JUDGMENT By the Court.—The appellant contemner, a practising lawyer of this Court who on an earlier occasion also held the office of the Secretary, Allahabad High Court Bar Association, has been charged for having committed ex-facie contempt by a learned Single Judge of this Court giving rise to this appeal. The division bench hearing the appeal found several issues worth reference as a result whereof Hon’ble the Chief Justice constituted this Full Bench to hear and dispose of the same. 2. A specific oral prayer was made for deciding the question of maintainability of the instant appeal, which is also one of the questions referred. It was urged by the learned Counsel that the said question be decided before taking up the contempt matter itself. The prayer was accepted by us in view of the sequence of the proceedings which we would prefer to mention at the out set, before traversing the specifics of the incident, and the arguments advanced thereon. 3. Sri V.C. Misra, Senior Advocate and coincidently the President of the Bar Association for the contemner, as well as the contemner in person and Sri A.C. Tripathi learned standing Counsel, have advanced their submissions covering arguments ranging over a wide canvas both on facts and law, which we shall presently refer to. 4. Hon’ble Mr. Justice Vinod Prasad the learned Single Judge who was presiding in Court No. 47, after recording the incident which took place inside the Court room between 10.07 A.M. and 10.16 A.M. on 10.12.2007, drew proceedings of ex-facie contempt against the appellant by framing charges and simultaneously issued a direction to send her to jail. The order recites taking cognizance of the matter under Section 15 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the 1971 Act) and directs the matter to be placed before the concerned Bench dealing with criminal contempt. The contemner preferred the instant appeal against the above mentioned order on the same day, which, under orders of the Hon’ble the Chief Justice, was placed before another Division Bench presided over by Dr. B.S. Chauhan, J. The said Bench proceeded to pass orders putting the order of the learned Single Judge directing judicial custody of the appellant in abeyance, with a further rider that the appellant is restrained from appearing in the High Court except in her contempt case. 5. B.S. Chauhan, J. The said Bench proceeded to pass orders putting the order of the learned Single Judge directing judicial custody of the appellant in abeyance, with a further rider that the appellant is restrained from appearing in the High Court except in her contempt case. 5. The appellant appears to have been set at liberty on the same day i.e. 10.12.2007 and on the following day i.e. 11.12.2007, the appellant moved an application before the learned Single Judge tendering her apology. The learned Single Judge passed orders thereon, placing the said application for consideration before the concerned Bench, as in his opinion once the matter had been sent before the appropriate bench, the application was also to be considered by the same bench. The application appears to have been again taken up by the Division Bench hearing the instant appeal on which a detailed order was passed on 11.12.2007 itself, placing the matter before the Hon’ble the Chief Justice for constituting a Larger Bench of not less than five Hon’ble Judges to opine on the issues referred to therein, and the interim order was continued. The order passed by the Division Bench dated 11.12.2007 pointedly referred questions which in the opinion of the Division Bench, had arisen in view of the incident which were subject matter of contempt and also issues which emanated as a consequence of the said incident, which were of general importance including the alleged unruly behaviour of a large number of lawyers who engaged themselves in a ruckus totally disrupting the proceedings of all the Courts. 6. The contemner moved before the Apex Court against all the aforesaid four orders passed by the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench on 10.12.2007 and 11.12.2007 respectively. All the four special leave to appeals (Cr.) SLP Nos. 582-585 of 2008 were filed simultaneously and we have been apprised of the proceedings of the apex Court through the supplementary affidavit dated 21.4.2008 and the affidavit filed in support of defective special appeal No. 308 of 2008.The matter appears to have been taken on Board on 8.2.2008 on which date the following order was passed : “CORAM: HON’BLE Mr. JUSTICE B.N. AGRAWAL HON’BLE Mr.JUSTICE G.S. SINGHVI For Petitioner(s) Mr. Shantanu Krishan, Adv. Mr. Abhishek Chaudhary, Adv (N/P) For Respondent(s) UPon hearing Counsel the Court made the following ORDER Perused the letter circulated by the learned advocate petitioner. JUSTICE B.N. AGRAWAL HON’BLE Mr.JUSTICE G.S. SINGHVI For Petitioner(s) Mr. Shantanu Krishan, Adv. Mr. Abhishek Chaudhary, Adv (N/P) For Respondent(s) UPon hearing Counsel the Court made the following ORDER Perused the letter circulated by the learned advocate petitioner. Place the petition after four weeks as it has been stated that wife of learned Counsel for the petitioner is unwell.” 7. The affidavit recites that the appellant rushed to Delhi for getting a mention made in the matter as the Full Bench had not yet been constituted before this Court and the matter required an urgent hearing. As such, a mention was made on her behalf before the Supreme Court to permit her to withdraw the case at that stage. The same bench which had passed the order on 8.2.2008 then passed an order on 11th of Feb., 2008 which is quoted below : “CORAM: Hon’ble Mr. JUSTICE B.N. AGRAWAL Hon’ble Mr. JUSTICE G.S. SINGHVI For Petitioner(s) Mr. Rakesh Dwivedi, Sr. Adv. Mr. Abhishek Chudhary , Adv. For Respondent(s) UPon hearing Counsel the Court made the following ORDER Taken on Board. Heard learned Counsel for the petitioners. After some arguments, learned Counsel for the petitioner is permitted to withdraw these petitions. The special leave petitions are, accordingly, disposed of.” 8. The appellant, thereafter, appears to have approached the Hon’ble Chief Justice with a representation on the administrative side dated 12.3.2008 praying for the constitution of a FIVE Judges Bench. The representation simultaneously expresses hope in the Chief Justice and his high office and also in a guarded language criticises the inaction of the Chief Justice in proceeding to constitute the Bench. 9. Thereafter, on 28.3.2008, an application was moved in the instant appeal praying for its withdrawal. This application appears to have been moved under the impression that the appeal, under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, was not maintainable. For this reason, it appears that the appellant on 31.3.2008 presented a Special Appeal bearing defective Special Appeal No. 309 of 2008, assailing the same order dated 10.12.2007 passed by the learned single Judge which has been questioned in the present Appeal. 10. For this reason, it appears that the appellant on 31.3.2008 presented a Special Appeal bearing defective Special Appeal No. 309 of 2008, assailing the same order dated 10.12.2007 passed by the learned single Judge which has been questioned in the present Appeal. 10. Hon’ble the Chief Justice, thereafter, proceeded to pass an order on 2.4.2008 constituting this Bench to hear and decide all the 3 matters namely the Criminal Contempt Petition No. 21 of 2007, the present Appeal under Section 19 of the Act and the defective Special Appeal No. 309 of 2008. The Bench assembled to proceed to hear the matter and the hearing commenced from 4.4.2008. It was adjourned for 16.4.2008 where after it was proceeded with in continuation on 17.4.2008, 18.4.2008 and 21.4.2008. 11. Sri V.C. Mishra, learned Counsel for the appellant, led the arguments by submitting that the learned single Judge acted without jurisdiction in proceeding to take cognizance and further did so without following the procedure prescribed under the 1971 Act read with Rules contained in Rules 7 and 8 of Chapter XXXV-E of the Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952 (hereinafter referred to 1952 Act). He also extensively narrated the facts and urged that the appellant was merely making a mention in Court which was with the intention to secure justice for her client and which could not be termed in any way designed to undermine or denigrate the authority of the Court, so as to constitute ex-facie contempt. 12. His submissions on 4.4.2008 were supplemented by the narration of facts by the contemner herself who stood up and informed the Court that she had been advancing the cause of her client and had not used any derogatory words so as to initiate action against her and put her on trial. She urged that the mention was being made as per the traditions of this Court where the very first moments of the Court in the morning hours are occupied by mentions being made by Counsels for taking up their cases for different reasons. She extensively narrated the manner in which she had conducted the bail applications in a criminal case where there were several accused and had been assigned similar roles in a murder case. She extensively narrated the manner in which she had conducted the bail applications in a criminal case where there were several accused and had been assigned similar roles in a murder case. She urged that one of the co-accused had been granted bail by another learned single Judge of this Court and, therefore, claiming parity, she had filed the bail application of two other co-accused which was rejected by Hon.Mr.Justice Vinod Prasad, even though they had already been granted bail under section 452 I.P.C. It was urged that she was fully justified in bringing this fact to the notice of the learned single Judge and pray for bail on parity . The contemner gave her own explanation about the incident and urged that the learned Judge had passed an altogether different order in Court and for this, she states that even though the order was passed on 1.11.2007, the certified copy of the same was delivered to her only on 13.11.2007. In para 8 of her representation dated 2.3.2008, the contemner has quoted the alleged order, which according to her was passed on 1.11.2007 in open Court. The same is quoted below : “Smt. Sadhna Upadhyaya has submitted on behalf of the Applicant that one of the co-accused has already been granted Bail therefore the Applicant whose role is similar and identical be given parity and released on Bail. Mr. J.S. Audichya and Mr. P. Verma, Counsel for the complainant, have contended that the Applicants are also charged under Section 452, IPC for which another F.I.R. has been registered upon being asked about this F.I.R. Mrs. Upadhyaya said that she has no knowledge about this second F.I.R. The complainant Counsel may file counter-affidavit within a month bringing this F.I.R. on record. Rejoinder-affidavit may be filed within 3 weeks thereafter. After the order for counter-affidavit and rejoinder-affidavit was passed Mrs. Upadhyaya has made a request that these Bail Applications be kindly dismissed at this stage. Accordingly, these two Bail Applications are being decided on merits the accused Applicants have tried to tamper with the evidence for which an F.I.R. under Section 452, IPC has been lodged. I am, therefore, not inclined to grant bail on parity and accordingly the bail application is rejected at this stage.” 13. Accordingly, these two Bail Applications are being decided on merits the accused Applicants have tried to tamper with the evidence for which an F.I.R. under Section 452, IPC has been lodged. I am, therefore, not inclined to grant bail on parity and accordingly the bail application is rejected at this stage.” 13. She alleges that the said order was substituted and changed by the learned single Judge, which she was surprised to find when the certified copy of the same order was delivered to her, and which according to her contained derogatory remarks including the word “Shrike”. This bail order dated 1.11.2007 in Bail Application No. 24380 of 2007 moved on behalf of the accused Arvind and Ajay has been brought on record as Annexures-4 and 5 to the Supplementary-Affidavit dated 16.4.2008 filed in defective Special Appeal No. 309 of 2008. 14. The contemner, thereafter, laid stress that the word “Shrike” used by the learned single Judge was objectionable as the word Shrike connotes a Brazilian butcher bird with a sharp and shrill voice. She contends that the bail application had already been rejected on merits in open Court in the order, which she claims as quoted herein above to have been passed in open Court and, therefore, there was every reason for her to get concerned about the aforesaid remarks. 15. On 7.12.2007 the bail of another co-accused Ajit alias Nanhe which had been filed on 5.12.2007, came up before the same learned single Judge and who was inclined to follow his earlier rejection order as referred to herein above. The contemner stated that she again made a humble request for releasing the matter and the learned Judge retired to his Chamber without passing any order. It is alleged that the contemner personally met the Hon’ble Senior Judge Mr. S.R. Alam apprising him of the same and according to the contemner she was advised to make a mention again on Monday i.e. 10.12.2007. In the aforesaid backdrop, the contemner states that she stood up on 10.12.2007 in the Court of Hon.Mr. Justice Vinod Prasad and proceeded to make a mention. She stated that she had made a request to the learned single Judge to give an answer to her question for which she would wait till the Court responded. In the aforesaid backdrop, the contemner states that she stood up on 10.12.2007 in the Court of Hon.Mr. Justice Vinod Prasad and proceeded to make a mention. She stated that she had made a request to the learned single Judge to give an answer to her question for which she would wait till the Court responded. According to the contemner, she did nothing more than this on which the contempt proceedings were drawn and she was taken into custody. She also states that she humbly accompanied the Court Officer Mr. Farman Raza and in case any disturbance or chaos was created by lawyers, thereafter, she was not responsible for it as she had neither led them to do this nor she had instigated them. 16. The question as to whether an Appeal would lie against the order passed by the learned single Judge dated 10.12.2007 under Section 19 of 1971 Act would depend upon the nature of the impugned order and the legal principles that have been reflected in the decisions of the Apex Court that have been cited at the bar. The scheme of the Act makes a separate provision in respect of an ex-facie contempt of the High Court and the Supreme Court. This is contained in Section 14 of the Act. A perusal of Section 14 would leave no room for doubt that any Court before which an ex-facie contempt is committed, has the jurisdiction to take cognizance and punish the contemner once the guilt is established subject to the provision of sub section (2) of Section 14. The power to punish for ex-facie contempt, therefore, has been dealt with separately and specifically, in the event such contempt is committed either before the High Court or the Supreme Court. 