S. U. KHAN, J. Heard learned Counsel for both the parties. All substitu tion applications in both the writ petitions are allowed. 2. Both the writ petitions have been filed by the tenants against the landlords in respect of the same property. 3. Initially Abdul Sattar was the tenant who died leaving behind sev eral legal representatives. Shri Abdul Aziz and Smt. Zohra - husband and wife were originally landlords. They filed S. C. C. Suit No. 763 of 1980 against Abdul Razzak one of the sons of original tenant Abdul Sattar. In the suit eviction was sought on several grounds including the ground of sub-letting, it was alleged that Abdul Razzak had sub-let the tenanted house to Abdul Majeed who was real brother of Abdul Razzak. Suit was dismissed on 15. 4. 1983 holding that there was not sub-tenancy. Said judgment and decree was not challenged. Thereafter in 1984-85 original owners landlords Abdul Aziz and Smt. Zohra transferred the house in dispute to Jamil Ahmad. Information of the said transfer was given by the transferor and transferee both to some of the heirs of Abdul Sattar. Thereafter the new purchasers filed release application before Rent Control and Eviction Officer under section 16 of Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 stating therein that Mohd. Nasir the tenant had sublet the property in dispute to Aslam hence there was vacancy. Application was filed on 30. 12. 1986. R. C. and E. O. /city Magistrate, Kanpur through order dated 25. 5. 1988 declared the house in dispute to be vacant. The said order was passed in case No. 3 of 1987, Jamil Ahmad v. Aslam. Said order has been challenged through the first writ petition. Before R. C. and E. O. earlier judgment of 1983 was also filed. 4. It is not disputed that Mohd. Nasir is son of Abdul Razzak and Mohd. Aslam is son of Abdul Majeed. Both Abdul Razzak and Abdul Majeed were sons of Abdul Sattar the original tenant. In my opinion the order declaring vacancy is patently erroneous in law. Both Mohd. Nasir and Mohd. Aslam are grand sons of Abdul Sattar hence residence of any of them can not amount to vacancy. Accordingly, first writ petition is allowed. Order dated 25. 5. 1988 declaring va cancy is set aside. 5. In my opinion the order declaring vacancy is patently erroneous in law. Both Mohd. Nasir and Mohd. Aslam are grand sons of Abdul Sattar hence residence of any of them can not amount to vacancy. Accordingly, first writ petition is allowed. Order dated 25. 5. 1988 declaring va cancy is set aside. 5. Simultaneously new purchaser landlord Jameel Ahmad also initiated eviction/release proceedings against three sons of Abdul Razzak i. e. , Mohd. Nasir, Abdul Wahab and Abdul Salam, and Smt. Bismillah wife of Late Abdul Razzak on the ground of bonafide need under section 21 of Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 in the form of case No. 58 of 1989. Release application was filed under both the Clauses (a) and (b) of section 21 (I) of the Act i. e. , on the ground of bonafide need as well as dilapidated condition of the building. Prescribed Authority, Kanpur through judgment and order dated 11. 5. 1993 allowed the release appli cation only on the ground of dilapidated condition i. e. , under section 21 (1) (b) of the Act but dismissed the release application on the ground of bonafide need i. e. under section 21 (1) (a) of the Act. Against the said judgment and order both the parties i. e. landlord and opposite parties-tenants in the release applica tion filed appeals being Rent Appeal No. 90 of 1993 and Rent Appeal No. 95 of 1993. In the appeals, petitioners who are also descendants of Abdul Sattar the original tenant, filed impleadment applications. Applications were rejected on 10. i. 1995. Applications for recalling the said order were filed on 6. 2. 1995 which were rejected on 6. 2,1995 itself. On 10. 1. 1995 impleadment application were rejected ex-parte. However, the said order is quite detailed order which was passed after hearing learned Counsel for the landlord and after perusing the allegations made in the impleadment applications. The orders dated 10. 1. 1995 and 6. 2. 1995 have been challenged through the second writ petition. 6. 2,1995 itself. On 10. 1. 1995 impleadment application were rejected ex-parte. However, the said order is quite detailed order which was passed after hearing learned Counsel for the landlord and after perusing the allegations made in the impleadment applications. The orders dated 10. 1. 1995 and 6. 2. 1995 have been challenged through the second writ petition. 6. After the death of the tenant all his heirs inherit the tenancy jointly and in case of joint tenants, impleadment of some of them in suit/application for eviction is sufficient as held by the Supreme Court in Harish Tandon v. Additional District Magistrate, Allahabad, U,p. and A. C. Juker v. K. P. Mantri AIR 2001 SC 225 =2001 SCFRC 342. However, in my opinion under the facts and circumstances of the case there was no harm in permitting the petitioners to be impleaded in the ap peals. 7. Accordingly, second writ petition is also allowed. Orders dated 10. 1. 1995 and 6. 2. 1995 passed in Appeals Nos. 90 of 1993 and 95 of 1993 are set aside and impleadment applications filed by the petitioners are allowed. However, it is clarified that firstly petitioners shall be permitted only to ar gue the appeals and not to adduce any evidence. Secondly no other heir of orig inal tenant Abdul Sattar should be permitted to file any impleadment applica tion. The Lower Appellate Court shall decide the appeals very expeditiously. 8. I have held in Khursheeda v. AD. J. 2004 (55) ALR 586 and H. M. Kichlu v. A. D. J. , 2004 (57) ALR 485 that while granting relief against eviction to the tenant in respect of building covered by Rent Courts Act or while maintaining the said relief already granted by the Courts below, Writ Court is empowered to enhance the rent to a reason able extent. 