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2008 DIGILAW 1685 (PNJ)

Dinesh And Etc. v. State Of Haryana

2008-09-30

SHAM SUNDER

body2008
Judgment 1. This judgment shall dispose of Criminal Appeal No. 327-SB of 1992, filed by Dinesh, and Criminal Appeal No. 160-SB of 1994, filed by Munna Lal @ Babbu, accused (now appellants), arising out of the judgment of conviction dated 29-8-1992, and the order of sentence dated 31-8-1992, rendered by the Court of Addl. Sessions Judge (I), Faridabad, vide which it convicted Dinesh, accused/appellant, for the offence, punishable under S. 366, IPC, and sentenced him, to undergo rigorous imprisonment, for a period of three years, and to pay a fine of Rs. 1000/-, and in default of payment of the same, to undergo rigorous imprisonment for another period of six months, and convicted Munna Lal @ Babbu, accused /appellant, for the offence, punishable under Section 376, IPC, and sentenced him, to undergo rigorous imprisonment, for a period of seven years, and to pay a fine of Rs. 2000/-, and in default of payment of the same, to undergo rigorous imprisonment for another period of one year. 2. The prosecutrix (her name is not being mentioned in view of the pronouncement of the Apex Court and she is being referred to as prosecutrix) aged 18/19 years, is the third child of Gopal. On 12-5-1991, Gopal was away from his house, for some work. His wife, Smt. Phoolwati, along with her daughter, (the prosecutrix), was present, in the house. On that day, in the morning, the mother of the prosecutrix, asked her to accompany her, to the fields, for some agricultural work. She declined, on account of the hot weather outside. She further told her that she will go to nearby Tigaon village, for wearing bangles. This led to a tiff between the mother, and the daughter. It was. stated that the prosecutrix left village Bhainsrawali, for village Tigaon, to wear bangles, at the shop of a Bangle-seller, popularly called Manihar. When she was, in the half way, Dinesh, accused, resident of Bhainsrawali and known to her, met her. He was on his scooter. He offered her a lift, on the scooter, for dropping her, at the place of work of her brother Jagdish, who was employed with Kamla Syntex Faridabad. It was further stated that the prosecutrix took the lift, on the scooter of Dinesh, accused. He was on his scooter. He offered her a lift, on the scooter, for dropping her, at the place of work of her brother Jagdish, who was employed with Kamla Syntex Faridabad. It was further stated that the prosecutrix took the lift, on the scooter of Dinesh, accused. Dinesh, accused, instead of dropping her, at the place of work of her brother, took her to ISBT, Delhi, and parked his scooter outside the Bus-stand. Munna Lal alias Babbu, accused, a driver by profession met Dinesh, accused, there. They had some conversation. Dinesh, accused, thereafter, handed over the prosecutrix, to Munna Lal, accused, who made her to sit in a three-wheeler, which he himself was driving, and took her to village Asmanpur, Delhi. Dinesh, accused thereafter, disappeared. Munna Lal, accused, kept the prosecutrix, for about a month, and repeatedly raped forcibly. She was also put under fear by Munna Lal, accused, and was not allowed to meet anybody, at village Asmanpur. When Gopal, returned home, in the evening, Phoolwati, narrated her the episode, in the morning. When the prosecutrix, did not return home, in the evening, a search for her, was made at village Tigaon, with relations, and well-wishers. Finding no clue of the prosecutrix, Gopal, lodged a report with the police, on 30-5-1991, about her disappearance. In the meanwhile, Dinesh, accused, contacted the family of Gopal, and offered to search, and bring the prosecutrix, if a sum of Rs. 400/-, was paid to him. This offer was accepted by the family of Gopal. When a sum of Rs. 400/- was arranged, and offered to Dinesh, accused, he declined to accept the money. He, however, did not bring back the prosecutrix, as per promise. On 12-6-1991. Gopal, lodged a formal report, with the police, regarding kidnapping/abduction of the prosecutrix. He suspected Dinesh, accused, for kidnapping/abduction of the prosecutrix. Munna Lal, accused, after keeping the prosecutrix, in his house and repeatedly raping her there, forcibly, brought her to jhuggis, near Bus-stand Ballabhgarh. She was kept there. He repeatedly raped her, in that jhuggi, which was located in the cluster of jhuggis, without her consent, and against her will. A secret information was received by the police, on 30-6-1991, whereupon, a raid was conducted, at that jhuggi. The prosecutrix was recovered from that jhuggi, where she had been confined by Munna Lal, accused. The prosecutrix, was sent for medico-legal examination. A secret information was received by the police, on 