17. The said power is also exercisable to the extent of taking into custody the contemner forthwith and then to hear the trial. The aforesaid provision, therefore, clearly spells out the wide nature of powers which, in our opinion, would directly and vitally affect the right of a contemner to defend himself or herself and also his or her personal liberty. Not only this, the proceedings have to be conducted in a fair and reasonable manner keeping in view the procedural safeguards provided in Section 14 of the 1971 Act read with Rules 7 and 8 of the Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952 under Chapter XXXV-E thereof. Not only this, the proceedings have to be conducted in a fair and reasonable manner keeping in view the procedural safeguards provided in Section 14 of the 1971 Act read with Rules 7 and 8 of the Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952 under Chapter XXXV-E thereof. These provisions have been made to ensure that the contemner gets an adequate opportunity to defend himself or herself and to ensure a fair trial. It cannot be lost sight of, that in such matters, the Court itself is the accuser, the prosecutor and the judge, all combined in one. 18. The appellant in this case was directed to be taken into custody and she comes up with a case that the proceedings are without jurisdiction inasmuch as the learned single Judge, being conscious of the provisions of the Act, did not chose to take cognizance under Section 14 and transferred the case to be tried as a criminal contempt under Section 15 of the 1971 Act. According to the contemner in such a situation, the learned single Judge should not have either taken cognizance or sent the contemner straight away to Jail. This, according to the appellant, could have been done only by a Bench of two Judges inasmuch as a criminal contempt under Section 15 can be tried only by a Division Bench as statutorily prescribed under Section 18 of the 1971 Act, read with the Allahabad High Court Rules referred to herein above. 19. It is urged that even otherwise, the Chief Justice is the master of the roster and Hon. Mr. Justice Vinod Prasad had not been assigned any work pertaining to criminal contempt nor it could have been assigned as he was sitting singly. Thus, according to the contemner, the learned single Judge himself acted without jurisdiction after having taken cognizance under Section 15 of the Act. It is further submitted that the procedure provided under Section 15 was also not followed and the rules referred to herein above were given a complete go bye. 20. Sri V.C. Mishra, learned Counsel for the appellant, repeatedly urged that the entire action was concluded in a very short time and in a very casual manner without complying with the procedure of law. This, according to him, has seriously prejudiced the rights of the appellant and has curtailed her liberty, which deserves to be remedied. 20. Sri V.C. Mishra, learned Counsel for the appellant, repeatedly urged that the entire action was concluded in a very short time and in a very casual manner without complying with the procedure of law. This, according to him, has seriously prejudiced the rights of the appellant and has curtailed her liberty, which deserves to be remedied. Sri Mishra, however, contends that the aforesaid defects, according to him, do not amount to a punishment and, therefore, in view of the ratio of the decision in the case of Midnapore Peoples’ Coop. Bank Ltd. and others v. Chunnilal Nanda and others, (2006) 5 SCC 399, the Appeal under Section 19 would not be maintainable, and the remedy would lie by filing a Special Appeal under Chapter VIII Rule 5 of the Allahabad High Court Rules which, according to him, is the appropriate remedy and which has already been availed of by the appellant. He has further placed reliance on the case of Prof. Y.C. Simhadri, Vice Chancellor, B.H.U. and others v. Deen Bandhu Pathak, 2001 (4) AWC 2688 , a Division Bench judgment of this Court to buttress his submissions. A further reliance has been placed in the case of State of U.P. and others v. Smt. Meera Sankhwar and others, 2004 (4) AWC 3162 on the same issue. As against this, the learned Standing Counsel Sri Avinash Chandra Tripathi, has urged that an Appeal would lie under Section 19 as held by the Apex Court in the case of R.N. Dey and others v. Bhagyabati Pramanik and others, (2000) 4 SCC 400 . 21. Sri Tripathi further pointed out that the contempt proceedings are resorted to take care of situations for securing the confidence of the public at large and protect public interest . He further invited the attention of the Court to the decision in the case of in re: V.C. Mishra reported in (1995) 2 SCC 584 , to urge that Suo Motu action was acknowledged as the right step for taking action in such matters, and further on the procedural aspect the judgment holds that it was neither necessary to formulate a charge or to examine the Judge concerned. In short, he urged that the procedure prescribed is only a handmade of justice and mere irregularities of procedure cannot vitiate the proceedings. In short, he urged that the procedure prescribed is only a handmade of justice and mere irregularities of procedure cannot vitiate the proceedings. Sri Tripathi concluded his submissions by urging that the present appeal under Section 19 can be entertained in respect of the questions raised and, therefore, the contentions advanced by the appellant deserve to be rejected. 22. Sri V.C. Mishra, in his ultimate rejoinder, urged that the appeal would still not lie inasmuch as there were no contentions entertained on behalf of the appellant, no opportunity at all was given to the appellant to defend herself and no decision was rendered in accordance with law. He contends that the order was not an adjudication and an appeal would lie only if there is an adjudication. He has invited the attention of the Court to paragraphs 12 and 13 of the IInd Supplementary- Affidavit filed on the last day of the submissions. He further submitted that the order of the learned single Judge was malafide, as the fact with regard to the change in the order by the learned single Judge while deciding the bail application, had already been mentioned in the second bail of which notice had already been given, and has been filed on 3.2.2008. He described the arguments with regard to the maintainability of the appeal raised by the learned A.G.A., Sri A.C. Tripathi as a funny argument. He further submitted that the Court itself took cognizance under Section 15 about an incident, which according to the learned Judge, was in public view. On this, he submits that since the ex-facie contempt was not in the personal view of the learned Judge, therefore, Section 14 would not apply and Section 15 was rightly invoked by him. Sri Mishra, thereafter, criticised the judgment of the Apex Court in his own case reported in (1995) 2 SCC 584 , to be an incorrect judgment on all scores and he also urged that the judgment was rendered on account of certain considerations. He further submitted that the present action is also on account of the personal anguish of the learned single Judge which appears to be on account of the insistence of the contemner to have an answer to her question. He again repeated that it was a mere mention and there was no intention on the part of the appellant to lower the prestige of this institution. 23. He again repeated that it was a mere mention and there was no intention on the part of the appellant to lower the prestige of this institution. 23. From the facts as disclosed we find that the bail application of an accused is granted in a murder case by Hon’ble Mr. Justice S.S. Kulshreshtha. At the hearing of the bail application of the other co-accused before Hon’ble Mr. Justice Vinod Prasad it is pointed out from the prosecution/complainant side that after committing the murder, the accused had threatened the witnesses regarding which another FIR had been lodged under section 452 IPC. Upon this the bail is refused to the co-accused in the murder case. Then a bail application is moved by the same Counsel on behalf of another co-accused before Hon’ble Mr.Justice Vinod Prasad seeking bail, alleging that bail had already been granted in the case under Section 452, IPC. Hon’ble Mr. Justice Vinod Prasad expresses his anxiety in the matter by hinting to the learned Counsel ”why have you filed this" application before me knowing that I have already rejected two bail applications in the same matter?” The learned Counsel instead of seeking an adjournment till the change of roster, presses the application and says that either Hon’ble Justice Vinod Prasad should grant bail in the murder case or he should release (transfer) the case from his Court. The bail application is rejected by Hon’ble Mr. Justice Vinod Prasad on Friday. On the morning of the following Monday the learned Counsel Smt. Sadhna Upadhya is in the Court when Hon’ble Justice Vinod Prasad appears on the dias. She asks the Judge whether the bail application has been released by him. Upon being informed by the Judge that the application has been rejected, she tells the Court that she will not allow the Court to function unless the Judge gives an answer to her question. What that question was is not specified, but no Counsel has the liberty to put questions to a Judge even during the course of hearing, much less after a case has been decided, and then to say that the Counsel will not allow the Court to function unless the Judge answers Counsel’s questions about a case already decided. The learned Counsel does not even stop at that. The learned Counsel does not even stop at that. From a perusal of the impugned order, it appears that she accuses the Judge of lack of integrity in open Court, in the presence of other Counsel, Counsel’s clerks, Court’s staff and litigants, by saying that the Judge should post a list of his favourite Counsel on the notice-board outside the Court-room. Faced with this situation the Judge takes cognizance of the ex-facie criminal contempt, orders the contemner to be taken into custody, frames the charge, gives a weeks time to the contemner to file her reply to the charge, and sends the papers to Hon’ble the Chief Justice with his recommendation that the contempt case be placed on the same day before the Division Bench dealing with criminal contempt matters. 24. Immediately after the order was passed a group of lawyers gathered in support of the contemner and attempted to get her forcibly released from the judicial custody and thereafter indulged in large scale rampage shouting filthy slogans against Judges and damaged the Court property breaking the doors and glass panes of Court-rooms, disrupted the entire judicial working of the High Court. 25. Hon’ble the Chief Justice assigned the case to the contempt Bench. In the meantime on the same day an appeal under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 is filed on behalf of the contemner which is placed before another Division Bench which stays the arrest of the contemner, but looking to the circumstances restrains the contemner from appearing in the High Court except in the case relating to the contempt. The Division Bench also pointed out certain wider issues which had become necessary, in the backdrop referred above, to be examined in the proceedings of the contempt appeal about checking such indiscipline and preservation of the Court property and security,and opined that having regard to the entirety of the circumstances the contempt appeal as well as the ex-facie contempt should be heard by a Bench of not less than five Judges. The contemner preferred 4 Special Leave Petitions before the Supreme Court on which orders were passed already extracted herein above. 26. The contemner preferred 4 Special Leave Petitions before the Supreme Court on which orders were passed already extracted herein above. 26. Hon’ble the Chief Justice was pleased to constitute this Bench for hearing the contempt appeal, the ex-facie contempt, as well as a Special appeal subsequently filed by the contemner (under Chapter VIII Rule 5 of the Rules of Court, 1952), against the order of Hon’ble Justice Vinod Prasad against which the SLP had been withdrawn by the contemner. 