Judgment :- This second appeal is focussed as against the judgment and decree dated 24.03.1999 passed in A.S.No.205 of 1996 by the learned Principal District Judge, Sivagangai, in reversing the judgment and decree dated 09.08.1996 passed in O.S.No.601 of 1994 by the learned District Munsif, Sivagangai. 2. The parties, for convenience sake, are referred to hereunder according to their litigative status before the trial Court. 3. Pithily and precisely, the case of the plaintiff could be set out thus: The properties described in the schedule of the plaint are the ancestral properties of the plaintiff who was in continuous possession and enjoyment of the same. While so, one Chittal Aatchi by way of executing the money decree as against the plaintiff, brought those properties to be sold in Court auction sale. The defendants herein individually purchased various items. To avoid multiplicity of proceedings, those defendants were added together as one unit in the suit. At the instance of the plaintiff herein, the said auction sale was set aside and redelivery was ordered in favour of the plaintiff in E.A.No.119 of 1965 and accordingly, the plaintiff got back the suit properties. There is no appeal filed by the defendants as against it. Accordingly, the plaintiff also acquired prescriptive title over the suit properties. However, the defendants subsequently during third week of August started occupying it. Hence the suit was filed for declaration of title of the plaintiff over the suit properties, for recovery of possession of the same and for mesne profits. 4. Per contra, denying and disputing, challenging and impugning the allegations/averments in the plaint, the defendants 1 and 4 to 6 filed the written statement with the averments inter alia thus: (i) The entire suit village constituted an estate before 1936 and Rent Reduction Act was enforced previously. Subsequently, the entire suit properties and the village in which the suit properties situated, were taken over by the Government under Act No.29 of 1963. The plaintiffs father purchased major share and that he was the major proprietor of the suit village. Since the plaintiffs father and the plaintiff were land-holders of the suit village, they could not claim the suit properties as their own ancestral properties or Pannai lands. .(ii) The plaintiff has not mentioned about the character of the land and it is very vague. Since the plaintiffs father and the plaintiff were land-holders of the suit village, they could not claim the suit properties as their own ancestral properties or Pannai lands. .(ii) The plaintiff has not mentioned about the character of the land and it is very vague. Neither the plaintiff nor his predecessors in title have directly cultivated the suit properties at any time and hence, they cannot claim ownership over the suit properties. The suit properties are the ryoti lands. The defendants and their ancestors have been in continuous possession and enjoyment of the suit lands. The respective defendants are in possession of various suit properties as their ancestral ryoti lands and that they acquired occupancy right under the Madras Estate Land Act and by customs and rescriptions. The plaintiff already received compensation as a senior proprietor of the suit village. Hence, he is having no right over it. Unless the plaintiff establishes that the suit lands were his Pannai lands, the plaintiff cannot claim that the suit lands are his ryoti lands. The plaintiff owned only Melvaram interest in the suit lands and after the Government taking over the land as per Act 26 of 1963, and the plaintiff having received the compensation amount for the Melvaram interest, he is estopped from claiming right as his lands. The legal proceedings referred to in the plaint are not properly set out. (iii) When the suit properties were brought for sale as though they belonged to the plaintiffs father, in order to avert the Court sale and to safeguard the right and interest of the defendants, the defendants purchased the suit lands in the Court auction sale. The plaintiffs father had only Melvaram interest in those lands. The pre-existing title of the defendants to the Kudivaram interest, was not affected by it. There was no redelivery of the property in favour of the plaintiff and the allegations to the contrary are false in the plaint. Accordingly, they prayed for the dismissal of the suit. 5. Per contra, the defendants 2 and 3 filed the written statement almost reiterating the averments as found set out in the written statement filed by the other defendants as set out supra. 6. The trial Court framed relevant issues. 7. Accordingly, they prayed for the dismissal of the suit. 5. Per contra, the defendants 2 and 3 filed the written statement almost reiterating the averments as found set out in the written statement filed by the other defendants as set out supra. 6. The trial Court framed relevant issues. 7. During trial, the plaintiff examined himself as P.W.1 along with P.W.2 to P.W.4 and Exs.A.1 to A.22 were marked and the first defendant examined himself as D.W.1 along with D.W.2 to D.W.7 and Exs.B.1 to B.8 were marked. 8. Ultimately, the trial Court dismissed the suit. 9. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with, the said judgment and decree of the trial Court, the plaintiff filed the appeal before the Principal District Court, Sivagangai, which Court reversed the judgment and decree of the trial Court and decreed the original suit. 10. Challenging the judgment and decree of the first appellate Court, the defendants preferred this second appeal on the following main grounds among others: The judgment and decree of the first appellate Court is contrary to law. The directions of the High Court in A.S.No.61 of 1978 has not been adhered to. The lower appellate Court erred in giving a finding that the suit lands are Pannai lands of the plaintiff. The recitals in Exs.A.5 to A.10 as Iruvaram lands cannot be the decisive factor to hold that the lands are Pannai lands, in the absence of evidence to prove that the plaintiff or his father had personal cultivation in the suit lands. The first appellate Court should have dismissed the appeal. Accordingly, they prayed for setting aside the judgment and decree of the first appellate Court and for restoring the judgment and decree of the trial Court in dismissing the original suit. 11. At the time of admitting this second appeal, this Court framed the following substantial questions of law: 1. In view of presumption as to ryoti land, whether the lower appellate Court is right in holding that the appellants have failed to prove their kudivaram right? 2. Whether the lower appellate Court is justified in finding that the suit lands are the private lands of the respondent merely on the basis of Exs.A.5 to A.10 without giving any finding as to whether the respondent was having personal cultivation over the lands?" 12. Heard both sides. 13. 2. Whether the lower appellate Court is justified in finding that the suit lands are the private lands of the respondent merely on the basis of Exs.A.5 to A.10 without giving any finding as to whether the respondent was having personal cultivation over the lands?" 12. Heard both sides. 13. On either side various contentions have been raised, as found set out supra and therefore, it is just and necessary to discuss all those points in seriatim. 14. The learned Counsel for the plaintiff would submit that the defendants entered into possession of the suit properties only as auction purchasers; subsequently, as per the Court order, the plaintiff was put in possession of the suit properties after setting aside the Court auction sale; thereafter, high-handedly and illegally, the defendants trespassed into the suit properties and occupied the same and in such a case, the plaintiff has to be put in possession of the suit properties. Whereas the learned Counsel for the defendants would contend that the proceedings relating to the Court auction sale are not at all germane for adjudicating the case at hand as the defendants were in possession and enjoyment of the suit properties even before the said Court auction sale, that the suit lands are ryoti lands and that the defendants are ryots holding patta as per the proceedings in Exs.B.7 and B.8. 15. The legal proceedings and consequent judicial adjudications and orders cannot be be-littled and slighted by anyone of the parties. The defendants cannot pick and choose only the relevant orders of revenue authorities in their favour and pray for discarding the civil Court orders. 16. The unassailable and indubitable facts are that one Chittal Aatchi of Nattarasan Kottai in the process of recovery of the amounts due under the decree passed in O.S.No.37 of 1956 as against the judgment debtor namely, plaintiffsfather, executed such decree by filing E.P.No.115 of 1957 so as to bring the suit properties for sale citing those suit properties as the absolute properties of the plaintiffs father. Thereupon, the defendants purchased those properties in the Court auction sale and obtained delivery of possession of the suit properties as per Court order; whereupon steps were initiated by the plaintiff and the sale was got set aside as per the order of the Court passed in E.A.No.119 of 1965 and he obtained delivery of possession through the Court as revealed by Ex.A.12. These legal events cannot be ignored by anyone of the parties. .17. The first appellate Court correctly appreciated the facts that the properties were brought for Court auction sale by the said creditor by citing them as absolute properties of the plaintiffs father. Absolutely, there is no substance in the contention of the defendants that the plaintiffs father and the plaintiff had only Melvaram right over the suit properties and only such right was brought for sale. 18. The defendants could not produce any iota or shred of evidence to prove that during such execution proceedings, Melvaram right by the plaintiffs father alone was brought for sale and that it was purchased by the defendants so as to safeguard their rights as ryots. The defendants could not produce any semblance of evidence much less any admissible piece of evidence in support of their contention that even before the Court auction sale, they had been in possession and enjoyment of the suit property and cultivating the same as ryots or in any other capacity. 19. At this juncture, it is worthwhile to refer to legal proceedings instituted by Chittal Aatchi. From Ex.A.12, it is clear that such a suit was filed in the year 1956 and the E.P for bringing the suit properties for Court auction sale was filed in the year 1957 as per E.P.No.115 of 1957. Subsequently, E.A.No.119 of 1965 for obtaining redelivery of those properties, was filed in the year 1965 by the plaintiff herein and obtained redelivery of the same from the defendants. 