30-6-1991, whereupon, a raid was conducted, at that jhuggi. The prosecutrix was recovered from that jhuggi, where she had been confined by Munna Lal, accused. The prosecutrix, was sent for medico-legal examination. She was medicolegally examined by Dr. Anita Bansal, Medical Officer, General Hospital, Ballabgarh. The doctor opined that the sexual intercourse had been committed with the prosecutrix, a number of times. After medicolegal examination, the prosecutrix, was produced on 1-7-1991, before the Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Faridabad, for her statement, under Section 164, Cr. P.C. Her statement under Section 164, Cr. P.C. was recorded. Munna Lal alias Babbu, and Dinesh, accused, were arrested. Medical examination of Munna Lal, accused, was conducted by Dr. C. Pal, RMO, General Hospital, Ballabgarh, who found 3 injuries, on his person. He also found him, fit to commit sexual intercourse. Ossification test of the prosecutrix was got conducted, for determining her age. She was found to be of the age of 17/18 years. Sealed plan of the scene of occurrence was prepared. The statements of the witnesses, were recorded. The offence, under Section 376, IPC, was added qua Munna Lal, accused. After the completion of investigation, the accused were challaned. 3. On their appearance, in the Court of the Committing Magistrate, the copies of documents, relied upon by the prosecution, werersupplied to the accused. After the case was received by commitment, in the Court of Sessions, charge under Section 376 of the IPC, was framed against Munna Lal, accused, whereas, charge under Section 366, IPC, was framed, against Dinesh, accused, to which they pleaded not guilty and claimed trial. 4. The prosecution, in support of its case, examined Dr. Anita Bansal, (P.W. 1), who medico-legally examined the prosecutrix. Dr. C. Pal, Medical Officer, (P.W. 2), who medico-legally examined accused. Munna Lal, Dr. V. K. Aggarwal, (P.W. 3), who conducted the ossification test, of the prosecutrix, Beg Raj, Constable, (P.W. 4), Gopal, (P.W. 5), father of the prosecutrix, Sohan Lal, Draftsman (P.W. 6), Smt. Phoolwati, (P.W. 7), mother of the prosecutrix, the prosecutrix, (P.W. 8), Rattan Singh, S.I. (P.W. 9), Bhagat Singh, ASI (P.W. 10), Kailash Chand, ASI, (P.W. 11), and S. K. Goyal, Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, (P.W. 12). Thereafter, the Public Prosecutor, for the State, closed the prosecution evidence. 5. The statements of the accused under Section 313, Cr. Thereafter, the Public Prosecutor, for the State, closed the prosecution evidence. 5. The statements of the accused under Section 313, Cr. P.C. were recorded, and they were put all the incriminating circumstances, appearing against them, in the prosecution evidence. They pleaded false implication. 6. It was stated by Dinesh, accused, that he was falsely implicated, at the behest of Gopal, on account of party faction, in the village. According to Dinesh, accused, he belonged to the faction of BJP, while Gopal, was supporting the Congress. 7. Munna Lal, accused, denied that the prosecutrix was ever made over to him, by Dinesh, accused, at Bus-stand Delhi, or that he kept her with him, and raped her, at Asmanpur, and in a jhuggi at Ballabgarh. It was also denied by him, that she was recovered from the jhuggi. He, however, admitted his arrest by the police, and his medico-legal examination, by the Doctor. It was stated by him, that he had rented a room, for his residence, in village Asmanpur. He further stated that he was arrested, by the Police, from that place. He further stated that he had no nexus with the prosecutrix. 8. Dinesh, accused, however, produced copy of the DDR No. 2, dated 30-5-1991, Ex. PQ, which was lodged by Gopal, father of the prosecutrix. Thereafter, the accused, closed the defence evidence. 9. After hearing the Public Prosecutor for the State, the Counsel for the accused, and, on going through the evidence, on record, the trial Court, convicted and sentenced the accused, as stated hereinbefore. 10. Feeling aggrieved, against the judgment of conviction, and the order of sentence, rendered by the trial Court, the instant appeals, were filed by the appellants. 11. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties, and have gone through the evidence and record of the case, carefully. 