27. Sri V.C. Misra, senior advocate, has contended before us that the contemner has not committed any contempt, and that she was merely making a mention before Hon’ble Mr. Justice Vinod Prasad. He also suggested that if the Hon’ble Judge was faced with the situation where a member of the Bar was insisting upon not allowing the Court to function, the Hon’ble Judge should have left the Court and returned after some time to continue with the judicial work. 28. The said submission that one member of the Bar or for that matter a litigant can be permitted in full public view to hold a Bench of the High Court to ransom, forcing it to stop work and rise may be a consideration when the contempt matter is proceeded on merits and may not be an issue to be dealt with at this stage. The contemner has filed an application for withdrawal of her contempt appeal saying that it is not maintainable on the assumption that she basically wants to substitute her special appeal for the contempt appeal. During the course of arguments Sri V.C. Misra suggested that this Bench should first decide whether the Contempt Appeal is maintainable under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, whereafter he will decide whether the withdrawal application will be pressed or not. Although a little unusual but looking to the entirety of circumstances we propose to adjudicate upon the maintainability of the said appeal as a preliminary issue. 29. We have considered the aforesaid submissions advanced and we find that the determination on the question of maintainability would be dependant upon the nature of the order which has been passed. In the instant case, the appellant has been charged with ex-facie contempt and was sent to Jail forthwith. The charges were framed after taking cognizance which according to the appellant was without jurisdiction. In the instant case, the appellant has been charged with ex-facie contempt and was sent to Jail forthwith. The charges were framed after taking cognizance which according to the appellant was without jurisdiction. Whether the proceedings taking cognizance initiated by the learned single Judge were within his jurisdiction or not is a question which goes to the root of the matter. It is trite law that if the proceedings initiated are without jurisdiction then they effect the substantive rights of a person inasmuch as the Court in such an event would not be competent to proceed with the matter. The question of jurisdiction is of vital importance and would be dependent upon the nature of the power exercised on the facts of a particular case. In the instant matter, the appellant contends that the proceedings have been consciously initiated by the learned single Judge under Section 15 and if that is found to be correct, then the single Judge, in view of the provisions of Section 18 of the Act, could not have either taken cognizance or framed charges or even have ordered the custody of the appellant. To our mind, this question, therefore, is of vital importance as it affects the substantive rights of the appellant and hence in our opinion can be corrected in an Appeal. We are also of the opinion that if there is a procedural violation of a mandatory provision even then the same would vitally affect the rights of a contemner which can also be subject matter of Appeal. 30. The question of liberty of a person charged with contempt is equally important. The concept of liberty is well known and taking a person into judicial custody or any other step curtailing his freedom by putting him in Jail is protected under Article 21 of the Constitution. It is a fundamental right under the Constitution and, therefore, it can be invoked by a person whenever it is impinged. It is the duty of this Court under the Constitution to act as a guardian and protect the fundamental rights of a citizen guaranteed under the Constitution. In the instant case, the appellant was taken into custody forthwith and according to the scheme of the Act, such custody can be ordered keeping in view the facts and circumstances of a particular case. In the instant case, the appellant was taken into custody forthwith and according to the scheme of the Act, such custody can be ordered keeping in view the facts and circumstances of a particular case. In our considered opinion, this very nature of peremptory power and its exercise thereof is likely to put the liberty of a person in peril. This, in our opinion, vitally affects the fundamental rights of a person. However this is subject to the statutory provisions of the 1971 Act which places reasonable restrictions on the rule of absolute liberty. In case any order is passed not supportable in law, and is not a mere interlocutory order, the same could also be a subject matter of Appeal. 31. An Appeal is a procedure provided in a Statute empowering a higher Court to correct an error, if any, in an order passed by a Court lower in hierarchy to the appellate Court. A very elucid and elaborate enunciation about what an appeal is and the purpose for which such a provision is made is narrated in paras 25, 41 and 42 of the Constitution Bench decision in the case of Sitaram v. State of U.P., 1979(2) SCC 656 . The usual connotation of the appellate power is that the appellate Court also exercises co-extensive powers as can be exercised by the original Court. 32. Under the contempt of Courts Act in a matter of ex-facie contempt under Section 14, a person, charged with ex-facie contempt, has the right to apply for bail. The Act uses the words “shall grant bail” for the Court, whenever such a prayer is made, meaning thereby that ordinarily a person if the circumstances permit would be admitted to bail. What if either the bail is refused or the consideration is deferred which means curtailment of the liberty of a person? We are of the opinion that in such a situation also an Appeal would be maintainable. Such a situation, therefore, in our opinion, cannot be termed as the result of a mere interlocutory order or orders of an interim nature. On the other hand, they are orders which affect the rights of the parties and are orders of moment. We are of the opinion that in such a situation also an Appeal would be maintainable. Such a situation, therefore, in our opinion, cannot be termed as the result of a mere interlocutory order or orders of an interim nature. On the other hand, they are orders which affect the rights of the parties and are orders of moment. We should not be presumed to have laid down a general principle of law but the facts, as arise in this case do indicate that the issues raised are of vital importance affecting the rights of a person which can be appealed against. 33. To this stage, there is no quarrel with the said proposition but the question that has been placed before us to be answered is whether such an appeal would lie under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act or not. To answer this proposition, we, for the sake of convenience, quote Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act : “19. Appeals.—(1) An appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt— (a) where the order or decision is that of a single Judge, to a Bench of not less than two Judges of the Court; (b) where the order or decision is that of a Bench, to the Supreme Court: Provided that where the order or decision is that of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner in any Union territory, such appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court. (2) Pending any appeal, the appellate Court may order that— (a) the execution of the punishment or order appealed against be suspended; (b) if the appellant is in confinement, he be released on bail; and (c) the appeal be heard notwithstanding that the appellate has not purged his contempt. (3) Where any person aggrieved by any order against which an appeal may be filed satisfies the High Court that he intends to prefer an appeal, the High Court may also exercise all or any of the powers conferred by sub-section (2). (4) An appeal under sub-section (1) shall be filed— (a) in the case of an appeal to a Bench of the High Court, within thirty days; (b) in the case of an appeal to the Supreme Court, within sixty day, from the date of the order appealed against.” 34. (4) An appeal under sub-section (1) shall be filed— (a) in the case of an appeal to a Bench of the High Court, within thirty days; (b) in the case of an appeal to the Supreme Court, within sixty day, from the date of the order appealed against.” 34. The aforesaid provision has been incorporated by the legislature with a clear intention to protect the rights of a person in case any order or decision is rendered in furtherance of the exercise of the jurisdiction for punishing for contempt. The question is whether an appeal would lie only against the final conviction order or can an Appeal under the said provision be entertained in respect of matters which have arisen of the nature in the present case. 35. Any direction issued or a decision which is incidental to or inextricably connected with the order punishing for contempt can also amount to an order in a nature of the decision as contemplated under Section 19 of the Act and, therefore, subject to appeal under Section 19. 36. The words “any order” has to be read with the expression “decision” used in the sub-section, which power is exercised to punish for contempt. Can it be said that the words “any order” or “decision” are independent of each other. The words, as used in the Section, appear to be ”any order or decision” which can be said to have been used in the alternative. Nonetheless, whether the nature of the order presently under question would still not be an interlocutory order and would be appealable. 37. The question as to whether an order is interlocutory in nature or not was discussed in detail in Madhu Limaye’s case ( 1977 (4) SCC 551 ) when the question arose with regard to the maintainability of a revision under Section 397, Cr.P.C. arising out of an order passed under Section 145 read with 146 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The Supreme Court in the said decision, coined a phrase namely an intermediary order, and held that the orders which do not one way or the other finally dispose the proceedings, yet affect the rights of the parties, can be termed as intermediary orders and would, therefore, be revisable under Section 397, Cr.P.C. We may observe that a revision is also a limited appeal. The question as to what is an interlocutory order amenable to appeal has been discussed elaborately in Midnapore People’s Co-operative Bank case (supra). 38. In the instant case, the allegations are of complete want of jurisdiction, violation of mandatory procedure, denial of basic opportunity which violates the principles of nature justice and curtailing the liberty of the appellant. As already indicated above, the question of jurisdiction goes to the root of the matter and the curtailment of liberty violates Article 21 of the Constitution of India. It is by now well settled that natural justice even if not statutorily incorporated, is a principle which has to be observed where an authority or a Court proceeds to decide a lis or some matter of moment. It is for this reason that the principles of natural justice have now been held by the Apex Court to be part of Article 14. In this view of the matter as well, the complaint of the appellant that the Statutory procedure has been violated by not providing opportunity, is not only a mere complaint of a Statutory violation but also of violation of fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The question as to whether violation of a procedure would prejudice a person would depend upon the nature of the proceedings. In the instant case, the violation of the procedure as alleged has deprived the appellant of her liberty and she was sent in judicial custody. Not only this, a procedural violation would vitiate the proceedings for which reliance has been placed by the learned Counsel for the appellant on L.P. Mishra’s case, 1998(7) SCC 379 . If such violations can prove to be fatal, then it cannot be said that the appeal would not be maintainable under Section 19. As such, a decision which violates mandatory procedure would be amenable to the provisions under Section 19 (1) of the Act. 39. In the decision of R.N. Dey and others v. Bhagyabati Pramanik and others (supra), the Supreme Court was concerned with a contempt rule having been issued during the pendency of a land acquisition appeal before the High Court. There was an order directing payment of interim compensation to the claimants in an appeal filed by the State. 39. In the decision of R.N. Dey and others v. Bhagyabati Pramanik and others (supra), the Supreme Court was concerned with a contempt rule having been issued during the pendency of a land acquisition appeal before the High Court. There was an order directing payment of interim compensation to the claimants in an appeal filed by the State. Certain more directions were issued with regard to payment during the pendency of the appeal upon which the State moved an application for vacating the order of payment of interim compensation as it was found that the claimants had no right, title or interest in the land and, therefore, no compensation was payable. It is in this situation that the claimants filed an application for contempt alleging that in spite of the interim directions by the High Court, no payment was being made. Against the order of making interim payments, the State had approached the Apex Court but later on had withdrawn the litigation before the Apex Court with liberty to move the High Court for suitable orders. Thereafter, when the matter was pressed on behalf of the State in defence of the contempt, the High Court passed an order that the application praying for vacating the interim order would be simultaneously heard along with the contempt matter. It is in this situation that an appeal was filed by the contemner before the Apex Court alleging that the High Court accepted the apology tendered by the contemner but issued directions for depositing the compensation that was payable to the petitioner. It was urged by the contesting opposite party that such an appeal was not maintainable as the order passed by the High Court was of an interlocutory nature and it did not finally determine the rights of the parties. It was further contended that contempt was rightly initiated and, therefore, the appeal deserves to be dismissed. Rejecting the aforesaid contention raised by the respondents therein, the Apex Court held that an Appeal would be maintainable under Section 19 as the proceedings undertaken by the High Court were in exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt. The relevant paragraphs 10 to 13 of the decision are quoted herein below : “10. Rejecting the aforesaid contention raised by the respondents therein, the Apex Court held that an Appeal would be maintainable under Section 19 as the proceedings undertaken by the High Court were in exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt. The relevant paragraphs 10 to 13 of the decision are quoted herein below : “10. In our view the aforesaid contention of the learned Counsel for the respondents requires to be rejected on the ground that after receipt of the notice, officers concerned tendered unconditional apology and after accepting the same, the High Court rejected the prayer for discharge of the rule issued for contempt action. When the Court either suo motu or on a motion or a reference, decides to take action and initiate proceedings for contempt, it assumes jurisdiction to punish for contempt. The exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt commences with the initiation of a proceeding for contempt and if the order is passed not discharging the rule issued in contempt proceedings, it would be an order or decision in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. Against such order, appeal would be maintainable. 