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2008 DIGILAW 1696 (PAT)

Suryadeo Kumar, Son Of Late Gyan Yadav v. State Of Bihar Through The Secretary, Department Of Panchayati Raj

2008-11-27

RAMESH KUMAR DATTA

body2008
JUDGEMENT Ramesh Kumar Datta, J. 1. Heard learned Counsels for the parties. 2. Both the writ applications pertain to the same set of transactions in relation to No Confidence Motion against the Pramukh of Chanan Panchayat Samiti passed in special meeting dated 14.7.2008 and, accordingly, they have been heard together and are being disposed of by this common order. 3. The writ petitioners, who are elected members of the Panchayat Samiti, in C.W.J.C. No. 11518/2008 seek quashing of the direction/communication of the District Magistrate, Lakhisarai to the Block Development Officer-cum-Executive Officer, Chanan Panchayat Samiti by letter No. 1874 dated 20.7.2008 (Annexure-7) staying the decision of the Chanan Panchayat Samiti dated 14.7.2008, by which No Confidence Motion against the Pramukh had been passed and further to hold that the decision of the said Panchayat Samiti dated 14.7.2008 is legal and for consequential reliefs. 4. The petitioner in C.W.J.C. No. 12005/2008 is the Pramukh of the said Panchayat Samiti and seeks quashing of letter No. 802 dated 5.7.2008 (Annexure-2) issued by the Block Development Officer-cum-Executive Officer, Chanan Panchayat Samiti, by which notices have been issued upon the petitioner and other directly elected members of the Panchayat Samiti for holding the special meeting to discuss No Confidence motion against the petitioner on 14.7.2008, and further for not giving effect to the decision taken on 14.7.2008 in the said special meeting pursuant to the said notice and also for quashing the part of the order dated 20.7.2008 (Annexure-7) issued by the District Magistrate, Lakhisarai by which direction has been given to the Block Development Officer-cum-Executive Officer, Chanan Panchayat Samiti to see that the next date is fixed for special meeting on point of No Confidence Motion against the petitioner and for consequential reliefs. 5. The short facts relevant for the decision in the present matters are that a requisition is said to have been made on 20.6.2008 for convening a special meeting for considering No Confidence Motion against the Pramukh, Pinki Kumari. It is stated that the said requisition was circulated to all the members and sent to the Pramukh on the same day, which was refused to be received by the Pramukh as reported by the Peon which reports are annexed as Annexures 1 and 1/1 to the writ petition. It is stated that the said requisition was circulated to all the members and sent to the Pramukh on the same day, which was refused to be received by the Pramukh as reported by the Peon which reports are annexed as Annexures 1 and 1/1 to the writ petition. Thereafter by letter dated 21.6.2008 (Annexure-2) of the Block Development Officer-cum-Executive Officer, the same was sent to the Pramukh by registered post in which it was mentioned that she had refused to accept the requisition sent to her along with the original file on 20.6.2008 as per the report of the peon and accordingly, the said requisition along with the photo copy of the original file was being sent for fixing a date for the special meeting for considering No Confidence Motion against her. The said letter sent through registered post is admitted to have been received by the Pramukh, Pinki Kumari on 27.6.2008. 6. Thereafter on 4.7.2008, the Pramukh fixed the date for the meeting on 8.7.2008. Finding the said date as being contrary to the mandatory requirement of 7 days clear notice under the Act, the Executive Officer approached the Up-Pramukh on 5.7.2008 to fix the date of the meeting on 14.7.2008 and the information in this regard was sent by the Executive Officer to the District Panchayat Raj Officer, Lakhisarai and the S.D.O., Lakhisarai also. Pursuant to the said notice, the special meeting was held on 14.7.2008 in which 8 out of total 14 directly elected members of Panchayat Samiti participated and voted and unanimously passed the No Confidence Motion against the Pramukh. 7. In the meantime, the Pramukh had written to the District Magistrate on 11th July, 2008 that at the time of No Confidence Motion on 14.7.2008, the Executive Officer was acting politically and against the Pramukh. 7. In the meantime, the Pramukh had written to the District Magistrate on 11th July, 2008 that at the time of No Confidence Motion on 14.7.2008, the Executive Officer was acting politically and against the Pramukh. The Sub-divisional Officer gave his report to the District Magistrate by his letter dated 14.7.2008, in which apart from other matters he referred to the fact that on 14.7.2008 the special meeting was called for in the Block premises and he was told that the moment the meeting started, there was hue and cry and the Pramukh was saying that the signatures of her members should also be taken in the register and there should be a discussion on the No Confidence Motion, but according to the Pramukh, the Block Development Officer-cum-Executive Officer was not ready for the same and no discussion took place on the No confidence Motion. The page of the register was torn. He further states that the Pramukh, Pinki Kumari says that they were not allowed to put their signatures but later on the signature of