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2008 DIGILAW 1743 (PNJ)

State of H. P. v. Ram Piari

2008-10-16

VINOD K.SHARMA

body2008
JUDGMENT Vinod K. Sharma, J. - The State of Himachal Pradesh through the Secretary Forests, Ministry of Forests has invoked the revisional jurisdiction of this Court to challenge the order passed by the learned Rent Controller, Jagadhri as affirmed by the learned Appellate Authority, Ambala ordering eviction of the petitioner on an application moved under Section 13 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act of 1949. 2. Late Smt. Ram Piari filed an application under Section 13 of the East Punjab Urban rent Restriction Act of 1949 for ejectment of the petitioner from land measuring 300 ft. x 140 ft. equal to 3 Bighas-6 Biswas on the plea that Sham Singh and Narain Singh were owners of 30 Bighas 13 Biswas land including the disputed land. The land was leased out to the Forest Department of Erstwhile Jubbal State which subsequently merged with the respondent State and thus the said land came under the tenancy of the petitioner State through Ministry of Forests. 3. Sham Singh and Narain Singh sold 20 Bighas 7 Biswas of land out of the said land toil Puran Singh Multari etc. and agreed to sell the remaining 10 Bighas 6 Biswas land to the Smt. Ram Piari through her husband on 23.3.1972. 4. It was claimed that Sham Singh and Narain Singh actually sold the disputed land measuring 3 Bighas 6 Biswas out of the said land to late Smt. Ram Piari vide sale deed dated 28.3.1972, so she claimed to be landlord and the petitioner State as tenant under her with respect to the land purchased by her. 5. The landlord claimed that the petitioner State failed to pay the rent since 28.3.1972. It was also the claim by the landlord that the disputed land has been sublet by the State of Himachal Pradesh to H.P. State Transport Corporation (hereinafter referred to "Corporation") without the consent and permission of the landlord. 6. It was also claimed that the respondent State has changed the use of land by leasing out the same to the Corporation, referred to above, and the land was now being used for transport business i.e. parking of buses and booking of passengers etc. It was also claimed that the suit land is rented land within the meaning of the Rent Act. It was also claimed that the suit land is rented land within the meaning of the Rent Act. She also raised a plea of personal bonafide requirement claiming that the land was required for her business of timber which she and her husband intended to start there. The landlord further claimed that the tenancy stood terminated by a legal notice. However, it was asserted that inspite of notice the petitioner State has failed to vacate the disputed and thus, eviction was sought under the provisions of Rent Act. 7. The petitioner-State in the written statement controverted the allegations made in the petition on the plea that late Sh. Moti Ram original owner had leased out 30 Bighas 13 Biaswas land to the Forest Department of Jubbal State and the lease was perpetual one. 8. It was claimed that the petitioner-State was permanent lessee and, therefore, cannot ordered to be ejected. The petitioner-State also denied the relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties. Plea that the tenancy could not be unilaterally split was also raised. The plea that the petitioner-State was in arrears of rent was also denied. However, the petitioner-State tendered Rs. 33-94 paise as rent for the aforesaid entire land for one year long with interest as well as costs assessed by the Court. 9. The plea of subletting was also denied. It was claimed that there was no restriction on the petitioner-State regarding the purpose for which the tenancy land could be used and, thus, the plea of change of user was also denied. The plea of bonafide personal necessary was also denied. It was claimed that the dispute land was not rented land within the meaning of Rent Act and, thus, it was claimed that the Court did not have any jurisdiction to try the case. The plea was raised that present petition under the Rent Act was not maintainable in view of the permanent lease in favour of the petitioner- State. A plea was also raised that the application was bad for non-joinder of necessary parties. 10. The replication was filed, wherein the respondent-landlored refuted the plea raised by the respondent and reiterated the allegations made in the application. 11. On the pleadings of the parties, the learned Rent Controller was pleased to frame the following issues :- "1. Whether the relationship of landlord and tenant exists between the parties ? OPA 2. 10. The replication was filed, wherein the respondent-landlored refuted the plea raised by the respondent and reiterated the allegations made in the application. 11. On the pleadings of the parties, the learned Rent Controller was pleased to frame the following issues :- "1. Whether the relationship of landlord and tenant exists between the parties ? OPA 2. Whether the respondent has sublet the premises as alleged ? OPA 3. Whether the respondent has changed the use and purpose of the premises as alleged ? OPA 4. Whether the application is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties ? OPR 5. Whether the respondent has made the valid tender ? OPR 5-A. Whether the disputed land is rented land as defined in the East Punjab Rent Urban Restriction Act and as such, this Court has jurisdiction to try the present case ? 