JUDGMENT G. RAJASURIA, J. 1. This appeal is focussed as against the judgment and decree dated 28.4.1995 passed by the learned Subordinate Judge, Chidambaram in decreeing the suit in O.S. No. 34 of 1993, which was filed by the plaintiff as against the defendants. For convenience sake, the parties are referred to here under according to their litigative status before the trial Court. 2. The quintessence of the case of the plaintiff, as stood exposited from the averments in the plaint, would run thus: The plaintiff is the owner of the shop bearing Door Nos. 72 and 73 at West Car Street, Chidambaram. The plaintiffs father was in possession and enjoyment of the said shop premises as a tenant and conducting business by putting up roof in front of those shops on the land, which is situated on the road margin ever since 1935. Following his father, the plaintiff started his business in the same premises during the year 1957. The extent of occupation of the plaintiff and his father ever since 1935 is measuring an extent of 19½ feet from North to South and 15 feet from East to West. Initially, a thatched roof was put up and subsequently, it was replaced by asbestos sheet by the plaintiff. The plaintiff acquired ownership over the shop premises bearing Door Nos. 72 and 73 from the owners concerned. He has also been paying tax for the suit property. The plaintiff purchased the premises bearing Door No. 72 vide sale deed dated 20.8.1962 and the premises bearing Door No. 73 was acquired by the plaintiffs brother-in-law Abdul Rasheed. However on 1.1.1963, the plaintiffs brother-in-law Abdul Rasheed executed an oral Hibba in respect of the premises bearing Door No. 73 in favour of the plaintiff. As such, by virtue of open, continuous and peaceful enjoyment of the suit property for over 30 years, the plaintiff acquired prescriptive title over it. While so, the defendants without any manner of right attempted to disturb his possession by trying to dispossession him. Hence, the suit. 3. Per contra, denying and refuting, challenging and impugning the allegations/averments in the plaint, the second defendant filed the written statement, the gist and kernel of them, would run thus: “Neither the plaintiff nor the plaintiffs father have been in possession and enjoyment of the suit property as claimed by them for such a long time. Hence, the suit. 3. Per contra, denying and refuting, challenging and impugning the allegations/averments in the plaint, the second defendant filed the written statement, the gist and kernel of them, would run thus: “Neither the plaintiff nor the plaintiffs father have been in possession and enjoyment of the suit property as claimed by them for such a long time. The suit property belongs to Highways Department and for widening the road such suit property, is very much required. The plaintiffs allegations that he acquired the property is not borne by any evidence. His allegation that he acquired title over the premises bearing Door Nos. 72 and 73 is not true and correct. The plaintiff has not acquired prescriptive title over the suit property. Accordingly, they prayed for the dismissal of the suit.” 4. The trial Court framed the relevant issues. During the trial, the plaintiff examined himself as P.W.1 along with his witness P.W.2 and Exhibits A-1 to A-16 were marked. On behalf of the defendants, their official D.W.1 was examined and no documents were marked. The Advocate Commissioner’s report and sketch were marked as Exhibits C-1 and C-2. 5. Ultimately, the trial Court decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiff. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the judgment and decree of the trial Court, the defendants have filed this appeal on the following grounds among others: The judgment and decree of the trial Court is against law, weight of evidence and all probabilities of the case. The trial Court failed to note that the suit property is forming part of highway and belongs to the Highway Department and no other person has got right or title over it. The Advocate Commissioner’s report has not been properly appreciated by the trial Court. The trial Court was wrong in relying on the evidence relating to the other encroachments made by others on the pavement near the suit property in decreeing the suit of the plaintiff. Accordingly, they prayed for the dismissal of the suit. 6. The points for consideration are as to whether the trial Court was justified in holding that the plaintiff acquired prescriptive title over the suit property and whether there was any. infirmity in the judgment and decree of the trial Court. 7. Accordingly, they prayed for the dismissal of the suit. 6. The points for consideration are as to whether the trial Court was justified in holding that the plaintiff acquired prescriptive title over the suit property and whether there was any. infirmity in the judgment and decree of the trial Court. 