MANJUNATH, J.- The appellant was the second respondent before the MACT, Bangalore in MVC No. 473/98. The respondents 1 to 5 were the claimants before the Tribunal. The claim petition was lodged by the claimants on account of death of one P. R. Tagore who died in a road traffic accident occurred on 19-8-97 between Palamaner and Bangalore on N. H. No. 4 near Pattikonda Village. The deceased was an officer of M/s. Kirloskar Electric Co. Ltd. M/s. Kirloskar Electric Co. Ltd. was the owner of vehicle bearing registration No. KA04-N-831 which has been insured with the appellant herein. Since the deceased was an officer of M/s. Kirloskar Electric Co. Ltd., the once had provided the above car for the personal use of the deceased. On the unfortunate day, the deceased was travelling with his wife Smt. P. Vijayalakshmi who is the second respondent in this appeal. They were proceeding from Bangalore towards Palamaner. Near Pattikonda village, on seeing an oncoming lorry in a rash and negligent manner, the deceased who was driving the vehicle applied brake due to which, it turned down. The deceased and his wife sustained grievous injuries. The wife was shifted to Palamaner Hospital and deceased was shifted to Manipal Hospital, Bangalore. The second respondent Smt. Vijayalakshmi lodged a complaint before the police in regard to the manner in which the accident occurred and the case was registered. FIR is produced as Ex. P.7. Since the injured driver died, the FIR is registered under Sections 279, 337 and 304A of IPC. The appellant insurance company admitted the issuance of policy. According to the appellant, the policy was in force on the date of the accident and it was further contended that if there is any liability of the insurance company, the same is subject to the terms and conditions of the policy. It was also contended that since deceased died on account of his negligence, there was no liability and requested the Court to exonerate the appellant-insurance company. The Tribunal based on the above pleadings, framed the following issues: 1. Whether the petitioner proves that on 19-8-98 at about 1.00 p.m. the driver of car bearing No. KA-04-N831 driven the vehicle in a rash and negligent manner and caused an accident? 2. Whether the petitioner is entitled for compensation? If so, what is the amount of compensation? and who is responsible for payment of compensation? 3. Whether the petitioner proves that on 19-8-98 at about 1.00 p.m. the driver of car bearing No. KA-04-N831 driven the vehicle in a rash and negligent manner and caused an accident? 2. Whether the petitioner is entitled for compensation? If so, what is the amount of compensation? and who is responsible for payment of compensation? 3. By what order or award?" 2. The widow was examined as PW -I. One witness was examined as PW-2. The claimants relied upon Ex. P. I to P. 10. On behalf of the insurance company, one witness was examined as RW-l. Insurance company relied upon Exs. R1 and R 2. The Tribunal considering the evidence let in by the parties, held issues Nos. 1 and 2 in affirmative and awarded compensation of Rs. 9,90,000/and fixed the liability on the insurance company. 3. We have heard the learned counsel appearing for both parties. 4. The learned counsel for the appellant has raised the following points during the course of his arguments: When the accident occurred on account of rash and negligent driving of the driver of the vehicle, the claim petition lodged by his legal representatives was not maintainable. The Tribunal without considering the terms and conditions of the policy has wrongly saddled the liability on it. Therefore, the judgment and award has to be set aside. 5. To support his arguments he has relied upon the charge-sheet filed by the police against the deceased which is produced as Ex. R I. He has also placed reliance on the judgment of this Court in the case of Jayamma D. & another v. S. Govindaswamy & others' reported in 1982 (1) KLJ 375: (1982 Lab IC 1666) and the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in 2007 AIR SCW 859 (Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Smt. Jhuma Saha & others); and in ACJ 2007 1284: (2007 (3) AIR Kar R 437) (Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Meena Variyal and others). 6. According, to the learned counsel for the respondents, none of the judgment relied upon by the counsel for the appellant are relevant to the facts and circumstances of this case. According to him, the vehicle in question owned by M/s. Kirloskar Electric Co. was provided to the deceased considering the nature of his employment for his personal use. The deceased had a valid driving licence. According to him, the vehicle in question owned by M/s. Kirloskar Electric Co. was provided to the deceased considering the nature of his employment for his personal use. The deceased had a valid driving licence. The second respondent was travelling with the deceased near Pattikonda village. On seeing an oncoming lorry in a rash and negligent manner, to avoid the accident, the deceased applied brake. Though there was no rashness or negligence in driving the vehicle, by him, the car turned down and the first respondent and the deceased sustained grievous injuries. Therefore, the learned counsel contends that the accident did not occur on account of the rash and negligent driving of the driver (deceased). According to him if the deceased was rash or negligent in driving the vehicle, the claimants could not have maintained the case on account of wrong committed by the deceased. According to him, considering the terms and conditions of the policy, the Insurance company cannot contend that it has no liability to satisfy the award. 