5-B. Whether the respondent is a permanent lessee as alleged ? If so, to what effect ? OPR 5-C. Whether the tenancy respecting the disputed land cannot be split up as alleged ? If so, to what effect ? OPR (onus objected to). 5-D. Whether the applicant requires the disputed land for her business ? If so, to what effect ? OPA 6. Relief." 12. The learned Rent Controller decided issues No. 1 & 5-A together. The learned Rent Controller was pleased to hold that out of the leased land measuring 30 Bighas-13 Biswas Sham Singh and Narain Singh, who succeeded to late Sh. Moti Ram sold the disputed land to Smt. Ram Piari vide sale deed dated 28.3.1972 and, thus, she became owner-cum-landlady of the disputed land qua the respondent. The plea that the tenancy could not be split was bit (not) ) accepted by observing that if was the petitioner State, who split the tenancy as 20 Bighas-7 Biswas of land out of the entire tenancy land was sold by the lessors through Puran Singh Multani and others stood released partly. 13. The learned Rent Controller observed that was admitted case of the respondents that according to the record brought by Anant Ram Sharma AW-1, 15 Bighas 8 Biswas land out of the entire tenancy land was released by the petitioner-State in favour of the persons, referred to above. 13. The learned Rent Controller observed that was admitted case of the respondents that according to the record brought by Anant Ram Sharma AW-1, 15 Bighas 8 Biswas land out of the entire tenancy land was released by the petitioner-State in favour of the persons, referred to above. Thus, it was held that it was the petitioner State who slit the tenancy and, therefore, it was not open to the petitioner-State to claim that the landlord could not split the tenancy. The learned Rent Controller also observed that there was not single tenancy now in respect of the entire 30 Bighas-13 Biswas land as the petitioner-State was not in possession of the said entire land. The issues No. 1 and 5-C were decided in favour of the respondent-landlord and against the petitioner-State. 14. On issue No. 2, the learned Rent Controller was pleased to observe that admittedly the buses of Corporation are parked in the disputed land and there is a booking office of the Corporation. The plea of the petitioner State that as per the Government gazette notification assets and liabilities of the Himachal Govt. Transport stood vested in the Corporation and, thus, the transfer of possession was in accordance with law and voluntarily was rejected by the Court holding that Corporation was an independent Company with independent legal entity and, therefore, held that part of the tenanted premises stood sublet. Thus, issue No. 2 was decided in favour of the respondent-landlord and against the petitioner-State. 15. On issue No. 3, the learned Rent Controller observed that as the disputed land has been leased out for stacking and auction of timber, but as part of it was being used for parking of buses for which the disputed land was not leased out, therefore, it was proved on record that there was change of user. However, the learned Rent Controller observed that in the lease deed the purpose of tenancy was not mentioned nor the use was subjected to any restriction and thus, the issue No. 3 was decided against the landlord and in favour of the petitioner-State. 16. Issue No. 4 was also decided against the petitioner-State by holding that the plea of non-joinder of necessary parties was not specific as it was not pleaded as to who were the parties, which were not impleaded, though necessary, for adjudication of the case. 17. 16. Issue No. 4 was also decided against the petitioner-State by holding that the plea of non-joinder of necessary parties was not specific as it was not pleaded as to who were the parties, which were not impleaded, though necessary, for adjudication of the case. 17. Issue No. 5 was decided in favour of the petitioner State and it was held that the tender made was valid. 18. Issue No. 5-A was decided against the petitioner-State by holding that the land in dispute fell within the definition of Section 2(f) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949. The learned Rent Controller observed that cultivation and planting of garden as recited in the impugned lease deed come within the mischief of business or trade. The learned Rent Controller made reference to the statement made by Ved Parkah RW-1 wherein he conceded that the entire tenancy land had been taken on rent for business. The learned Rent Controller also observed that it was admitted by the witnesses of the petitioner that the disputed land was used for stacking and auction of timber. The Court also noticed that it was a conceded position that the disputed land has been used for storing or stocking of timber and some rooms have been constructed for office. 19. Forest Rest House, other houses and residential quarters of the staff have also been constructed. Thus, the learned Rent Controller came to the conclusion that the purpose for which the land was being used came within the purview business and, thus, held that the disputed land was rented land as defined under the Rent Act. So, it was held that the Court under the Rent Act had the jurisdiction to entertain and try the petition. 