JUDGMENT:- By this appeal, the appellant takes exception to the judgment and order dated 21.08.2006 passed by the Additional Session Judge, South Goa, Margao in Criminal Appeal No.2512006 by which the judgment and order dated 09.06.2006 passed by the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Vasco in Criminal Case No.821/0A/NIA/2005 has been set aside. The learned Magistrate convicted the respondent No.1 for the offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act ("The Act" for short) and sentenced him to undergo imprisonment for a period of 3 months and to pay compensation of Rs.5,50,000/- to the complainant/appellant and in default to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of 3 months. The appellant is the complainant and the respondent No.1 is the accused in the case aikar Vs. Dattaram Chandaikar before the learned Magistrate. The parties shall, hereinafter, be referred to as per their status before the learned Magistrate. 2. In nutshell, the case of the complainant is as under: The accused issued cheque dated 26.05.2005 drawn on State Bank of India, Vasco branch for an amount of Rs.5 Lacs towards the payment of his share received by the accused by way of sale of the property. The complainant presented the said cheque for payment, but the same was returned by the Bank with a memo with remark 'payment stopped by the drawer' and the same was intimated to the complainant on 26.05.2005. Thereafter, the complainant serit a demand notice dated 21.06.2005 to the accused demanding the payment of said cheque within 15 days. The said notice was received by the accused on 21.06.2005, but the accused failed to pay the amount. The accused sent reply dated 30.06.2005 denying that the said cheque was issued towards the payment of the share of the complainant. 3. The complainant examined two witnesses including himself as P.W.l and Advocate Rajkumar Naik as P.W.2. The accused examined himself in defence. 4. The learned Magistrate did not accept the defence of the accused since the accused had admitted his signature on the cheque and held that the accused has not rebutted the presumption under Section 139 of the Act. 3. The complainant examined two witnesses including himself as P.W.l and Advocate Rajkumar Naik as P.W.2. The accused examined himself in defence. 4. The learned Magistrate did not accept the defence of the accused since the accused had admitted his signature on the cheque and held that the accused has not rebutted the presumption under Section 139 of the Act. The learned Magistrate did not accept the defence of the accused that he had issued a blank cheque in favour of the complainant for carrying out development in the property on the ground that it was a case of the accused " himself that he had done major improvements in the property and was looking after the same and as such the possibility of the accused issuing a blank cheque to the complainant, was ruled out. The learned Magistrate also relied upon the fact that during the period from" 07.08.2004 till 29.01.2005, the amount in the bank account of the accused, was in the range of Rs.l,000/- to 2,000/- and on 24.05.2005, the accused had deposited Rs.5 Lacs in his account and, therefore, the question of the accused giving a blank cheque to the complainant in order to carry out development in the property, did not arise. The learned Magistrate held that the defence of the accused was false and concocted. The learned Magistrate also relied upon the fact that this defence was not taken in the reply dated 30.06.2005 sent on behalf of the accused to the notice sent by the complainant before filing of the case. The learned Magistrate also held that the deposit of Rs.5 Lacs on 24.05.2005 led credence to the case set up by the complainant that the cheque for Rs.5 Lacs was given towards the share of the complainant in the property which was sold. The learned Magistrate, therefore, held that the complainant had proved that the cheque was issued to discharge legally enforceable liability. Consequently, the learned Magistrate convicted and sentenced the accused as above. 5. The learned Additional Session Judge did not accept the defence version that the accused had issued a blank cheque to the complainant for carrying out development in [he property. However, the learned Judge held that the exact shares of the parties, were not mentioned in the sale deed and the complainant had come out with the story that the cheque. The learned Additional Session Judge did not accept the defence version that the accused had issued a blank cheque to the complainant for carrying out development in [he property. However, the learned Judge held that the exact shares of the parties, were not mentioned in the sale deed and the complainant had come out with the story that the cheque. was issued towards his share for the first time in his cross-examination. The learned Judge also held that the agreement which was alleged by the complainant, pursuant to which the complainant claimed that the cheque was issued, was opposed to public policy, since it was with a view to avoid tax and therefore, the said agreement was void under Section 23 of the Contract Act. The learned Judge, therefore, held that there was no legally