12. It is settled principle of Criminal Jurisprudence, that the prosecution, is required to prove its case, against the accused, beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court is not required to act on mere suspicion, conjectures or surmises or suspicious circumstances, to bring home the guilt to the accused. Reasonable doubt should not be stretched too far, to suspect everything so as to defeat the ends of justice. The Court is not required to act on mere suspicion, conjectures or surmises or suspicious circumstances, to bring home the guilt to the accused. Reasonable doubt should not be stretched too far, to suspect everything so as to defeat the ends of justice. In Gurbachan Singh V/s. Sat Pal, AIR 1990 SC 209 : (1990 Cri LJ 562), the principle of law, laid down, was to the effect, that reasonable doubt, is simply that degree of doubt, which could permit a reasonable and just man to come to a conclusion. Reasonableness of the doubt must be commensurate with the nature of offence to be investigated; Exaggerated devotion to the rule of benefit of doubt, must not nurture fanciful doubts, and lingering suspicions and thereby destroy social defence. Justice cannot be made sterile, on the plea, that it is better to let hundred guilty escape, than punish an innocent. Letting guilty escape is not doing justice according to law. In State of Uttar Pradesh V/s. Anil Singh, AIR 1988 SC 1998 : (1989 Cri LJ 88), the principle of law, laid down, was to the effect, that it is necessary to remember that a Judge does not preside over a criminal trial merely to see, that no innocent man is punished. A Judge also preside to see that guilty man does not escape. One is as important, as the other. Both are public duties, which the Judge has to perform. 13. Before touching the merits of the case, in the light of the evidence, on record, in the first instance, it must be stated, as to what approach, the Court should adopt, while evaluating the prosecution evidence, particularly the evidence of the prosecutrix, in sex related offence. Is it essential that the evidence of the prosecutrix should be corroborated in material particulars, before the Court bases a conviction on her testimony ? Does the rule of prudence demand that in all cases save the rarest of rare, the Court should look for corroboration before acting on the evidence of the prosecutrix? Let us see, if the Evidence Act, provides the clue to this riddle, under the Evidence Act, evidence means and includes all statements, which the Court permits or requires to be made before it, by the witnesses, in relation to the matters of fact, under inquiry. Let us see, if the Evidence Act, provides the clue to this riddle, under the Evidence Act, evidence means and includes all statements, which the Court permits or requires to be made before it, by the witnesses, in relation to the matters of fact, under inquiry. Under Section 59 of the Evidence Act, all facts, except the contents of documents, may be proved by oral evidence. Section 118 then illustrates, as to who may give oral evidence. According to that Section, all persons are competent to testify, unless the Court considers that they are prevented from understanding the questions, put to them, or from giving rational answers to those questions, by tender years, extreme old age, disease, whether of body or mind, or any other cause of the same kind. Even, in the case of an accomplice, Section 133 provides that he/ she shall be a competent witness, against an accused person, and the conviction is not illegal, merely because it proceeds upon the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice. However, illustration (b) to Section 114, which lays down a rule of practice, says that the Court may presume that an accomplice is unworthy of credit, unless he is corroborated, in material particulars. Thus, under Section 133, which lays down a rule of law, an accomplice is a competent witness, and the conviction based solely on his uncorroborated evidence, is not illegal, although in view of Section 114 illustration (b), the Courts do not, as a matter of practice, do so, and look for corroboration, in material particulars. This is the conjoint effect of Sections 133 and 114 illustration (b). 13-A. In State of Maharashtra v. Chandraprakash Kewalchand Jain with Stree Atyachar Virodhi Parishad V/s. Chandraprakash Kewalchand Jain, 1990 (2) Chandigarh, Law Reporter 228 (SC) : (1990 Cri LJ 889) it was held as under : "A prosecutrix of a sex-offence cannot be on par with an accomplice. She is in fact a victim of the crime. The Evidence Act nowhere says that her evidence cannot be accepted unless it is corroborated in material particulars. She is undoubtedly a competent witness under Section 118 and her evidence must receive the same weight as is attached to an injured in cases of physical violence. The same degree of care and caution must attach in the evaluation of her evidence, as in the case of an injured complainant or witness and no more. She is undoubtedly a competent witness under Section 118 and her evidence must receive the same weight as is attached to an injured in cases of physical violence. The same degree of care and caution must attach in the evaluation of her evidence, as in the case of an injured complainant or witness and no more. What is necessary