20. On issue No. 5-B, the learned Rent Controller was pleased to hold that as per lease died the petitioner-State was a permanent tenant over the tenancy land including the disputed land. However, the learned Rent Controller came to the conclusion that Section 13 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, apply to permanent tenant also and, therefore, it was not permissible for the petitioner-State to take shelter under the permanent tenancy to oust the jurisdiction of Rent Controller. The learned Rent Controller further observed that in case the grounds of ejectment are proved then no benefit can be taken of permanent tenancy. The learned Rent Controller further observed that in case the grounds of ejectment are proved then no benefit can be taken of permanent tenancy. The learned Rent Controller, therefore, recorded a finding that petitioner-State was a permanent lessee. However, it was also held that they were liable to be evicted from the disputed land on the grounds provided in the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act. 21. On issue No. 5-D, the learned Rent Controller recorded a finding that the statement made by Nirmal Singh-Special Attorney that the respondent-landlord required the premises for her business along with him stood unrebutted. The Learned Rent Controller also rejected the plea that the premises could be got vacated by the landlord for the purpose other than for which it was rented out and, thus, issue No. 5-D was a so decided in favour of the respondent- landlord. 22. In view of the findings record above, the learned Rent Controller accepted the plea of the respondent-landlord and directed the petitioner-State to vacate the disputed land and hand over its vacant possession to the respondent-landlord within one month from the date of the order. 23. The petitioner preferred an appeal under Section 15 of the Haryana Urban (Control of Rent & Eviction) Act, 1973, as by that time the Haryana Urban (Control of Rent & Eviction) Act, 1973 was enacted and made applicable to Jagadhri. 24. During the pendency of the appeal the respondent-landlord sought amendment of the ejectment petition to aver that the landlord had not vacated any such rented land or was in possession of such rented land, the said amendment was allowed and thereafter additional evidence was led on the point in the Appellate Court. 25. The petitioner-State referred to lease deed Ex. A-2 dated 28.1.1925 executed by Sh. Moti Ram in favour of Jubbal State to show that the land was leased out to the Forest Department of Jubbal State permanently on payment of annual lease money with the right to State to cultivate it or to keep it vacant or to construct the house or to plant a garden. It may be mentioned here that in the said lease deed permission was also granted to the State either to use the land by itself or through any other person. It may be mentioned here that in the said lease deed permission was also granted to the State either to use the land by itself or through any other person. The plea was also raised that Ram Piari respondent had purchased the land measuring 3 Bigha-6 Biswas and, thus, the petition for ejectment was not competent as it was not permissible to split the tenancy. However, this plea was rejected by the learned Appellate Authority by observing as under :- "25. So far as the question to splitting of the tenancy was concerned the authority referred to by the learned counsel for the appellant was on the point where a particular building was let out to the tenant for residence and for running a school and then the residential portion was sold by the landlord to some other person and the purchaser sought ejectment of the residential portion and then it was held that the integrity of the tenancy could not be splitted and the ejectment could be sought from the entire building under the tenancy. The other authorities were on the point that where a part of the tenanted premises was sought to be vacated and then was held that the tenancy could not be splitted. The present case is governed by Section 109 of the T.P. Act and when the landlady had purchased only a part of the leased property then she could seek ejectment of that part. So the case law in AIR 1976 Madhya Pradesh 55, AIR 1939 Lahore 49, AIR 1975 Rajasthan 136 and AIR 1972 Madhya Pradesh 206 were fully applicable to the facts of this case and the leaned Rent Controller had correctly given the findings on issue No. 5C against the respondent and issue No. 1 in favour of the applicant." 26. The plea of the petitioner-State that the application moved by the respondent-landlord was liable to be rejected for want of necessary ingredients of Section 13 of he Rent Act was also rejected in view of the fact that the respondent-landlord was allowed to amend the petition in order to implead the necessary ingredients. 27. The finding with regard to the subletting was also affirmed by observing as the part of the premises was in possession of the Corporation which was not a Government Department and it wash separate legal entity. 27. The finding with regard to the subletting was also affirmed by observing as the part of the premises was in possession of the Corporation which was not a Government Department and it wash separate legal entity. The finding that the rented land fell within the definition of Section 2(f) of the Rent Act was also affirmed. The plea that Corporation was necessary party was rejected by observing that sub-tenant was not a proper or necessary party in eviction petition filed against tenant. 28. The Appellate Court also observed that the creation of Municipal Committee, Yamuna Nagar, the site in dispute fell within the Municipal limits of Yamuna Nagar and, therefore, the provisions of Rent Act became applicable to the property in dispute. Consequently, the findings of the learned Rent Controller, as observed above, stood affirmed. 