 1969 SC 118 ); Raj Kumar v. Union of India, (1975) 3 SCR 963 : ( AIR 1975 SC 1116 ); K. Nagaraj v. State of A. P., (1985) 1 SCC 523 : ( AIR 1985 SC 551 ) and State of J.&K. v. Triloki Nath Khosa, (1974) 1 SCR 771 : ( AIR 1974 SC 1 ). It is equally well settled that any rule which affects the right of a person to be considered for promotion is a condition of service although mere chances of promotion may not be. It may further be stated that an authority competent to lay down qualifications for promotion is also competent to change the qualifications. The rules defining qualifications and suitability for promotion are conditions of service and they can be changed retrospectively. This rule is however subject to a well-recognised, principle that the benefits acquired under the existing rules cannot be taken away by an amendment with retrospective effect, that is to say, there is no power to make such a rule under the proviso to Art. 309 which affects or impairs vested rights. Therefore, unless it is specifically provided in the rules, the employees who are already promoted before the amendment of the rules, cannot be reverted and their promotions cannot be recalled. In other words, such rules laying down qualifications for promotion made with retrospective effect must necessarily satisfy the tests of Arts. 14 and 16(1) of the Constitution’. 17. Therefore, unless it is specifically provided in the rules, the employees who are already promoted before the amendment of the rules, cannot be reverted and their promotions cannot be recalled. In other words, such rules laying down qualifications for promotion made with retrospective effect must necessarily satisfy the tests of Arts. 14 and 16(1) of the Constitution’. 17. The above observations have been made by this Court in the case of T.R. Kapur v. State of Haryana, 1986 JT 1092 at p. 1101 : ( AIR 1987 SC 415 at p. 422) (in which one of us was a party). It has been held by this Court in E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1974 SC 555 at p. 583 Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 597 at p. 624 that there should not be arbitrariness in State action and the State action must ensure fairness and equality of treatment. It is open to judicial review whether any rule or provision of any Act has violated the principles of equality and non-arbitrariness and thereby invaded the rights of citizens guaranteed under Arts. 14 and 16 of the Constitution. As has been stated hereinbefore the Assistant Engineers who have already become members of the Service on being appointed substantively against temporary posts have already acquired the benefit of 1936 Rules for having their seniority computed from the date of their becoming member of the service. 1969 and 1971 Amended Rules take away this right of these temporary Assistant Engineers by expressly providing that those Assistant Engineers who are selected and appointed in permanent vacancies against 50% quota provided by Rule 6 of the Amended 1969 Rules will only be considered for the purpose of computation of seniority from the date of their appointment against permanent vacancies. Therefore the temporary Assistant Engineers are not only deprived of the right that accrued to them in the matter of determination of their seniority but they are driven to a very peculiar position inasmuch as they are to wait until they are selected and appointed against permanent vacancies in the quota set up for this purpose by the amended Rule 6. The direct recruits on the basis of the competitive examination conducted by the Commission and appointed against permanent vacancies on probation will supersede ‘the rights that accrued under the unamended rules to the temporary Assistant Engineers having precedences in the matter of determination of their seniority from the date of their appointment against permanent vacancies. In other words, the Assistant Engineers appointed substantively against temporary posts several years before the direct recruits and working in the posts of Assistant Engineers will be pushed down to the direct recruits against permanent vacancies. It is also evident that there are about 200 Assistant Engineers who have been appointed substantively by the Government with the approval of the Public Service Commission before the enforcement of 1969 Rules. The direct recruits appointed on the basis of the examination against permanent vacancies will get precedence over Assistant Engineers appointed in the matter of determination of their seniority in the cadre of Assistant Engineers on the basis of changed rules, particularly new Rule 23 which takes into account only appointments in substantive vacancies. Thus appointments made under Rule 5(b)(i) are to be treated as temporary i.e. ‘T’ category officers and their such services will not be taken into consideration in determining seniority until they are selected and appointed to permanent posts under Rule 5(a)(ii). Note I to Rule 23 made it clear that an appointment made substantively on probation against a clear vacancy in a permanent post will be treated as substantive appointment. Thus the 1969 and 1971 amendments in effect take away from the officers appointed to the temporary posts in the Cadre through Public Service Commission, i.e. after selection by Public Service Commission, the substantive character of their appointment. These amendments are not only disadvantageous to the future recruits against temporary vacancies but they were made applicable retrospectively from 1-3-1962 even to existing officers recruited against temporary vacancies through Public Service Commission. As has been stated hereinbefore that the Government has power to make retrospective amendments to the Rules but if the Rules purport to take away the vested rights and are arbitrary and not reasonable then such retrospective amendments are subject to judicial scrutiny if they have infringed Arts. 14 and 16 of the Constitution. 