is that the Court must be alive to and conscious of the fact that it is dealing with the evidence of a person, who is interested in the outcome of the charge levelled by her. If the Court keeps this in mind and feels satisfied that it can act on the evidence of the prosecutrix, there is no rule of law or practice incorporated in the Evidence Act, similar to illustration (b) to Section 114 which required it to look for corroboration. If for the same reason the Court is hesitant to place implicit reliance on the testimony of the prosecutrix, it may look for evidence which may lend assurance to her testimony short of corroboration required in the case of an accomplice. The nature of evidence to lend assurance to the testimony of the prosecutrix must necessarily depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. But if a prosecutrix is an adult and of full understanding the Court is entitled to base a conviction on her evidence unless the same is shown to be infirm and not trustworthy. If the totality of the circumstances appearing on the record of the case disclose that the prosecutrix does not have a strong motive to falsely involve the person charged, the Court should ordinarily have no hesitation, in accepting her evidence. We have, therefore, no doubt, in our minds, that ordinarily the evidence of a prosecutrix who does not lack understanding must be accepted. The degree of proof required must not be higher than is expected of an injured witness. For the above reasons we think that exception has rightly been taken to the approach of the High Court as is reflected in the following passage : "It is only, in the rarest of rare cases if the Court finds that the testimony of the prosecutrix is so trustworthy truthful and reliable that other corroboration may not be necessary." With respect, the law is not correctly stated. If we may say so, it is just the reverse. If we may say so, it is just the reverse. Ordinarily, the evidence of prosecutrix, must carry the same weight as is attached to an injured person, who is a victim of violence, unless there are special circumstances which call for greater caution, in which case it would be safe to act on her testimony, if there is independent evidence lending assurance to her accusation. We think it proper, having regard to the increase in the number of sex-violation cases in the recent past, particularly cases of molestation and rape in custody, to remove the notion, if it persists, that the testimony of a woman who is a victim of sexual violence must ordinarily be corroborated in material particulars, except in the rarest of rare cases. To insist on corroboration except in the rarest of rare cases is to equate a woman who is a victim of the lust of another with an accomplice to crime and thereby insult womanhood. It would be adding insult to injury to tell a woman that her story of woe would not be believed unless it is corroborated in material particulars in the case of an accomplice to a crime. Ours is a conservative society where it concerns sexual behaviour. Ours is not a permissive society as in some of the Western and European countries. Our standard of decency and morality in public life is not the same as in those countries. It is, however, evident that respect for womanhood, in our country is on active and cases of molestation and rape are steadly growing. Indian woman is now required to suffer indignities in different forms. From lewd remarks to eve-teasing, from molestation to rape. Decency and morality in public life can be promoted and protected only if we deal strictly with those, who violate the social norms. The standard of proof to be required by the Court in such cases, must take into account the fact that such crimes are generally committed on the sly and very rarely direct evidence of a person other than the prosecutrix is available. Courts must also realise that ordinarily woman, more so a young girl, will not stake her reputation by levelling a false charge concerning her chastity. Courts must also realise that ordinarily woman, more so a young girl, will not stake her reputation by levelling a false charge concerning her chastity. It is time to recall the observation of this Court made not so far back in Bhaiwaca Bhognibhai Hirjinbhai: In the Indian setting refusal to act on the testimony of a victim of sexual assault in the absence of corroboration as a rule, is a doing insult to injury. Why should the evidence of the girl or the woman who complains of rape or sexual molestation be viewed with the aid of spectacles fitted with lenses tinged with doubt, disbelief or suspicion ? To do so is to justify the charge of male chauvinism in a male dominated society. We must analyse the argument in support of the need for corroboration and subject it to relentless and remorseless