29. Mr. Vikas Bahl, learned counsel appearing on behalf the petitioner-State has challenged the finding of the learned authorities below on issue No. 5-B. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner-State is that once the Rent Controller as well as the learned Appellate Authority has recorded a positive finding that the petitioner-State was holding the land on permanent lease, the authorities under the Rent Act did not have any jurisdiction to entertain a petition during the pendency of the lease. 30. Learned counsel for the petitioner-State referred to Ex. A-2 i.e. the lease deed to show that the lease executed in favour of the petitioner did not have any forfeiture cause. The contention of the leaned counsel for the petitioner, therefore, was that the authorities under the Rent Act did not have any jurisdiction to entertain the petition filed by the respondent landlord. 31. The petitioners claimed that the finding on issue No. 5-B, therefore, deserves to be set aside. In support of his contention the leaned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on the judgment of Full Bench of the Honble Karnataka High Court in the case of Siri Ramakrishana Theatres Ltd v. General Investments and Commercial Corporation Ltd, Manipal and ors., 1992(2) Rent Control Reports 631 wherein the Honble Full Bench of the Honble Karnataka High Court after considering the law on the point was pleased to lay down as under : "26. It is also necessary to refer to Smt. Gian Devi Anand v. Jeevan Kumar and others, AIR 1985 SC 796. It is also necessary to refer to Smt. Gian Devi Anand v. Jeevan Kumar and others, AIR 1985 SC 796. This is a decision of the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court (Five Judges). Under the Delhi Rent Control Act the heirs of the tenant were protected specifically in the case of residential premises but no provision was made with regard to the heirs of tenants in respect of commercial tenancies. The question therefore was whether the statutory tenancy in respect of commercial premises was heritable or not. The Supreme Court held that heirs were entitled to the protection of the Rent Control Act even though the Act was silent on the said question. One of the reasons given is found at page 812 : "... If it be held that commercial tenancies after the termination of the contractual tenancy of the tenant are not heritable on the death of the tenant and the heirs of the tenant are not entitled to enjoy the protection under the Act, an irreparable mischief which the legislature could never have intended is likely to be caused. Any time after the creation of the contractual tenancy the landlord may determine the contractual tenancy, allowing the tenant to continue to remain the possession of the premises, hoping for an early death of the tenant, so that on the death of a tenant he can immediately proceed to institute the proceeding for recovery and recover possession of the premises as a matter of course, because the heirs would not have any right to remain in occupation and would not enjoy the protection of the Act. This could never have been intended by the Legislature while framing the Rent Acts for affording protection to the tenant against eviction that the landlord would be entitled to recover possession, even no grounds for eviction as prescribed in the Rent acts are made out. " The same reasoning can be applied to the facts of the instant case before us. If the landlord is permitted to evict the tenant even before the expiry of the lease period by resorting to the provisions of the Act the resultant mischief will be irreparable. " The same reasoning can be applied to the facts of the instant case before us. If the landlord is permitted to evict the tenant even before the expiry of the lease period by resorting to the provisions of the Act the resultant mischief will be irreparable. Many of commercial and industrial premises are obtained by the entrepreneurs on term lease and huge investments are made on buildings and machineries on the assurance that such a tenant is secured in possession of the leasehold during the lease period. If, however, a landlord can evict such a tenant within a few months aft the grant of the lease or even before the expiry of the lease period under Section 21 of the Act the exercise of the tenant in developing the land for commercial or industrial purposes will be rendered futile. For example, and Section 21(1), if the leased premises to a land only, the landlord is entitled to seek eviction if such land is reasonably and bonafide, required by him for the erection of a new building which a local authority or other competent authority has approved or permitted him to build thereon. If a landlord makes out a case that he requires the land leased by him for the erection of a new building and that such a requirement is reasonable and bonafide, an unconditional order of eviction will have to be made under Clause (1) of Section 21(1). If so the entire investment of the tenant will have to be sacrificed and it will not be of any consolation to him that probably he may dismantle and remove the structures and machineries put up by him. A law cannot be interpreted in such a way as to cause such a mischief and hardship. Such an interpretation of the law would not advance any public interest. The object of the Act is not to confer such a wide and large right on the landlord as to enable him to recover possession of the leased premises at a time when he possessed no such right under general law. Such an interpretation of the law would not