7. After hearing the parties, we are of the opinion that following points would arise for our consideration in this appeal: "(a) Whether the accident occurred on account of the rash and negligent driving of deceased and was he responsible for the cause of the accident? (h) Whether the appellant-insurance company is liable to answer the claim of the claimants?" 8. In order to consider point No. I, we have to examine the evidence let in by both the parties. On behalf of the claimants, first claimant P. Vijayalakshmi who was travelling with the deceased at the time of the accident has been examined as PW -1. According to her, on 18-8-1997 she was proceed with her husband in Car No. KA 04 N-831 from Bangalore to Palamaner in order to avoid a cow and a lorry her husband took a turn, due to the same accident occurred and that she and her husband sustained injuries in the accident and she was shifted to Palamaner Hospital and sustained fracture on her right hand and fracture of ribs 2 to 6 her husband was shifted to Manipal Hospital, Bangalore, There is 110 cross-examination by the appellant in regard to the manner in which the accident occurred. There are only 4 sentences of cross-examination which 'is re-produced as hereunder: "I have not produced any succession certificate. There are only 4 sentences of cross-examination which 'is re-produced as hereunder: "I have not produced any succession certificate. I do not know whether the police have filed charge-sheet against my husband. It is false to suggest that my husband has not died due to the accident. It is false to suggest that we have not spent Rs. 15,000/for conveyance. It is false to suggest that I have sustained simple injuries. It is false to suggest that due to the accident I have not sustained any injuries." From looking into the above cross-examination, it is clear that the appellant did not cross-examine PW - 1 to the manner in regard to the accident. If Tagore who was driving the vehicle in order to avoid a cow and on coming lorry had to apply the brakes and due to which if the car has turned, it cannot be alleged that the deceased died on account of his negligence. We have to infer that in order to avoid accident viz., head on collision between car and the lorry and to save a cow as a prudent driver had applied brake and due to which if the car has turned, it cannot be inferred that the accident occurred on account of the rash and negligent driving of the deceased. It is also not in dispute in charge-sheet marked as Ex. R-I, it is not mentioned that the accident occurred on account of the rash and negligent driving of the driver. Except production of FIR which is marked as Ex. R-I, no oral evidence is let in by the insurance company. 9. In this background, we have to consider the FIR lodged by the second respondent who is an eye witness. FIR is lodged by her stating that while negotiating a curve, on seeing an on-coming lorry, her husband applied the brake and the vehicle turned down. The case was registered' at the first instance under Sections 279 and 337 of IPC. Ten days later, on account of death of the driver, one more FIR has been registered under Section 304-A of IPC. Even, while registering the second FIR, it is not mentioned that the accident occurred on account of the rash and negligent driving of the driver (deceased). The insurance company has produced. Ex. R. 1 which is a charge sheet. Ten days later, on account of death of the driver, one more FIR has been registered under Section 304-A of IPC. Even, while registering the second FIR, it is not mentioned that the accident occurred on account of the rash and negligent driving of the driver (deceased). The insurance company has produced. Ex. R. 1 which is a charge sheet. Except producing the charge-sheet, no other evidence is let in by the insurance company. Therefore, from the facts of this case, it is clear that the accident did not occur on account of the rash and negligent driving of the deceased. 10. Even in 'the case of judgment of this Court in Jayamn as case (1982 Lab IC 1666) (supra), the question was of a paid driver who was responsible for the cause of accident on account of his rash and negligent driving. Therefore, their Lordships have held that when a person died on account of rash and negligent driving of the driver and for his own wrong" he is not entitled to file a claim petition. 