9. In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda (supra), I placed reliance upon the Supreme Court authority of M. V. Acharya v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1998 SC 602 =1998 SC FBRC 75 where it was held that it was essential to provide for periodical enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Arts- The Supreme Court has further held that frozen rents are giving rise to lawlessness and landlords out of frustration are approaching muscle man to get the premises vacated and Courts of law are be coming redundant in this sphere. This authority has recently been followed by the Supreme Court in Satyawati Sharma (dead) by LRs. v. Union of India and another AIR 1996 SC 2410 =1996 SCFBRC 472 part of Para-29 and Para-34 of which are quoted below : "29. It is trite to say that legislation which may be quite reasonable and rationale at the time of its enactments may with the lapse of time and/or due to change of circumstances become arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of the doctrine of equity and even if the validity of such legisla tion may have been upheld at a given point of time, the Court may, in sub sequent litigation, strike down the same if it is found that the rationale of classification has become non-existent. 34. In Malpe Vishwanath Acharya and others v. State of Maharashtra and another (supra) the Court found that the criteria for de termination and fixation of rent by freezing or by pegging down of rent as on 1. 9. 1940 or as on first date of letting, had, with the passage of time become irrational and arbitrary but did not strike down the same on the ground that extended period of Bombay Rent Act was coming to an end on 31. 3. 1998. " 10. Under U. P. Rent Control Act, there is no provision of enhancement of rent after October, 1972 [except where landlord is public charitable or public religious institution (section 9-A) or Government is tenant (section 21 (8)]. In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I have also placed reliance upon the au thority of Supreme Court in Shangrila Food Products Ltd. v. Life Insurance Corporation of India, AIR 1996 SC 2410 =1996 SCFBRC 472 paragraph-11 of which is quoted below : "it is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction un der Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the par ties complete and substantial justice. This jurisdiction of the High Court, being extraordinary, is normally exercisable keeping in mind the principles of equity. One of the ends of the equity is to promote honesty and fair play. This jurisdiction of the High Court, being extraordinary, is normally exercisable keeping in mind the principles of equity. One of the ends of the equity is to promote honesty and fair play. If there be any unfair advantage gained by a party priorly, before invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court, the Court can take into account the un fair advantage gained and can require the party to shed the unfair gain be fore granting relief. " Thereafter in Para-8 of the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I held as under : "rent Control Act confers a reasonable advantage upon the tenant of protection against arbitrary eviction. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the land lord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. This advantage is also coupled with the advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent. The latter advantage cannot be said to be either reasonable or equitable. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid authority of S. F. P. v. LJ. C. ,1 has laid down that while granting relief to a party the Writ Court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. By slightly extending the said doctrine it may safely be held that while granting the reasonable advantage to the tenant conferred upon him by the Rent Control Act the tenant may be asked to shed the un-reasoanble arbitrary advantage conferred upon him by the said Rent Control Act. The Writ Court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the un-reasoanble benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him in the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be. Tenant will have to shed the undue advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Act to barter his protection from arbitrary eviction provided for by the said Act. " 11. Tenant will have to shed the undue advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Act to barter his protection from arbitrary eviction provided for by the said Act. " 11. Thereafter in H. M. Kitchlu v. A. D. J. ,2 I have held that the same prin ciple of enhancement of rent to a reasonable extent may be made applicable while dismissing the writ petition of the landlord for the reason that by doing so Writ Court approves the protection of Rent Control Act granted to the tenant by the Courts below. 12. Property in dispute contains three rooms, courtyard and latrine and is situate in Kanpur Nagar which is most expensive city of Uttar Pradesh. Rent of Rs. 15/- per month for such an accommodation is virtually as well as actually no rent. It is rather ridiculous. Accordingly, it is directed that with effect from September, 2008 onwards tenants-petitioners shall pay rent @ Rs. 1,000/- per month to the landlords- respondents. During pendency of tenants appeal before the Lower Appellate Court, eviction of the tenants in pursuance of judgment and order of the Prescribed Authority challenged in the appeal shall remain stayed on the condition that this amount of Rs. 1,000/- per month is deposited before the Lower Appellate Court by 7th of each succeeding month for immedi ate payment to the landlords- respondents, Writ Petition Allowed. .