20. The serial order of occurrences is crucial so as to understand the realities as well as the preponderance of probabilities involved in this case. It is obvious that Act No.26 of 1963 namely, the Tamil Nadu Inam Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act 1963, came into vogue with effect from 01.01.1964. 21. It is therefore crystal clear that as on the date of coming into force of the said Act 26 of 1963, the possession of the defendants was only that of the Court auction purchasers and not in any other capacity. 21. It is therefore crystal clear that as on the date of coming into force of the said Act 26 of 1963, the possession of the defendants was only that of the Court auction purchasers and not in any other capacity. Ex.B.7, the order passed by the Settlement Court in S.R.159/SVG70 dated 25.07.1978, and Ex.B.8, the order passed by the Appellate Tribunal in R.A.No.79 of 1971 dated 30.03.1985, would in no way enure to the benefit of the defendants for the reason as already highlighted supra that as on the date of commencement of the said Act 26 of 1963, the defendants possession of the lands was only that of auction purchasers and not any other capacity. 22. The perusal of Ex.B.7, would clearly indicate that the Settlement Tahsildhar fell into error in ignoring the E.P proceedings and the preponderance of probabilities involved in this case as he merely held as though there was no independent evidence to prove that the plaintiff was doing personal cultivation either by himself or by engaging workers by spending his money and that too, for three years immediately before the first day of 1960. However, G.O.Ms.No.1300 Revenue Department, dated 30.04.1971, would mandate a different approach and it is quite obvious from a perusal of it. 23. The first appellate Court has correctly referred to the decision of this Court in Srinivasan and 6 others v. Sri Madhyarjuneswaraswami, Pattavaithalai, Thiruchirappalli District by its Executive Officer at Pattavaithalai Devasthanam and 5 others reported in 1998 (II) M.L.J Page 722 and extracted the relevant portion of it and as such, I need not extract the same once again. 24. Both sides in unison would admit that the Civil Court has got independent right de hors the decision arrived at by the Settlement Tahsildhar and the Appellate Tribunal concerned under the Special enactments such as Act 26 of 1963 and other allied acts. 125. The learned Counsel for the plaintiff correctly submitted that the orders of the Settlement Tahsildhar and the Appellate Tribunal as in Exs.B.7 and B.8, could not constitute evidence or any semblance of evidence in support of the contention of the defendants that they had been allegedly in possession and enjoyment of the suit lands anterior to the Court auction sale. .26. .26. On the side of the defendants, Exs.B.1 to B.8 were marked and out of those exhibits, Ex.B.1 to B.6 are relating to the certified copy of the deposition of one Raman in C.C.No.4500 of 1975 on the file of the Judicial Magistrate, Sivagangai, and it is quite axiomatic and obvious that the said deposition cannot be the evidence in this case wherein the civil rights of the parties have to be adjudicated. The remaining exhibits Exs.B.7 and B.8, as highlighted supra, are mere orders passed by the Settlement Tahsildhar and the Appellate Tribunal, which cannot be taken as evidence in view of the earlier cited decision of this Court. If this Court has to take only the findings as contained in Exs.A.7 and A.8, as evidence then the precedent of this Court referred to in the cited case, would be rendered nugatory. The defendants are only trying to pick holes in the case of the plaintiff. Even though the defendants candidly and categorically projected themselves as if they were in possession of the suit properties anterior to the Court auction sale, yet they have not chosen to produce any evidence. This crucial aspect has not been considered by the trial Court, but the first appellate Court properly addressed itself to the vital issues involved in this case and decided the appeal properly. 127. It is well established by evidence that anterior to the said Court auction sale, the plaintiff and his father were in possession and enjoyment of the suit lands. On the plaintiffs side, Exs.A.5 to A.10, the sale deeds were relied on. In paragraph Nos.11 and 12 of the judgment of the first appellate Court, the learned Appellate Judge correctly discussed the importance of those deeds, in which it is found mentioned that both Melvaram and Kudivaram rights were purchased by the plaintiffs ancestors. 128. However, the learned Counsel for the defendants would contend that the plaintiff has not proved that such both rights were purchased relating to the entire properties and that all those lands are Pannai lands and that there is no specification as to which are Pannai lands and what are the lands over which the plaintiffs predecessor in title had only Melvaram right. 129. At this juncture, the pertinent question arises as to what locus standi the defendants do have, to raise such questions. 129. At this juncture, the pertinent question arises as to what locus standi the defendants do have, to raise such questions. The defendants clearly expressed themselves that they are only the Court auction purchasers in the said Court auction sale and that such sale was set aside and the properties were delivered back to the plaintiff. Consequently there occurred snapping of the connection between the suit lands and the defendants. Hence, they cannot call upon this Court to ignore those Court orders and the juridical events which took place and nor can they claim any right over the suit lands. 