11. Let us now consider the question of liability of the appellant-Insurance Company. Section 95 of the Act provides that policy of insurance must be one which insures the person against any liability which may be incurred by him in respect of death or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of third party caused by or arising out of the use of the vehicle in a public place. The section does not however require a policy to cover the risk of passengers who are not carried for hire or reward. The statutory insurance does not cover injuries suffered by occupants of the vehicle who are not carried for hire or reward and the insurer cannot be held liable under the Act. But that does not prevent the insurer from entering into contract with insurance covering a risk wider than the minimum requirement of the statute whereby the risk to a gratuitow3 passengers would also be covered. In such cases, where the policy is not a statutory policy, the terms of the policy has to be considered to determine the liability of the insurer. 12. In the instant case, the appellant insurance company has got marked only the certificate of insurance not the policy before the tribunal. A copy of the policy has also not been made available to us. 12. In the instant case, the appellant insurance company has got marked only the certificate of insurance not the policy before the tribunal. A copy of the policy has also not been made available to us. It is pertinent to reiterate what has been stated by the Supreme Court on the attitude of the insurance companies in not filing a copy of the policy on which they rely upon so as to avoid their liability. In the case of National Insurance Company, New Delhi v. Jugal Kishore ( AIR 1988 SC 719 ), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has stated as follows: "10. Before parting with the case, we consider it necessary to refer to the attitude often adopted by the Insurance Companies, as was adopted even in this case, of not filing a copy of the policy before the Tribunal and even before the High Court in appeal. In this connection what is of significance is that the claimants for compensation under the Act 'are invariably not possessed of either the policy or a 'copy thereof. This Court has consistently emphasised that it is the duty of the party which is in possession of a document which would be helpful in doing justice in the cause to produce the said document and such party should not be permitted to take shelter behind the abstract doctrine of burden of proof. This duty is greater in the case of instrumentalities of the State such as the appellant who are under an obligation to act fairly. In many cases even the owner of the vehicle for reasons known to him does not choose to produce the policy or a copy thereof. We accordingly wish to emphasise that in all such cases where the Insurance Company concerned wishes to take defence in claim petition that its liability is not in excess of the statutory liability it should file a copy of the insurance policy along with its defence. Even in the instant case had it been done so at the appropriate stage necessity of approaching this Court in Civil Appeal would in all probability have been avoided. Filing a copy of the policy, therefore not only cuts short avoidable litigation but also helps the Court in doing justice between the parties. The obligation on the part of the State or its instrumentalities to act fairly can never be over -emphasised." 13. Filing a copy of the policy, therefore not only cuts short avoidable litigation but also helps the Court in doing justice between the parties. The obligation on the part of the State or its instrumentalities to act fairly can never be over -emphasised." 13. A perusal of the cover note (Ex. R. 2) shows that the policy is in respect of a private car and is a 'B' policy and there is an important notice, which states as follows: "The insured is not indemnified if the vehicle is used or driven otherwise than in accordance with this schedule. Any payment made by the company by reason of wider terms appearing in the certificate in order to comply with the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, is recoverable from the insured. See the clause headed "Avoidance of Certain Terms and Right of Recovery" The contract of insurance shall be governed by the printed terms, conditions and endorsements applicable to the contract attached hereto. The contract is further subject to tariff regulations applicable as on date of issuance of the policy." Thus, in the absence of terms and conditions of the policy, we have no other option but to raise an adverse inference against the insurance company that there was wider coverage in the instant case and that the "important notice" at the foot note of the cover note also proves that the policy in question was not an Act or statutory policy with a limited liability. On the other hand, I there was a wider liability and right of recovery with the Insurance company. 