JUDGMENT: (Per the Hon'ble Mr Justice L.Narasimha Reddy) The appellant was tried by the Court of VII Additional District & Sessions Judge (Fast Track Court), Vijayawada, in Sessions Case No.134 of 2004 on the charge that he committed murder of one Jakka Venkateswara Rao at 9 p.m. on 05.06.2003. Through its judgment dated 06.01.2006, the trial Court held the appellant guilty of the offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). Sentence of imprisonment for life and fine of Rs.10,000/- was imposed. Hence, this appeal. 2. The deceased was the tenant in respect of non-residential premises at Vijayawada. The owner thereof was one T. Satyanarayana. After his death, the ownership devolved upon his daughter-in-law by name Nagamani, the sister of the appellant. Proceedings were pending under the A.P. Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960 between the landlord and the tenant, for eviction from the premises. 3. The prosecution alleged that on 05.06.2003, the appellant went to the premises in question where, the deceased, his son and his brother-in-law, P.Ws.1 and 3 respectively were present. Initially, the appellant was offered water and thereafter, P.W.1 went inside to fetch tea for him. In the meanwhile, altercation is said to have taken place between the deceased and the appellant in connection with handing over the vacant portion of the premises. The appellant is said to have taken out a knife, stabbed the deceased in the abdomen and ran away. P.W.1 chased the appellant and the latter is said to have been caught by the police and handed over to the Sub Inspector of the concerned Police Station. P.W.1 came back to the premises and by that time, P.W.3 tried to move the deceased to the hospital in an auto rickshaw. However, the deceased succumbed to injuries. The inquest and post mortem on the dead body were conducted. After completing the investigation, charge sheet was filed. The appellant pleaded not guilty. The trial Court convicted and sentenced him as mentioned above. 4. Sri C. Padmanabha Reddy, learned Senior Counsel for the appellant, submits that the very presence of P.W.1 at the scene of occurrence is doubtful and that in view of the discrepancy in the evidence of P.W.9, it is difficult to believe that the appellant was apprehended by the police. The trial Court convicted and sentenced him as mentioned above. 4. Sri C. Padmanabha Reddy, learned Senior Counsel for the appellant, submits that the very presence of P.W.1 at the scene of occurrence is doubtful and that in view of the discrepancy in the evidence of P.W.9, it is difficult to believe that the appellant was apprehended by the police. He further submits that there was no motive for the appellant to cause any harm to the deceased and at the most, it is a case of culpable homicide not amounting to murder. He urged other contentions also. 5. Learned Additional Public Prosecutor submits that the appellant was apprehended by the police immediately after he committed the offence and the trial Court had rightly convicted him for the gruesome murder caused by him. He submits that the presence of P.W.1 in the shop is natural and the minor discrepancy as to the timings at which the appellant was actually nabbed and thereafter, produced before the Sub Inspector of Police, is of little consequence. 6. To prove its case, the prosecution examined P.Ws.1 to 13 and filed Exs.P1 to P11. P.W.1 is the son and P.W.3 is the brother-in-law of the deceased. P.W.2 is an employee. P.Ws.4 and 5 are the owners of the shops in the immediate neighbourhood. Out of them, P.W.4 was declared hostile and P.W.5 stated that he has witnessed the discussion between the deceased and the accused in loud voice and saw that the deceased falling on the ground, with injuries. P.W.6 is a witness to the scene of offence panchanama. P.W.7 is a mediator for the arrest of the appellant. P.W.8 is the doctor, who conducted autopsy on the deceased. The appellant was said to have been apprehended by a mobile police team of which P.W.9 is a member. P.W.10 is the A.S.I. of Police, who registered the case on receiving a wireless message from the Government Hospital. P.W.11 is the Scientific Officer of the Regional Forensic Scientific Lab, Vijayawada. The Investigating Officer was examined as P.W.12. P.W.13 is another Circle Inspector, who conducted part of the investigation. 7. The complaint in this case, marked as Ex.P1, was submitted by P.W.1 depicting the sequence of events. He stated that himself, his father-the deceased and P.W.3 were present in the shop on 05.06.2003 in the morning. The Investigating Officer was examined as P.W.12. P.W.13 is another Circle Inspector, who conducted part of the investigation. 