the rival side was taken and without giving them any opportunity and holding discussion, the Proceedings Book was written as per the views of the other side. The Sub-divisional Officer states that he had, in the very beginning, told the Block Development Officer to adjourn the meeting and to act in accordance with the provisions of the Bihar Panchayat Raj Act, 2006 , but he did not agree. The Sub-divisional Officer has also made comments against the conduct of the Block Development Officer-cum-Executive Officer and states that when the Pramukh was willing to call the meeting then contrary to rules, the notice has been given on the basis of date fixed by the Up-Pramukh. He has also made other comments against the illegalities in the notice, which are not relevant. From the report of the Sub-divisional Officer one thing is certain that whatever he has stated is on the basis of what has been told by the Pramukh and the others and he has not given the said report as an eye witness to the occurrence for the reasons best known to him since he had been specially deputed by the Collector to be present in the meeting. 8. 8. On the basis of the aforesaid report, the District Magistrate, Lakhisarai, by his impugned letter dated 20.7.2008 addressed to the Block Development Officer-cum-Executive Officer, Chanan Panchayat Samiti, had issued the aforesaid directions purportedly in exercise of his powers u/s. 157 of the Bihar Panchayat Raj Act, 2006 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) directing that no action should be taken pursuant to the resolution of No Confidence Motion dated 14.7.2008 and staying the execution of the proposals of the said date and further directing him to fix a fresh date for considering No Confidence Motion against the Pramukh after informing the higher authorities. The said letter of the Collector states that the Sub-divisional Officer, Lakhisarai was present in the meeting dated 14.7.2008 as per his directions which, however, appears to be an error of record in view of the tenor of the report dated 14.7.2008 of the Sub-divisional Officer himself. 9. Learned Counsel for the petitioners in C.W.J.C. No. 11518 of 2008 submits that the District Magistrate had no jurisdiction to pass the order dated 20.7.2008 staying and over-riding the decision taken in the meeting of the Panchayat Samiti on 14.7.2008, by which the motion of No Confidence has been passed against the Pramukh. It is submitted that Sec. 157 of the Act only empowers the District Magistrate to take action where he is of the opinion that any irregularity or mistake "is being committed" so far as the provisions related to conduct of any special meeting of the Panchayat Samiti to consider No Confidence Motion is concerned. In such a situation he may issue such directions as he considers necessary for complying with the provisions of the Act. However, it is argued that once the meeting has already been held and a decision taken by the Panchayat Samiti then it is beyond the jurisdiction of the District Magistrate to act u/s. 157 of the Act and the only recourse available to the aggrieved party in such circumstances is to approach this Court in its writ jurisdiction. 10. It is further submitted by learned Counsel for the petitioner, in the first case, that as a matter of fact, it is the conduct of the Pramukh Pinki Kumari, which has been in gross violation of the provisions of the Bihar Panchayat Raj Act from the very beginning. 10. It is further submitted by learned Counsel for the petitioner, in the first case, that as a matter of fact, it is the conduct of the Pramukh Pinki Kumari, which has been in gross violation of the provisions of the Bihar Panchayat Raj Act from the very beginning. It is submitted that u/s. 44(3)(i) of the Act, the Pramukh is obliged to accept any requisition that is sent to her for considering the No Confidence Motion against her and no power of rejection has been granted in this regard, rather the Act says that it is the duty of the Pramukh to see that the meeting is convened on a date which is within 15 days from the date of the requisition; this of course has to be done after taking into account the provisions of Sec. 46(4) of the Act which provides clear 7 days notice for such a meeting to be held. It is, thus, contended that the Pramukh must act within seven days of the receipt of the requisition so that a date for special meeting may be fixed by complying with both the statutory requirements. 11. It is further submitted by learned Counsel that immediately after the refusal of the Pramukh to receive the requisition which was sent through the Peon, the matter was reported by the Peon in writing in which he has stated that the Pramukh had read the file and thereafter refused to accept the same or to sign upon the Peon Book or register. Learned Counsel points out that immediately on the next date mentioning the said facts in the enclosed letter dated 21.6.2008 (Annexure-2), the Executive Officer had again sent the file as stated above to the Pramukh through registered post which the Pramukh admits to have received but at no stage prior to the filing of the present writ petition, she ever took the plea that the said requisition and the file had not been sent through the peon; only belatedly such a plea has been taken in the writ petition after due deliberation in the matter. In any case, it is submitted that