14. The said "important notice has been considered and interpreted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of "Amrit Lal Sood v. Kaushalya Devi Thaparfl ( AIR 1998 SC 1433 ). The facts were that the car which was involved in the accident was insured with 5th respondent. One Kisan Swaroop, husband of respondent No. 1 who was travelling in the car was injured and hospitalised for some time. The tribunal found that the accident had occurred due to the negligence of the driver of the car and passed an award of Rs. 13,800/- against the appellant owner and the 5th respondent insurance company. One Kisan Swaroop, husband of respondent No. 1 who was travelling in the car was injured and hospitalised for some time. The tribunal found that the accident had occurred due to the negligence of the driver of the car and passed an award of Rs. 13,800/- against the appellant owner and the 5th respondent insurance company. Aggrieved by the said award two letter patent appeals, one by the legal representatives of the claimant and the other by the driver of the vehicle who was the appellant before the Supreme Court were filed before the High Court of Himachal Pradesh. In the said appeals, it was held that the insurer was not liable as the claimant was only a passenger in the vehicle. Then the driver and owner of the car preferred appeals on special leave. The Hon'ble Supreme Court said that the question to be decided was whether the insurer was liable to satisfy the claim of compensation made by a person travelling gratuitously in the car. The Supreme 'Court referred to Sec. 94 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 which compels owner of the motor vehicle to insure the vehicle in compliance with the requirements of chapter VIII of the Act. In the said case, the policy was admittedly a comprehensive policy which has been defined in Black's Law Dictionary in 5th Edition "all risk insurance" which means "type of insurance policy which ordinarily covers every loss that may happen, except by fraudulent act of the insured. After examining the relevant clause in the policy "section-11 liability to 3rd parties" and the term driver which was expressly defined in the policy as anyone of the following; a) any person b) the insured may also drive the car belonging to him and not hired to him under a Hire Purchase Agreement, the Court found that in Section 11, 1(a) of the policy, insurer had agreed to indemnify the insured against all sums which the insured became legally liable to pay in respect of death or bodily injury to "any person According to the Supreme Court. the expression 'any person' undoubtedly included an occupant of the car who was gratuitously travelling in the car. the expression 'any person' undoubtedly included an occupant of the car who was gratuitously travelling in the car. In so far as gratuitous passengers are concerned, there was no limitation in the policy and the Supreme Court held that under the terms of the said policy, the insurer / s was liable to satisfy the award passed in favour of the claimant. The Supreme Court approved the, reasoning in the case of Madras Motor General Insurance Company v. Khatan Reddy Subba Reddy ( AIR 1974 AP 310 ) : Premier Insurance Company Ltd. v. Gambir Singh Ghalub Singha, ( AIR 1975 Guj 133 ) and Prabhu Dayal Agarwal v. Sarawathi Bai (1975 ACJ 355 (Orissa). 15. The Court also reiterated its judgment in New Asiatic Insurance Company v. Pessumal Dhanamal Aswani, ( AIR 1964 SC 1736 ). In the said case, the insured had permitted another person to drive his car and while the said person was driving the car, it met with an accident. The question was whether the insurance policy would enable the said driver to claim indemnity from the insurance company. On a consideration of the terms of the policy, the Court held that the company would be liable to indemnify him. In the course of the judgment, the Court said as follows (paras 21 and 22 of AIR): "The Act contemplates the possibility of policy of insurance undertaking liability to third parties providing such a contract be tween the insured and insurer I.e. the person who is effected the policy as would make the company entitled to recover the whole part of the amount it has paid to the 3rd party from the insured. The insurer thus acts as security for the 3rd party with respect of its realising damages for the injuries suffered but in relation to the insured vis a vis the insured the company does not undertake that liability or undertakes it to a limited extent. It is in view of such a possibility that various conditions are laid down in the policy. Such conditions are however effective only between the insured and the company, and have to be ignored when considering the liability of the company to 3rd parties. This is mentioned prominently in the policy itself. It is mentioned under the heading "Avoidance of certain terms and rights of recovery" in the schedule to the policy. Such conditions are however effective only between the insured and the company, and have to be ignored when considering the liability of the company to 3rd parties. This is mentioned prominently in the policy itself. It is mentioned under the heading "Avoidance of certain terms and rights of recovery" in the schedule to the policy. The avoidance clause says that nothing