advance any public interest. The object of the Act is not to confer such a wide and large right on the landlord as to enable him to recover possession of the leased premises at a time when he possessed no such right under general law. Again, coming to the Gian Devis case, 1985(1) RCR 459, the following observations made at page 812 are to be noted : "....These decisions correctly lay down that the termination of the contractual tenancy by the landlord does n& bring about a change in the status of the tenant who continues to remain in possession after the termination of the tenancy by virtue of the provisions of the Rent Act. A proper interpretation of; the definition of tenant in the light of the provisions made in the Rent Acts makes it clear that the tenant continues to enjoy an estate or interest in the tenanted premises despite the termination of the contractual tenancy. Accordingly, we hold that if the Rent Act in question defines a tenant in substance of mean a tenant who continues to remain in possession even after the termination of the contractual tenancy till a decree for eviction against him is passed, the tenant even after the determination of the tenancy continues to have an estate or interest in the tenanted premises and the tenancy rights both in respect of residential premises and commercial premises are heritable. The heirs of the deceased tenant in the absence of any provision in the Rent Act to the contrary will step into the position of the deceases tenant and all the rights and obligations of the deceased tenant including the protection afforded to the deceased tenant under the Act will devolve on the heirs of the deceases tenant." Therefore, it is clear that the tenants estate or interest in the tenanted premises in a valuable right and, if so, such an estate or interest cannot be defeated by interpreting the Act in a particular manner when the words used in the Act specifically do not provide for the taking away of the estate or interest vested in the tenant. One more decision which is very relevant is the one reported in Modern Motel, Gudur v. K. and others, 1989(2) RCR 306 : AIR 1989 SC 1510. The tenant therein was a term lessee. One more decision which is very relevant is the one reported in Modern Motel, Gudur v. K. and others, 1989(2) RCR 306 : AIR 1989 SC 1510. The tenant therein was a term lessee. An action for eviction was initiated against the tenant on the plea that the tenant had failed to pay the rent for a certain period. There was an order of eviction which was affirmed by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that the action was not maintainable because :- "....... It has next been contended that the lease of 1969 was for a term of 30 years certain and eviction has been claimed against a contractual tenant during the subsistence of the lease. Admittedly, matter within the ambit of Section 111(g) of the Transfer of Property Act. The application for eviction, a copy of which is available on the record (at p.10 of the second paper book), refers to a notice in paragraph 7 in the following terms : "The petitioners caused a registered notice through their counsel dated 28.10.1975 to the respondent demanding the rent due and also for the eviction from the schedule mentioned premises since the respondent has become a willful defaulter. The respondent received the notice and has not chosen to give any reply. " It, therefore, follows, appellants counsel has contended that the lease remained unterminated and the right created under the lease cannot be taken away by filing an application for eviction on the plea of will default in the matter of payment of rent. This contention was accepted by the Supreme Court at page 1513, thus. "....The lease being for a term of 30 years is to expire in September 1999. As we have already said, the lease did not stipulate a forfeiture clause in the lease leading to terminating forfeiture, the contractual tenancy was subsisting under the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act and there could not be any eviction from such a tenancy. " 27. From the above it is clear that while the contractual tenancy subsists the Rent Control Act cannot be applied to evict the tenant. The observation of the Supreme Court is not based on any particular provision of the relevant Andhra Pradesh Rent Control Act but is based on the principles flowing out of the provisions of the T.P. Act and the interest created in the tenant under a term lease. The observation of the Supreme Court is not based on any particular provision of the relevant Andhra Pradesh Rent Control Act but is based on the principles flowing out of the provisions of the T.P. Act and the interest created in the tenant under a term lease. Mr. A.G. Holla, learned counsel for the petitioner, however, very fairly brought to our notice that the term leases were excluded from the ambit of the Andhra Pradesh Act. But the learned counsel also rightly contended that the decision of Supreme Court is not based only any such provision because such provision was not noticed in the decision of the Supreme Court as a ground for the above observation. 