enforceable debt and the accused had rebutted the presumption under Section 139 of the Act. Consequently, the learned Judge acquitted the accused of the offence under Section 138 of the Act. 6. Mr. Lotlikai, learned Senior Counsel/appearing for the appellant/complainant submitted that both the Courts below having not accepted the defence version that the cheque was issued by the accused to the complainant for carrying out development, the presumption under Section 139 of The Act, operates and the Appellate Court was not entitled to make out a case which is not made out by the accused. According to learned Counsel, the findings given by, the learned Magistrate, are perfectly justified and, therefore, the Lower Appellate Court ought not to have interfered with the judgment and order of conviction and sentence, which was passed after considering the entire evidence led by the parties. Mr. Lotlikar submitted that the fact that the accused did not mention in his reply dated 30.06.2005 that the cheque was issued for carrying out development in the property, is an important factor which goes against the accused in as much as this defence has come up for the first time in the cross-examination of the complainant. Mr. Lotlikar pointed out that even in the said reply, it is not the case of the accused that a blank cheque was given to the complainant, but the accused admitted issuance of cheque for Rs.5 Lacs while denying that it was given towards the share of the complainant. Mr. Lotlikar pointed out that even in the said reply, it is not the case of the accused that a blank cheque was given to the complainant, but the accused admitted issuance of cheque for Rs.5 Lacs while denying that it was given towards the share of the complainant. According to the learned Counsel, the agreement pursuant to which the cheque was given, cannot be termed as illegal. Moreover, schedule to the sale deed, does not mention about the shares. It is the case of the complainant that the transaction was entered into at the instance of the accused and as such there was no question of the complainant avoiding to pay tax. According to the learned Counsel, the reasons given by the learned Magistrate for convicting the accused, cannot be faulted. Therefore, the impugned judgment ancle order passed by the Additional Session Judge, is liable to be set aside and the judgment and order passed by the learned Magistrate, is liable to be maintained. 7. Per contra, Mr. Sardessai, learned Counsel appearing for the respondent No.1 accused submitted that no interference is called for by this Court with the impugned judgment and order in as much as the Lower Appellate Court has correctly appreciated the legal and factual position and has acquitted the accused. He further urged that neither in the complaint nor in examination-in-chief or by putting the suggestion to the accused, the complainant has suggested that his share was 50% in the property which was sold. Moreover, the sale deed dated 30.06.1987 by which the father of the complainant and the accused purchased the property, has not been produced on record to demonstrate that the share of the complainant, was 50%. Moreover, the sale deed produced on record discloses that Manisha M. Chandaikar, the sister of the complainant has been shown as confirming party and there is absolutely no explanation as to why she was made a confirming party. The learned Counsel submitted that since the complainant had chosen not to produce original sale deed dated 30.06.1987 to prove that his share was 50%, adverse inference has to be drawn against the complainant. In support of this submission, the learned Counsel placed reliance upon the judgment of Apex Court in Kundanlal Rallaram Vs. Custodian. Evacuee Property reported in AIR 1961 SC 1316 and M.S. Narayana Menon alias Mani Vs. In support of this submission, the learned Counsel placed reliance upon the judgment of Apex Court in Kundanlal Rallaram Vs. Custodian. Evacuee Property reported in AIR 1961 SC 1316 and M.S. Narayana Menon alias Mani Vs. State of Kerala reported in (2006)6 SCC 39 : [2006(5) ALL MR (S.C.) 33]. The learned Counsel further urged that since the complainant had come up with a specific case that the cheque was issued towards the share of the complainant in the property sold, the complainant was bound to prove the same and since he has failed to prove the same, the learned Additional Session Judge was justified in holding that presumption under Section 139 of The Act, stood rebutted. In support of this submission, the learned Counsel relied upon the judgment in the case of K.P.O. Moideenkutty Hajee Vs. Pappu Manjooram and another reported in (1996)8 SCC 586 . The learned Counsel further urged that the case set up by the complainant is inadmissible in evidence in view of bar under Sections 91 and 92 of the Indian Evidence Act. According to the learned Counsel, since the sale deed mentions that an amount of Rs.18 Lacs as mentioned in the schedule II of the sale deed, has been paid to the vendors and since Rs.4 Lacs were paid to the complainant, the complainant cannot contend that he has half share in the property for which he was entitled to receive Rs.9 Lacs and therefore, the cheque was towards his share in the