the Pramukh admits to have received the letter on 27.6.2008 and even if for the sake of arguments, if the service is to be treated as on 27.6.2008, then she ought to have fixed the date for the special meeting latest by 4th July, 2008 after complying with the statutory requirements because thereafter her power to fix the date is taken away by the statutory provision itself and the same is vested in the Up-Pramukh and 1/3rd of the directly elected members. The Pramukh had failed to fix the special meeting for considering No Confidence Motion till 4.7.2008 since the date which she had fixed on that day as 8.7.2008 was contrary to the requirement of 7 clear days notice and the same was, according to the petitioner, deliberately in order to create legal recourse for her at later stage. It is submitted that thereafter the Executive Officer had rightly on the next day, i.e., 5.7.2008 called upon the Up-Pramukh for fixing the date for the special meeting for considering No Confidence Motion, since the power of the Pramukh to fix the date had come to an end by the operation of the statutory provisions by that date. It is urged that the conduct of the Pramukh makes it clear that anyhow she wanted to prevent the No Confidence Motion to be taken up against her. 12. It is, thus, submitted by learned Counsel for the petitioner that in the facts and circumstances of the case there was no occasion for the Sub-divisional Officer to have given a report which shows his ignorance of the legal provisions and intention to somehow support the stand of the Pramukh. It is submitted that the District Magistrate has committed a grievous error in acting upon the report of the Sub-divisional Officer treating the same as if the Sub-divisional Officer was present at the special meeting, whereas the entire report is based upon whatever was told to the Sub-divisional Officer by other persons including the Pramukh, as is evident from the report dated 14.7.2008 itself. 13. The plea of learned Counsel for the Pramukh, respondent No. 6, in the first case is that the District Magistrate has rightly acted in the present matter since the Executive Officer was behaving in a partisan manner. 13. The plea of learned Counsel for the Pramukh, respondent No. 6, in the first case is that the District Magistrate has rightly acted in the present matter since the Executive Officer was behaving in a partisan manner. It is submitted that the Act provides 15 days time to the Pramukh to fix the date of the meeting and therefore even if due to inadvertence or ignorance the Pramukh had fixed the date without giving clear seven days notice, the Executive Officer ought to have again approached the Pramukh for fixing the next date which is the requirement under the statutory provisions. It is submitted that only on account of partiality, the Executive Officer did not again approach the Pramukh, rather he approached the Up-Pramukh for fixing a date for considering no confidence motion. 14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner also seeks to rely upon the report of the Sub-divisional Officer to show the biased conduct of the Executive Officer. According to learned Counsel for the respondent-Pramukh, the Collector has rightly acted u/s. 157 of the Act, as it is the duty of the Collector to see that the special meeting for discussing No Confidence Motion is held in accordance with the provisions of the Act. When he had deputed the Sub-divisional Officer to the said meeting, it was his bounden duty to take effective action to see that illegalities are not permitted to continue. It is submitted that the said order of the District Magistrate cannot be faulted so far as his staying the decision taken on 14.7.2008 in the special meeting is concerned. 15. Learned Counsel for the Pramukh has also sought to assail the decision taken in the said meeting on the ground that the notice dated 5.7.2008 convening the special meeting on 14.7.2008 does not disclose any reasons/ charges on which the said No Confidence Motion has been moved, which according to him, is a violation of the mandatory provisions of Sec. 44(3)(v) of the Act. It is submitted that a mere annexing of the requisition cannot be said to be proper compliance of the requirement of the said Section. 16. Learned Counsel for the Pramukh further states that the very notice has been issued contrary to the requirement of the Act as the Up-Pramukh had no jurisdiction on the said date to fix a date for special meeting for considering no confidence motion against her. 16. Learned Counsel for the Pramukh further states that the very notice has been issued contrary to the requirement of the Act as the Up-Pramukh had no jurisdiction on the said date to fix a date for special meeting for considering no confidence motion against her. Learned Counsel also states that the Pramukh in her writ petition in paragraph No. 16 denied that the notice has been sent through the Peon Book. 17. It is further submitted that the notice is also contrary to law for the reason that it has been sent only to the elected members of the Panchayat Samiti, whereas the requirement of Sec. 44(3)(i) of the Act is that it should be sent to all the members of the Panchayat Samiti. In support of the aforesaid proposition, learned Counsel refers to the specific words used in the said Section, which requires the Executive Officer to give notice to the "members". It is thus submitted that such notice could not have been confined only to the elected members. In this regard, learned Counsel also refers Sec. 44(3)(vii) of the Act which provides that during the discussion an opportunity shall be given to the Pramukh and Up-Pramukh against whom no confidence motion has been moved for his defence before the Panchayat Samiti. 