11. For the aforesaid purpose, reference can be made to the decision in Purshotam Dass Goel v. Justice B.S. Dhillon, wherein the Court observed that : “If the alleged contemnor in response to the notice appears before the High Court and asks it to drop the proceeding on the ground of its being barred under Section 20 of the Act but the High Court holds that the proceeding is not barred, it may well be that an appeal would lie to this Court under Section 19 from such an order although the proceeding has remained pending in the High Court.” 12. The Court further observed that if the order decides some disputes raised before the Court by the contemnor asking it to drop the proceedings on one ground or the other, the appeal against the said order is maintainable. 13. In the present proceedings the question whether appeal under Section 19 is maintainable or not is not required to be decided finally as, in our view, facts of this case are grossly inadequate and the contempt proceedings were not required to be initiated at all. In any case, the unconditional apology tendered could have been accepted and further proceedings dropped and the rule ought to have been discharged." 40. In any case, the unconditional apology tendered could have been accepted and further proceedings dropped and the rule ought to have been discharged." 40. The ratio of the aforesaid decision unfortunately does not appear to have been noticed in the case of Midnapore People’s Cooperative Bank case (supra). Apart from this, the conclusion drawn and bracketed as “I” in the case of Midnapore People’s Cooperative Bank includes the word “only” after referring to the ratio in the case of J.S. Parihar reported in 1996(6) SCC 291 . It would be noticed that in Parihar’s case, the Apex Court had not used the word “only” to interpret the invoking of the appellate powers under Section 19. The Apex Court in Parihar’s case did not say that an appeal under Section 19 would lie only when there is a conviction. To our mind the word only, which has been incorporated in the judgment of Midnapore Cooperative Society, is not borne out from the reading of the judgment of Parihar’s case. If the exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt commences with the initiation of the proceedings for contempt, as has happened in the present case, and if the proceedings are held to be without jurisdiction, then in that event in our considered opinion an appeal would be maintainable under Section 19 of the Act. This interpretation would also be inconsonance with the scheme of the Contempt of Courts Act as it would provide an adequate remedy to an aggrieved person before the High Court itself under the Statute which is extensively meant for such purpose. 41. The decision of the apex Court in the Midnapore People’s Co-operative Bank case proceeded on the interpretation given by the apex Court in the case of D.N. Taneja reported in 1988(3) SCC 26 . Applying the ratio of the said decision, it was held that an appeal under Section 19 would lie only against the order punishing the contemner for contempt and not against any other orders passed in a contempt proceeding. This ratio , however, does not take into account the situation which was indicated in the Purshottam Dass Goel’s case reported in 1978(2) SCC 370 where the question of jurisdiction was discussed in the event an appeal was preferred beyond the limitation prescribed under Section 20. This ratio , however, does not take into account the situation which was indicated in the Purshottam Dass Goel’s case reported in 1978(2) SCC 370 where the question of jurisdiction was discussed in the event an appeal was preferred beyond the limitation prescribed under Section 20. The decision in Midnapore People’s Co-operative Bank case does not take notice of the case of R.N. Dey (supra) where an appeal under section 19 has been found to be maintainable. Further the said decision holds that neither an order declining to initiate proceeding or an order initiating the proceeding or an order dropping the proceeding for contempt nor an order acquitting or exonerating the contemner is appealable under Section 19 of the Act. It has also been held that an appeal would be maintainable under Section 19, only against an order or decision of the High Court imposing the punishing for contempt. The said decision in our opinion was not concerned with the competence of the Court to initiate and take cognizance of a criminal contempt under Section 14 of the Contempt of Courts Act arising out of an ex-facie contempt. 42. In the said case the narration of facts indicate that a writ petition challenging a suspension order passed against an employee was disposed of with a direction to conclude the inquiry within a specified period of time. The inquiry proceeded and a second writ petition was filed challenging the inquiry proceeding on the ground of bias. The petition was allowed and certain directions were again issued for concluding the proceeding. The time schedule and directions issued by the Court were not complied with, as a result whereof the petitioner moved a contempt petition in which notices were issued under Section 12 of the Contempt of Court Act. The said case was of a civil contempt, hence while issuing notice, the Court further proceeded to pass orders for reinstating the petitioner, and issued directions which also touched the merits of the dispute between the parties. An appeal under Section 19 was filed which was dismissed as not maintainable. The contemner also preferred an intra Court appeal which was dismissed as being time barred. Both the aforesaid orders were assailed before the apex Court and it is in this context that the apex Court rendered the decision aforesaid. An appeal under Section 19 was filed which was dismissed as not maintainable. The contemner also preferred an intra Court appeal which was dismissed as being time barred. Both the aforesaid orders were assailed before the apex Court and it is in this context that the apex Court rendered the decision aforesaid. Thus, the facts of the present case are clearly distinguishable, being one of ex-facie criminal contempt, where the issues raised, are entirely different and hence, in our opinion, the ratio of the decision in the case of Midnapore People’s Co-operative Bank case (supra) would in no way impede or contradict the views that we have taken in the instant matter. 43. The question relating to the applicability of Section 14 or 15 of the Contempt of Courts Act has to be deliberated upon for the purposes of deciding the jurisdiction of the Court. It is a vital issue and can, therefore, have a direct bearing or the rights of a contemner which can be subject matter of an appeal. The decision to take cognizance or to initiate a proceeding which is questioned on the ground of jurisdiction, procedural violation and violation of fundamental rights, is a question of moment and, therefore, can be said to be appealable under Section 19 of the Act. The aforesaid issues are inextricably mixed up with the authority and competence of the Court to proceed to decide the contempt and hence the same would be an order in the exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt. 44. The contemner has, time and again, repeated the submissions advanced by Sri V.C. Mishra as well, that making of a mention before the Court was an old tradition of the High Court which privilege was available to the lawyers during the opening morning hours of the Court. A tradition is a practice which is handed down from one generation to another and is derived from a regular usage either by word of mouth or by any action from generation to generation. Such practices are adhered to in all institutions and is a customary privilege which comes to be established by a long usage. It is no doubt true that mentions are made before the Courts as and when the Courts find it convenient to entertain such mentions, and which is normally done in the morning hours as urged by the learned Counsel for the appellant. It is no doubt true that mentions are made before the Courts as and when the Courts find it convenient to entertain such mentions, and which is normally done in the morning hours as urged by the learned Counsel for the appellant. However, in the instant case, the inquiry is not with regard to such a tradition but just to the contrary. The question is that can a lawyer in the name of the practising or adhering to such a tradition, transgress limits and hold up the Court by not allowing it to function any further? In the instant case, the charge on the appellant is not that she was making a mere mention rather the charge is that she insisted upon the Court to give an answer or else would not allow the Court to function any further. The recital contained in the order of the learned single Judge dated 10.11.2007 and the charges framed against the applicant spell out that the appellant not only over stepped her right and privilege to make a mention but she deliberately withheld the proceedings of the Court in spite of the fact that her case was not on the Board. She not only prevented the Court from functioning but also prevented the lawyers, who were waiting for their cases to proceed with their matters. In essence the appellant brought the functioning of the Court to a grinding halt in an absolutely obstinate fashion to undermine the prestige of the Court not only in public view but also in the presence of the Judge himself. It is in these circumstances, that the proceedings for contempt are stated to have been drawn against the appellant. This enquiry is however not relevant at this stage as it would be necessary only when the contempt proceedings is heard on merits. 45. Nonetheless we would like to refer to certain norms to be observed by the lawyers fraternity. It is the duty of the Members of the Bar to maintain towards the Courts, a respectful attitude. Justice can be achieved only by the proper conduct of the Members of the legal profession which should receive the approval of all right thinking people. The future of our judicial system depends to a great extent on the maintenance of justice, pure and unsullied stream of justice. Justice can be achieved only by the proper conduct of the Members of the legal profession which should receive the approval of all right thinking people. The future of our judicial system depends to a great extent on the maintenance of justice, pure and unsullied stream of justice. The respect which a lawyer commands from the litigants would largely depend upon the respect shown by them to Courts. This, in turn, also maintains and fosters the confidence of the litigants, who enter the portals of justice with a lot of hope, expectation trust and confidence. The moment this confidence is lost, the citadel of justice will fall. Justice Oliver Wendel Holmes of the U.S. Supreme Court spoke of lawyers as “The artist sees the line of growth in a tree, the businessman an opportunity in a muddle, the Lawyers, a principle in a lot of dramatic details. The glory of Lawyers like that of men of science is more corporate than individual.” 46. The aforesaid lines indicate the duties of a Lawyer, who spells out principles, which govern Society and civilisation at large. The duty of a lawyer is so onerous that what ever he says may at times move a whole civilisation. This has been witnessed in the freedom struggle of our country and even after independence the great Lawyers of this nation including stalwarts like late Mr. M.C. Setalvad and the everest of this profession late Mr. Nani A. Palkiwala have held the torch of freedom through their forensic and scholarly arguments. This trait of a lawyer establishes that the duty of a lawyer is that of a conscience keeper of the nation and a watch-dog of Society to make his clients respect law and the constitutionally established authority of law. 47. What would happen if lawyers fail to perform their duty and responsibility reposed in them. Our legal profession which is one of the most ancient and most noble has also witnessed unprecedented erosion of human values and at times was faced with a catastrophic phenomenon. The elementary ethics which has to be observed by a lawyer and which have been undermined by unscrupulous acts and omissions came to be observed by the Apex Court in the case of Bar Council of Maharashtra v. M.V. Dabholkar, 1976(2) SCC 291 . The Supreme Court commented heavily on the role of lawyers whose morals were facing a severe crisis. The Supreme Court commented heavily on the role of lawyers whose morals were facing a severe crisis. 48. The lawyers have to act as leaders of a reform movement with a view to restore the fast deteriorating moral standards in the Society. An efficient and disciplined bar, in our opinion, is a sine qua non for the due administration of justice and for the preservation of rule of law. Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer while describing the role of Advocates had to say as follows : “The rule of law cannot be built on the ruins of democracy, for where law ends, tyranny begins. If such be the keynote thought for the very survival of our Republic, the integral bond between the lawyer and the public is unbreakable. And the vital role of the lawyer depends upon his probity and professional life-style. Be it remembered that the central function of the legal profession is to promote the administration of justice. If the practice of law is thus a public utility of great implications and a monopoly is statutorily granted by the nation, it obligates the lawyer to observe scrupulously those norms which make him worthy of the confidence of the community in him as a vehicle of justice–social justice. The Bar cannot behave with doubtful scruples or strive to thrive on litigation.” 49. The legal profession, though a source of living, is mainly a career of service to the community. A lawyer is the guardian and vindicator of the two most precious things in life-Justice and Liberty. In this context the moral standard expected from a practitioner of law is very high. 50. The question as to how a contempt should be proceeded with and for what purpose has been quoted by Lord Denning at page 15 in one of his celebrated books, “The Due Process of Law” : “This power of summary punishment is a great power, but it is a necessary power. It is given so as to maintain the dignity and authority of the Court and to ensure a fair trial. It is to be exercised by the judge of his own motion only when it is urgent and imperative to act immediately–so as to maintain the authority of the Court–to prevent disorder – to enable witnesses to be free from fear–and jurors from being improperly influenced – and the like. It is to be exercised by the judge of his own motion only when it is urgent and imperative to act immediately–so as to maintain the authority of the Court–to prevent disorder – to enable witnesses to be free from fear–and jurors from being improperly influenced – and the like. It is, of course, to be exercised with scrupulous care, and only when the case is clear and beyond reasonable doubt: see R. v. Gray, (1900) 2 QB 36, 41 by Lord Russell of Killowen CJ. But properly exercised it is a power of the utmost value and importance which should not be curtailed.” 51. While concluding Lord Denning in the same Chapter at page 17 of the book described the disruption of the proceedings of the Court to be dealt with in the following words : “There is a lesson to be learned from the recent cases on this subject. It is particularly appropriate at the present time. The new Crown Courts are in being. The Judges of them have not yet acquired the prestige of the Red Judge when he went on Assize. His robes and bearing made everyone alike stand in awe of him. Rarely did he need to exercise his great power of summary punishment. Yet there is just as much need for the Crown Court to maintain its dignity and authority. The Judges of it should not hesitate to exercise the authority they inherit from the past. Insults are best treated with disdain – save when they are gross and scandalous. Refusal to answer with admonishment – save where it is vital to know the answer. But disruption of the Court or threats to witnesses or to jurors should be visited with immediate arrest. Then, a remand in custody and, if it can be arranged, representation by Counsel. If it comes to a sentence, let it be such as the offence deserves with the comforting reflection that, if it is in error, there is an appeal to this Court. We always hear these appeals within a day or two. The present case is a good instance. The Judge acted with a firmness which became him. As it happened, he went too far. That is no reproach to him. It only shows the wisdom of having an appeal.” 52. We always hear these appeals within a day or two. The present case is a good instance. The Judge acted with a firmness which became him. As it happened, he went too far. That is no reproach to him. It only shows the wisdom of having an appeal.” 52. In the instant case, the charges framed against the appellant, prima facie, indicate that the appellant proceeded to conduct herself in a manner so as to bring the proceedings of the Court to a grinding halt on account of the posture adopted by her totally defying the norms of the practice of this noble profession. In spite of the request of the learned Judge, the appellant persisted in blocking the proceedings of the Court defiantly and deliberately. This conduct was coming forth from a member of the legal feternity, who claims to have a lineage and a notable descent from a family of lawyers. The incident which is reflected in the order of the learned single Judge, prima facie, indicates that an attempt was made to get the case released, and in the absence of the Judge obliging to do so it became an incident of “Relief or Release”. The persistence of the lawyer to make a mention even on a day when the case was not on Board, co-relating it with her previous encounter in the same matter, would indicate that the appellant had knowingly pursued this path which ended up in a some what confrontationist attitude. For the time being, we should not be construed to have formed an opinion in this matter as the contempt petition is yet to be heard but we have narrated this with a view to point out the propensity of the incident in which the appellant may have to defend herself and for which important questions of jurisdiction, curtailment of liberty and the like have been raised in the present proceedings. 53. It is in this background that the issue of maintainability of the appeal has to be answered inasmuch as this would be another point of consideration as to whether such an incident should be allowed to be dissolved on account of procedural flaws as pointed out by the learned Counsel on behalf of the appellant. 53. It is in this background that the issue of maintainability of the appeal has to be answered inasmuch as this would be another point of consideration as to whether such an incident should be allowed to be dissolved on account of procedural flaws as pointed out by the learned Counsel on behalf of the appellant. It is for this reason and also the aftermath of the incident which appears to have impelled the Division Bench to refer the matter to a larger Bench. The question of maintainability of the appeal would, therefore, be also dependant in the light of what has been stated herein above. 54. Sri V.C. Mishra has urged that the proceedings are also tainted with mala fides. It is contended that the learned Judge, with a pre-determined mind, had proceeded to reject the bail applications successfully argued by the appellant and the annoyance expressed by him in Court also reflected that bias. He, therefore, contends that the action of the learned single Judge being founded on mala fides deserves to be set aside. The aforesaid question, as to whether the action apart from suffering from procedural faults was also affected by mala fides, goes to the root of the competence of the Court to decide a matter and, therefore, from this point of view as well, the appeal under Section 19 would be maintainable. This we say because if it is proved that the very initiation of the proceedings was a mala fide transaction, the same could be a ground, even though debatable, for terminating the proceedings at this stage itself. Accordingly, we find that this issue can also be entertained under Section 19 of the Act about which there is no pronouncement by the Apex Court in the decision of Midnapore People’s Cooperative Bank case (supra) or the like. 55. It would, thus, be seen that the issues raised with regard to maintainability of the appeal in the present case, in our opinion are spread over in an unchartered and unexplored area. The decisions cited at the Bar on behalf of the appellant, in our opinion, do not cover the said field and, therefore, having traversed the same, we find this appeal to be maintainable for considering the issues advanced before us. 56. The decision in the case of Purshotam Dass Goel v. Hon’ble Mr. The decisions cited at the Bar on behalf of the appellant, in our opinion, do not cover the said field and, therefore, having traversed the same, we find this appeal to be maintainable for considering the issues advanced before us. 56. The decision in the case of Purshotam Dass Goel v. Hon’ble Mr. Justice B.S. Dhillon and others, 1978 (2) SCC 370 was in a case which arose out of the initiation of proceedings of criminal contempt under Section 15 of the 1971 Act. The Supreme Court after considering the ratio of the decision in Bardakant Misra v. Orissa High Court, 1975 (3) SCC 535 held that an appeal under Section 19 of the Act against the issuance of a show cause under Section 15 would not lie. It was held that any order or decision as referred to in Section 19, would not mean that the Legislature intended to provide for an appeal as a matter of right from each and every such order that would be passed by the Court in such matters. It was held that the order or the decision must be such that it decides some bone of contention raised before the High Court affecting the right of the party aggrieved. Merely because the Court on a prima facie view thinks it fit to draw proceedings, does not decide any question of moment and, therefore, it was held that an appeal against such an order would not be maintainable. The Court however cautioned that it is neither possible, nor advisable, to make an exhaustive list of the type of orders which may call for scrutiny under Section 19. 57. While proceeding to assess the impact of Section 19, the Court cited an example that where the proceedings are initiated for contempt beyond the period of limitation prescribed under Section 20 and the question raised is about the jurisdiction of the Court to do so, then in that event, an appeal would lie under Section 19 against such an order. Such an order where the High Court refused to drop the proceedings inspite of the aforesaid jurisdictional error, would be appealable, even though the matter remained pending before the High Court. 58. Such an order where the High Court refused to drop the proceedings inspite of the aforesaid jurisdictional error, would be appealable, even though the matter remained pending before the High Court. 58. However, the apex Court opined that it was not called upon to express any final opinion with regard to such an order but the example was being mentioned to show that even orders made at some intermediate stage in the proceeding, may be also appealable under Section 19. The Court further held that a mere initiation of proceeding without anything further, which does not decide anything would not be appealable under Section 19. The Court in para 5 of the said decision again states “we may repeat that it may be a different matter if the order does decide some disputes raised before it by the contemner asking it to drop the proceeding on one ground or the other”. 59. Judging from that point of view in the instant case, the learned Single Judge, according to the appellant herself has proceeded to assume jurisdiction which he otherwise did not possess in case the proceedings are taken to have been initiated under Section 15 of the Act. The aforesaid issue, therefore, in our opinion, if decided in favour of the appellant, would make the entire proceedings coram non-judice and in view of the example given by the apex Court in the decision referred to herein above, an appeal would be maintainable under Section 19 of the Act. It is trite law that every Court also has the power to determine its own jurisdiction. In the instant case, the High Court being a superior Court of record exercising powers under Article 215 of the Constitution of India has the authority to determine its own jurisdiction and such a question if raised, can be adjudicated in appeal. 60. The question of jurisdiction of the Court to initiate the proceeding was not even raised at the first instance before the learned Single Judge and, therefore, there was no adjudication on this specific issue. It can be argued that the appeal if entertainable, would be only after such an adjudication is made by the learned Single Judge and not otherwise. The question of jurisdiction of the Court to initiate the proceeding was not even raised at the first instance before the learned Single Judge and, therefore, there was no adjudication on this specific issue. It can be argued that the appeal if entertainable, would be only after such an adjudication is made by the learned Single Judge and not otherwise. On this aspect, it will have to be kept in mind that it is a settled principle of law that since the question of jurisdiction goes to the root of the matter, therefore, it can be raised at any stage of proceeding. In the instant case, the said question was not raised before the learned Single Judge and, therefore, there was no decision to be appealed against. The question is that whether a formal decision on the issue would be necessary to maintain the question of jurisdiction at the first instance in appeal itself. It can be argued that there was no cause of action inasmuch as there was no conscious decision of the learned Single Judge on the issue of jurisdiction. 61. The other side of the coin is that the learned Single Judge has taken a view consciously to proceed and take cognizance of ex-facie contempt and has also taken the appellant into custody. Thus, there is a decision to undertake proceedings in exercise of the jurisdiction to punish for contempt. The two steps of taking cognizance and judicial custody have been questioned on the ground of want of jurisdiction by the appellant, and it has been urged that the learned Single Judge was incompetent to take this action either way as he mentions Section 15 of the Act and not Section 14. 