property. According to the learned Counsel, the case set up by the complainant, is inconsistent with the sale deed and, therefore, the evidence led by the complainant that the cheque was issued towards his share, is not admissible in evidence. In support of this submission, the learned Counsel relied upon the judgment in the cases of Mula Sahakari Sakhar Karkhana Ltd. Vs. State Bank of India and another reported in (2005)4 ALL MR 875 and Bhandari Construction Company Vs. Narayan Gopal Upadhye reported in (2007)3 SCC 163 . Mr. Sardessai further submitted that the alleged agreement pursuant to which the complainant claims that the accused issued the cheque, is opposed to public policy and, therefore, void under Section 23 of the Contract Act. Narayan Gopal Upadhye reported in (2007)3 SCC 163 . Mr. Sardessai further submitted that the alleged agreement pursuant to which the complainant claims that the accused issued the cheque, is opposed to public policy and, therefore, void under Section 23 of the Contract Act. In support of this submission, the learned Counsel relied upon Section 4 of the Income, Tax Act, which is charging section and placed reliance upon the judgment in the case of Commissioner of Income Tax Vs. Balubhai Nanubhai (Hut) reported in 1996(220) Gujarat Income Tax Reports 334 and Chowgule and Company Ltd. V s. Commissioner of Income Tax and others reported in 1992(195) Bombay Income Tax Reports 810. The learned Counsel further submitted that the parties are not entitled to contract themselves out of the Statute and placed reliance upon the judgment of Allahabad High Court in Madan Mohan Ramchander Rao reported in AIR 1935 AU. 619. According to the learned Counsel, the object of agreement pursuant to which the cheque was issued, was unlawful and was opposed to public policy and, therefore, void. The learned Counsel has placed Reliance Upon the, judgment of the Apex Court in Ratanchand Hirachand, is, Askar Nawraz Jungment reported in (1991)3 (SCC 67 ; Medowell and Company Ltd. Vs Commercial Tax Officer report in 1985(154) Income Tax Reports SC 148 and Canbank Finance Services Ltd. Vs. Custodian and Others reported, in (2004)8 SCC355: [2004(5) ALL MR (S.C.), 547]. 8. The learned Counsel further placed reliance on the judgment in the case of Krishna Janardhan Bhat Vs. Dattatray Hegde reported in (2008)4 SCC 54 : [2008 ALL MR(Cri) 1164 (S.C.)Jin which the Apex Court had held that the Criminal Court must be on the guard to see that merely on the application of presumption as contemplated under Section 139 of The Act, the same may lead to injustice or mistaken conviction. Lastly, Mr. Sardessai submitted that the view taken by the Lower Appellate Court, is a possible view and in view of the settled principle that if two views are possible, no interference is warranted in appeal against the acquittal. The learned Counsel placed reliance on the judgment of the Apex Court Kamla S. V s. Vidhyadharan M.J. and another reported in 2007(5) SCC 264 . 9. In rejoinder, Mr. The learned Counsel placed reliance on the judgment of the Apex Court Kamla S. V s. Vidhyadharan M.J. and another reported in 2007(5) SCC 264 . 9. In rejoinder, Mr. Lotlikar, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the complainant/appellant submitted that when the cheque was issued, the burden is on the accused to prove that there was no legally enforceable debt and even if, the complainant does not prove his case, the same is irrelevant. In support of this submission, the learned Counsel relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Bharat Barrel and Drum Manufacturing Company Vs. Amin Chand Payrelalreported in AIR 1999 SC 2008 : [1999(2) ALL MR 269 (S.C.)] and K. Bhaskaran Vs. Sankaran Vaidhyan Balan and another reported in AIR 1999 SC 3762 : [1999(4) ALL MR 452 (S.C.)]. The learned Counsel further submitted that Sections 91 and 92 of the Evidence Act, are not attracted since the agreement pursuant to which the cheque was issued, is not inconsistent\with the sale deed nor is there any material on record to show that by the said agreement either party actually evaded the tax. The learned Counsel further submitted that the agreement cannot be said to be either opposed to public policy or illegal since no provision of Income Tax Act, is circumvented by the said agreement The learned Counsel, therefore, submitted that the impugned judgment and order is liable to be set aside. 10. I have considered the submissions made by the learned Counsel' for the parties and perused the record and the judgments relied upon. 11. In view of the rival submissions, following points arise for determination in the present appeal: i) Whether the cheque issued by the accused to the complainant, was towards legally enforceable debt? ii) Whether the agreement pursuant to which the cheque was issued, is opposed to public policy and as such, is illegal? iii) Whether the case set up by the complainant, is inadmissible in terms of Sections 91 and 92 of the Evidence Act? 12. There is no dispute that the sale deed dated 20.05.2005 was executed by the complainant and the accused along with Mrs. Shobhawati, the wife of the accused in respect of the properties bearing Survey NOS. 175/1 and 181/2 situated at Pernem and sale deed was executed before Sub-Registrar, Pernem on 23.05.2005. 