7. Tersely and pithily, the case of the plaintiff is that he has acquired prescriptive title over the road margin, which is situated between the shop premises bearing Door Nos. 72 and 73 and the metal road portion by virtue of his own enjoyment and by virtue of his father’s enjoyment ever since 1935. As such, the very plea of the plaintiff is based on the alleged fact that he acquired prescriptive title over road margin, which belongs to Highways Department. At this juncture, my mind is redolent with the decision of this Court in Consumer Action Group v. State of Tamil Nadu (2007) 1 MLJ 897 (Mad) : 2006 (4) CTC 483 . An excerpt of it would run thus at p. 913 of MLJ: “30. Both the C.M.D.A and Corporation have submitted elaborate charts to show that the provisions of the Act and the Rules have been grossly violated by the builders and buildings have been constructed in total violation of the Rules. Buildings have been either constructed without any permission or additional floors have been raised in violation of the FSI Regulations. In none of these buildings, the mandatory safeguards relating to the car-parking area and fire safety measures have been observed. On the other hand, the basement and stilt portions, which are exclusively made for car parking, have been illegally converted into shops for commercial use. It appears that in some cases the authorities have taken action and demolition notices have been issued. However, the builders have obtained stay on the ground that their Applications for negutarisation are pending before the competent authority. It is also seen that some of the violators have encroached upon the roads by constructing steps, platforms, etc. right on the pavements or on the roads. It is brought to our notice that there are encroachments on busy streets like Ranganathan Street, Natesan Street, Madley Road, etc. It is also seen that some of the violators have encroached upon the roads by constructing steps, platforms, etc. right on the pavements or on the roads. It is brought to our notice that there are encroachments on busy streets like Ranganathan Street, Natesan Street, Madley Road, etc. It is necessary to direct the municipal authorities to clear the encroachments in order to ensure smooth flow of traffic on these streets and roads, it is needless to say that there is no necessity of issuing notice for the removal and demolition of the encroachment in public streets and roads, as such encroachment shall be liable to be removed forthwith. So also the electricity connection or sewerage connection facilities shall be liable to be disconnected forthwith. 32........ (xiv) The Corporation is directed to forthwith take steps to remove the encroachments on all busy streets like Ranganathan Street, Natesan Street, Madley Road, etc. and the Commissioner of Police is directed to provide adequate police force at the disposal of the Corporation for the purpose of carrying out work of removal of encroachments. (xv) No Civil Court shall entertain any suit or proceedings or Application in respect of the action taken by the CMDA or Corporation in respect of the illegal construction and encroachments on roads and pavements. All pending and future petitions filed/to be filed against CMDA and the Corporation relating to the illegal and unauthorised construction of buildings and or encroachment, and the demolition notice shall be placed before the special bench to be nominated by the Chief Justice.” (emphasis supplied) From the perusal of the said decision, it is crystal clear that no private individual can acquire prescriptive title over road margin or pavements or platform in front of shop. Road margins are public properties coming within the realm of the public domain and as such no one can acquire prescriptive title over it. Further more, it has to be seen as to whether the plaintiff has established his possession and enjoyment over the suit property by proving his open, continuous and hostile possession over the suit property, in his own right for a period of 30 years. 8. Article 111 of the Limitation Act, 1963 would contemplate that 30 years after the date of dispossession or discontinuance of possession of the public authority, there would be an embargo for recovering the property. 9. 8. Article 111 of the Limitation Act, 1963 would contemplate that 30 years after the date of dispossession or discontinuance of possession of the public authority, there would be an embargo for recovering the property. 9. The plaintiff examined himself as P.W.1 and it is only his self-serving statement, which could be nomenclatured as his ipse dixit. P.W.2 Ramamoorthi is a retired Indian Revenue Services conferred official. He is not living adjacent to the suit property. However, he would state that from 1960 onwards he knew that the suit property is under the enjoyment of the plaintiff by putting up iron enclosure around it. Even, though in chief, in a vague manner he had stated that the plaintiffs father was occupying it even during the year 1935, nevertheless, it is an admitted fact by the plaintiff himself in the plaint that his father was not the owner of the shop premises bearing Door Nos. 72 and 73 and he was only a tenant and that the plaintiff started conducting business from the year 1957. It is also his case that only by virtue of the sale deed dated 20.8.1962 (Exhibit A-1), he became the owner of the premises bearing Door No. 72 