ORDER 1. This Civil Revision Petition is directed against the order dated 29.9.2005 in I.A. No. 130 of 2005 in O.S. No. 12 of 2005 on the file of the First Additional District Judge, Tirunelveli. 2. The first respondent in the present revision had filed a suit in O.S. No. 12 of 2005 before the trial Court against the revision petitioner and others praying for a decree for the payment of a sum of Rs. 18,78,478/- with interest at the rate of 18%. Summons was issued to the revision petitioner in the said suit and accordingly, he has entered appearance through counsel. Even though time was given to file written statement, the revision petitioner failed to submit the written statement within the period of 90 days from the date of service. Therefore, the petitioner filed an application in I.A. No. 130 of 2005 for the purpose of adjourning the case for a period of two weeks so as to enable him to file the written statement and to contest the claim of the first respondent. 3. The learned trial Judge considered the application in I.A. No. 130 of 2005 in a hypertechnical manner and having found that the affidavit was sworn to by the Junior counsel, attached to the counsel appearing for the revision petitioner and that the reason stated in the affidavit filed in support of the application is not a valid reason for extension of time for the purpose of filing written statement, was pleased to dismiss the application as per order dated 29.9.2005. It is the said order which is impugned in the present civil revision. 4. I have heard Mr. S. Jawaharlal, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and Mr. A.P. Athithan, learned counsel appearing for the first respondent. 5. The learned trial Judge rejected the prayer made by the revision petitioner for extension of time to file the written statement by a non-speaking order, and rather by a one line order saying that the reason stated is not a valid reason. While considering the application like the one, the trial Judge is expected to exercise his judicial mind and he should not be swallowed by technicalities. Everybody got a right to take part in a judicial proceeding preferred by him or filed against him and nobody should have a feeling that his case has not been heard by the Court properly. While considering the application like the one, the trial Judge is expected to exercise his judicial mind and he should not be swallowed by technicalities. Everybody got a right to take part in a judicial proceeding preferred by him or filed against him and nobody should have a feeling that his case has not been heard by the Court properly. So far as the revision petitioner is concerned, he is permitted by the Civil Procedure Code to file the written statement, of course, within the time provided by the Code or within the time allowed by the trial Court. However, it is not as if the Court is powerless to take care of situations like the present one, wherein the revision petitioner being the defendant in the suit failed to file the written statement within a period of 90 days. 6. It is true that Order 8 Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code provides that the defendant shall present the written statement of his defence within 30 days from the date of service of summons on him. As per the proviso to the said provision, in case the defendant fails to file the written statement within the period of 30 days, he shall be allowed to file the same on such other day, as may be specified by the Court, for reasons to be recorded in writing and the said outer limit shall not be later than 90 days from the date of service of summons. 7. In R.N. Jadi & Brothers v. Subhashchandra (2007) 6 MLJ 59 : 2007 (9) Scale 202 , the Apex Court considered the issue as to whether Order 8 Rule 1 of C.P.C. is mandatory or directory and after considering the entire matter in extenso held as under at p. 62 of MLJ: “6. The Code of Civil Procedure enacted in 1908 consolidated and amended the laws relating to the procedure of the Courts of Civil Judicature. It has undergone several amendments by several Acts of Central and State Legislatures. Under Section 122 C.P.C. the High Courts have power to amend by rules, the procedure laid down in the orders. In exercise of these powers various amendments have been made in the orders by various High Courts. Amendments have also been made keeping in view the recommendations of the Law Commission. Under Section 122 C.P.C. the High Courts have power to amend by rules, the procedure laid down in the orders. In exercise of these powers various amendments have been made in the orders by various High Courts. Amendments have also been made keeping in view the recommendations of the Law Commission. Anxiety of Parliament as evident from the amendments is to secure an early and expeditious disposal of civil suits and proceedings without sacrificing the fairness of trial and the principles of natural justice inbuilt in any sustainable procedure. The Statement of Objects and Reasons for enacting the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976 (104 of 1976) (in short ‘the 1976 Amendment Act’) highlights the following basic considerations in enacting the amendments: (i) with the accepted principles of natural justice that a litigant should get a fair trial in accordance; (ii) that every effort should be made to expedite the disposal of civil suits and proceedings, so that justice may not be delayed; (iii) that the procedure should not be complicated and should, to the utmost extent possible, ensure fair deal to the poorer Sections of the community who do not have the means to engage a pleader to defend their cases. 