28. It is a necessary to multiply the citations as we do not find any other decision which is quite relevant to the question raised before us. The meaning attributed to the non-obstinate clause is in sub-section (1) of the Section 2 of the Act in Bharth Petroleum Corporations case is not correct; the overriding effect of the said clause is limited to the subject referred to immediately by the words following in other words, even if any other law or contract provides recovery of possession the same shall be of no effect and the eviction can be made only on the grounds stated in clauses (a) to p of the proviso. This indicates that the landlord should have a right to recover possession and that right cannot be held to vest in him during the period of the term leased unless there is something in the lease deed which provides for the determination of the lease; in such a situation, even after the determination of the lease in the manner stated in term lease, the recovery of possession will have to be made only by recourse to Section 21(1)." 32. The reference was also made to the Judgment of the Honble Supreme Court in the case of Modern Motel, Gudur, represented by M.N. Narayanan v. K Radhakrishnaiah and others, AIR 1989 Supreme Court 1510, wherein the Honble Supreme Court has been pleased to lay down as under :- "11. The second contention advanced before us is equally weighty. The lease being for a term of 30 years is to expire in Sept. 1999. The second contention advanced before us is equally weighty. The lease being for a term of 30 years is to expire in Sept. 1999. As we have already said, the lease did not stipulate a clause and in the absence of a forfeiture clause in the lease leading to terminating by forfeiture, the contractual tenancy was subsisting under the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act and there could not be any eviction from such a tenancy." 33. Mr. Pawan Kumar, the learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the newly added respondents No. 5 to 10 vehemently contended that the authorities below were correct in coming to the conclusion that though the petitioner- State was a permanent tenant still he was governed by the provisions of the Rent Act and and could be evicted on the grounds mentioned under Section 13 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act. 34. The learned counsel also referred to the findings recorded by the learned Appellate Authority holding therein that once the land in dispute fell under the definition of rented land then the same was to be governed by the provisions of the Act and, therefore, it was not permissible to the petitioner to take shelter under the permanent tenancy so as to seek the ouster of the jurisdiction of the authorities under the Rent Act. 35. The learned counsel in support of this contention has placed reliance on the judgment of the Full Bench of this Court in the case of Sawan Ram v. Gobinda Ram and another, 1980 The Punjab Law Reporter 271 wherein the Honble Full Bench has been pleased to lay down as under: "Held, that for all practical purposes; jurisdiction with regard to the matter covered by the Act is taken away the ordinary run of the Civil Courts and vested in the Controller. Sub-section (1) of Section 13, which lays down in no uncertain terms that a tenant is not to be evicted except in accordance with the provisions of this very Section. That this provisions is exclusory in nature is patent and that is bards all other laws and confines the remedy to what is spelt out in the statute itself is, therefore, mainfest. That this provisions is exclusory in nature is patent and that is bards all other laws and confines the remedy to what is spelt out in the statute itself is, therefore, mainfest. Coupled with this is the fact that the procedural jurisdiction to decide the questions in accordance with Section 13 is again vested only in the Controller subject, of course to the decision of the appellate authority constituted under the Act and the final revisional jurisdiction has been conferred expressly on the High Court by the amending Act of 1956. It is thus evident that both as regards the substantive law applicable and also the forum in which is to be enforced, the Act covers the field to the total exclusion of all other laws. What exactly, therefore, does it exclude ? Plainly it excludes on the substantive aspect the general law of the tenant landlord relationship and on the procedural aspect bars the forum of the ordinary run of the Civil Courts." 36. The learned senior counsel also relied upon the Division Bench Judgment of this Court in the case of Gordhan Dass and others v. Smt. Dhan Mala Devi, 1984 the Punjab Law Reporter 703 wherein again the Honble Division Bench of this Court was pleased to lay down that East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act covered the field to total exclusion of all other laws. It excluded on the substantive aspect the general law of tenant and landlord relationship and on to procedural aspect barred the forum of the ordinary run of the Civil Courts. Thus, the Civil Courts would have no jurisdiction to entertain the suit by a landlord to eject a tenant. 37. Mr. D.S. Brar, learned counsel appearing on behalf of other respondents placed reliance on the judgment of the Honble Supreme Court in the case of V. Dhanapal Chettiar v. Yesodai Ammal, AIR 1979 SC 1745 wherein the Honble Supreme Court has been pleased to lay down that no notice to evict was necessary under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act in order to enable the landlord to get an order of eviction against the tenant. The contention of the learned counsel, therefore, was that once the termination of tenancy was not required to invoke the provisions of the Rent Act. The contention of the learned counsel, therefore, was that once the termination of tenancy was not required to invoke the provisions of the Rent Act. It has to be presumed that the Rent Controller has the jurisdiction to evict a tenant if case falls under Section 13 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act. 38. The contention of Mr. D.S. Brar, learned counsel, therefore, was that the findings recorded by the learned authorities below were in consonance with the law laid down by the Honble supreme Court and the Full Bench judgment of the Honble Karnataka High Court, relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner being contrary to the judgment of the Honble Supreme Court cannot be sustained. 