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2008 DIGILAW 1767 (PNJ)

Pushpa Rani v. Raghubir Singh

2008-10-21

MAHESH GROVER

body2008
Judgment Mahesh Grover, J. 1. he claimants have filed the instant appeal against award dated 30.9.1989 passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Faridkot (for short, the Tribunal) purportedly on the basis of the compromise arrived at between the parties in M.V.A. Case No. 6 of 18.1.1989. 2. On 30.9.1989, a joint statement of the counsel for claimants-appellants and P.K. Banerjee, Deputy Manager, Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. with Mr. P.P. Gosam, Advocate, was got recorded before the Tribunal, which is extracted below: "We have arrived at an amicable settlement in this case through the efforts of Lok Adalat. In terms of that settlement, a total sum of Rs. 60,000 be awarded as compensation in favour of claimants to be shared by them equally and against Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., respondent. A period of one month be allowed to insurance company to make payment of that amount, failing which the claimants shall also be entitled to recover interest at the rate of 12 per cent per annum from the date of claim petition till realization." Pursuant to the above reproduced statement, the impugned award had come into existence. The same is also reproduced hereunder: "In the terms of the compromise arrived at between the parties, a total sum of Rs. 60,000 is awarded as compensation in favour of claimants, to be shared by them equally and against Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., respondent. A period of one month is allowed to the insurance company to make payment, failing which the claimants shall also be entitled to recover interest at the rate of 12 per cent per annum from the date of petition till realization. No orders as to costs." 3. On 23.9.2008, CM. No. 19085-CII of 2008 was moved under the provisions of Order 22, rule 3 read with section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code for impleading the applicants as legal representatives of Pushpa Rani, one of the appellants, who has been stated to have expired on 11.6.2007. It is allowed subject to all just exceptions. 4. On 23.9.2008, CM. No. 19085-CII of 2008 was moved under the provisions of Order 22, rule 3 read with section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code for impleading the applicants as legal representatives of Pushpa Rani, one of the appellants, who has been stated to have expired on 11.6.2007. It is allowed subject to all just exceptions. 4. The primary contention raised by the learned counsel for appellants is that the counsel for the claimants before the Tribunal could not have given a statement and in any eventuality, the same being contrary to the provisions of Order 23, rule 3 of the Civil Procedure Code could not have been given effect as the compromise was not reduced into writing under the signatures of the parties and the same has resulted in the denial of fair and just compensation to them to which they were entitled to. In support of his contention, he placed reliance on Gurpreet Singh v. Chatur Bhuj Goel, (1988-2) 94 PLR 365 (SC); Sushma Lata v. Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Jaipur, 1989 ACJ 352 (Rajasthan); United India Fire & Genl. Ins. Co. Ltd. v. Pallapu Sridevi, 1993 ACJ 575 (AP); Nagappa v. Gurudayal Singh, 2003 ACJ 12 (SC) and Raju Adityan v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., 1998 ACJ 488 (Karnataka). 5. To the contrary, learned counsel for the respondents contended that once the Lok Adalat had got settled the matter, no appeal was maintainable against the award passed on the basis of such settlement and that the parties having accepted the terms of the compromise could not resile therefrom. 6. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have perused the record. 7. The impugned award and the proceedings leading to it even if accepted, shows that it is not an award passed by the Lok Adalat in the first instance. It is an award which has come into existence pursuant to the provision of section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 . 8. The law relating to the grant of compensation is primarily propelled with the sole objective of providing just compensation to the aggrieved. It is an award which has come into existence pursuant to the provision of section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 . 8. The law relating to the grant of compensation is primarily propelled with the sole objective of providing just compensation to the aggrieved. Any proceedings which tend to defeat this cardinal principle of the grant of compensation have, therefore, to be viewed with circumspection by the courts as it can often mean an unsuspecting trap for the gullible persons, manoeuvred by the persons whose motives are best served by the defeat of such principle. 9. In the instant case, the son of the claimants, aged 22 years, had died in a motor vehicular accident due to rash and negligent driving of the bus belonging to Haryana Roadways by Raghubir Singh, respondent No. 1. In this view of the situation, the statement of the counsel for the parties without there being any record of the statement of the claimants clouds the mind of the court with suspicion. 10. Even if these facts were not thereon, an appeal having been preferred by the claimants, the court is not precluded to peep into the facts of the case and arrive at a decision to ensure that they are granted just compensation for the death of their young son. 11. In Nagappa v. Gurudayal Singh, 2003 ACJ 12 (SC), their Lordships of the Apex Court held that the Tribunal/court is to award just compensation which is reasonable on the basis of evidence on record. 12. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case and the law laid down in the judgments relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellants including the aforementioned judgment, I am of the opinion that the appeal deserves to succeed. 13. Now, this court is confronted with the situation where ordinarily, the matter ought to be remanded back for decision of the claim petition on merits as the evidence of the parties was yet to be recorded, but considering the fact that the accident took place in the year 1988 and twenty years have elapsed since then, it would be grossly unjust to compel the claimants to face the ordeal of the proceedings as it is apparent that they would be fairly advanced in years by now. 14. 14. Insofar as the issue of negligence in causing the accident is concerned, the same was not seriously disputed by the counsel for the respondents. Even otherwise, when they had offered to settle the matter, they had tacitly acquiesced to the factum of the accident being a result of their negligence. 15. Therefore, the quantum which is to be determined relates to the quantum of compensation that should be awarded to the claimants. 16. As noticed above, the claim petition was disposed of on the basis of the statement of the counsel for the parties and, therefore, this court has been robbed of the benefit of evidence in support of the claim of the claimants regarding the quantum of compensation. 17. The deceased was a young man of 22 years. The claimants are his parents. The claim petition was filed in January, 1989. At that point of time, a labourer was expected to earn at least Rs. 1,100 per month. When the income is meagre, one may not strictly apply the norms of 1/3rd or /4th as deduction as personal expenses. It would be just and appropriate to assess the dependency at Rs. 950 per month, i.e., Rs. 11,400 per annum. A multiplier of 10 should be just and adequate considering the fact that the deceased would have got married and dependency qua the appellants would have reduced. 18. In this manner, the compensation comes to Rs. 1,14,000. 19. A sum of Rs. 20,000 is awarded on account of funeral expenses and loss of love and affection. 20. Thus, the appellants are held entitled to receive a sum of Rs. 1,34,000 as compensation. 21. The enhanced amount of compensation is directed to be paid to the claimants along with interest at the rate of 9 per cent per annum from the date of claim petition till the date of realization. 22. The liability to pay the enhanced compensation and interest shall be joint as well as several of the respondents. The impugned award is modified to the aforementioned extent and the appeal is allowed in the above terms. Appeal allowed.