19. As has been stated hereinbefore that the Government has power to make retrospective amendments to the Rules but if the Rules purport to take away the vested rights and are arbitrary and not reasonable then such retrospective amendments are subject to judicial scrutiny if they have infringed Arts. 14 and 16 of the Constitution. 19. The office memorandum dated December 7, 1961 which purports to amend the united Provinces Service of Engineers (Buildings and Roads Branch) Class II Rules, 1936 in our opinion cannot override, amend or supersede statutory rules. This memorandum is nothing but an administrative order or instruction and as such it cannot amend or supersede the statutory rules by adding something therein as has been observed by this Court in Sant Ram Sharma v. State of Rajasthan, (1967) 1 SCR 111 : ( AIR 1967 SC 1910 ). Moreover the benefits that have been conferred on the temporary Assistant Engineers who have become members of the service after being selected by the Public Service Commission in accordance with the service rules are entitled to have their seniority reckoned in accordance with the provisions of Rule 23 as it was then, from the date of their becoming member of the service, and this cannot be taken away by giving retrospective effect to the Rules of 1969 and 1971 as it is arbitrary, irrational and not reasonable”. (Emphasis supplied) 97. This decision, thus, lays down that the power to frame rules to regulate the conditions of service under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India carries with it the power to amend or alter the rules with a retrospective effect. However, such alteration must necessarily satisfy the tests of Articles 14 and 16(1) of the Constitution of India. This decision again shows that service rules are subject to change at any point of time, even with retrospective effect, provided there is no violation of the Fundamental Rights guaranteed under Part-III of the Constitution of India or any other constitutional provision. Hence, alteration in service rule laying down the age of superannuation is permissible at any point of time, and no vested right can be claimed by the employee in regard to the age of superannuation as provided under the unaltered service rule. 98. In Professor K.A. Nizami v.. Hence, alteration in service rule laying down the age of superannuation is permissible at any point of time, and no vested right can be claimed by the employee in regard to the age of superannuation as provided under the unaltered service rule. 98. In Professor K.A. Nizami v.. Aligarh Muslim University, Aligarh and others, 1986 UPLBEC 418, a Division Bench of this Court laid down as follows : “30. Since the petitioner’s terms and conditions of service were liable to be changed or modified he did not have any vested right. Consequently, the submission of the petitioner’s learned counsel that Ordinance No. 4 cannot affect the same is untenable. A Statute is said to be retrospective, which takes away or impairs any vested right under the existing laws. In this case, we have shown above, that the petitioner did not have any such right. His entitlement to continue as a Head of the Department was subject to codification and changes which could be made by the Ordinances. It is settled that existing rights can be taken away and to do so would not bring in the rule of retrospectivity.” (Emphasis supplied) 99. This decision, thus, lays down that as the terms and conditions of service are liable to be changed or modified, the employee does not have any vested right. This decision again shows that no vested right is acquired by an employee in regard to the age of superannuation as provided in the service rules. 100. In view of the above discussion, it is concluded that the petitioners had not acquired any vested right to continue upto the age of 60 years in view of the new Rule No. 23 as substituted with effect from 28/29.5.1998 raising the normal age of superannuation from 58 years to 60 years. Question No. 3 : 101. Question No. 3, as noted above, is : Even assuming that the amended Rule No. 23 was retrospective in operation and the petitioners had acquired any vested right to continue upto the age of 60 years, was the said right taken away in view of the clear intendment expressed in the Circular dated 30.3.2001? 102. Question No. 3 : 101. Question No. 3, as noted above, is : Even assuming that the amended Rule No. 23 was retrospective in operation and the petitioners had acquired any vested right to continue upto the age of 60 years, was the said right taken away in view of the clear intendment expressed in the Circular dated 30.3.2001? 