7. The complaint in this case, marked as Ex.P1, was submitted by P.W.1 depicting the sequence of events. He stated that himself, his father-the deceased and P.W.3 were present in the shop on 05.06.2003 in the morning. The appellant is said to have come to their shop at 9.15 a.m. It was also mentioned that on the previous day, the appellant came to their shop at 11 a.m. He alleged that on 05.06.2003, the appellant started discussion with the deceased about the vacation of the shop and that initially, he was offered water. While P.W.1 was giving tea to the appellant, the latter is said to have taken out a knife from his pocket and stabbed the deceased in the abdomen. Thereafter, he is said to have escaped from the scene towards Bhavanarayana Veedhi. Even when the chase by P.W.1 is on, the appellant was apprehended by the police patrol team called "Rakshak". It is pertinent to mention that much before Ex.P1 was submitted in the Police station, a wireless intimation was received from the hospital, where the deceased was shifted for treatment by P.W.3. Case was registered and further steps were taken. 8. It was strongly urged that the presence of P.W.1 in the shop is doubtful and that the apprehension of the appellant by the police is unbelievable. We have gone through the evidence on record and are of the view that there is nothing unnatural about the presence of P.W.1 in the shop at the relevant point of time. Except making suggestions, which are not directly on the point, the defence was not able to elicit anything from P.W.1 to disbelieve or suspect his presence in the shop. 9. It is a matter on record that the proceedings between the landlady and the tenant of the premises are pending. The appellant was helping his sister, the landlady. At the relevant point of time, an appeal was pending and the rents were being deposited into the Court, by the deceased. Obviously, on account of pressing necessity or otherwise, the appellant went to the shop and was pestering the deceased to vacate the premises. P.W.1 and the deceased extended hospitality by offering water and thereafter, tea. At the relevant point of time, an appeal was pending and the rents were being deposited into the Court, by the deceased. Obviously, on account of pressing necessity or otherwise, the appellant went to the shop and was pestering the deceased to vacate the premises. P.W.1 and the deceased extended hospitality by offering water and thereafter, tea. The appellant, however, appears to have been enraged by the reluctance on the part of the deceased to vacate the premises. The evidence clearly discloses that he stabbed the deceased and ran away. The manner in which the offence came to be committed would be dealt with by us a little later. 10. This is one of the rare cases where the police apprehended a culprit within seconds after the offence was committed. The Andhra Pradesh Police had introduced mobile police teams named as "Rakshak" and such teams provided with vehicles in important cities. One such team was moving in the area and on hearing the cries of P.W.1, who was chasing the appellant; the team swung into action and caught hold of the appellant. P.W.9, the Head Constable of the team, has spoken to the manner in which the appellant was nabbed. 11. The event of nabbing of the appellant is sought to be doubted on the ground that there is discrepancy about the time at which he is said to have been taken into custody, and the one at which he was produced before the Police Station. Though certain discrepancies are pointed out, we are of the view that the delay or the discrepancy is caused in the process of preparing the necessary record, to mark the arrest of the appellant. It must be noted that even if a person was apprehended by a mobile team of the police, it can become valid if only it can be traced to properly initiated the proceedings. In a way it can be said that even before the intimation about the death of the deceased, or the complaint, Ex.P1 was received, appellant came to be nabbed and the preparation of F.I.R. would naturally taken its own time. The discrepancy is, at the most, of a few hours and in our view, it was properly explained, in the circumstances of the case. 12. Apart from P.W.1, there is another eye witness to the occurrence namely P.W.3. The discrepancy is, at the most, of a few hours and in our view, it was properly explained, in the circumstances of the case. 12. Apart from P.W.1, there is another eye witness to the occurrence namely P.W.3. He too was present in the shop when the appellant came there to meet the deceased. His presence cannot be doubted nor anything was elicited to discredit his version. Though the prosecution examined P.W.2 as another eyewitness, we are not prepared to accept the same in view of the fact that his presence was not spoken to by P.W.1. 13. Apart from there being two eye witnesses and one of the strongest circumstances in the form of arrest of the appellant by P.W.9 and his team, there is medical evidence, which would complete the chain, to link the appellant with the occurrence. It must be said to the credit of the trial Court that it had undertaken extensive discussion with relation to each and every piece of evidence and contentions advanced on behalf of the parties, major or trivial, and arrived at a proper conclusion. A perusal of the judgment discloses that the cooperation from the Investigating Officer, P.W.12, was far from satisfactory and the trial Court has overcome the same, by taking extra pains. 