62. To further analyse this argument, one can take a case where the question of jurisdiction was not even raised during the entire trial and after its conclusion, the said question is raised in appeal for the first time. Can it be said that the question of jurisdiction, cannot be raised in appeal? The obvious answer would be in the negative inasmuch as the principle that the question of jurisdiction can be raised at any stage of the proceedings will squarely applying in such circumstances. Thus from the aforesaid analysis, it is evident that the question of jurisdiction which was not raised pending trial, can be raised in appeal for the first time. The obvious answer would be in the negative inasmuch as the principle that the question of jurisdiction can be raised at any stage of the proceedings will squarely applying in such circumstances. Thus from the aforesaid analysis, it is evident that the question of jurisdiction which was not raised pending trial, can be raised in appeal for the first time. Applying the same analogy and accepting that there is no formal decision in the instant case by the learned Single Judge on the issue of jurisdiction, the same can be raised for the first time in appeal. There is, therefore, no inhibition on the raising of the issue for the first time in appeal. In view of this reasoning it cannot be said that the question of jurisdiction cannot be raised straight away in an appeal under Section 19 on the allegation that an incompetent cognizance has been taken by the learned Single Judge. 63. We are of the opinion that in such a situation the right of appeal would be available under Section 19 apart from the other reasons given herein above. 64. The case of P.D. Goel (supra), it may be pointed out, was a matter exclusively pertaining to a criminal contempt under Section 15 and not a civil contempt matter. We are pointing out this to hint that in case the matter arises out of a criminal contempt, as the present proceedings, then the same may not be appealable under Chapter VIII, Rule 5 of the Allahabad High Court Rules under the special appellate jurisdiction which is analogous to the letters patent appeal in other High Courts. It is to be borne in mind that in a proceeding for a civil contempt, notices have to be issued and the matter heard and adjudicated before confinement is ordered. In a matter of ex-facie criminal contempt, the Court can command immediate custody as per the provisions of Section14 of the Act. The circumstances in the instant case bring about a situation where the appellant challenges the competence of the Court right from the inception of the proceedings. The aforesaid distinguishing features, therefore have to be kept in mind while considering the right of appeal available under Section 19 of the Act. 65. The circumstances in the instant case bring about a situation where the appellant challenges the competence of the Court right from the inception of the proceedings. The aforesaid distinguishing features, therefore have to be kept in mind while considering the right of appeal available under Section 19 of the Act. 65. Coming to the decision in the case of D.N. Taneja v. Bhajan Lal, 1988(3) SCC 26 the apex Court had decided an appeal under Section 19 of the Act directed against the judgment and order of the Punjab and Haryana High Court dismissing an application for contempt filed by the appellant therein. The allegation in the criminal contempt matter was, that the alleged contemner had intimidated the complainant to withdraw the writ petition filed by him in the High Court, which amounted to interference with the due course of judicial proceedings. The contempt application was admitted and notices were issued whereupon a response was filed thereto and a learned Single Judge of the High Court came to the conclusion that it was not a fit case in which the Court should exercise its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. It was undisputed therein that in case the allegations made therein if proved, would constitute a criminal contempt as defined under Section 2(c) of the Act. The contention raised before the apex Court was that since no punishment had been imposed on the alleged contemner, therefore, no appeal would lie as of right against such an order. The apex Court in paragraphs 8 to 12 traversed through the nature of jurisdiction of appeal under Section 19 and held that an appeal would lie under Section 19 of the Act only when the High Court makes an order or decision in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. It was further held that the High Court exercises its jurisdiction or power as conferred on it by Article 215 of the Constitution when it imposes a punishment for contempt. When the High Court does not impose any punishment on the alleged contemner the High Court does not exercise its jurisdiction or power to punish for contempt. The jurisdiction of the High Court is to punish. When no punishment is imposed by the High Court, it would be difficult to held that the High Court has exercised its jurisdiction or power conferred on its under Article 215 of the Constitution. 66. The jurisdiction of the High Court is to punish. When no punishment is imposed by the High Court, it would be difficult to held that the High Court has exercised its jurisdiction or power conferred on its under Article 215 of the Constitution. 66. The ratio of the judgment was specifically indicated in para 10 of the said judgment where it was held that when a Court is vested with a jurisdiction to decide a matter, such jurisdiction can be exercised in deciding the matter in favour or against a person. But when a Court is conferred with the power or jurisdiction to act in a particular manner, the exercise of jurisdiction or the power will involve the acting in that particular manner and in no other. It was held that so long as no punishment is imposed by the High Court, the High Court cannot be said to be exercising its jurisdiction or power to punish for contempt under Article 215 of the Constitution. 67. It has been laid down by the apex Court time and again that a judgment is an authority on what it actually decides and not what logically follows from it. It is the principle deducible that is enunciated on the facts arising in a case and the law applicable thereon which is known as the ratio of the decision. 68. The above mentioned decision was in a case where the learned Single Judge had refused to exercise his jurisdiction as it was not a fit case for doing so. It is in this context that the Supreme Court came to the conclusion that such an order did not amount to exercise of jurisdiction by the High Court to punish for contempt. The decision, therefore, cannot be said to have laid down an universal and absolute proposition that unless and until there is an order of conviction, no appeal would lie. 69. A Division Bench of this Court in the case of Somesh Sachdev v. Baldev Raj, 1989 ALJ 928 had considered the question of maintainability of appeal under Section 19 (1) on the issue of the jurisdiction being raised as a preliminary issue. The appeal was dismissed on the other reasons but it was held : “10. From the above it will be seen that there is no total bar on an appeal against an order passed at an intermediate stage. The appeal was dismissed on the other reasons but it was held : “10. From the above it will be seen that there is no total bar on an appeal against an order passed at an intermediate stage. It will depend upon the nature of contention raised and the manner in which the same has been disposed of by the Court. In case a contention which goes to the very root of jurisdiction is raised and the same is turned down, certainly it must give rise to a right of appeal under Section 19(1).” 70. The said view was followed by another Division Bench of this Court in the case of V.K. Goswami v. Suresh Chand Jain, 1994 (23) All LR 248. It was held in para 8 thereof : “From the above it would be seen that appeal lies from a “decision” as well as from an “order”. Decision, in our opinion, would be final decision of the contempt application. When a separate word “order” has been used in the same clause it would appear that it refers to something other than the final judgment. Accordingly we are of the opinion that an appeal is maintainable even against an order which does not finally dispose of the contempt proceedings. However, every interim order passed in the contempt proceedings is not appealable under the above provision. Only that order is appealable which is passed in the exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt.” 71. Their Lordship’s while considering the said issue also taken notice of the view taken by the apex Court in D.N. Taneja case (supra) and held in para 11 thereof : “Their Lordship’s have not laid down that no appeal will lie even when jurisdiction has been exercised in the process of punishing the contemnor. In the present case the order under appeal has been passed in the process of punishing the appellant which is apparent from the fact that finding of deliberate disobedience of Court’s order has already been recorded by the learned Single Judge. What the learned Single Judge has deferred is the actual award of punishment.” 72. We would have been content by approving the said view taken by the division bench decision but with the submissions advanced, we have to attempt the answer in the light of the observations of the apex Court. 73. What the learned Single Judge has deferred is the actual award of punishment.” 72. We would have been content by approving the said view taken by the division bench decision but with the submissions advanced, we have to attempt the answer in the light of the observations of the apex Court. 73. It would be relevant to point out that the decision in D.N. Taneja’s case no where refers to the earlier decision in the case of Purshotam Dass Goel (supra) nor is it founded on facts as in the present case. The nature of an order with which we are presently concerned. constitutes a challenge to the proceedings on the ground of jurisdiction, on the ground of violation of mandatory provisions, on the ground of violation of fundamental rights enshrined under Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India and the curtailment of the liberty of an individual pending such proceeding. In our opinion, therefore, the said decision in the case of D.N. Taneja (supra) would not apply as the same was concerned only with dropping of the proceedings and refusal of the High Court to further proceed to exercise jurisdiction in a matter of criminal contempt. 74. The decision in the case of J.S. Parihar v. Ganpat Duggar, 1996 (6) SCC 291 was a matter arising out of a civil contempt in which proceedings had been initiated under section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act. The Court therein was not called upon to decide any issue as presently involved, inasmuch as, in that case certain directions had been issued to decide a dispute of a seniority list which arose between the parties in that case. An appeal against the said order was filed under Section 19 before the Division Bench of the High Court and it was held that the appeal would not lie under Section 19 of the Act but would be entertainable as a letters patent appeal in view of the directions given by the learned Single Judge while dropping the proceeding for contempt. It was held that an appeal would lie only when an order of punishment or conviction is passed. The word “only” has not been used by the apex Court in para 5 of the said decision. Apart from this as already indicated above, it was a matter pertaining to civil contempt and not a criminal contempt. 75. It was held that an appeal would lie only when an order of punishment or conviction is passed. The word “only” has not been used by the apex Court in para 5 of the said decision. Apart from this as already indicated above, it was a matter pertaining to civil contempt and not a criminal contempt. 75. There is yet another case which deserves mention namely State of Maharashtra v. Mahboob S. Allibhoy, 1996 (4) SCC 411 . A writ petition had been filed before the High Court of Bombay claiming refund of a certain amount of additional duty imposed by the Customs Department. The Customs Department filed an affidavit that the claim was a false claim as the writ petitioner had not paid any duty at all and the claim of refund was founded on forged documents. It is in this connection that a notice was issued to the alleged contemners as to why a complaint be not filed against them under Sections 191, 192, 209 and 210 of the I.P.C. and a further notice was issued to them to show cause as to why contempt proceedings be not initiated against them. Cause was shown by the noticees and an order was passed for filing a criminal complaint against the respondents and while doing so, the learned Judges of the High Court took a view that no action was required to be taken under the Contempt of Courts Act. This order of the High Court by which it refused to take action under the Contempt of Courts Act was assailed before the Supreme Court in an appeal. 