18. He further refers to Sec. 36 of the Act relating to composition of the Panchayat Samiti which states that the Panchayat Samiti shall consist of directly elected members from the Panchayat Samitis territorial constituencies; the Members of the Lok Sabha and the Members of the Legislative Assembly of the State representing constituencies which fall either wholly or partly in the Panchayat Samiti area; Members of Rajya Sabha and Members of the State Legislative Council who are registered as electors within the Panchayat Samiti area and all the Mukhiyas of the Gram Panchayats falling within the Panchayat Samiti area. It is stated that apart from the requirement to issue notice to the members the fact that opportunity is to be given for his defence before the Panchayat Samiti makes it clear that all the members of the Panchayat Samiti are entitled to be present and to participate in the special meeting considering the No Confidence Motion and the only prohibition is with regard to their right to vote. 19. 19. Learned Counsel for the Up-Pramukh and other elected members, who had successfully moved No Confidence Motion on 14.7.2008, on the other hand, submits that it is evident from the scheme of the Act that, although the term "member" has been used where it is mentioned that the notice is to be given but the same has to be read in the context of immediately preceding use of the word "directly elected members" in the same sentence of the said provision and repeatedly in other parts of said sub Sec. (3) of Sec. 44 and, therefore, the word member has to be read ejusdem generis and in the context in which it has been used. It is submitted that only the directly elected members of the Panchayat Samiti have the right to elect and remove Pramukh and Up-Pramukh and thus no purpose can be served by participation of ex officio members of the Panchyat Samiti, who had no right either to elect or to remove the Pramukh and Up-Pramukh who themselves are required to be directly elected members. 20. In support of the aforesaid proposition, learned Counsel relies upon a decision in the case of Rajendra Mehta V/s. The State of Bihar and Ors., 2005 3 PLJR 439 in paragraph Nos. 4 and 6 of which it has been laid down as follows: 4. Section 38 of the Act authorizes only the elected members of the Panchayat Samiti to elect Pramukh and Up-Pramukh thereof. None of the non-elected members has any right of any nature in the matter of election of Pramukh and Up-Pramukh. In such view of the matter, their presence is not required at all. 6. In any event, neither Sec. 44 nor any other section authorizes any non-member to elect a Pramukh or Up-pramukh. It is only the elected members who can do so. Learned Counsel also relies upon a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Ramesh Mehta V/s. Sanwal Chand Singhvi and Ors., AIR 2004 SC 2258 ; paragraph Nos. 12 and 42 to 44 of the said decision are quoted below. 12. It is only the elected members who can do so. Learned Counsel also relies upon a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Ramesh Mehta V/s. Sanwal Chand Singhvi and Ors., AIR 2004 SC 2258 ; paragraph Nos. 12 and 42 to 44 of the said decision are quoted below. 12. In the case of Knowles V/s. Zoological Society of London, 1959 1 WLR 823 it has been held by Court of Appeals that the expression " majority of fellows entitled to vote" in the bye-laws of a society would mean the majority of those present at a meeting and entitled to vote and not the majority of the whole electorate whether present or not. Before us, as stated above, it was urged that the respondent is claiming casus omissus in support of his argument that the words "whole number of members" must be construed as "whole number of elected members". We do not find any merit in this argument. In the case of State of Karnataka V/s. Union of India and Anr., AIR 1978 SC 68 , it has been observed by this Court that although a Court cannot supply casus omissus, it is equally clear that it should not interpret a statute so as to create a casus omissus when there is really none. 42. The decisions of the Courts as regard right of participation of the member who was an elected or who had a right equal to that of an elected member had been taken notice of by Brother Kapadia, J. The said decisions are pointers to the fact that only elected members and those who are to be treated at par were entitled to participate in a proceeding initiated for removal of the Chairman of the Municipality. 43. By reason of the amendment in the Constitution and consequent amendment by the Sate Legislature in the Rajasthan Municipalities Act, however, no indication has been given that by reason thereof a special right is sought to be created in the nominated members although they would not participate in such a proceedings and would not have any voting right either at the election of the Chairman or in the proceedings for his removal. 44. 