7. By the 1999 Amendment Act the text of Order 8 Rule 1 was sought to be substituted in a manner that the power of the Court to extend the time for filing the written statement was so circumscribed as would not permit the time being extended beyond 30 days from the date of service of summons on the defendant. Due to resistance from the members of the Bar against enforcing such and similar other provisions sought to be introduced by way of amendment, the Amendment Act could not be promptly notified for enforcement. The text of the provision in the present form has been introduced by the Amendment Act with effect from 1.7.2002. The purpose of such like amendments is stated in the Statement of Objects and Reasons as ‘to reduce delay in the disposal of civil cases.” The text of Order 8, Rule 1, as it stands now, reads as under: “1. The text of the provision in the present form has been introduced by the Amendment Act with effect from 1.7.2002. The purpose of such like amendments is stated in the Statement of Objects and Reasons as ‘to reduce delay in the disposal of civil cases.” The text of Order 8, Rule 1, as it stands now, reads as under: “1. Written statement-The defendant shall, within thirty days from the date of service of summons on him, present a written statement of his defence: Provided that where the defendant fails to file the written statement within the said period of thirty days, he shall be allowed to file the same on such other day, as may be specified by the Court, for reasons to be recorded in writing, but which shall not be later than ninety days from the date of service of summons. 8. Order 8 Rule 1 after the amendment casts an obligation on the defendant to file the written statement within 30 days from the date of service of summons on him and within the extended time falling within 90 days. The provision does not deal with the power of the Court and also does not specifically take away the power of the Court to take the written statement on record though filed beyond the time as provided for. Further, the nature of the provision contained in Order 8 Rule 1 is procedural. It is not a part of the substantive law. Substituted Order 8 Rule 1 intends to curb the mischief of unscrupulous defendants adopting dilatory tactics, delaying the disposal of cases causing inconvenience to the plaintiffs and the petitioners approaching the Court for quick relief and also to the serious inconvenience of the Court faced with frequent prayers for adjournments. The object is to expedite the hearing and not to scuttle the same. While justice delayed may amount to justice denied, justice hurried may in some cases amount to justice buried.” 8. In a recent judgment in Zolba v. Keshao 2008 (6) Scale 70 : (2008) 5 MLJ 1089 , the Apex Court, after noticing the Salem Bar Association’s case, observed as under at p. 1091 of MLJ: “6. While justice delayed may amount to justice denied, justice hurried may in some cases amount to justice buried.” 8. In a recent judgment in Zolba v. Keshao 2008 (6) Scale 70 : (2008) 5 MLJ 1089 , the Apex Court, after noticing the Salem Bar Association’s case, observed as under at p. 1091 of MLJ: “6. As noted herein earlier, the trial Court as well as the High Court, relying on the proviso to Order 8 Rule 1 of the C.P.C., refused to permit the appellant to file the written statement on the ground that such written statement was filed after 90 days from the date of service of summons. 7. Considering the facts and circumstances of the present case and the statements made in the application for condoning the delay in filing the written statement, we are not in a position to hold that the appellant was not entitled to file the written statement even after the expiry of the period mentioned in the proviso to Order 8 Rule 1 of the C.P.C. After reading the provisions, in particular the proviso to Order 8 Rule 1 of the C.P.C., we are unable to hold that the provisions under Order 8 Rule 1 are mandatory in nature. In Salem Advocate Bar Association, Tamil Nadu v. Union of India AIR 2005 SC 3353 , it has been clearly held that the provisions including the proviso to Order 8 Rule 1 of the C.P.C. are not mandatory but directory. It has been held that in decision that the delay can be condoned and the written statement can be accepted even after the expiry of 90 days from the date of service of summons in exceptionally hard cases. It has also been held in that decision that the use of the word “shall” in Order 8 Rule 1 of the C.P.C. by itself is not conclusive to determine whether the provision is mandatory or directory. The use of the word “shall” is ordinarily indicative of mandatory nature of the provision but having regard to the decision in that case, the same can be construed as directory. In