in the policy or any endorsement thereon shall affect the right of any person indemnified by the policy or any other person to recover an amount under or by virtue of the provisions of the Act. It also provides that the insured will repay to the company all sums paid by it which the company would not have been liable to pay but for the provisions of the Act. The "Important Notice" mentions that any payment made by the company by reason of wider terms appearing in the certificate in order to comply with the Act is recoverable from the insured and refers to the avoidance clause. Thus the contract between the insured and company may not provide for all the liabilities which the company has to undertake vis-a-vis the third parties in view of the provisions of the Act. We are of opinion that once the company had undertaken, liability to third parties incurred by the persons specified in the policy, the third parties' right to recover any amount under or by virtue of the provisions of the Act is not affected by any condition in the policy. Considering this aspect of the terms of the policy. it is reasonable to conclude that proviso (a) of para 3 bf Section II is a mere condition affecting the rights of the insured who effected the policy and the persons to whom the cover of the policy and the persons to whom the policy was extended by the company. and does not come in the way of third parties claim against the company on account of its claim against a person specified in para 3 as one to whom cover of the policy was extended". 16. The Supreme Court after considering the clause under the heading "Avoidance of Certain Terms and Rights of Recovery" held that the said clause did not enable the insurance company to resist or avoid the claim made by the claimant. 16. The Supreme Court after considering the clause under the heading "Avoidance of Certain Terms and Rights of Recovery" held that the said clause did not enable the insurance company to resist or avoid the claim made by the claimant. The Court further held that the clause will arise for consideration only in a dispute between the insurer and insured. The question whether under the said clause the insurer could claim repayment from the insured was left open and it was directed that the insurance company was liable to meet the claim of the claimant and satisfy the award passed by the Tribunal and modified by the High Court. The judgment of the High Court in so far as it exonerated the insurance company from the liability was set aside. 17. The aforesaid decision rendered by a three Judge bench was considered by a five Judge bench in the case of New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. C. M. Jaya and others. ( (2002) 2 SCC 278 ) : ( AIR 2002 SC 651 ) and upheld and it was stated that the liability of the insurer though limited as indicated in Section 95 of the Act, it is open to the insured to make payment of additional/higher premium and to get the higher risk covered in respect of third party also. But in the absence of any such clause in the insurance policy, the liability of insurer cannot be unlimited in respect of third party and it is limited only to the statutory liability. 18. The Appellant insurance company has relied upon the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Oriental Insurance Company v. Meena Variyal ( 2007 ACJ 1284 ) : (2007 (3) AIR Kar R 437) in order to contend that the insurance company has to be exonerated from its liability in the instant case. In the said case, the facts were that one Suresh Chandra Variyal was employed as a regional manager in M/s. Apace Savings and Mutual Benefits (India) Ltd. the owner of the vehicle. Variyal was provided with a car by the employer. The vehicle was insured with the appellant insurance company in terms of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and there was no special contract. On 14-6-1999, the vehicle met with an accident and Suresh Chandra Variyal died. Variyal was provided with a car by the employer. The vehicle was insured with the appellant insurance company in terms of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and there was no special contract. On 14-6-1999, the vehicle met with an accident and Suresh Chandra Variyal died. His widow and daughter had filed claim petition under Section 166 of the Act before the Tribunal which had granted compensation to the tune of Rs. 7,20,000/- with interest. The claim was filed against the employer, the owner of the motor vehicle, the insured and against the insurance company. One Mahmood Hasan who was allegedly driving the car at the time of accident was not impleaded. The Insurance company contended before the Tribunal that the alleged driver of the car had not been impleaded and as a matter of fact the deceased himself was driving the car and therefore the insurance company has no liability. However, in the evidence it was clear that the deceased himself was driving the car at the time of accident. Under the circumstances, the claim granted directing the owner of the car to pay the claimant. The claimant filed an appeal