102. Clause (c) of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, as already noted, lays down that where any enactment is repealed then, unless a different intention appears, the repeal shall not affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under any enactment so repealed. Therefore, normally the repeal shall not affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under any enactment so repealed. However, in case a different intention appears from the newly enacted Act or regulation, the right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under the repealed enactment may be affected. 103. While examining Question No. 2, we have already noticed various decisions of the Supreme Court which lay down that the rules framed under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India may be amended or altered with retrospective effect and vested rights may be affected or impaired, provided there is no violation of the fundamental rights guaranteed in Part III of the Constitution of India or any other constitutional provision. 104. Thus, in T.R. Kapoor case (supra), their Lordships of the Supreme Court opined as under (paragraph 16 of the said AIR) : “.......... Therefore, unless it is specifically provided in the rules, the employees who are already promoted before the amendment of the rules cannot be reverted and their promotions cannot be recalled. In other words, such rules laying down qualifications for promotion made with retrospective effect must necessarily satisfy the test of Arts. 14 and 16(1) of the Constitution........” (Emphasis supplied) 105. Therefore, unless it is specifically provided in the rules, the employees who are already promoted before the amendment of the rules cannot be reverted and their promotions cannot be recalled. In other words, such rules laying down qualifications for promotion made with retrospective effect must necessarily satisfy the test of Arts. 14 and 16(1) of the Constitution........” (Emphasis supplied) 105. In State of Gujarat v. Ramanlal Keshavlal Soni, AIR 1984 SC 161 , as quoted in T.R. Kapoor case (supra), their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed as follows : “..............The legislature is undoubtedly competent to legislate with retrospective effect to take away or impair any vested right acquired under existing laws but since the laws are made under a written Constitution, and have to conform to the do’s and dont’s of the Constitution neither prospective nor retrospective laws can be made so as to contravene Fundamental Rights. The law must satisfy the requirements of the Constitution today taking into account the accrued or acquired rights of the parties. (Emphasis supplied) 106. In P.D. Aggarwal case (supra), their Lordships of the Supreme Court opined as follows (paragraph 17 of the said AIR) : “............As has been stated hereinbefore that the Government has power to make retrospective amendments to the Rules but if the Rules purport to take away the vested rights and are arbitrary and not reasonable then such retrospective amendments are subject to judicial scrutiny if they have infringed Arts. 14 and 16 of the Constitution.....” (Emphasis supplied) 107. Certain other decisions in this regard may also be noticed. 108. In Ex-Captain K.C. Arora and another v. State of Haryana and others, AIR 1987 SC 1858 , their Lordships of the Supreme Court held as follows (paragraphs 15 and 23 of the said AIR) : “15. It may be pointed out at the very outset that the Parliament as also the State Legislature have plenary powers to legislate within the field of legislation committed to them and subject to certain constitutional restrictions they can legislate prospectively as well as retrospectively. It is, however, a cardinal principle of construction that every statute is prima facie prospective unless it is expressly or by necessary implication made to have retrospective effect. But the rule in general is applicable where the object of the statute is to affect the vested rights or to impose new burden or to impair existing obligations. It is, however, a cardinal principle of construction that every statute is prima facie prospective unless it is expressly or by necessary implication made to have retrospective effect. But the rule in general is applicable where the object of the statute is to affect the vested rights or to impose new burden or to impair existing obligations. Unless there are words in the statute sufficient to show the intention of the legislature to affect existing rights it is deemed to be prospective only. Provisions which touch a right in existence at the passing of the statute are not to be applied retrospectively in the absence of express enactment or necessary intendment. The Governor can also exercise the same powers under Art. 309 of the Constitution and there is not the slightest doubt that the impugned amendment brought in has been made retrospective. The impugned amendments in the instant case by necessary implication have undoubtedly a retrospective effect. 