12. There is no dispute that the sale deed dated 20.05.2005 was executed by the complainant and the accused along with Mrs. Shobhawati, the wife of the accused in respect of the properties bearing Survey NOS. 175/1 and 181/2 situated at Pernem and sale deed was executed before Sub-Registrar, Pernem on 23.05.2005. The said properties were sold to one Subhash Chavda and in the sale deed, Mrs. Manisha Chandaikar has been shown as confirming party. The sale deed discloses that an amount of Rs.14 Lacs was paid to the accused. In the sale deed, there is no mention about the shares of the vendors or whether the confirming party had any share in the property. It is the case of the complainant that the accused represented to him that instead of paying Rs.9 lacs to the complainant at the time of execution of sale deed, if an amount of Rs.14 Lacs is paid to the accused, the accused being a senior citizen, would be benefited. In cross-examination, the complainant stated that the sale deed as on the date, was valid and on the date of execution of sale deed, he was aware that the amount of Rs.9 Lacs to which he was entitled, was not mentioned in the sale deed. He added that the accused had promised to give him Rs.5 Lacs and also promised to execute some document and specified why he was giving the cheque of Rs.5 Lacs and hence, he signed the deed. The complainant denied the suggestion that a blank undated cheque was deposited with him which was to be used by him for withdrawal of money to carry out developments in the property. He also admitted that in terms of the sale deed Exh.21, the accused was not even liable to pay any amount to him, but he voluntarily stated that as per oral agreement between him and the accused, he, was to get his share of Rs.9 Lacs and on the date of the execution of the sale deed, Rs.4 Lacs were paid to him and towards balance amount of Rs.5 Lacs, the cheque was issued by the accused. 13. The accused in his examination in chief, stated that he had major share in the property and one blank cheque was given to the complainant somewhere in the month of January. 13. The accused in his examination in chief, stated that he had major share in the property and one blank cheque was given to the complainant somewhere in the month of January. He further stated that when they purchased the property jointly, there was no other person entitled for any share and the complainant was not entitled for the half share in the said property. In cross-examination, the accused stated that he had no proof that he had done improvements in the property by spending huge amount. He also denied the suggestion that he did not have major share in the said property. He also denied that he ha9 received Rs.14 Lacs and he had agreed to pay the complainant Rs.5 Lacs towards his share in the property. He also denied the suggestion that he had informed the complainant that in order to save the tax he had, changed the mode of payment being a senior citizen and no tax can be charged upon receiving the payment in his name. 14. The first question which arises for consideration is, whether the cheque was issued by the accused to the complainant towards his share in the property, which was sold. Upon scrutiny of the evidence led by the complainant and the accused in the light of the defence taken by the accused, I am of the opinion that the complainant has been able to establish that the cheque was issued by the accused to the complainant towards his share in the property which was sold by sale deed dated 20.5.2005 which was executed before Sub-Registrar, Pemem on 23.05.2005. There are two clinching circumstances which lead credence to the case set up by the complainant. Firstly, in the reply dated, 30.06.2005 sent by the accused to the notice issued by the complainant before filing of the case, the accused only denied that the cheque was issued towards his share. In the notice, the accused neither denied the execution of the agreement nor stated that a blank cheque was issued to the complainant for carrying out development in the property. Paras 2 and 3 of the reply sent by Advocate D.P. Agni on behalf of the accused, are relevant. They read thus: "2. In the notice, the accused neither denied the execution of the agreement nor stated that a blank cheque was issued to the complainant for carrying out development in the property. Paras 2 and 3 of the reply sent by Advocate D.P. Agni on behalf of the accused, are relevant. They read thus: "2. With reference to para 1 of your notice, my client specifically denies that the said cheque of Rs.5,00,000/- issued to your client was towards the payment of his share of the sale of property, received by my client, as alleged. My client specifically denies that it is legally enforceable debt and liability to your client, as alleged. 