and that only from 1.1.1963 onwards he became the owner of the shop premises bearing Door No. 73 by virtue of an oral Hibba, which he got from his brother-in-law Abdul Rasheed. As such, only from the year 1962-1963, he could at the most claim to be in possession and enjoyment of the suit property in his own capacity and even that fact he did not prove by reliable evidence. The said Abdul Rasheed is not a party to the proceedings. There is no evidence to show that the plaintiff in fact acquired by virtue of oral Hibba, the premises bearing Door No. 73. The said Abdul Rasheed was also not examined as a witness to prove the oral hibba. It is not known as to how anterior to 1962-1963, the plaintiffs father could be held to have acquired prescriptive title by his enjoyment ever since 1935 when admittedly, the plaintiff’s father was only a tenant. If the matter is viewed in this manner, the real facts would at once come to limelight. It is not known as to how anterior to 1962-1963, the plaintiffs father could be held to have acquired prescriptive title by his enjoyment ever since 1935 when admittedly, the plaintiff’s father was only a tenant. If the matter is viewed in this manner, the real facts would at once come to limelight. Assuming for a moment, that a tenant is in possession of a shop and he has been occupying the area in front of the shop for his convenience and enjoyment of doing business in the said shop; on his eviction he has to go away from the shop as well as the area of his occupation in front of the said shop premises. As such, the tenant cannot claim prescriptive title in front of the area before the shop. The trial Court utterly failed to consider all these glaring facts and simply decreed the suit, blindly countenancing the plea of prescription as falsely and erroneously put forth by the plaintiff. 10. It is an admitted fact by the plaintiff himself that the defendant’s official during the month of November 1992 asserted right over the suit property and called upon him to remove his encroachment. As such counting the period of 30 years from 1.1.1963 relating to Shop No. 73, 30 years time did not get elapsed. The plaintiffs simple utterness that he has in possession and enjoyment of the suit property would not in any way enure to his benefit to prove his prescriptive title. The evidence of P.W.2 is vague as vagueness could be. Barely, with an intention to support the case of P.W.1, he would state as though the plaintiff and his father had been in possession of the suit property ever since 1935. In fact, such sort of vague utterance are totally insufficient to hold prescriptive title in favour of the plaintiff. At this juncture, I would like to recollect the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court P.T. Munichlkkanna Reddy and Others v. Revamma and Others AIR 2007 SC 1753 : (2007) 6 SCC 69 : (2007) 4 MLJ 912 . An excerpt of it would run thus at p. 917 of MLJ: 11. At this juncture, I would like to recollect the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court P.T. Munichlkkanna Reddy and Others v. Revamma and Others AIR 2007 SC 1753 : (2007) 6 SCC 69 : (2007) 4 MLJ 912 . An excerpt of it would run thus at p. 917 of MLJ: 11. In that context it is relevant to refer to J.A. Pye (Oxford) Ltd. v. United Kingdom wherein the European Court of Human Rights while referring to the Court of Appeal judgment J.A. Pye (Oxford) Ltd. v. Graham made the following reference: “Lord Justice Keene took as his starting point that limitation periods were in principle not incompatible with the Convention and that the process whereby a person would be barred from enforcing rights by the passage of time was clearly acknowledged by the Convention (Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms). This position obtained, in his view, even though limitation periods both limited the right of access to the Courts and in some circumstances had the effect of depriving persons of property rights, whether real or personal, or of damages: there was thus nothing inherently incompatible as between the 1980 Act and Article 1 of the Protocol”. 12. This brings us to the issue of mental element in adverse possession cases – intention. ……………….. 14. Importantly, intention to possess cannot be substituted for intention to dispossess which is essential to prove adverse possession. The factum of possession in the instant case only goes on to objectively indicate intention to possess the land. As also has been noted by the High Court, if the appellant has purchased the land without the knowledge of earlier sale, then in that case the intention element is not of the variety and degree which is required for adverse possession to materialise. 18. As also has been noted by the High Court, if the appellant has purchased the land without the knowledge of earlier sale, then in that case the intention element is not of the variety and degree which is required for adverse possession to materialise. 