23. In view of this latest pronouncement by the Constitution Bench of this Court, the law appears to be well settled and the Haryana Government cannot take away the accrued rights of the petitioners and the appellants by making amendment of the rules with retrospective effect”. (Emphasis supplied) 109. This decision, thus, shows that a statutory provision is prima-facie prospective unless it is expressly or by necessary implication made to have retrospective effect. Therefore, the intention to affect vested rights or existing rights retrospectively may be expressed either in express words or such intention may follow from necessary implication. 110. In K. Narayanan and others v. State of Karnataka and others, AIR 1994 SC 55 , their Lordships of the Supreme Court held as follows (paragraph 7 of the said AIR) : "7. Rules operate prospectively. Retrospectivity is exception. Even where the Statutes permits framing of rule with retrospective effect the exercise of power must not operate discriminately or in violation of any constitutional right so as to affect vested right. The rule making authority should not be permitted normally to act in the past. The impugned rule made in 1985 permitting appointment by transfer and making it operative from 1976 subject to availability of vacancy in effect results in appointing a Junior Engineer in 1986 with effect from 1976. Retrospectivity of the rules is a camouflage for appointment of Junior Engineers from a back date. The impugned rule made in 1985 permitting appointment by transfer and making it operative from 1976 subject to availability of vacancy in effect results in appointing a Junior Engineer in 1986 with effect from 1976. Retrospectivity of the rules is a camouflage for appointment of Junior Engineers from a back date. In our opinion the rule operates viciously against all those Assistant Engineers who were appointed between 1976 to 1985. In Ex-Capt. K. C. Arora v. State of Haryana, (1984) 3 SCC 281 : ( AIR 1987 SC 1858 ) and P. D. Aggarwal v. State of U.P., (1987)3 SCC 622 : ( AIR 1987 SC 1676 ) it was held by this Court that the President or Governor cannot make such retrospective rules under Art. 309 of the Constitution as contravene Art. 14, 16 or 311 and affect vested right of an employee. Even in B. S. Yadav v. State of Haryana, (1981) 1 SCR 1024 : ( AIR 1981 SC 561 ) where the power to frame rules retrospectively was upheld it was observed (para 76 of AIR) : “Since the Governor exercises a Legislative power under the proviso to Art. 309 of the Constitution, it is open to him to give retrospective operation to the rules made under that provision. But the date from which the rules are made to operate must be shown to bear, either from the face of the rules or by extrinsic evidence, reasonable nexus with the provisions contained in the rules, especially when the retrospective effect extends over a long period as in this case.” As seen earlier there is no nexus between framing a rule permitting appointment by transfer and making it retrosepective with effect from 1976. Appointing a person to a higher post in a different cadre in which he has never worked is violative of constitutional guarantee of those who are working in the cadre. It is against basic principle of recruitment to any service. Appointing a person to a higher post in a different cadre in which he has never worked is violative of constitutional guarantee of those who are working in the cadre. It is against basic principle of recruitment to any service. Even in Mohammad Shujat Ali, ( AIR 1974 SC 1 631 ) (supra) where the Constitution Bench while reiterating that distinction in qualification was valid criteria for determining eligibility for promotion except where both held the same post and perform same duty did not strike down the rules as the differentiation in same class of persons was not brought about for the first time but existed from before and the two were treated as distinct and separate class. The retrospective operation of the impugned rule attempts to disturb a system which has been existing for more than twenty years. And that too without any rationale. Absence of nexus apart no rule can be made retrospectively to operate unjustly and unfairly against other. In our opinion the retrospective operation of the rule with effect from 1st January, 1976 is discriminatory and violative of Arts. 14 and 16." (Emphasis supplied) 111. This decision shows that even though the Rules framed under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India may be given retrospective effect but such retrospective effect must not be violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. 112. Hence, the principle, as deduced from the above decisions, is that the Rules pertaining to the conditions of service of employees may be amended or altered with retrospective effect, and such amended or altered Rules may affect the vested rights of the employees but such amended or altered Rules should not be violative of the Fundamental Rights given in Part III of the Constitution of India, particularly in Articles 14 and 16 thereof, or of any other constitutional provision. 113. Keeping in view the above principle,let us examine Question No. 3, which has already been reproduced above. 114. 113. Keeping in view the above principle,let us examine Question No. 3, which has already been reproduced above. 