44. We, therefore, are of the opinion that the rules which were made in the year 1974 having not been amended; with a view to give an effective and proper meaning must be construed to mean that only members with voting right are entitled to participate in that proceedings and not the nominated members. On a consideration of the rival submissions, this Court is in agreement with the submissions made by learned Counsel for the petitioners of C.W.J.C. No. 11518/2008 and respondents in the other writ petition. 21. SO far as the power of the District Magistrate to act with respect to conduct of special meeting called for No Confidence Motion is concerned, the same is contained in Sec. 157 of the Act, which is in the following terms: 157. Power of the District Magistrate with regard to conduct of special meetings called to consider no confidence motion- If the District Magistrate suo motu or upon information being received from any source, is of the opinion that any irregularity or mistake is being committed so far as provisions related to conduct of any special meeting of a Panchayat to consider a no confidence motion is concerned, he shall have the power to issue such directions as considered necessary for complying with the provisions of the Act in that regard. He may also depute any officer to be present in such a meeting and to call for a report from such officer. It is evident from the aforesaid provisions that the power of the District Magistrate to act in such matters is circumscribed to a situation where any irregularity of mistake " is being committed". So far as the provisions related to conduct of such special meeting, the very use of the word " is being committed" goes to show that the power of the District Magistrate to rectify such a situation exists so long as the actual special meeting has not been held. At any time before the same is held, he has a right to issue appropriate orders in order to see that the provisions of the Act are complied with. At any time before the same is held, he has a right to issue appropriate orders in order to see that the provisions of the Act are complied with. 22 However, in the instant matter the District Magistrate, although the information had been received by him in advance on 11.7.2008 itself, has chosen not to act in the matter but deputed the S.D.O to be present in the said special meeting and called for a report from him; in such circumstances, he cannot thereafter act so as to countermand any decision taken in such a meeting. The Section does not confer upon him any such power. Once the Panchayat Samiti in a special meeting has already acted or arrived at a particular decision no person or other machinery has been provided under the Act to overturn its decision. In this regard, any person aggrieved by what has transpired in the course of the special meeting and the decision taken therein can at best approach this Court in its writ jurisdiction. The power of the District Magistrate to depute an officer to be present and call for a report can only be of assistance in the matter of arriving at a correct conclusion as to whether the special meeting has been conducted in accordance with law or not. However, the same cannot confer any power upon the District Magistrate to countermand the decision taken by the elected members of the Panchayat Samiti, when the statute itself does not expressly authorize him to do so. 23. In view of the aforesaid discussions, this Court finds that the District Magistrate has no power to pass any order u/s. 157 of the Act with respect to a final and concluded resolution passed at a special meeting with regard to No confidence Motion. The letter dated 20.7.2008 staying and countermanding the decision of the Chanan Panchayat Samiti dated 14.7.2008 is declared contrary to law and is set aside. 24. So far as the contention of the petitioner Pramukh, Pinki Kumari in C.W.J.C. No. 12005/2008 with respect to the notice dated 5.7.2008 being bad for not disclosing reasons/ charges are concerned, the same is without any basis. It is evident from the said notice that the requisition on the basis of which the notice has been issued was annexed to the said notice. It is evident from the said notice that the requisition on the basis of which the notice has been issued was annexed to the said notice. The said requisition details the nine reasons/ charges passed, upon which the proposal for No Confidence Motion was requested to be brought. Even if the notice had to mention the reasons/ charges, only those reasons could have been incorporated in the same notice, nothing else. Thus, by enclosing the requisition in the notice the members of the Panchayat Samiti, including the Pramukh thereof, were duly informed about the reasons/charges on the basis of which No Confidence Motion was proposed to be moved and thus there is substantial compliance with the mandatory requirements of Section 44(3)(v) of the Act. 25. The other contention on behalf of the Pramukh regarding fixing of the date by the Up Pramukh, who was not authorized to do so on the said date is also fit to be rejected. The conduct of the petitioner left much to be desired in the present matter. From a consideration of the provisions of Section 44(3)(i) of the Act, it is evident that the same does not confer any power either on the Pramukh or the others to convene a meeting, rather the same is couched in the form of a direction indicating a duty or obligation to convene a meeting the moment the