JUDGMENT Honble Tarun Agarwala, J.—Heard Sri Ashok Khare, the learned senior Counsel for the petitioners and the learned Standing Counsel for the respondents. 2. Since all the petitions relate to the same incident, consequently all the writ petitions are decided together by a common judgment. 3. The petitioners are constables and their services were dismissed with under Rule 8(2)(b) of the U.P. Police Officers of the Subordinate Ranks (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1991 on the ground that it was not reasonably practicable to hold an inquiry. 4. It transpires that the petitioners were posted at the Police Station and, within its vicinity, a theft was committed in a Jewellery shop. A first information report against the said theft was lodged at the police station. A preliminary inquiry was held and it was found that the petitioners could have avoided the theft, had they were cautious. The preliminary report, further stated that it would be a waste of time to hold a full-fledged inquiry against the petitioners. On the basis of this report, the disciplinary authority exercised his power under Rule 8(2)(b) of the aforesaid Rules and dismissed the petitioners from the service. The petitioners, being aggrieved by the said order, have filed separate writ petitions. 5. In my opinion, this is an escape route adopted by the authority by taking an easy way out from not holding an inquiry. 6. The services of the petitioners has been terminated under Rule 8(2)(b) of the Uttar Pradesh Police Officers of the Subordinate Ranks (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1991. Rule 8(2)(b) reads as under : “8. (2)(b) Where the authority empowered to dismiss or remove a person or to reduce him in rank is satisfied that for some reason to be recorded by that authority in writing, it is not reasonably practicable to hold such inquiry.” 7. The language of the aforesaid rule is similar to the second proviso to Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India. In Union of India and another v. Tulsiram Patel, AIR 1985 SC 1416 , the Supreme Court held : “The condition precedent for the application of clause(b) the satisfaction of the disciplinary authority that “it is not reasonably practicable to hold” the inquiry contemplated by clause (2) of Article 311.... “Thus, whether it was practicable to hold the inquiry or not must be judged in the context of whether it was reasonably practicable to do so. “Thus, whether it was practicable to hold the inquiry or not must be judged in the context of whether it was reasonably practicable to do so. It is not a total or absolute impracticability, which is required by clause (b). What is requisite is that the holding of the inquiry is not practicable in the opinion of a reasonable man taking a reasonable view of the prevailing situation.” “.....The reasonable practicability of holding an inquiry is a matter of assessment to be made by the disciplinary authority.” “.....A disciplinary authority is not expected to dispense with a disciplinary inquiry lightly or arbitrarily or out of ulterior motives or merely in order to avoid the holding of an inquiry or because the Department’s case against the Government servant is weak and must fail.” 8. In Tulsiram Patel’s case (supra) the Supreme Court further held : “The second condition necessary for the valid application of clause (b) of the second provise is that the disciplinary authority should record in writing its reason for its satisfaction that it was not reasonably practicable to hold the inquiry contemplated by Article 311(2). This is a Constitutional obligation and if such reason is not recorded in writing, the order dispensing with the inquiry and the order of penalty following thereupon would both be void and unconstitutional. It is obvious that the recording in writing of the reason for dispensing with the inquiry must precede the order imposing the penalty.” 9. The Supreme Court further went on to say : “If the Court finds that the reasons are irrelevant, then the recording of its satisfaction by the disciplinary authority would be an abuse of power conferred upon it by clause (b) and would take the case out of the purview of that clause and the impugned order of penalty would stand invalidated.” 10. In Chief Security Officer and others v. Singasan Rabi Das, 1991(1) SCC 729 , the Supreme Court held that there was a total absence of sufficient material or good ground for dispensing with the inquiry and accordingly held that the order of termination dispensing with the inquiry was illegal. 11. In Chief Security Officer and others v. Singasan Rabi Das, 1991(1) SCC 729 , the Supreme Court held that there was a total absence of sufficient material or good ground for dispensing with the inquiry and accordingly held that the order of termination dispensing with the inquiry was illegal. 11. In Jaswant Singh v. State of Punjab and others, (1991)1 SCC 362 , the Supreme Court held : “It was incumbent on the respondents to disclose to the Court the material in existence at the date of the passing of the impugned order in support of the subjective satisfaction recorded by respondent No. 3, in the impugned order. Clause (b) of the second proviso to Article 311 (2) can be invoked only when the authority is satisfied from the material placed before him that it is not reasonably practicable to hold a departmental inquiry.” 12. The Supreme Court further held : “The decision to dispense with the departmental inquiry cannot, therefore, be rested solely on the ipse dixit of the concerned authority. When the satisfaction of the concerned authority is questioned in a Court of law, it is incumbent on those who support the order to show that the satisfaction is based on certain objective facts and is not the outcome of the whim of caprice of the concerned officer.” 13. In view of the aforesaid, I am of the opinion that the impugned order of termination does not contain sufficient reasons for dispensing with the inquiry. The charges so levelled are such that it can easily be enquired through a departmental enquiry. It is not a case where it could be said that it was not reasonably practicable to hold an inquiry. In my opinion, the decision of the disciplinary authority was wholly arbitrary. The reasons given for dispensing with the enquiry was wholly irrelevant. I am of the view that the disciplinary authority has misused the provision of Rule 8 (2)(b) of the Rules. Similar view was taken by me in Dharam Pal Singh v. State of U.P. and others, 2005(1) ESC 566 and in writ petition No. 33057 of 2006, Virendra Kumar Premi v. State of U.P. and another, decided on 7.8.2008. 14. In view of the aforesaid, the exercise of the powers under Rule 8 (2)(b) of the Rules was totally arbitrary. Similar view was taken by me in Dharam Pal Singh v. State of U.P. and others, 2005(1) ESC 566 and in writ petition No. 33057 of 2006, Virendra Kumar Premi v. State of U.P. and another, decided on 7.8.2008. 14. In view of the aforesaid, the exercise of the powers under Rule 8 (2)(b) of the Rules was totally arbitrary. Consequently, the impugned order terminating the services of petitioners cannot be sustained and is quashed. The writ petitions are allowed and the matter is remitted to the authority to proceed from the stage prior to passing of the impugned order and conclude the inquiry and pass a final order within six months from the date of the production of a certified copy of this order. 15. It is made clear that the petitioners will not be reinstated in service but would be treated to be in suspension. The petitioners will not be entitled for any salary from the date of the dismissal till the date when final orders are passed. The authority will pass orders on the question of payment of salary while passing the order of penalty, if any. The petitioners would be entitled for payment of suspension allowance as per rules from today during the pendency of the inquiry proceedings. ————