cross-examination. And we must do so with a logical, and not an opinionated eye in the light of probabilities with our feet firmly planted on the soil of India and with our eyes focussed on the Indian horizon. We must not be swept off the feet by the approach, made in the Western world which has its own social milies, its own permissive values, and its own code of life. Corroboration may, by considered essential to establish a sexual offence in the backdrop of the social ecology of the Western World. It is wholly unnecessary to import the said concept on a turn Key basis and to transplant it on the Indian soil regardless of the altogether different atmosphere, attitudes, mores, responses of the Indian Society and its profile. The identities of the two worlds are different. The solution of problems therefore, cannot be identical. Further this Court said : Without the fear of making two wide a statement or of over-stating the case it can be said that rarely will a girl or a woman in India false allegations of sexual assault. The statement is generally true in the context of the urban as also rural society. It is also by the and large true in the context of the sophisticated, not so sophisticated, and unsophisticated society. Only very rarely can one conceivably come across an exception or to and that too possibly from amongst the urban elites. Because (1). The statement is generally true in the context of the urban as also rural society. It is also by the and large true in the context of the sophisticated, not so sophisticated, and unsophisticated society. Only very rarely can one conceivably come across an exception or to and that too possibly from amongst the urban elites. Because (1). A girl or a woman in the tradition bound non-permissive society of India would be extremely reluctant even to admit that any incident which is likely to reflect on her chastity had ever occurred. (2) She should be conscious of the danger of being ostracised by the society or being looked down by the society including by her own family members, relatives, friends and neighbours. (3) She would have to brave the whole world. (4) She would face the risk of losing the love and respect of her own husband and near relatives, and of her matrimonial home and happiness being shattered. (5) If she is unmarried she would apprehend that it would be difficult to secure an alliance with a suitable match from a respectable or an acceptable family. (6) It would almost inevitably and almost invariably result in mental torture and suffering to herself. (7) The fear of being taunted by others will always haunt her. (8) She would feel extremely embarrassed in relating the incident to others being over powered by a feeling of shame on account of the upbringing in a tradition bound society whereby and large sex is taboo. (9) The natural inclination would be to avoid giving publicity to the incident lest the family name and family honour is brought into controversy. (10) The parents of an unmarried girl as also the husband and members of the husband family of a married woman would also more often than not, want to avoid publicity on account of the fear of social stigma on the family name and family honour. (11) The fear of the victim herself being considered to the promiscuous or in some way responsible for the incident regardless of her innocence. (12) The reluctance to face interrogation by investigating agency, to face the Court to face the cross-examination, by Counsel for the culprit, and the risk of being disbelieved, acts as a deterrent. 14. (11) The fear of the victim herself being considered to the promiscuous or in some way responsible for the incident regardless of her innocence. (12) The reluctance to face interrogation by investigating agency, to face the Court to face the cross-examination, by Counsel for the culprit, and the risk of being disbelieved, acts as a deterrent. 14. The counsel for Dinesh, appellant, at the very outset, submitted that no offence, punishable, under Section 366 of the IPC, was constituted, against him. He further submitted that even if the story of the prosecution, is assumed as correct for the sake of arguments, Dinesh had no intention to force her (the prosecutrix) to illicit intercourse with Munna Lal alias Babbu. The submission of the Counsel for Dinesh, appellant, in this regard, does not appear to be correct. It is proved from the statement of the prosecution, who appeared as P.W. 8, that after having a tiff, with her mother, she left the house for village Tigaon, for wearing bangles. It was further stated by her, that her brother Jagdish, at that time was employed at Kamla Syntex Faridabad. It was further stated by her, that on the way, Dinesh accused, on a scooter met her. Dinesh, accused, as per the statement of prosecutrix, belongs to village Bhainsrawali, to