requisition is received and to do the same by complying with the statutory requirement of the date of such meeting falling within 15 days of the requisition, as also the further requirement of 7 days clear notice as provided under Section 46(4) of the Act. The said provision does not confer a discretion upon the Pramukh, rather it speaks about the failure to call a special meeting and not the refusal or rejection of the same. Such a failure is to be considered in terms of the mandatory provisions of the Bihar Panchayat Raj Act, which obliges the Pramukh to act within seven days of the receipt of the requisition so as to provide seven days clear notice of the special meeting in order that the said meeting itself is held within fifteen days of the presentation of requisition. It is also a trite proposition that a notice (or requisition) served upon any person being refused is deemed to be treated as validly served and no such plea can be taken that the notice has not been received on that date. In the present matter, it is evident from the materials on the record that the petitioner had deliberately refused to accept the requisition on 20.6.2008. 26. In view of the mandate of the statute there is no reason as to why the requisitionist will not serve or like to serve the requisition upon the Pramukh in such matter. It is the Pramukh who faces conflict of interest in such matter and would like to somehow or the other delay the calling of the special meeting for considering No Confidence Motion against herself. Further the failure of the Pramukh to immediately reply to the charge of refusal to receive the requisition, while admitting the fact of receiving the same by registered post, clearly shows that the petitioner was merely playing a game, which is not expected of her as a Constitutional and statutory authority. In such circumstances it does not behave the petitioner to make counter charges of bias against the Executive Officer when she herself grossly failed in discharging her statutory responsibility. 27. In this regard, the Court also finds indefensible the request allegedly made by the Sub-divisional Officer to the Executive Officer to adjourn the meeting, whereas Section 44(3) clearly lays down that no such meeting shall be postponed once the notice for the same has been issued and also a discussion on the motion shall not be adjourned. Unless gross irregularities are found by the District Magistrate prior to holding of the meeting, in which circumstances he may issue appropriate direction under Section 157 of the Act, there can be no occasion for adjournment of the meeting at the behest of either the Executive Officer-cum-Block Development Officer or the Sub-divisional Officer. 28. It is, thus, evident that the petitioner had failed to act within the 7 days permitted by statute when the requisition was first served upon her and which she had read, according to the report of the Peon on 20.6.2008 itself. Even assuming that she had received the notice on 27.6.2008 then she ought to have fixed a proper date for the meeting in terms of the statutory requirement by 4th July, 2008. Even assuming that she had received the notice on 27.6.2008 then she ought to have fixed a proper date for the meeting in terms of the statutory requirement by 4th July, 2008. Having failed to do so till that date, probably with a view to defeat the decision taken at the said meeting by not fixing a date complying with the requirement of seven clear days notice, it was for the Up-Pramukh or one third of the total number of directly elected members to act in the matter by fixing a date of the special meeting for considering no confidence motion against the Pramukh. This Court is of the view that the Executive Officer had rightly approached the Up-Pramukh for fixing the date of the meeting and accordingly no fault can be found with the said meeting, which was fixed on 14.7.2008. As a matter of fact, this Court finds that gross impropriety was committed by the Pramukh in refusing to receive the requisition at the first instance and thereafter she acted contrary to law by fixing the date of the special meeting for considering no confidence motion against her without providing for clear seven days notice. In such circumstances the District Magistrate, and others, have seriously erred in treating her as the wronged party. 29. So far as the actual conduct of the meeting is concerned, this Court has before it only the respective versions put forward by the Pramukh on the one side and the elected members opposing her on the other. Although the Sub-divisional Officer had been deputed by the Collector but his report and whatever he has stated regarding the meeting are not his own version but what has been told by him by other persons, including the Pramukh. Hence, no definite conclusion regarding the actual conduct of the special meeting can be drawn. For the said reasons the resolution passed in the said meeting cannot be interfered with. 30. Lastly, this Court is also of the view that in a special meeting to consider No Confidence Motion, the participation of only elected members of the Panchayat Samiti is required who alone have the right to vote in such a meeting. 31. For the said reasons the resolution passed in the said meeting cannot be interfered with. 30. Lastly, this Court is also of the view that in a special meeting to consider No Confidence Motion, the participation of only elected members of the Panchayat Samiti is required who alone have the right to vote in such a meeting. 