paragraph 21 of the said decision, this Court observed as follows: “The use of the word “shall” in Order 8 Rule 1 by itself is not conclusive to determine whether the provision is mandatory or directory. In paragraph 21 of the said decision, this Court observed as follows: “The use of the word “shall” in Order 8 Rule 1 by itself is not conclusive to determine whether the provision is mandatory or directory. We have to ascertain the object which is required to be served by this provision and its design and context in which it is enacted. The use of the word “shall” is ordinarily indicative of mandatory nature of the provision but having regard to the context in which it is used or having regard to the intention of the legislation, the same can be construed as directory. The rule in question has to advance the cause of justice and not to defeat it. The rules of procedures are made to advance the cause of justice and not to defeat it. Construction of the rule or procedure which promotes justice and prevents miscarriage has to be preferred. The rules or procedure are hand-maid of justice and not its mistress. In the present context, the strict interpretation would defeat justice.” 8. Therefore, following the principles laid down in the decision, as noted hereinabove, it would be open to the Court to permit the appellant to file his written statement if exceptional circumstances have been made out. It cannot also be forgotten that in an adversarial system, no party should ordinarily be denied the opportunity of participating in the process of justice dispensation. Therefore, unless compelled by express and specific language of the statute, the provisions of Order 8 Rule 1 of C.P.C. or any procedural enactment should not be construed in a manner, which would leave the Court helpless to meet extraordinary situations in the ends of justice. .........” 9. In R.N. Jadi & Brothers v. Subhashchandra (supra), the Apex Court also considered the procedural law vis-a-vis substantive law with reference to Order 8 Rule 1 of C.P.C. and held thus at p. 63 and 64 of MLJ: “9. All the rules of procedure are the handmaid of justice. The language employed by the draftsman of processual law may be liberal or stringent, but the fact remains that the object of prescribing procedure is to advance the cause of justice. In an adversarial system, no party should ordinarily be denied the opportunity of participating in the process of justice dispensation. The language employed by the draftsman of processual law may be liberal or stringent, but the fact remains that the object of prescribing procedure is to advance the cause of justice. In an adversarial system, no party should ordinarily be denied the opportunity of participating in the process of justice dispensation. Unless compelled by express and specific language of the statute, the provisions of C.P.C. or any other procedural enactment ought not to be construed in a manner which would leave the Court helpless to meet extraordinary situations in the ends of justice. 10. The mortality of justice at the hands of law troubles a judge’s conscience and points an angry interrogation at the law reformer. 11. The processual law so dominates in certain systems as to overpower substantive rights and substantial justice. The humanist rule that procedure should be the handmaid, not the mistress, of legal justice compels consideration of vesting a residuary power in judges to act ex debito justitiae where the tragic sequel otherwise would be wholly inequitable. Justice is the goal of jurisprudence, processual, as much as substantive. (See Sushil Kumar Sen v. State of Bihar.) 12. No person has a vested right in any course of procedure. He has only the right of prosecution or defence in the manner for the time being by or for the Court in which the case is pending, and if, by an Act of Parliament the mode of procedure is altered, he has no other right than to proceed according to the altered mode. (See Blyth v. Blyth.) A procedural law should not ordinarily be construed as mandatory, the procedural law is always subservient to and is in aid to justice. Any interpretation which eludes or frustrates the recipient of justice is not to be followed. (See Shreenath v. Rajesh.) 13. Processual law is not to be a tyrant but a servant, not an obstruction but an aid to justice. Procedural prescriptions are the handmaid and not the mistress, a lubricant, not a resistant in the administration of justice. 14. It is also to be noted that though the power of the Court under the proviso appended to Rule 1 of Order 8 is circumscribed by the words ‘shall not be later than ninety days’ but the consequences flowing from non-extension of time are not specifically provided for though they may be read by necessary implication. 