JUDGMENT : S.U. Khan, J. Heard learned Counsel for the parties. 2. Landlord-petitioner filed S.C.C. Suit No. 2 Ram Mohan Tewari for eviction from the tenanted accommodation in dispute which is a shop on the ground of default in payment of rent and sub-letting. Prayer for recovery of arrears of rent was also made in the suit. J.S.C.C./Civil Judge (Sr. Division). Banda decreed the suit for eviction through judgment and decree dated 6.11.1998. However, finding on the question of sub-letting was recorded against the plaintiff and it was held that there was no sub-letting. Against the said judgment and decree, tenant-respondent No. 2 filed S.C.C. 3. Revision No. 79 of 1998. A.D.J./Special Judge (S.C. & S.T. Act), Banda allowed the revision through judgment and order dated 7.9.1999, set aside the Judgment and decree passed by the trial court and remanded the matter to the trial court to make fresh calculation to ascertain as to whether amount deposited by the tenant on the first date of hearing was sufficient u/s 20(4) of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 or not? The said judgment of the revisional court has been challenged through this writ petition. 4. In the plaint, in respect of default, it had been stated that rent was Rs. 100 per month which had not been paid since 1.5.1992. It was further stated that water tax with effect from 1.4.1981 had also not only been paid. However, both the courts below found that the tenant had been depositing water tax before Jal Sansthan, Jhansi. It was found that till 1995, total amount of Rs. 2,358 had been deposited as water tax by the tenant before Jal Sansthan. However, the trial court held that deposition of water tax before Jal Sansthan was not sufficient and tenant should have paid the said amount to the landlord by virtue of Section 7 of the Act and its non-payment to the landlord amounted to default in payment of rent. 5. The lower revisional court reversed the said findings and in my opinion rightly. Water tax is to be paid to the landlord for the reason that landlord is required to pay the same to the authority concerned. If a tenant directly pays the water tax to the authority concerned, it is quite valid. 5. The lower revisional court reversed the said findings and in my opinion rightly. Water tax is to be paid to the landlord for the reason that landlord is required to pay the same to the authority concerned. If a tenant directly pays the water tax to the authority concerned, it is quite valid. In fact, by paying the water tax directly to the authority concerned, tenant saves the landlord from the trouble of depositing the said amount before the authority concerned after receiving the same from the tenant. 6. Revisional court in its judgment categorically held as follows: And if the amount paid by the landlord (sic. tenant) as water tax is deducted from the total amount of Rs. 10,009.52 paisa as claimed in paper No. 74C, the total amount due comes much less than Rs. 8,000 deposited by the tenant on the first day of hearing. Learned Counsel for the landlord-petitioner has argued that the revisional court should not have remanded the matter and should have decided the matter finally. Learned Counsel has further argued that water tax should have been paid directly to the landlord. I accept the first contention and reject the second. 7. Learned Counsel for the landlord-petitioner has not disputed that if it is held that tenant was not liable to pay water tax again to the landlord after paying the same to the authority concerned then deposit made by him before the trial court was complete u/s 20(4) of the Act. 8. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has cited several authorities of this Court and the following authorities of the Supreme Court: 1. Chase Bright Steel Limited Vs. Shantaram Shankar Sawant and another, (1994) 4 SCC 89 2. Laxman Jiwaba Baherwade and Another Vs. Bapurao Dodappa Tandale, (2002) 7 SCC 618 3. Ramji Purshotam (D) by Lrs. and Others Vs. Laxmanbhai D., Kurlawala (D) by Lrs. and Another, (2004) 6 SCC 455 9. However, none of the cited authorities has got any direct relevance to the point involved in this writ petition. In view of the above, judgment and decree for eviction passed by the trial court is liable to be set aside, revisional court should have finally allowed the revision. Remanding the matter to the revisional court just for the sake of allowing the revision would be redundant and superfluous. 10. In view of the above, judgment and decree for eviction passed by the trial court is liable to be set aside, revisional court should have finally allowed the revision. Remanding the matter to the revisional court just for the sake of allowing the revision would be redundant and superfluous. 10. Accordingly writ petition is disposed of Judgment and decree passed by the trial court is set aside. Judgment and order passed by the revisional court remanding the matter is also set aside. Revision stands allowed. 11. I have held in Smt. Khursheeda Begum and Others Vs. Additional District Judge and Others, (2004) 1 AWC 851 , that while granting relief against eviction to the tenant in respect of building covered by Rent Control Act or while maintaining the said relief already granted by the courts below, writ court is empowered to enhance the rent to a reasonable extent. 