76. The apex Court after considering the provisions of Section 19 held that the word “any order” used in Section 19 is not independent of the expression decision and they have been put in an alternative form, saying order or decision. It was construed by the apex Court that the order must be necessarily in the nature of punishment for contempt inasmuch as if the word ‘any order’ is dealt with too widely, then even an interlocutory order passed in a proceeding for contempt would also become appealable, and which in the opinion of the apex Court, would lead to a ridiculous result. The apex Court referred to the decisions of Bardakanta Mishra (supra) and D.N. Taneja (supra) and held that no appeal would be maintainable against an order dropping a proceeding for contempt or refusing to initiate proceedings for contempt. It was further held that even if no appeal would lie under Section 19 then that person is not remedy less and an appeal can be filed under Article 136 of the Constitution. It is, therefore, evident that it was on account of a false claim founded on forged documents which was the subject matter of consideration and which in our opinion would might have been a cause for criminal contempt. It is in this context that the High Court refused to initiate proceedings of contempt. The apex Court, therefore, in the aforesaid context proceeded to interpret the impugned order which in the opinion of the apex Court did not amount to a decision or an order passed in exercise of the jurisdiction of proceeding to punish for contempt. It is now well settled that a refusal by the Court to initiate contempt proceedings does not amount to a decision as understood under Section 19 and, therefore, the same would not be appealable. The ratio of the aforesaid decision of the apex Court is in our opinion confined only to the issue raised therein, namely refusal to initiate proceedings and not beyond that. The apex Court was not called upon or even faced with an issue of the nature which is raised in the present case. The order impugned in the present appeal is not a mere interlocutory order as it is being questioned on the ground of incompetence, being without jurisdiction, and also that it proceeds to confine the appellant in custody without following the procedure prescribed under law. 77. At this juncture, we would like to refer to the scope of the appeal as understood under criminal law. In The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 appeals are provided for under Chapter XXIX. Section 372 of the Criminal Procedure Code declares that no appeal shall lie unless otherwise provided under the Act. Section 373 provides for appeal from orders requiring surety or refusal to accept or rejecting surety for keeping peace or good behaviour. Then comes an appeal against conviction. Section 372 of the Criminal Procedure Code declares that no appeal shall lie unless otherwise provided under the Act. Section 373 provides for appeal from orders requiring surety or refusal to accept or rejecting surety for keeping peace or good behaviour. Then comes an appeal against conviction. This provision clearly spells out that appeal would lie against conviction in a trial held by the subordinate Court in which a sentence of imprisonment is for more than seven years. Further Sections 325 and 360 have also been made appealable. The provision of appeal is not attracted in certain cases where the accused has pleaded guilty. Section 376 spells out that no appeal shall lie in petty cases as referred to therein. Section 377 provides for an appeal by the State against the sentence awarded while convicting a person on the ground of its inadequacy and appeal is also provided for against acquittal under Section 378 and under Section 379 against the order of the High Court in certain cases. The aforesaid appeals have been broadly provided for under chapter XXIX. It would be seen that appeals are provided for specifically either against conviction or acquittal or in some cases as provided for under Section 373 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The language used in the Criminal Procedure Code is in contrast to the language used under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act. Section 19 of the Act speaks of “any order or decision”, therefore, the Legislature has consciously and carefully incorporated the words which are entirely different from the language employed under the criminal procedure code. In our opinion the words used in Section 19 of the Act are of much wider import and cannot be said to be restricted to the remedy of appeal only in cases of an order of punishment or conviction. To our mind, the Legislature even though gave a restricted right of appeal, yet never intended to deny the opportunity of appeal where the proceedings under challenge were either without jurisdiction or was in violation of mandatory procedure or otherwise in violation of the fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution. This issue with which we are presently concerned, was not subject matter of discussion or even adjudication in the case of D.N. Taneja (supra). 78. This issue with which we are presently concerned, was not subject matter of discussion or even adjudication in the case of D.N. Taneja (supra). 78. The scheme of the provisions contained in Section 19 indicate the intention of the legislature to provide for an appeal against any “order or decision”. The said words have been used in sub-section (1) and (2) of Section 19, but there appears to be a departure in sub-section (3) thereof. The word “decision” has been consciously omitted in Section 19(3) and the “intention to file an appeal” is made open against “any order”. The Court has to adopt an interpretation of the word used in a statute which serves the object and purpose for which the statute was enacted and the provisions incorporated. 79. The question is, can it be said that the right of appeal under Section 19 is confined only against an order of conviction. If that were the intention, then what would have been the purpose of use of separate connotations in Section 19(1) and (2) as compared to Section 19(3). 80. Section 19(3) provides for an opportunity to an aggrieved person to approach the Court for protection if he “intends to file an appeal” against “any order”. This can be in the event a person has been ordered to be taken into immediate custody. Such an order can be passed upon conviction or even at the stage of cognizance as a measure of interim custody pending proceedings initiated under Section 14 in a matter of ex-facie contempt. Thus there can be a stage even prior to punishment when an aggrieved person may require the protections as provided for in Section 19 (2). This may take the shape of stay of an order of custody passed pending proceedings. An appeal, in such a situation would therefore be available as a matter of right under Section 19 itself. To our mind the legislature appears to have taken care of such a situation and has therefore consciously used the word “any order” while providing for a statutory right of appeal. This right of appeal would however be not available against a pure interlocutory order not affecting vital rights nor would it would be available to a person not aggrieved. 81. The assumption of jurisdiction, which if not possessed by a Court, would directly attract the principle of patent incompetence. This right of appeal would however be not available against a pure interlocutory order not affecting vital rights nor would it would be available to a person not aggrieved. 81. The assumption of jurisdiction, which if not possessed by a Court, would directly attract the principle of patent incompetence. A Court cannot proceed to hear a dispute or decide a lis about which no authority is conferred by the Statute but what if the Court assumes such a jurisdiction? Would it not be a conscious decision to proceed to exercise the jurisdiction to punish for contempt? Can it be said, in such a situation that the order does not amount to a conviction or award of punishment, as such, an appeal would not lie? The appellant herself has described the initiation and cognizance of the matter as a case of ARROGATED JURISDICTION. 82. In our opinion, the jurisdiction to proceed to punish for a contempt commences with the cognizance taken. If the cognizance is incompetent or without jurisdiction, it affects the rights of the contemner and it is open to the contemner to question the order on the ground of lack of competence or patent lack of jurisdiction. The contemner cannot be compelled to wait for the entire trial to end in conviction or punishment. 83. The words “order or decision” are separated by a disjunctive word “or”. It suggests an alternative. Can the aforesaid words be said to be synonymous? Are they a substitute for each other? If that were so, why would the legislature use 2 words for the same purpose? Can it be said to be superfluous? If the intention of the legislature was to use the words as a substitute for each other, then the word decision, which would ordinarily connote termination of the proceedings, could have only been used. But here, the word “order” has also been used disjunctively. This could also mean orders other than the final decision which may decide a matter of moment; for example in the instant case, the assumption of jurisdiction, which is seriously questioned by the appellant on several grounds. Thus, the alternate word “order” can be construed to connote such other decisions which may not be decisions finally terminating the proceedings. This could also mean orders other than the final decision which may decide a matter of moment; for example in the instant case, the assumption of jurisdiction, which is seriously questioned by the appellant on several grounds. Thus, the alternate word “order” can be construed to connote such other decisions which may not be decisions finally terminating the proceedings. Accordingly, if such an order which may amount to a decision of moment vitally affecting the contemner, can also be appealed against under Section 19 of the Act in our considered opinion. 84. The order impugned in the present case determines a vital matter namely taking of the cognizance, framing of charges and the order of judicial custody. If this order is quorum non-judice, and it also curtails the personal liberty of the appellant violating her fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution, then in view of the conclusions drawn herein above the order impugned cannot be termed as a mere interlocutory order in a proceeding of contempt. 85. A reference to the ratio in the cases of Bardakanta Misra (supra), D.N. Taneja (supra), State of Maharashtra v. Mahboob S. Allibhoy (supra) and J.S. Parihar (supra) would again be necessary at this juncture. In all the aforesaid cases the Supreme Court held that if the High Court has refused to exercise its jurisdiction to proceed to punish the alleged contemner, then in that event no appeal would lie as a matter of right under Section 19 of the Act. They were cases in which the contempt proceedings had been dropped with a slight distinction in J.S. Parihar’s case where a further direction to draw the seniority list had been issued and an observation was made that in case the said directions are not complied with, the petitioners may move a fresh contempt. 86. None of the aforesaid cases related to any proceedings of ex-facie contempt as is involved in the present case. More important, the issue of jurisdiction to take cognizance, the issue of custody coupled with violation of fundamental rights and violation of any mandatory procedure were not involved in the said cases as raised directly in the instant case. The interpretation preferred by the apex Court in all the aforesaid judgments revolved around the issue of refusal to exercise jurisdiction. 87. The interpretation preferred by the apex Court in all the aforesaid judgments revolved around the issue of refusal to exercise jurisdiction. 87. In contrast thereto, the Supreme Court in Purshottam Dass Goel’s case (supra) discussed an example pertaining to the incompetence of the Court to exercise jurisdiction when a matter was barred by limitation under section 20 and observed that an appeal may lie under Section 19, but did not express any final opinion thereon. The said decision or the example referred to therein have neither been noticed or considered in the later decisions of D.N. Taneja (supra), State of Maharashtra v. Mahboob S. Allibhoy (supra). On the other hand following the decision of Purshottam Dass Goel (supra) the apex Court in the case of R.N. Dey v. Bhagyabati Pramanik, 2000(4) SCC 400 , while considering a matter where the high Court refused to discharge the notices pending proceedings, held that an appeal under Section 19 of the Act would be maintainable. 88. However, the Court did not finally decide the issue raised in that case, but set aside the proceedings as per the observations in Para 13 of the decision. 89. Two other cases deserve mention in this connection. The decision of the Apex Court in the case of Modi Telefibres Ltd. and others v. Sujit Kumar Choudhary and others, (2005) 7 SCC 40 , arose out of a civil contempt matter in which the learned single Judge, while proceeding under the Contempt of Courts Act, recorded a conclusion that by not making the requisite payments to the workmen, the employer had committed a contempt. The findings so recorded, was followed by an order directing the employers to be present in Court along with the bank drafts for being paid over to the workmen. Against such an order, an appeal was preferred before the Division Bench of the High Court, which was dismissed on the short ground that the contempt matter was still pending. The Apex Court reversed the said decision and held that the order passed by the learned single Judge was not an interlocutory order and the right of appeal to the appellant could not have been denied merely because the matter had been adjourned to enable the contemner to purge the contempt or in the alternative to decide the quantum of punishment. The Apex Court, after considering the impact of Section 19 of the Act, set aside the judgment of the High Court and the matter was remitted back for decision on merits. The aforesaid decision even though arose out of civil contempt proceedings, yet it acknowledged the right of appeal against an order which had already recorded a finding of the commission of the contempt, and in such a situation, the order passed by the High Court was not treated to be a mere interlocutory order. This decision has neither been noticed or discussed in the later decision of Midnapore People’s Cooperative Bank case (supra). 