which she belonged, and, as such, on account of that reason, he was known to her. He induced her to take lift, on his scooter, and he will drop her, at the place of employment of her brother, at Faridabad. Instead of dropping her, at the place of employment of her brother, he took her to ISBT, Delhi, and after having conversation with Munna Lal alias Babhu, co-accused, handed over her, to him. She identified, Dinesh, accused, in the Court correctly. It is very difficult to prove the intention of an accused, through direct evidence. When he gave lift to the prosecutrix, on his scooter, and induced her that she would be left at the place of employment of her brother, he had an intention not to do so, but to hand her over to Munna Lal, co-accused, with a view to seduce her to illicit intercourse with him. When he gave lift to the prosecutrix, on his scooter, and induced her that she would be left at the place of employment of her brother, he had an intention not to do so, but to hand her over to Munna Lal, co-accused, with a view to seduce her to illicit intercourse with him. Had it not been the intention of Dinesh, accused, he would have, after giving lift to the prosecutrix, taken her to the place of employment of her brother, at Faridabad, instead of taking her to ISBI, Delhi, and handing her over to Munna Lal, accused, for the purpose of illicit intercourse, with her. The intention of Dinesh, accused, thus, was writ large, on the face of it, as is proved from the facts, and circumstances of the case. Even Gopal, father of the prosecutrix, in clearcut terms, stated that Dinesh, accused, visited them, on the next day, and told them, that in case, he was paid Rs. 400/-, he would arrange for the restoration of the prosecutrix, as he knew about her whereabouts. He further stated that when he arranged the amount of Rs. 400/-, and offered the same to Dinesh, accused, he refused to accept the same, and told that the prosecutrix would return home. Dinesh, accused, thus, abducted the prosecutrix, with an intention to seduce her to illicit intercourse with Munna Lal alias Babbu, accused. There is no reason to disbelieve the statement of the prosecutrix, in this regard. She had no ill-will, grudge, or enmity, against Dinesh, accused. The Counsel for the appellant placed reliance on Chotte Lal V/s. State of Haryana, 1979 (81) PLR 656 : (1979 Cri LJ 1126) (SC) to contend that the offence under Section 366, IPC was not committed by Dinesh, accused. In that case it was not proved that the accused abducted the prosecutrix for any purpose mentioned in the Section. In the instant, the purpose is proved. The facts of this authority are distinguishable from the facts of this case. No help, therefore, can be drawn by the Counsel for appellant therefrom. Even if, the defence taken up by Dinesh, accused, that he belonged to BJP, and the father of the prosecutrix, belonged to Congress, that did not mean, that the prosecutrix had an intention to falsely implicate him, in this case. No help, therefore, can be drawn by the Counsel for appellant therefrom. Even if, the defence taken up by Dinesh, accused, that he belonged to BJP, and the father of the prosecutrix, belonged to Congress, that did not mean, that the prosecutrix had an intention to falsely implicate him, in this case. A number of persons belong to different parties, but that does not mean that they would go on falsely implicating, in such like cases, their opponents. The defence taken up by Dinesh, accused, is not believable. The trial Court was right, in coming to the conclusion, that Dinesh, accused, committed the offence, punishable, under Section 366, IPC. This Court, after reappraisal of the evidence, also comes to the same conclusion. The finding recorded by the trial Court, that Dinesh, accused, committed the offence, punishable under Section 366, IPC, being correct, is affirmed. 15. It was next submitted by the Counsel for the appellants, that there was a considerable delay in lodging the FIR which was utilized for falsely implicating the accused, introduction of false witnesses, and concoction of story. The submission on the Counsel for the appellants, in this regard, does not appear to be correct. The occurrence, took place on 12-5-1991. As soon as, the father of the prosecutrix, was told by her mother, that she left the house, after having a tiff with her, for wearing bangles, they waited for her. Thereafter, when Dinesh, accused, met the father of the prosecutrix, and told him, that in case, he was paid a sum of Rs. 400/-, he would restore the prosecutrix, but, later on, refused to accept the amount, left with no alternative, the father of the prosecutrix, got lodged missing report dated 30-5-1991. The FIR dated 12-6-1991 was lodged. It may be stated here, that the prosecutrix was an unmarried young girl, aged