31. From a consideration of the provisions of Section 44 of the Act, it is evident that the power to remove the Pramukh or Up-Pramukh by a vote of No Confidence Motion is vested exclusively in the elected members of the Panchayat Samiti.; the requisition also can only be given by 1/3rd of the total number of directly elected members of the Panchayat Samiti; on failure of the Pramukh to call the special meeting again, it is 1/3rd of the total member of directly elected members or the Up-Pramukh who can fix a date for such meeting. It is true that the words used in Section 44(3)(i) of the Act " require the Executive Officer to give notice to the members" but the same has to be read in the context in which it has been used. The said use of the word "member" follows the repeated use of the words directly elected members, including even in the same sentence. Thus, the same has to be read ejusdem generic as referring to the directly elected members. 32. Even otherwise in the context of a special meeting convened for the purpose of considering No Confidence Motion, which can be passed only by the majority of the elected members, this Court does not find any requirement for the participation of the ex-officio members of the Panchayat Samiti. Such member having no right to vote cannot contribute anything to the said meeting. Similarly, the mere statement in Sub clause (vii) of Section 44(3) of the Act that the Pramukh or the Up-Pramukh should be given an opportunity for his defence before the Panchayat Samiti cannot be taken to mean that even the ex-officio members of the Panchayat Samiti have to be present during such special meeting, since Section 36 of the Act, which provides for the composition of the Panchayat Samiti including certain ex-officio members, also clearly provides that in case of election and removal of Pramukh and Up-Pramukh only the directly elected members from the Panchayat Samiti territorial constituencies shall have the right to vote. It is, thus, evident that during the discussion of No Confidence Motion the defence has to be placed before such members of the Panchayat Samiti who have the power to consider and act upon that defence, that is, the directly elected members. Further, this Court does not find anything in Section 44 of the Act to show that a specific mandate has been given that even such ex-officio members must participate in a discussion of No Confidence Motion. Considering the fact that Section 44(3)(i) clearly states that no quorum is required for the special meeting to discuss the same, the presence of such ex-officio members appears to be wholly uncalled for. 33. The aforesaid conclusions also follow from the decision of this Court in Rajendra Mehta case. In the said case, this Court has clearly held that the presence of the ex-officio members is not required since none of the elected members has any right of any nature in the matter of election of Pramukh and Up-Pramukh. The same logic is applicable with equal force in the case of No Confidence Motion since the non-elected members do not have any right of any nature in the matter of removal by No Confidence Motion of a Pramukh or Up-Pramukh. Hence, their presence is not required during such special meeting. 34. Similarly in the case of Ramesh Mehta the Supreme Court has held that although the word used in the Statute involved in the said case was "whole number of members", the same must be construed as "whole number of elected members". The same was done holding that the Court should not interpret the Statute so as to create a casus omissus. The said logic would apply with equal force in the present matter where it appears that at one place the word used is only members where the issuance of notice is spoken about. The same was done holding that the Court should not interpret the Statute so as to create a casus omissus. The said logic would apply with equal force in the present matter where it appears that at one place the word used is only members where the issuance of notice is spoken about. Following the said judgment which held that with a view to give an effective and proper meaning the words used in the statute therein must be construed to mean that only members with voting right are entitled to participate in the said proceedings and not the nominated members, it must be held that with respect to a Panchayat Samiti under the Act it is only members with voting rights, that is, the directly elected members, who are entitled to participate in proceedings of no confidence motion and not the ex-officio members. 35. Thus on a consideration of the entire matters, this Court is of the view that the notice for special meeting for considering No Confidence Motion is required to be sent only to the directly elected members who have right to participate and vote in the said motion and not the ex-officio members. 36. In the light of the aforesaid discussions, it is held that the resolution in favour of No Confidence Motion passed by the special meeting held by the Chanan Panchayat Samiti on 14.7.2008 is legal, valid and effective. 37. C.W.J.C. No. 11518/2008 is, accordingly, allowed and C.W.J.C. No. 12005/2008 is dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the parties shall bear their own costs.