14. It is also to be noted that though the power of the Court under the proviso appended to Rule 1 of Order 8 is circumscribed by the words ‘shall not be later than ninety days’ but the consequences flowing from non-extension of time are not specifically provided for though they may be read by necessary implication. Merely, because a provision of law is couched in a negative language implying mandatory character, the same is not without exceptions. The Courts, when called upon to interpret the nature of the provision, may, keeping in view the entire context in which the provision came to be enacted, hold the same to be directory though worded in the negative form. 15. Challenge to the constitutional validity of the Amendment Act and the 1999 Amendment Act was rejected by this Court in Salem Advocate Bar Assn. (I) v. Union of India. However, to work out modalities in respect of certain provisions a committee was constituted. After receipt of the committee’s report the matter was considered by a three-Judge Bench in Salem Advocate Bar Assn. (II) v. Union of India (supra). As regards Order 8 Rule 1 the committee’s report is as follows: The question is whether the Court has any power or jurisdiction to extend the period beyond 90 days. The maximum period of 90 days to file written statement has been provided but the consequences on failure to file written statement within the said period have not been provided for in Order 8 Rule 1. The point for consideration is whether the provision providing for maximum period of ninety days is mandatory and, therefore, the Court is altogether powerless to extend the time even in an exceptionally hard case. It has been common practice for the parties to take long adjournments for filing written statements. The legislature with a view to curb this practice and to avoid unnecessary delay and adjournments, has provided for the maximum period within which the written statement is required to be filed. The mandatory or directory nature of Order 8 Rule 1 shall have to be determined by having regard to the object sought to be achieved by the amendment. It is, thus, necessary to find out the intention of the legislature. The consequences which may follow and whether the same were intended by the legislature have also to be kept in view. In Raza Buland Sugar Co. It is, thus, necessary to find out the intention of the legislature. The consequences which may follow and whether the same were intended by the legislature have also to be kept in view. In Raza Buland Sugar Co. Ltd. v.Municipal Board, Rampura Constitution Bench of this Court held that the question whether a particular provision is mandatory or directory cannot be resolved by laying down any general rule and it would depend upon the facts of each case and for that purpose the object of the statute in making out the provision is the determining factor. The purpose for which the provision has been made and its nature, the intention of the legislature in making the provision, the serious general inconvenience or injustice to persons resulting from whether the provision is read one way or the other, the relation of the particular provision to other provisions dealing with the same subject and other considerations which may arise on the facts of a particular case including the language of the provision, have all to be taken into account in arriving at the conclusion whether a particular provision is mandatory or directory. In Sangram Singh v. Election Tribunal, Kotah considering the provisions of the Code dealing with the trial of suits, it was opined that (SCR pp. 8-9): Now a code of procedure must be regarded as such. It is procedure, something designed to facilitate justice and further its ends: not a penal enactment for punishment and penalties; not a thing designed to trip people up. Too technical a construction of Sections that leaves no room for reasonable elasticity of interpretation should therefore be guarded against (provided always that justice is done to both sides) lest the very means designed for the furtherance of justice be used to frustrate it. Next, there must be ever present to the mind the fact that our laws of procedure are grounded on a principle of natural justice which requires that men should not be condemned unheard, that decisions should not be reached behind their backs, that proceedings that affect their lives and property should not continue in their absence and that they should not be precluded from participating in them. Of course, there must be exceptions and where they are clearly defined they must be given effect to. Of course, there must be exceptions and where they are clearly defined they must be given effect to. But taken by and large, and subject to that proviso, our laws of procedure should be construed, wherever that is reasonably possible, in the light of that principle.” 10. The application filed by the petitioner for extension of time to file written statement was considered by the learned trial Judge in a highly technical manner, without making an attempt to probe into the bona fides or otherwise of the steps taken by the revision petitioner to file the written statement. Therefore, I am of the view that the learned trial Judge was clearly in error in rejecting the prayer as contained in the application in I.A. No. 130 of 2005 and as such, the impugned order cannot be sustained. Hence, the order dated 29.9.2005 in I.A. No. 130 of 2005 is set aside and the civil revision petition is allowed accordingly. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs. Consequently, the connected miscellaneous petition is closed. C.R.P. allowed.