about 17/18 years. The delay in lodging the report was, on account of the reason, that in the first instance, the parents of the prosecutrix, tried their level best, to search her, in their relations, and acquaintances. When they failed to do so, left with no alternative, they lodged her disappearance report on 30-5-1991, as by that time, they did not have suspicion against anybody. When the police failed to recover the prosecutrix, ultimately, the FIR was lodged on 12-6-1991. When they failed to do so, left with no alternative, they lodged her disappearance report on 30-5-1991, as by that time, they did not have suspicion against anybody. When the police failed to recover the prosecutrix, ultimately, the FIR was lodged on 12-6-1991. In such like matters, which are sensitive in nature, the family members are always reluctant to immediately approach the police, as the honour of the family, is involved. In the first instance, such like matters, are always kept a closely guarded secret, so that undue publicity is not given, just to save the honour of the family. When no alternative is left with the parents, of a young girl, who is missing, only then a report in the Police, is lodged. In State of Punjab V/s. Gurmit Singh, 1996 (1) RCR 533 : (1996 Cri LJ 1728) (SC), the parents of the victim of rape, reported the matter, in the first instance, to the village Panchayat, and when the Panchayat, failed to provide any relief, the FIR was lodged thereafter. In these circumstances, the Apex Court held that the delay stood properly explained. It was also held that in sex related offences, the delay in lodging the FIR, could be due to a variety of reasons, particularly the reluctance of the prosecutrix, or family members to approach the police, and lodge complaint, about the incident which concerns the reputation and honour of the family and victim. In State of Punjab V/s. Ramdev Singh, 2004 (1) Crimes 149 (SC) : (AIR 2004 SC 1290), rape was committed with a girl of 14 years. There was delay of 17 days, in lodging the report. The father of the prosecutrix, was seriously ill, and the family members did not want to create tension, in his mind, and waited for his recovery. In these circumstances, such explanation was accepted as correct, and the Hon ble Supreme Court, held that the delay stood explained. In the instant case, the delay in lodging the FIR stood fully explained, from the circumstances, and the evidence discussed above. Even otherwise, the evidence of the prosecutrix, has been found to be cogent, convincing, and trustworthy. In this view of the matter, the delay, if any, paled into insignificance. The delay, in this case, was not utilized for falsely implicating the accused, concoction of story, or introduction of the false witnesses. Even otherwise, the evidence of the prosecutrix, has been found to be cogent, convincing, and trustworthy. In this view of the matter, the delay, if any, paled into insignificance. The delay, in this case, was not utilized for falsely implicating the accused, concoction of story, or introduction of the false witnesses. In this view of the matter, the submission of the Counsel for the appellants, being without merit, must fail, and the same stands rejected. 16. It was next submitted by the counsel for the appellants, that the prosecutrix, was major and she remained with Munna Lal alias Babbu, accused, of her own accord, for a period of about 1½ months, and, as such, she was a consenting party. The submission of the Counsel for the appellants, in this regard, does not appear to be correct. The prosecutrix, while appearing as P.W. 8, gave a vivid detail of the occurrence. It was stated by her, that when she was handed over to Munna Lal, accused, he took her to village Asmanpur, in a three-wheeler, and committed sexual intercourse with her, without her consent, and against her will. She further stated that Munna Lal, accused, committed rape with her, at village Asmanpur, and, ultimately, took her to Ballabgarh, and kept her in a Jhhugi, where he also committed rape with her, until he was arrested, and she was recovered by the police. She, during the course of her cross-examination, in clear-cut terms, stated that she had been terrorized by Munna Lal alias Babbu, accused and, therefore, did not raise alarm, at any point of time. She further stated that she had been terrorized, by the accused, in such a manner, that he used to keep a guard on her throughout. She further stated that during the period of her confinement, in the house, at village Asmanpur, Munna Lal, accused, did not go anywhere. He only used to go for 10/15 minutes to a hotel, but had never absented for long hours. She further stated that she was not allowed to meet anybody, by Munna Lal alias Babbu, accused, during her confinement, in his house. Since throughout, the