before the High Court which was resisted by the insurance company on the ground that the deceased was not a third party covered by the insurance policy but was an employee of the owner of the vehicle and was not covered by the policy and since the accident was caused by his own negligence the insurance" company was not liable. In the said case, there was a controversy as to whether the deceased himself was driving the vehicle or there was paid driver who was driving the vehicle' at .the time of accident and owner of the vehicle had acquiesced in the award passed by the 'tribunal, I against it. 19. On the above facts, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that there was no finding that Mahmood Hasan, an employee of the owner, was driving the vehicle, Even if he was, there was no, finding of his negligence. The victim was, Regional Manager of the Company that owned the car and was using the car given to him by the company for use. The victim was, Regional Manager of the Company that owned the car and was using the car given to him by the company for use. Whether he is treated as owner of the vehicle or an employee he is not covered by the insurance company taken in terms of the Act without any special contract Le the policy in question in the said case was an Act policy. Under the peculiar circumstances of the case, it was' held that the appellant insurance company was not liable to indemnify the insured and was also not obliged to satisfy the award of the claims Tribunal/Court and then have a recourse to the insured the owner of the vehicle. Therefore, the Hon'ble Court clearly held that under an Act policy, the insurance company would not be liable to indemnify the insured except to the extent and as limited by the policy. 20. It is, however, significant in the said decision, the Supreme Court while considering another decision in the case of Pushpa Bai Purshottam Udeshi & Ors v. M/s. Ranjit Ginning and Pressing Company (P) Ltd. & Anr., ( AIR 1977 SC 1735 ) held that when a car is driven by the owner's employee on owner's business the normal rule was, it was for the claimant for compensation to prove negligence. When the Manager or Owner while driving car on the business of the owner took in a passenger it would be taken that he had the authority to do so considering his position unless otherwise shown. All due to his negligent driving, an accident occurred and the passenger dies, the owner would be liable for compensation. The Court noticed that the modern trend was to make the master liable for acts of his servant which may not fall within the expression "in the course of his employment" as formally understood. The Court approved that the extension to the principle of liability had been rightly indicated in the Pushpabai's case. 21. The learned counsel for the appellant has relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court in Jhuma Saha's case, (2007 AIR SCW 859) (supra). There it, was an act policy. But in the instant case, it is not 'an act policy. It is a package or comprebensive policy. As stated earlier, that the insurance company has not produced the policy. The learned counsel for the appellant has relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court in Jhuma Saha's case, (2007 AIR SCW 859) (supra). There it, was an act policy. But in the instant case, it is not 'an act policy. It is a package or comprebensive policy. As stated earlier, that the insurance company has not produced the policy. to show its liability, therefore it is difficult, it for us to accept the argument advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant." 22. As already stated in the instant case, the insurance company has not placed before us or before the Tribunal detailed terms and conditions of the Policy. Therefore, in our view, it is not proper, to, assume that the policy was only Act policy a it did not cover wider liability particularly, when the cover note itself refers to "important notice" which refers to "Avoidance of certain terms and rights of recovery" clause, and we hold that the policy contained a wider liability. Further in Meena Variyal's case, the policy in question was an Act policy without any special contract and therefore the said decision cannot be straightway applied to the facts and circumstances of the instant case as the liability was restricted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the said decision on being satisfied that it was only an Act policy. We therefore, rely upon the ratio of Pushpabai case ( AIR 1977 SC 1735 ) approved in Meena Variyal's case (2007 (3) AIR Kar R437) so as to grant relief to the claimants herein. Further, the present facts and circumstances are in no way applicable to the decisions relied upon' by the learned counsel for the appellant. Since the accident has occurred not on account of the rash and negligent driving of the deceased, we do not see any justification to interfere with the findings of the Tribunal. 23. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed. The amount in deposit if any, is ordered to be sent to the tribunal.