114. We are of the opinion that even if it be assumed that the amended Rule No. 23 was retrospective in operation and the petitioners had any vested right to continue upto the age of 60 years, the same was evidently taken away by clear intendment expressed in the said Circular dated 30.3.2001 which made the amended Rule No. 23 applicable to all the employees who had already attained the age of 58 years before 2.4.2001 as well as the employees who would be attaining the age of 58 years on or after 2.4.2001 i.e. during the month of April, 2001. There was no prohibition on the said Company to make such amendment provided the same did not violate the Fundamental Rights given in Part III of the Constitution of India, particularly in Articles 14 and 16 thereof, or any other constitutional provision. 115. There is neither any pleading in the writ petition nor has it been contended on behalf of the petitioners that the said amendment was violative of the Fundamental Rights given in Part III of the Constitution of India, particularly in Articles 14 and 16 thereof, or any other constitutional provision. In fact, as noted above, there is no challenge by the petitioners to the validity of the amendment made in Rule No. 23 with effect from 2.4.2001. 116. Even otherwise, as noted above, the amended Rule No. 23 was made applicable to the employees who had already attained the age of 58 years prior to 2.4.2001 and all the employees who would be attaining the age of 58 years on or after 2.4.2001 i.e. during the month of April, 2001. All the said employees would retire from the service of the said Company on 30.4.2001. Thus, the amended Rule No. 23 treated all the employees of the said Company alike. Therefore, no discrimination was made by the amended Rule No. 23 amongst the employees of the said Company. We are, therefore, of the view that the said amended Rule No. 23 was not violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. Thus, the amended Rule No. 23 treated all the employees of the said Company alike. Therefore, no discrimination was made by the amended Rule No. 23 amongst the employees of the said Company. We are, therefore, of the view that the said amended Rule No. 23 was not violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. We are further of the view that none of the other Fundamental Rights given in Part III of the Constitution of India nor any other constitutional provision has been violated by the amended Rule No. 23. 117. Hence, even if it be assumed that the amended Rule No. 23 was retrospective in operation and the petitioners had any vested right to continue upto the age of 60 years, the said Circular dated 30.3.2001 expressed clear intendment to take away such vested right. Further, as discussed above, the said Circular dated 30.3.2001 containing the amended Rule No. 23, whereby such vested right was taken away, did not violate the Fundamental Rights guaranteed under Part III of the Constitution of India, particularly in Articles 14 and 16 thereof, or any other constitutional provision. 118. In view of the above discussion, it is concluded that even assuming that the amended Rule No. 23 was retrospective in operation and the petitioners had acquired any vested right to continue upto the age of 60 years, the said right was taken away in view of the clear intendment expressed in the Circular dated 30.3.2001 which contained the amended Rule No. 23. 119. There is yet another aspect of the matter. 120. In M.P. Vidyut Karmchari Sangh v. M.P. Electricity Board, AIR 2004 SC 2974 , their Lordships of the Supreme Court held as under (paragraph 46 of the said AIR) : “46. Alterations in the age of retirement by the employer is a matter of executive policy and for sufficient and cogent reasons, the same is permissible. (See K. Nagaraj and others v. State of Andhra Pradesh and another, (1985) 1 SCC 523 ); Osmania University v. V. S. Muthurangam and others, (1997) 10 SCC 741 ; N. Lakshmana Rao and others v. State of Karnataka and others, (1976) 2 SCC 502 and Chandra Singh v. State of Rajasthan, (2003) 6 SCC 545 ). (See K. Nagaraj and others v. State of Andhra Pradesh and another, (1985) 1 SCC 523 ); Osmania University v. V. S. Muthurangam and others, (1997) 10 SCC 741 ; N. Lakshmana Rao and others v. State of Karnataka and others, (1976) 2 SCC 502 and Chandra Singh v. State of Rajasthan, (2003) 6 SCC 545 ). AIR 1985 SC 551 : 1985 Lab IC 746 : AIR 1997 SC 2758 : 1997 AIR SCW 2734 : 1997 Lab IC 2849 : AIR 1975 SC 1646 : 1975 Lab IC 1121 : AIR 2003 SC 2889 : 2003 AIR SCW 3518." 121. In the present case, as is evident from a perusal of various paragraphs of the counter affidavit, particularly paragraphs 5, 10, 12, 27, 38 and 39 thereof, the alteration in the age of retirement of the employees of the said Company from 60 years to 58 years was made for sufficient and cogent reasons, and there was no arbitrariness or unreasonableness involved in the said decision. 122. In view of this also, the amended Rule No. 23 is valid, and no illegality has been committed by applying the said amended Rule No. 23 to the petitioners. 123. In view of the above discussion, we are of the opinion that the Writ Petition lacks merits, and the same is liable to be dismissed. The Writ Petition is accordingly dismissed. However, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, no order is passed as to costs. ————