prosecutrix was terrorized by Munna Lal, accused, it was not possible, for her to raise alarm, so as to attract the attention of the persons. Ultimately, she was recovered from the custody of Munna Lal alias Babbu, accused. Since throughout, the prosecutrix was terrorized by Munna Lal, accused, it was not possible, for her to raise alarm, so as to attract the attention of the persons. Ultimately, she was recovered from the custody of Munna Lal alias Babbu, accused. It, therefore, could not be said that she was a consenting party to the act of sexual intercourse, with Munna Lal accused. She was placed, in such circumstances, as she became helpless lady, in the hands of Munna Lal, accused. Even no plea was taken by Munna Lal alias Babbu, accused, during the course of cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses, or in his statement, under Section 313, Cr. P. C, that the prosecutrix was a consenting party. Under these circumstances, he cannot take such a plea, at this belated stage, without any foundation having been made, during the course of trial of the case, in this regard. From the statement of the prosecutrix, which was duly corroborated by the medical evidence, it was, thus, proved that Munna Lal alias Babbu, accused, committed sexual intercourse with her, without her consent, and against her will, from time to time. The trial Court, was right, in holding so. After reappraisal of the evidence, produced by the prosecution, this Court also reaches the same conclusion. The finding of the trial Court, in this regard, being correct, is affirmed. 17. Even Section 114-A deals with the presumption, as to the absence of consent in certain prosecutions for rape. The trial Court, was right, in holding so. After reappraisal of the evidence, produced by the prosecution, this Court also reaches the same conclusion. The finding of the trial Court, in this regard, being correct, is affirmed. 17. Even Section 114-A deals with the presumption, as to the absence of consent in certain prosecutions for rape. Section 114-A of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 , reads as under : "114-A. Presumption as to absence of consent in certain prosecution for rape In a prosecution for rape under Clause (a) or Clause (b) or Clause (c) or Clause (d) or Clause (e) or Clause (g) of sub-section (2) of Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) where sexual intercourse by the accused is proved and the question is whether it was without the consent of the woman alleged to have been raped and she states in her evidence before the Court that she did not consent, the Court shall presume that she did not consent." 17-A. A plain reading of the provisions of Section 114-A, leaves no manner of doubt that, where sexual intercourse by the accused, is proved, and the question, whether it was without consent of the woman, alleged to have been raped, and she states, in her evidence, before the Court, that she did not consent, the Court shall presume that she did not consent. No doubt, such a presumption is rebuttable. In the instant case, the prosecutrix, when appeared as, PW-8, in a clear-cut manner, stated that she was terrorized by Munna Lal alias Babbu, accused, and, in these circumstances, he committed sexual intercourse with her, from time to time, without her consent, and against her will. Munna Lal alias Babbu, accused failed to rebut the presumption, under Section 114-A of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 . Under these circumstances, the question of the prosecutrix, being a consenting party, to the act of sexual intercourse, with Munna Lal alias Babbu, accused, could be completely ruled out. The submission of the Counsel for the appellants, being without merit is rejected. 18. No other point, was urged, by the Counsel for the parties. 19. In view of the above discussion, it is held that the judgment of conviction and the order of sentence, rendered by the trial Court, are based on the correct appreciation of evidence, and law, on the point. 18. No other point, was urged, by the Counsel for the parties. 19. In view of the above discussion, it is held that the judgment of conviction and the order of sentence, rendered by the trial Court, are based on the correct appreciation of evidence, and law, on the point. The same do not warrant any interference, and are liable to be upheld. 20. For the reasons recorded, hereinbefore, the appeals are dismissed. The judgment of conviction dated 29-8-1992, and the order of sentence dated 31-8-1992, are upheld. If the appellants are on bail, their bail bonds, shall stand cancelled. The Chief Judicial Magistrate, Faridabad, shall take necessary steps, to comply with the judgment, with due promptitude, and compliance report be sent within a period of one month, from the date of receipt of a copy thereof.