39. On consideration of the matter, I find force in the contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner. It is well established that in India a lease in perpetuity can be granted as neither the Transfer of Property Act nor the general law abhor the lease in perpetuity. This proposition has been taken notice by the Honble Supreme Court in the case of State of U.P. v. Lalji Tandon (dead), AIR 2004 SC 32. 40. In view of proposition referred to above, the lease deed Ex.A-2 has to be given its true meaning. 41. Once the owner of the property has leased the premises by way of lease in perpetuity it was not open the respondent-landlord to seek eviction during the pendency of the lease. The reading of lease deed Ex. A-2 would clearly shows that the owner of the land had categorically mentioned that it will not be open to him or his successor to get back the land leased out to the petitioner-State. 42. The option was, however, given to the lessee to hand back the land, if so desired, but there was no right left with the owner thereof except to claim rent. The landlord is bound by the terms of the lease deed. The judgments relied upon by the learned senior counsel and the counsel for the respondents, therefore, would have no application to the facts of the present case. 43. The landlord is bound by the terms of the lease deed. The judgments relied upon by the learned senior counsel and the counsel for the respondents, therefore, would have no application to the facts of the present case. 43. The judgment of the Full Bench of the Honble Karnataka High Court, referred to above, does not run contrary to the law laid down by this Court in the case of Sawan Ram v. Gobinda Ram and another (supra) and Ordhan Dass and others v. Smt. Dhan Mala Devi (supra) as the Honble Karnataka High Court has also held that after the expiry of the lease period that a landlord can seek eviction and the remedy with the landlord would be one under the Rent Act alone and not under the general law which is in consonance with the view taken by the Honble Full Bench and Division Bench of this Court, referred to above. 44. The Honble Supreme Court in the case of Modern Motel, Gudur, represented by M.N. Narayanan v. K. Radhakrishnaiah and others (supra) has clearly held that where the lease does not stipulate a forfeiture clause the contractual tenancy under the Transfer of Property Act continues and the person cannot be ordered to be evicted under the provisions of Rent Act. 45. It may be mentioned here that the judgment of the Honble Supreme Court in the case of V. Dhanapal Chettiar, Appellant v. Yesodai Ammal (supra) relied upon by learned counsel for respondents would also have no application as it only permits the landlord to seek eviction without terminating the tenancy under the general law once there is no forfeiture clause and tenancy could not be terminated under the general law by issuance of notice, the object cannot be achieved by invoking under the Rent Act to seek eviction. 46. The finding of the learned Rent Controller as well as the learned Appellate Authority on Issue No. 5-B, therefore, cannot be sustained and accordingly ordered to be reversed and it is held that the authorities under the Rent Act did not have the jurisdiction to entertain a petition for eviction during the subsisting lease which did not have a forfeiture clause. 47. 47. The learned counsel for the petitioner also challenged the findings of the authorities below on issue No. 5-D by placing reliance on the judgment of this Court in the case of Teja Singh v. Mehanga Singh, 1986(2) RCR(Rent) 60 to contend that Smt. Ram Piari who sought eviction for her personal need has since died. The legal heirs of the respondent Ram Piari have sold the and to different persons and, therefore, as she ceased to be the owner of the tenanted property, the eviction order could not be maintained. 48. The contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner has been controverted by Sh. D.S. Brar, learned counsel for the respondent by placing reliance on the judgment of the Honble Supreme Court in the case of Shakuntala Bai and others v. Narayan Das and others, AIR 2004 SC 3484 to contend that bonafide need of the landlord has to be examined on the date of institution. The subsequent event i.e. the death of landlord is not relevant. 49. On consideration, the matter, I find force in the contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner. The requirement of the landlord was required to be seen on the date of institution, if the case was contested by the legal representatives. In the present case, the respondent Ram Piari and her legal heirs have transferred the property in favour of third party and there is no evidence on record to prove the requirement of the present owners of the property and, thus, in view of the law laid down by this Court in the case of Teja Singh v. Mehanga Singh (supra) findings of the learned authorities below on issue No. 5-D also stands reversed. The judgment of Honble Supreme Court in case of Shakuntala Bai and others v. Narayan Das and others (supra) is not applicable to facts of present case. It is always open to Court to take notice of subsequent event in Rent petition. 