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2008 DIGILAW 1742 (PNJ)

Zuber Rice Mills v. Punjab State Coop. Supply and Marketing Federation

2008-10-16

VINOD K.SHARMA

body2008
JUDGMENT Vinod K.Sharma, J. (Oral) -The petitioner has invoked the revisional jurisdiction of this court to challenge the order passed by the learned Additional Civil Judge (Sr. Division), Malerkotla allowing an application moved by the respondent No.1 for leading additional evidence. 2. The respondent/defendant No.1 moved an application to produce on record resolution dated 27.12.2003 passed by the Board of Directors of Marketing Federation Ltd. (for short Markfed) authorising District Manager of the district concerned to exercise the power to sign power of attorney, petition, written statement etc. and also to engage advocates up to district level. It was claimed that the production and proof of resolution was necessary for just decision of the case. 3. The application was opposed on the plea that the resolution sought to be produced by way of additional evidence was well within the knowledge of defendant No.1 and therefore, additional evidence could not be allowed at this stage. 4. In a suit for recovery filed by the plaintiff a joint written statement was filed by all the defendants which was signed by the District Manager Markfed, Sangrur on his own behalf as well as on behalf of the Markfed. 5. The learned court observed that the resolution passed in favour of the District Manager was a material document which was necessary for the just and proper adjudication of the case and therefore, allowed the application subject to payment of Rs.1000/-as costs. 6. Mohd. Yousaf, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner has vehemently contended that in the application for additional evidence defendant-respondent No.1 failed to disclose any reason for filing the application at the stage when the case was fixed for rebuttal evidence. Learned counsel for the petitioner also contended that once it was not disputed that the additional evidence sought to be produced was within the knowledge of respondent/defendant No.1, therefore, learned trial court was not justified in allowing additional evidence. 7. However, the plea raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner cannot be accepted in view of the law laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of United Bank of India Vs. Naresh Kumar and others (1996) 6 SCC 660 wherein Hon'ble Supreme Court was pleased to lay down as under:- “A company like the appellant can sue and be sued in its own name. Naresh Kumar and others (1996) 6 SCC 660 wherein Hon'ble Supreme Court was pleased to lay down as under:- “A company like the appellant can sue and be sued in its own name. Reading Order 6 Rule 14 together with Order 29 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure it would appear that even in the absence of any formal letter of authority or power of attorney having been executed a person referred to in Rule 1 of Order 29 can, by virtue of the office which he holds, sign and verify the pleadings on behalf of the corporation. In addition thereto and dehors Order 29 Rule 1CPC, as a company is a juristic entity, it can duly authorise any person to sign the plaint or the written statement on its behalf and this would be regarded as sufficient compliance with the provisions of Order 6 Rule 14 CPC. A person may be expressly authorised to sign the pleadings on behalf of the company, for example by the Board of Directors passing a resolution to that effect or by a power of attorney being executed in favour of any individual. In absence thereof and in cases where pleadings have been signed by one of its officers a corporation can ratify the said action of its officer in signing the pleadings. Such ratification can be express or implied. The court can, on the basis of the evidence on record, and after taking all the circumstances of the case, specially with regard to the conduct of the trial, come to the conclusion that the corporation had ratified the act of signing of the pleading by its officer. In this case it is difficult, in these circumstances, even to presume that the suit had been filed and tried without the appellant having authorised the institution of the same. The only reasonable conclusion would be that R must have been authorised to sign the plaint and, in any case, it must be held that the appellant had ratified the action of R in signing the plaint and thereafter it continued with the suit. It will be a travesty of justice if the appellant is to be non-suited for a technical reason which does not go to the root of the matter. It will be a travesty of justice if the appellant is to be non-suited for a technical reason which does not go to the root of the matter. The suit did not suffer from any jurisdictional infirmity and the only defect which was alleged on behalf of the respondents was one which was curable. The courts below could have held that R must have been empowered to sign the plaint on behalf of the appellant. In the alternative it would have been legitimate to hold that the manner in which the suit was conducted showed that the appellant Bank must have ratified the action of R in signing the plaint. If, for any reason whatsoever, the courts below were still unable to come to this conclusion, then either of the appellate courts ought to have exercised their jurisdiction under Order 41 Rule 27(1)(b) CPC and should have directed a proper power of attorney to be produced or they could have ordered R or any other competent person to be examined as a witness in order to prove ratification or the authority of R to sign the plaint. Such a power should be exercised by a court in order to ensure that injustice is not done by rejection of a genuine claim. In cases like the present where suits are instituted or defended on behalf of a public corporation, public interest should not be permitted to be defeated on a mere technicality. Procedural defects which do not go to the root of the matter should not be permitted to defeat a just cause. There is sufficient power in the courts, under the Code of Civil Procedure, to ensure that injustice is not done to any party who has a just case. As far as possible a substantive right should not be allowed to be defeated on account of a procedural irregularity which is curable.” 8. Even otherwise, the court has exercised the jurisdiction vested in it in order to advance justice. Resolution is a material document for just and proper adjudication of the case. The defence raised by the respondent/defendants can not be looked into in absence of proof of resolution. 9. For the reason stated above, there is no merit in the present revision petition which is accordingly dismissed. Petition Dismissed.