JUDGMENT Hon’ble Mrs. Poonam Srivastava, J.—Heard Sri Tej Prakash, learned Standing Counsel for the Union of India and Ms. Tulika Prakash, learned Counsel appearing for the plaintiff/respondent. 2. The instant second appeal has been preferred against the judgment and decree dated 6.1.1995 passed by 10th Additional District Judge, Ghaziabad, in civil appeal No. 34 of 1993, Union of India v. Surendra Pal, confirming the judgment and decree dated 15.2.1993 passed by the Civil Judge, Ghaziabad, in suit No. 1449 of 1990. 3. The suit was instituted in respect of the land situated in Khasra No. 176, 1 Bigha. 12 Biswas, village Mohammadpur Dheda, Pargana Jalalabad, Tehsil Modinagar, District Ghaziabad. (hereinafter referred to as the disputed land). The plaintiff claimed that he had certain constructions on the disputed land since the time of his ancestor and also a Samadhi and tethering the animals on the said land but officers of the Union of India are trying to interfere in his possession and forcefully demolish the construction and evict him. The plaintiff gave a notice dated 27.7.1990 under Section 80, C.P.C. but the officers were not deterred. Consequently, the suit for permanent injunction was instituted claiming relief that the defendant be restrained from interfering in the peaceful possession of the plaintiff-respondent. 4. The defendant-appellant filed his written statement denying claim of the plaintiff stating therein that there are no constructions. The disputed land was acquired by the Union of India for the Ordnance Factory. The ancestor of the plaintiff has already received compensation and the disputed land is part and parcel of the ordnance factory, Muradnagar. 5. The claim of the defendant was that the suit is barred by Section 80. C.P.C., Sections 15 of Public Premises Act and 34 and 41 of Specific Relief Act. Besides the Civil Judge, Ghaziabad has no jurisdiction to try the suit. After exchange of the pleadings, a number of issues were framed. The relevant issues were issue Nos. 1 and 2 which relate to the question; whether the plaintiff is the owner in possession over plot Khasra No. 176, 1 Bigha, 12 Biswas as detailed at the foot of the plaint. Issue No. 2 is whether the disputed land was acquired by the Union of India and he is also in possession of the land consequent to the acquisition. Issue No. 2 is whether the disputed land was acquired by the Union of India and he is also in possession of the land consequent to the acquisition. Issue No. 8 relates to the entitlement of relief to the plaintiff in the facts and circumstances of the case. 6. The plaintiff adduced oral evidence as well as documentary evidence such as extract of Khasra 1359 F (Exhibit 1) Khatauni 1350 F (Exhibit 4), extract of Khatauni 1352 F (Exhibit 5), extract of Khatauni 1359 F (Exhibit 6). The total area shown in the Exhibit 1 was 3 Bighas, 4 Biswas, which was recorded as Abadi. The area of 1 Bigha, 12 Biswas was recorded in the name of Mahal Bhure and 1 Bigha 12 Biswas in the name of Mahal Phool Singh. Bhure was ancestor of Surendra Pal, plaintiff who was examined as PW-1. The disputed land was also recorded in Khewat No. 2 where Bhure was shown to be the owner in occupation at the time of abolition of Zamindari and after death of Bhure, his descendants are in continuous possession and consequently the land stood settled in favour of the plaintiff under Section 9 of U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act. 7. The defendant filed Paper No. 59Ga which was photostat copies of Khewat Nos. 1 and 2 in which Khasra number has not been given to controvert the Will dated 19.3.1942 adduced in evidence by the plaintiff. The trial Court, while deciding issue Nos. 1 and 2 categorically held and confirmed by the lower appellate Court that though the documentary evidence given by the defendant is only photostat copies, which has not been proved, therefore, not acceptable in evidence, yet this will not have any adverse effect on the plaintiffs case since Khasra number is not mentioned in Khewat Nos. 1 and 2. There is clear mention of the name of Khajan Singh and Bhure being descendant of Khajan Singh, it, makes no difference. The trial Court was of the view that the Union of India has not adduced any satisfactory evidence to establish that the disputed land was acquired for the Ordnance Factory. 1 and 2. There is clear mention of the name of Khajan Singh and Bhure being descendant of Khajan Singh, it, makes no difference. The trial Court was of the view that the Union of India has not adduced any satisfactory evidence to establish that the disputed land was acquired for the Ordnance Factory. The entire Khasra No. 176 is 3 bighas 4 biswas, out of which only 19 Biswas land is recorded in the name of Ordnance Factory, Muradnagar and, therefore, claim for the entire area including that of the plaintiff which consists of 1 Bigha, 12 Biswas could not be said to be acquired. The notification under Sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act also do not mention any Khasra number or there was anything on record to establish that the disputed land was acquired. Neither the date of award nor award itself was brought on record. Besides, defendant failed to even mention the date on which possession was taken and any document to establish that compensation was paid to the forefather of the plaintiff. Paragraph 3 of the written statement though mentions that ancestor of the plaintiff accepted compensation but there is no evidence to establish this fact, therefore, the trial Court had no other option but to draw adverse inference. 8. After taking into consideration and weighing the documentary as well as oral evidence, issues were decided against the Union of India, the suit was decreed and the defendant was restrained from interfering in the disputed land as described at the foot of the plaint. A regular civil appeal was preferred by the Union of India and surprisingly an altogether different stand was taken in the appeal. The claim was that the land was acquired for the railway and, therefore, all the documents pertaining to the acquisition were in the railway department. It may be noted that this fact was not pleaded by the defendant. The lower appellate Court confirmed the judgment and decree of the trial Court. Both the judgments have been challenged in the instant second appeal. 9. The substantial questions of law framed in the memorandum of appeal are enumerated herein below : “1. Whether the Courts below were right in not considering this aspect of the matter that public documents are admissible even if the same is not certified? 