12. In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda (supra), I placed reliance upon the Supreme Court authority of Malpe Vishwanath Acharya and Others Vs. State of Maharashtra and Another, (1998) 2 SCC 1 , where it was held that it was essential to provide for periodical enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Acts. The Supreme Court has further held that frozen rents are giving rise to lawlessness and landlords out of frustration are approaching muscle man to get the premises vacated and courts of law are becoming redundant in this sphere. 13. This authority has recently been followed by the Supreme Court in Satyawati Sharma (Dead) by LRs. Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Another, (2008) 5 SCC 287 of which are quoted below: 29. It is trite to say that legislation which may be quite reasonable and rationale at the time of its enactment may with the lapse of time and/or due to change of circumstances become arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of the doctrine of equity and even if the validity of such legislation may have been upheld at a given point of time, the Court may, in subsequent litigation, strike down the same if it is found that the rationale of classification has become non-existent. 34. In Malpe Vishwanath Acharya and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Anr. 34. In Malpe Vishwanath Acharya and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Anr. (supra), the Court found that the criteria for determination and fixation of rent by freezing or by pegging down of rent as on 1.9.1940 or as on first date of letting, had, with the passage of time become irrational and arbitrary but did not strike down the same on the ground that extended period of Bombay Rent Act was coming to an end on 31.3.1998. 14. Under U.P. Rent Control Act, there is no provision of enhancement of rent after October, 1972 [Except where landlord is public charitable or public religious institution (Section 9A) or Government is tenant (Section 21(8)). In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I have also placed reliance upon the authority of Supreme Court in Shangrila Food Products Ltd. and another Vs. Life Insurance Corporation of India and another, (1996) 5 SCC 54 , of which is quoted below: It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its Jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. This jurisdiction of the High Court, being extraordinary, is normally exercisable keeping in mind the principles of equity. One of the ends of the equity is to promote honesty and fair play. If there be any unfair advantage gained by a party priory, before invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court, the Court can take into account the unfair advantage gained and can require the party to shed the unfair gain before granting relief. 15. Thereafter, in Para 8 of the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I held as under: Rent Control Act confers a reasonable advantage upon the tenant of protection against arbitrary eviction. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. This advantage is also coupled with the advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent. The latter advantage cannot be said to be either reasonable or equitable. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid authority of Shangrila Food Products Ltd. and another Vs. This advantage is also coupled with the advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent. The latter advantage cannot be said to be either reasonable or equitable. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid authority of Shangrila Food Products Ltd. and another Vs. Life Insurance Corporation of India and another, (supra), has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. By slightly extending the said doctrine it may safely be held that while granting the reasonable advantage to the tenant conferred upon him by the Rent Control Act the tenant may be asked to shed the unreasonable arbitrary advantage conferred upon him by the said Rent Control Act. The writ court therefore, while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him in the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however, inadequate the rent might be. Tenant will have to shed the undue advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Act to barter his protection from arbitrary eviction provided by the said Act. 16. Thereafter in H.M. Kichlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, I have held that the same principle of enhancement of rent to a reasonable extent may be made applicable while dismissing the writ petition of the landlord for the reason that by doing so writ court approves the protection of Rent Control Act granted to the tenant by the courts below. 17. The property in dispute is a shop, rent of Rs. 100 per month is highly inadequate. Accordingly, it is directed that with effect from September, 2008 onwards, tenant-respondent No. 2 shall pay rent to the landlord-petitioner at the rate of Rs. 600 per month.