50. The learned counsel for the petitioner challenged the findings of the learned authorities below on Issue No. 4 by placing reliance on the Judgment of the Honble Supreme Court in the case of South Asia Industries Private Ltd. v. Anup Singh and others, 1966 Punjab Law Reporter (Delhi Section) 108 wherein the Honble Supreme Court was pleased to observe that sub-tenant or assignee is a necessary party. However, this plea of the petitioner cannot be accepted in view of the law laid down by this Court in the case of Reema Rani v. Gurmukh Singh and another, holding therein that in a petition for eviction of tenant on the ground of sub-letting, sub-tenant is not a necessary party although he might be possession of the demised premises. In the case of Reema Rani v. Gurmukh Singh and another (supra) this Court was pleased to hold as under : "4. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties, I am of the considered view that respondent No. 2 is not a necessary part because no claim by the landlord has been made against him. In fact it is admitted position that respondent, No. 2 is a tenant under Kanti Kumar. Once there is no relationship between the landlord petitioner and respondent No. 2 it cannot be held that he is a necessary party. The view taken by this Court in Vijay Singhs case (supra) fully applies to the facts of the instant case. It is well settled that even in case of subletting a sub-tenant is not a necessary party although he might be in possession of the demised premises. For the aforementioned proposition a reference may be made to a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Importers and Manufacturers Ltd v. Pheroze Fromroze Taraparowala, AIR 1953 SC 73. Moreover, the petitioner is dominus litus and if he has not impleaded the respondent No. 2 as a party he cannot be compelled to fight litigation against him. It is needless to say that any adjudication between the petitioner and Gurmukh Singh, respondent N6.1 would not have any affect on respondent No. 2." 51. The authority relied upon by the petitioner in South Asia Industries Private Ltd. v. S. Anup Singh and others (supra) would not be applicable as the Honble Supreme Court in the said case has been pleased to lay down that it is only in cases where the assignment is with consent of the landlord then the assignee would be necessary party and, therefore, the findings of the learned authorities below holding that the petition did not suffer from non- joinder of necessary parties stands affirmed. 52. The learned counsel for the petitioner also challenged the finding of the learned Rent Controller as well as the learned Appellate Authority on issue No. 2. 52. The learned counsel for the petitioner also challenged the finding of the learned Rent Controller as well as the learned Appellate Authority on issue No. 2. 53. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner was that as per the provisions of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act the tenant is liable to be ejected only if he sublets the premises after the commencement of the Act and once the tenancy in favour of the petitioner was created in the year 1925, the petitioner could not be ordered to be evicted on the ground of subletting as East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act was enforced in 1949. This plea of the learned counsel for the petitioner has been controverted by Mr. D.S. Brar, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents by referring to Ex. A-12 i.e. the notification vide which the property stood transferred to the Corporation on 13.9.1974. The contention of the learned counsel for the respondent, therefore, was that the subletting was after the commencement of the Act and, therefore, the finding on issue No. 2 deserves to be affirmed. 54. On consideration of the matter, I find that the findings of the learned authorities below on issue No. 2 also cannot be sustained. As already observed above, the lease deed Ex. A-2 executed by Moti Ram clearly stipulates that it was permissible for the petitioner to cultivate the land to keep it vacant or to construct house or plant garden. The State was even allowed to transfer the same to any third party. Once by way of written deed the permission was given by the landlord to transfer it to third party, it cannot be said that sub- tenancy was without the consent of the landlord, as the successors to Moti Ram were also bound by the terms of the lease deed. In view of the clear terms in the deed permitting creating of third party interest it cannot be said that disputed land was sublet without the consent of landlord, to seek eviction on the ground of subletting. The finding on issue No. 2 also stand reversed. 55. In view of, what has been observed above, this revision petition stands allowed. In view of the clear terms in the deed permitting creating of third party interest it cannot be said that disputed land was sublet without the consent of landlord, to seek eviction on the ground of subletting. The finding on issue No. 2 also stand reversed. 55. In view of, what has been observed above, this revision petition stands allowed. The order passed by the learned Rent Controller as well as the learned Appellate Authority is ordered to be set aside and the petition filed by the respondent-landlord is ordered to be dismissed but with no order as to costs. Petition allowed.