2. Both the judgments have been challenged in the instant second appeal. 9. The substantial questions of law framed in the memorandum of appeal are enumerated herein below : “1. Whether the Courts below were right in not considering this aspect of the matter that public documents are admissible even if the same is not certified? 2. Whether the Courts below rightly came to the conclusion and gave findings that the plaintiff/opposite party is in possession of the plot in question whereas there is nothing on the record in support thereof? 3. Whether the Courts below have rightly relied upon the ex-parte report of Ameen ignoring the confidential documents and map of Ministry of Defence?“ 10. Learned Counsel for the appellant has not been able to advance any satisfactory’ arguments in support of the substantial questions of law raised in this appeal. So far the substantial question of law No. 1 is concerned, no doubt public document need not be certified and there is a presumption of its correctness under the Evidence Act but yet photostat copies of Khewat Nos. 1 and 2 were not sufficient to establish the defendant’s case. The appellant was neither able to produce any award nor even photostat copy or uncertified copy of the award or any document to establish that the compensation was accepted by the ancestors and to establish definite and positive purpose of acquisition. He had all along changed his stand at different stage. Initially, the case of the appellant is that the land was acquired for Ordnance Factory and it was for this purpose, certain Photostat copies of Khewat Nos. 1 and 2 were adduced in evidence to show that 19 biswas of land is recorded in the name of Ordnance Factory and thereafter since no other evidence was adduced on behalf of the appellant, he had taken a different stand that the land was acquired for the railway. 11. I have perused the two judgments of the Courts below. The lower appellate Court has gone to the extent of recording the findings against the appellant inas much by making an observation that it appears that this has been done intentionally and deliberately by the officers of the Union of India for the reason’s best known to them and therefore, the lower appellate Court has no other option but to confirm the judgment of the trial Court. I am in complete agreement with the findings recorded by the two Courts below and since the written statement filed by the defendant was absolutely baseless, moreover no effort was made to substantiate the pleadings by means of the cogent evidence. The effort was absolutely half-hearted and in absence of any evidence to substantiate the pleadings, issue Nos. 1 and 2 were decided against the defendant-appellant and it call for no interference in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 100, C.P.C. The substantial questions of law are imaginary, farfetched and by no stretch of imagination can it be said that the two judgments suffer from any error of law whatsoever. In the circumstances, the judgments and decree of the Courts below are confirmed. 12. The Apex Court depreciated the liberal construction and generous application of provisions of Section 100, C.P.C. Hon’ble Supreme Court was of the view that only because there is another view possible on appreciation of evidence that cannot be sufficient for interference under Section 100, C.P.C. For ready reference, extract of paragraph 7 of the case of Veerayee Ammal v. Seeni Ammal, (2002) 1 SCC 134 is quoted below : “7. ...,.We have -noticed with distress that despite amendment, the provisions of Section 100 of the Code have been liberally construed and generously applied by some Judges of the High Courts with the result that objective intended to be achieved by the amendment of Section 100 appears to have been frustrated. Even before the amendment of Section 100 of the Code, the concurrent finding of facts could not be disturbed in the second appeal. This Court in Paras Nath Thakur v. Mohani Dasi held : (AIR p. 1205 para 3). It is well settled by a long series of decisions of the Judicial committee of the Privy Council and of this Court, that a High Court, on second appeal, cannot go into questions of fact, however, erroneous the findings of fact recorded by the Courts of fact may be. It is not necessary to cite those decisions. Indeed, the learned Counsel for the plaintiff-respondents did not and could not contend that the High Court was competent to go behind the findings of fact concurrently recorded by the two Courts of fact.” 13. It is not necessary to cite those decisions. Indeed, the learned Counsel for the plaintiff-respondents did not and could not contend that the High Court was competent to go behind the findings of fact concurrently recorded by the two Courts of fact.” 13. Similar view has been expressed in a number of other decisions by the Apex Court in the cases of Thiagarajan and others v. Sri Venugopalaswamay B. Koil and others, JT 2004 (5) SC 54; Rajeshwari v. Puran Indoria, (2005) 7 SCC 60 ; Gurdev Kaur and others v. Kaki and others, 2006 All.C.J. 1481 (SC); and Kondiba Dagadu Kadam v. Savitribai Sopan Gujar and others, (1999) 3 SCC 722 . 14. The Apex Court in the recent case of Santosh Hazari v. Purshottam Tiwari, (2001) 3 SCC 179 , ruled that a point of law which admits of no two opinions may be preposition of law but cannot be a substantial question of law. To be ‘substantial’ a question of law must be debatable, not previously settled by law of the land or a binding precedent, and must have a material bearing on the decision of the case, if answered either way, in so far as the rights of the parties before it are concerned. It will, therefore, depend on the facts and circumstances of each case whether a question of law is substantial one and involved in the case or not? The same view has been expressed by the Apex Court in the case of Govinda Raju v. Mariamman, (2005) 2 SCC 500 . 15. In facts and circumstances and after a careful consideration of arguments of the respective Counsel, I do not find any error of law in the two concurrent conclusions recorded by the Courts below. No substantial question of law arises in the instant appeal. The judgments under challenge cannot be interfered in this appeal in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 100, C.P.C. The second appeal fails and is dismissed. 16. Cost on parties. ————