14. Learned Senior Counsel urged that even if the appellant can be said to have committed the offence, at the most it could be one under Section 304 IPC and not the one under Section 302 IPC. In this regard, certain aspects need to be examined. Firstly, the appellant did not entertain any serious enmity against the deceased. The very fact that the parties have chosen the Court of law to resolve the disputes, discloses that none of them intended to take the law into their hands. Secondly, the appellant did not prepare himself to commit any offence nor did he meditate upon it. This view of ours gains strength from the fact that he proceeded to the shop almost in a courteous manner and the same was reciprocated by the deceased and P.W.1 by offering water and thereafter, tea. Either on account of not being able to secure the vacant premises or otherwise the appellant suddenly became emotional, and an altercation took place between the deceased and the appellant. It was in this process that the appellant stabbed the deceased almost on spur of the moment. Either on account of not being able to secure the vacant premises or otherwise the appellant suddenly became emotional, and an altercation took place between the deceased and the appellant. It was in this process that the appellant stabbed the deceased almost on spur of the moment. Whatever be the provocation, his act cannot be supported or condoned. The discussion would become relevant most in the context of the quantum of sentence. 15. Judgment rendered by various Courts and the treatise of different authors explain the difference between a murder, and a culpable homicide not amounting to murder. Reference to them individually, would only add to the length of the judgment. Suffice it make a reference to the judgment reported in Tholan v. State of Tamil Nadu. The Hon'ble Supreme Court explained the distinction between the two, as well as the circumstances under which the homicide and murder can be treated under one provision or the other. In the ultimate analysis, the difference between a culpable homicide defined under Section 299 IPC, and murder under Section 300 IPC. The distinction between part I and II of Section 304 IPC is, mostly, the degree of ill-will, which an accused held, against the deceased and the manner in which the ill-will came to be exhibited. It is not necessary to go into the details thereof. The precedents suggest that if a person came to be killed by another, not on the basis of a strong motive and premeditated plan therefore, the incident deserves to be treated as a culpable homicide, not amounting to murder. Further, depending upon the presence of intention on the one hand, knowledge on the other hand about the consequences of the acts or omissions resorted to by the accused, Part I or II of Section 304 IPC would be attracted. 16. Reverting to the facts of the case, it is evident that the appellant did not hold any motive to kill the deceased. The very fact that at his instance, proceedings were initiated before a Civil Court and that he used to frequently visit the shop of the respondent supports this. Secondly, he did not undertake any preparation for committing the offence, nor did he meditate upon it. The fact that he alone went to the shop where several persons would be present and that courtesy ensured between the parties, reflects this. 17. Secondly, he did not undertake any preparation for committing the offence, nor did he meditate upon it. The fact that he alone went to the shop where several persons would be present and that courtesy ensured between the parties, reflects this. 17. The medical evidence disclosed that only one stab injury was noticed in the abdomen. In the normal course, an accused with firm determination to kill another, would cause number of stab injuries, so that the possibility of the victim to survive does not exist. In several precedents, Courts held that where the death is the result of a single stab injury, the case deserves to be treated as the one under Section 304 Part I IPC. Added to this, a clear suggestion was made to the prosecution witnesses that the appellant did not hold any knife and in the shop itself, there were knives for sale. The cumulative effect of this discussion is that the act resorted to by the appellant that resulted in the death of the deceased, deserves to be treated the one under Part I of Section 304 IPC. 18. The Criminal Appeal is, therefore, partly allowed holding that the appellant, Seethala Naga Mali Nancharaiah @ Bulli Babu, S/o.Venkata Surya Narayana Rao, accused in Sessions Case No.134 of 2004 on the file of the VII Additional District & Sessions Judge (Fast Track Court), Vijayawada, caused bodily injury to the deceased, which resulted in death and convict him of the offence under Part I of Section 304 of the Indian Penal Code. We sentence him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for seven {7} years and impose fine of Rs.1,000/- (Rupees one thousand only), in default to undergo simple imprisonment for three {3} months. The conviction and sentence rendered by the trial Court shall be substituted by the above said conviction and sentence.