130. It is not as though the defendants were not the parties to those execution proceedings. A fortiori, the Court order in the execution proceedings is binding on the defendants and they are estopped from contending otherwise orally without any evidence much less any clinching evidence as though they have been in possession prior to the Court auction sale. 131. The preponderance of probabilities would govern the civil adjudication. Here, the aforesaid facts would clearly demonstrate that the preponderance of probabilities are in favour of the plaintiff. 132. The perusal of Exs.A.5 to A.10, the sale deeds in favour of the plaintiffs ancestors, would prove that they got Iruvaram right in their favour. Those lands were described as Pannai lands. The first appellate Court which happened to be the last Court of facts, scrutinized the documents and arrived at the conclusion that those Exs.A.5 to A.10 are referring to the sale of Iruvaram right and that Pannai right was also purchased by the plaintiffs predecessor in title. The first appellate Court also referred to the fact that a person owning Melvaram right can also have Kudivaram right as it is in this case in favour of the plaintiff. 20.33. The contention of the defendants is that in certain suit properties, the plaintiff had both rights; in certain other suit properties, Iruvaram right including Pannai right and in some other properties, only Melvaram right. However, D.W.1 during cross-examination clearly and candidly admitted that in the said Court auction sale, the entire property was brought for sale and that alone, the defendants purchased in the auction sale which was subsequently set aside. As such, the first appellate Courts approach in analysing both oral and documentary evidence, requires no interference. 234. However, D.W.1 during cross-examination clearly and candidly admitted that in the said Court auction sale, the entire property was brought for sale and that alone, the defendants purchased in the auction sale which was subsequently set aside. As such, the first appellate Courts approach in analysing both oral and documentary evidence, requires no interference. 234. To the risk of repetition without being tautologous, I would highlight that the defendants are having no locus standi to question the title or the right to possession of the plaintiff over the suit properties. The defendants would contend as though the plaintiff admitted that he received compensation for the Melvaram right. It has become the trite proposition of law that simply because, certain proceedings had taken place earlier under the Special enactment that it does not mean that really the owner of the land is deprived of his right to assert his title as well as the right to possession. The defendants who are having no locus standi simply put forth the plea that since the plaintiff received compensation amount for Melvaram right, his prayer for declaration and possession should be dismissed. .35. It is a trite proposition of law that the judgments rendered in matters of this nature, would be judgment in personam and not judgment in rem. Here, the civil Court is called upon to decide whether the plaintiffs or the defendants stand is in a better footing and nothing more. This important aspect should be borne in mind. The defendants cannot assume to themselves as though they are capable of questioning the right and title of the plaintiff. If at all, under Act 26 of 1963, the Government questions the plaintiffs right and title, then the matter would be different and in such proceedings, various other factors should be taken into consideration. But, here, the Government is not a party and the Government so far has not initiated any action as against the plaintiff, even though the plaintiff obtained redelivery of the property through the Court and the fact was that even as on the date, Act 26 of 1963 was very much in vogue. Hence, in these circumstances, I am of the considered opinion that no interference with the finding of the first appellate Court is required. 236. Hence, in these circumstances, I am of the considered opinion that no interference with the finding of the first appellate Court is required. 236. Had the defendants been cultivating the suit lands anterior to the Court auction sale, certainly there should have been records and revenue records evidencing the same, but they could not produce any such evidence. On the side of the defendants, it was contended quite contrary to onus probandi that over and above, the documentary evidence, there should be clear evidence that the plaintiff cultivated personally the suit lands or by employing workers by spending his own money. The aforesaid exhibits are ancient documents and if at all, the plaintiff and his predecessor in title have not conducted personal cultivation, then certainly some other persons names would have been in the revenue records. Unmindful of this very important point, the defendants simply had put forth the plea as though the plaintiff should prove his personal cultivation. The very fact that documentary evidence available in favour of the plaintiff coupled with the absence of any documentary evidence in favour of the defendants or in favour of any third party, would amply prove that the case of the plaintiff is acceptable. 237. In the result, this second appeal is dismissed, confirming the judgment and decree dated 24.03.1999 passed by the learned Principal District Judge, Sivagangai, in A.S.No.205 of 1996. No costs.