18. On intention, Powell v. McFarfane is quite illustrative and categorical, holding in the following terms: “If the law is to attribute possession of land to a person who can establish no paper title to possession, he must be shown to have both factual possession and the requisite intention to posess (animus possidendi)” If his acts are open to more than one interpretation and he has not made In perfectly plain to the world at large by his actions or words that he has intended to exclude the owner as best he can, the Courts will treat him as not having had the requisite animus possidendi and consequently as not having dispossessed the owner. In my judgment it is consistent with principle as well as authority that a person who originally entered another’s land as a trespasser, but later seeks to show that he has dispossessed the owner, should be required to adduce compelling evidence that he had the requisite animus possidendi in any case where his use of the land was equivocal, in the sense that it did not necessarily, by itself, betoken an intention on his part to claim the land as his own and exclude the true owner. What is really meant, in my judgment, is that the animus possidendi involves the intention, in one’s own name and on one’s own behalf, to exclude the world at large, including the owner with the paper title if he be not himself the possessor, so far as is reasonably practicable and so far as the processes of the law will allow.” (emphasis supplied) 19. Thus, there must be intention to dispossess. And it needs to be open and hostile enough to bring the same to the knowledge and the plaintiff has an opportunity to object. After all adverse possession right is not a substantive right but a result of waiving (wilful) or omission (negligent or otherwise) of the right to defend or care for the integrity of property on the part of the paper-owner of the land. After all adverse possession right is not a substantive right but a result of waiving (wilful) or omission (negligent or otherwise) of the right to defend or care for the integrity of property on the part of the paper-owner of the land. Adverse possession statutes, like other statutes of limitation, rest on a public policy that does not promote litigation and aims at the repose of conditions that the parties have suffered to remain unquestioned long enough to indicate their acquiescence. 20. While dealing with the aspect of intention in the adverse possession law, it is important to understand its nuances from varied angles. 22. A peaceful, open and continuous possession as engraved in the maxim nec vi nec clam nec precario has been noticed by this Court in Karnataka Board of Wakf v. Government of India in the following terms: “Physical fact of exclusive possession and the animus possidendi to hold as owner in exclusion to the actual owner are the most important factors that are to be accounted in cases of this nature. Plea of adverse possession is not a pure question of law but a blended one of fact and law. Therefore, a person who claims adverse possession should show: (a) on what date he came into possession, (b) what was the nature of his possession, (c) whether the factum of possession was known to the other party, (d) how long his possession has continued, and (e) his possession was open and undisturbed. A person pleading adverse possession has no equities in his favour. Since he is trying to defeat the rights of the true owner, it is for him to clearly plead and establish all facts necessary to establish his adverse possession:” 23. It is important to appreciate the question of intention as it would have appeared to the paper-owner. The issue is that intention of the adverse user gets communicated to the paper-owner of the property. This is where the law gives importance to hostility and openness as pertinent qualities of manner of possession. It follows that the possession of the adverse possessor must be hostile enough to give rise to a reasonable notice and opportunity to the paper-owner. 31. Inquiry into the starting point of adverse possession i.e. dates as to when the paper-owner got dispossessed is an important aspect to be considered. It follows that the possession of the adverse possessor must be hostile enough to give rise to a reasonable notice and opportunity to the paper-owner. 31. Inquiry into the starting point of adverse possession i.e. dates as to when the paper-owner got dispossessed is an important aspect to be considered. In the instant case the starting point of adverse possession and other facts such as the manner in which the possession operationalised, nature of possession: whether open, continuous, uninterrupted or hostile possession, have not been disclosed. An observation has been made in this regard in S.M. Karim v. Bibi Sakina: “Adverse possession must be adequate in continuity, in publicity and extent and a plea is required at the least to show when possession becomes adverse so that the starting point of limitation against the party affected can be found. There is no evidence here when possession became adverse, if it at all did, and a mere suggestion in the relief clause that there was an uninterrupted possession for ‘several 12 years’ or that the plaintiff had acquired ‘an absolute title’ was not enough to raise such a plea. Long possession is not necessarily adverse possession and the prayer clause is not a substitute for a plea.” (emphasis supplied) 32. Also mention as to the real owner of the property must be specifically made in an adverse possession claim. 