90. The next decision which deserves attention is the judgment in the case of Municipal Corporation, Jabalpur v. Om Prakash Dubey, (2007) 1 SCC 373 . The said case also was concerned with the question of regularisation in the services of the Municipal Corporation where the issue was about the applicability of the Rules in respect of certain employees. The directions had been issued by the High Court on the writ side and alleging non-compliance thereof a contempt petition was filed by a large number of workmen, who were parties before the High Court. The allegation was that discrimination was being practised while implementing the judgment in respect of the regularisation of the services of such employees. Certain directions were issued by the contempt Court in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act. The Apex Court found that these directions had been issued without arriving at a finding as to how the Municipal Corporation, Jabalpur, had violated the said order. The Apex Court further held that the directions issued by the contempt Court were either contrary to or inconsistent with the directions issued by the writ Court. After having recorded this finding, the Apex Court ruled that such an order could be corrected both under Article 136 of the Constitution of India as also under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act. While forming this opinion, their Lordship of the Supreme Court have relied on the decision in the case of R.V. Serumaga, (2005) 2 All. E.R. 160, which was a matter arising out of the law of contempt as applicable in England. While forming this opinion, their Lordship of the Supreme Court have relied on the decision in the case of R.V. Serumaga, (2005) 2 All. E.R. 160, which was a matter arising out of the law of contempt as applicable in England. The provision under consideration in the said case was Section 13 of The Administration of Justice Act, 1960 which deals with the law of contempt in England and which is in para-meteria to the provisions of Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. Having considered the language employed in the said provision, their Lordship’s have quoted a paragraph of the aforesaid judgment with approval, where the words “any order or decision in exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt” was held to be sufficiently wide enough to relate also to orders or decision made in the course of proceedings which may result in a conviction of and sentence for contempt. The approach has been described as a broader interpretation of the said words and it has been further indicated that the remedy of appeal may also be available in a case of unjustifiably prolonged custody. It has been further held that there are certain other exceptional features which surround summary proceedings for contempt that demand an enlarged process of judicial scrutiny. 91. The ratio of the aforesaid decision, therefore, to our mind clearly broadens the horizon of Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act and includes within its fold other orders or decisions which are not ultimate orders of conviction alone. The aforesaid decision is a 2 Judges decision, which is later in point of time, than the decision in the case of Midnapore People’s Cooperative Bank (supra). The said aspect as explained in the case of Municipal Corporation, Jabalpur, therefore, in our opinion, would be a closer decision on the facts of the present case which deserves to be applied on all squares. 92. The Contempt of Courts Act is a self contained Code which was enacted to aid the exercise of powers whenever the necessity arose for the High Court to exercise its power under Article 215 of the Constitution of India and the Apex Court in exercise of its powers under Article 129 of the Constitution. 92. The Contempt of Courts Act is a self contained Code which was enacted to aid the exercise of powers whenever the necessity arose for the High Court to exercise its power under Article 215 of the Constitution of India and the Apex Court in exercise of its powers under Article 129 of the Constitution. The legislature will be presumed to have, therefore, provided the remedy of appeal to an aggrieved person who may be subjected to such proceedings under the 1971 Act. The act of contempt, particularly of criminal contempt, has been held to be an offence and, therefore, the legislature will be presumed to have made provisions to encompass all possible situations to be remedied under the Act itself other than there which are either specifically or impliedly excluded. The same has to be construed in the light of the provisions of the Act and may not include a remedy for each and every situation. Nonetheless in the latest decision of the Apex Court in the case of Municipal Corporation Jabalpur reported in 2007 (1) SCC 373 it has been held that the words “order or decision” are of a wider import. The Court, therefore, had in mind the intention of the legislature. Such an interpretation advances the cause for which the provision of appeal was provided under the Act. It is also to be noted that the words used in a particular section of the Statute may have different meanings in different contexts. 93. The decisions, which have been cited at the bar, do not in any way lay down a proposition in respect of a situation which is involved in the instant case. None of the cases that have been cited on behalf of the appellant arose out of any question of jurisdiction, the interim custody of a contemner, procedural violations or the violation of fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution. The interpretation, therefore, given to the words “order or decision” particularly in the case of State of Maharashtra v. Mahboob S. Allibhoy and another, (1996) 4 SCC 411 , is in a context where the Court had refused to proceed to take action under the Contempt of Courts Act which had been dropped after the cause was shown by the alleged contemner and does not apply on the issues raised in the present case. The aforesaid decision proceeded to interpret the meaning of the said words in a context where the facts and issues raised were entirely different as against the present case. The Supreme Court did not render an absolute or universal interpretation for all situations. In our opinion, the meaning of the words used must yield to the requirements of the context. The presumption that the words carry the same meaning in every context would be a very weak presumption and can be readily displaced by the change of context. In the instant case, the context in which the appeal has been filed is an altogether different situation from that which was involved in any of the cases which have been cited at the bar. It is for this reason also that we find that none of the said decisions bar this Court from adopting the interpretation which has been spelled out by us on the issues raised and in the given fact situation of this case. The case of Midnapore People’s Cooperative Bank (supra) does not indicate the consideration of the issues as raised and the question involved in the present case and, therefore, it cannot be said that the said decision blocks the passage of filing an appeal under Section 19 in all situations including the present one. We have carefully perused the aforesaid decision which arose out of a civil contempt proceeding and not in a matter of criminal contempt, and further it does not spell out any such situation which was under consideration alike to that of the present case. Accordingly, we are of the opinion that none of the decisions would govern the situation involved in the present case. 94. The Division Bench decision in the case of Prof. Y.C. Simhadari (supra) and State of U.P. v. Smt. Meera Sankhwar (supra) also do not stand attracted on the facts of this case and on the issues that have been raised for adjudication. The issue as to whether an appeal would lie under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act or not, was neither raised nor decided in the aforesaid case. The Division Bench proceeded on the presumption that special appeal would be maintainable under Chapter VIII Rule 5 which seeks to question the jurisdiction of the learned Judge to entertain a contempt proceeding while exercising powers under section 215 of the Constitution of India. The Division Bench proceeded on the presumption that special appeal would be maintainable under Chapter VIII Rule 5 which seeks to question the jurisdiction of the learned Judge to entertain a contempt proceeding while exercising powers under section 215 of the Constitution of India. The other case of Smt. Meera Sankhwar (supra) also does not even remotely touch this issue and was concerned only with the question of maintainability of special appeal against an interlocutory order. The aforesaid issues therefore do not come to the aid of the appellant in the present matter. 95. Sri V.C. Mishra, learned Counsel for the appellant, further repeatedly reminded us of the judgment in his own case in which he was punished for having committed contempt, reported in (1995) 2 SCC 584 , and urged that the Supreme Court realising its mistake had to reverse its own judgment. Sri Mishra, in his usual tone of criticism, made reference to the said case in a manner which revealed the respect he has for the said judgment. We have perused the said judgment wherein the Supreme Court held the contemner guilty and simultaneously while convicting him also imposed the punishment of suspending him from practising as an Advocate for a period of 3 years coupled with the consequence that he shall cease to hold the elective and nominated offices held by him in his capacity as an Advocate. 96. The aforesaid judgment was questioned by the Supreme Court Bar Association through its Honorary Secretary to the extent of the directions issued suspending the contemner from practising as an Advocate for a period of 3 years. This particular issue came to be reviewed by the Supreme Court in the decision of Supreme Court Bar Association v. Union of India and another, (1998) 4 SCC 409 , wherein a 5 Judges bench overruled the decision in Vinay Chand Mishra’s case to the extent whereby directions had been issued for the suspension of the contemner from practising as an Advocate. The view in short expressed by the Apex Court was that such a power could only be exercised by the Bar Council of India and not by the Supreme Court in exercise of its powers under Article 142 read with Article 129 of the Constitution. The view in short expressed by the Apex Court was that such a power could only be exercised by the Bar Council of India and not by the Supreme Court in exercise of its powers under Article 142 read with Article 129 of the Constitution. It further held that such a punishment could not even be imposed by taking recourse to the appellate power under Section 38 of the Bar Council of India Act in a matter arising out of contempt proceedings. 97. However, while over ruling the earlier decision, the Apex Court ruled as follows : “80. In a given case it may be possible, for this Court or the High Court, to prevent the contemner advocate to appear before it till he purges himself of the contempt but that is much different from suspending or revoking his licence or debarring him to practise as an advocate. In a case of contemptuous, contumacious, unbecoming or blameworthy conduct of an Advocate-on-record, this Court possesses jurisdiction, under the Supreme Court Rules itself, to withdraw his privilege to practice as an Advocate-on-Record because that privilege is conferred by this Court and the power to grant the privilege includes the power to revoke or suspend it. The withdrawal of that privilege, however, does not amount to suspending or revoking his licence to practice as an advocate in other Courts or tribunals.” 98. The conviction of the contemner was, however, upheld and it was further found to be unpardonable. The Supreme Court further opined “..............Nothing can be more destructive of public confidence in the administration of justice than incivility, rudeness or disrespectful conduct on the part of a Counsel towards the Court or disregard by the Court of the privileges of the Bar.” 99. The aforesaid decision, to our mind, does not in any way, touch the question of maintainability of the appeal inasmuch as the present appeal is only against the order of the learned single Judge dated 10.11.2007 and we are at present called upon to render our opinion only on the question of maintainability of the appeal under Section 19 of 1971 Act. 100. The arguments have also been advanced on the question of rights of the appellant to withdraw the appeal. 100. The arguments have also been advanced on the question of rights of the appellant to withdraw the appeal. This argument need not be answered by us at the moment as the request on behalf of the appellant is only to consider the question of maintainability at this stage and this question, as to whether the appellant has a right to withdraw or not, may be considered after this issue is decided. We would, accordingly, deal with it as and when the appellant exercises her option to either press the application moved for withdrawing this appeal or otherwise. 101. Another submission, which has been advanced by Sri V.C. Mishra, was that in case the learned single Judge committed an error by referring to a wrong section then this error or omission could not be corrected by this Court while hearing this reference or while hearing the appeal. The question, as to whether the error could be corrected or any opinion expressed on the same otherwise, would be required to be gone into when the appeal is proceeded on merits. We are, therefore, refraining from answering the said submissions at this stage. 102. We, therefore, accordingly hold that where in a matter arising out of ex-facie contempt referable to Section 14 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 is concerned, in such a situation if the issue raised is of jurisdiction or the competence of the Court to initiate or take cognizance and where the same is coupled with an order of taking a person into custody, an appeal under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act would be entertainable and such a person will be entitled to file an appeal as a matter of right. 103. As urged by learned Counsel for the appellant and noted by us earlier, the appellant is yet to exercise her choice of pressing the application filed in this appeal for withdrawing the same. For this purpose we direct the appellant to file an affidavit exercising such option within two weeks. 104. Let the matter be listed after the expiry of the aforesaid period. ————