33. In Karnataka Board of Wakf v. Government of India it is stated: 12) “A plaintiff, filing a title suit should be very dear about the origin of title over the property. He must specifically plead it. In P. Periasami v. P. Periathambi this Court ruled that: ‘Whenever the plea of adverse possession is projected, inherent in the plea is that someone else was the owner of the property.’ The pleas on title and adverse possession are mutually inconsistent and the latter does not begin to operate until the former is renounced. Dealing with Mohan Lal v. Mirza Abdul Gaffar that is similar to the case in hand, this Court held: ‘4.As regards the first plea, it is inconsistent with the second plea. Dealing with Mohan Lal v. Mirza Abdul Gaffar that is similar to the case in hand, this Court held: ‘4.As regards the first plea, it is inconsistent with the second plea. Having come into possession under the agreement, he must disclaim his right thereunder and plead and prove assertion of his independent hostile adverse possession to the knowledge of the transferor or his successor in title or interest and that the latter had acquiesced to his illegal possession during the entire period of 12 years i.e. up to completing the period his title by prescription nec vi nec clam nec precario. Since the appellants claim is founded on Section 53-A, it goes without saying that he admits by implication that he came into possession of land lawfully under the agreement and continued to remain in possession till date of the suit. Thereby the plea of adverse possession is not available to the appellant” (emphasis supplied) As such, a mere perusal of the aforesaid decision would leave no doubt in the mind of the Court that so far this case is concerned, the trial Court miserably failed to understand the concept of prescriptive title and the evidence required to prove it. P.W.1 himself through cross examination would state thus: From the above it is clear that the suit property is not even an enclosed place. The Commissioner’s report and sketch also would not reveal that the suit property was enclosed by any permanent structure. What are all that could be seen from the evidence, is that there was a cemented platform in the suit property, with an asbestos roof over it. 11. In this context, I would like to refer to the maxim “nec vi nec clam nec precario (not by violence, stealth or permission). (In order that a person may acquire title to land by adverse possession, his possession has to be characterised by these attributes)” Relating to this maxim, various decisions emerged as under: (i) Guruvammal and Another v. Subbiah Naicker and Others 1999 (3) CTC 650 (ii) Subramanian and 2 Others v. Karuppayee Ammal and 15 Others 1998 (1) CTC 79 A perusal of these decisions would clearly highlight that in a case of this nature, clinching evidence is required to prove prescription but absolutely there is no evidence much less reliable evidence to prove prescription in this case. 12. 12. Even though, the plaintiff would claim that he paid tax for the suit property, nonetheless, none of the Exhibits A-1 to A-7 the tax receipts would evidence the same. In fact, those exhibits would refer to the shop premises bearing Door Nos. 72 and 73 and nothing more. In such a case, it is not known as to how the trial Court could accept the case of the plaintiff that he paid taxes for the suit property also. The plaintiffs payment of tax for the shop premises bearing Door Nos. 72 and 73 Municipality would not tantamount to paying tax for the suit property, which is part and parcel of the road margin belonging to the Government. The trial Court was not justified in simply relying upon the statement of P.W.1, that such encroachment was not a source of menace to the public. It is the case of the defendant that they want to widen the road for public welfare and in such a case, it is not for the plaintiff to dish out a plea that his encroachment is not a source of hindrance to the public. Furthermore, the trial Court was not justified in simply holding that because there are other encroachers adjacent to the plaintiffs encroachment, mere removal of the plaintiff encroachment will not in any way enure to the benefit of the public. Such an approach, in my opinion, is totally perverse on the part of the trial Court. It is for the Government to take steps to remove other encroachments also and now the case is relating to the plaintiffs encroachment only. All the suit property has formed a road margin, which cannot be the subject matter of prescription by any private individual. 13. In this factual matrix, I would hold that the trial Court neither appreciated the facts in the proper perspective nor applied the law properly and it failed to hold that the plaintiff had not acquired prescriptive title over the suit property. 14. In the result, the judgment and decree of the trial Court is set aside and the appeal is allowed. However, there shall be no order as to costs. Appeal allowed.