3. With reference to para 2 of your notice, my client has instructed me to state that your client was not entitled to deposit the said cheque of Rs.5,00,000/- issued by my client to your client for realisation on 26/5/2005 or at any time. However, having done so, without the consent of my client, he had to stop the payment of the said cheque. My client has instructed me to state that the said cheque for Rs.5,00,000/- was not for any consideration to your client." Thus, the accused in reply to the notice sent by the complainant neither stated that a blank cheque was issued to the complainant nor stated that the same was issued for carrying out developments in the property. It is for the first time, in the cross-examination of the complainant and thereafter in his own evidence that the accused came out with a story that he had issued a blank cheque to the complainant. It is pertinent to note that not only the learned Magistrate but even the learned Additional Session Judge has not accepted the defence taken by the accused. This fact assumes more importance because the accused has to state as to why he had issued the cheque to the complainant. Therefore, the defence taken by the accused in the course of cross-examination of the complainant and during his evidence, appears to be an afterthought. I am unable to accept the submission of Mr. Sardessai that the complainant was bound to state in the complaint and in his examination-in-chief the details about his share in the property and why the cheque of Rs.5 Lacs, was issued in his favour by the accused. I am unable to accept the submission of Mr. Sardessai that the complainant was bound to state in the complaint and in his examination-in-chief the details about his share in the property and why the cheque of Rs.5 Lacs, was issued in his favour by the accused. In terms of Sections 118 and 139 of the Act, the presumption operates and the accused is expected to rebut the presumption more particularly under Section 139 of The Act either by cross-examination of the complainant and his witnesses or by leading defence evidence. There is an initial presumption that the cheque was issued for consideration, therefore, mere fact that the complainant did not specify his share in the property either in the complaint or in his examination-in-chief, would not be a ground to disbelieve the complainant. There is one more clinching circumstance against the accused. Perusal of statement of account Exh.33 of the accused of the State Bank of India, discloses that on 24.5.2005, the accused deposited an amount of Rs.5 Lacs and during the period 07.08.2004 till 29.01.2005 the balance in his account, was ranging between 1,000/- to 2,000/-. This is a clinching circumstance, which goes against the accused and in the absence of any explanation from the accused as to why he deposited an amount of Rs. 5 Lacs in his account on 24.05.2005, leads corroboration to the version of the complainant that at the time of the execution of the sale deed on 23.05.2005, the accused had agreed to pay Rs.5 Lacs to the complainant towards his share and had issued the cheque in question. 15. I am of the considered opinion that the complainant has been able to establish that the cheque was issued in discharge of legally enforceable liability and the accused has not been able to discharge the presumption under Section 139 of the Act. In so far as other grounds taken by the accused in support of his defence are concerned, I shall deal with the same one by one later, but in my considered opinion, none of the grounds urged on behalf of the accused has any merit. 16. In so far as the submission made by Mr. In so far as other grounds taken by the accused in support of his defence are concerned, I shall deal with the same one by one later, but in my considered opinion, none of the grounds urged on behalf of the accused has any merit. 16. In so far as the submission made by Mr. Sardessai that since the complainant has not stated his share in the complaint or in the evidence and therefore, the case set up by the complainant, cannot be accepted is concerned, I find no merit in the said submission. It is the case of the complainant in the cross-examination that the cheque was issued towards his share in the property since the entire amount was not paid to him. This clearly means that he was entitled to Rs.9 Lacs towards his share in the property. Consideration mentioned in the sale deed, is Rs.18 Lacs and therefore, the necessary sequitur is that the share of the complainant in the property sold, is 50%. Merely because the complainant did not state that he was entitled to 50% share in the property or for that matter Manisha Chandaikar was the confirming party in the deed, the version of the complainant that the cheque was given towards his share, cannot be brushed aside more particularly having regard to the clinching circumstances which have been mentioned above. In so far as the argument regarding non-production of the sale deed is concerned, there is absolutely no evidence on record that the original sale deed dated 30.06.1987 executed in the year 1987, was or is in the possession of the complainant. According to the accused, by the said sale deed, the accused and the father of the complainant had purchased the property and it appears that the father executed sale deed since the complainant was a minor. I find it difficult to accept the argument of Mr. Sardessai that adverse inference has to be drawn against the complainant for non-production of the said sale deed, which has not been proved to be in possession of the complainant. Moreover, nothing prevented the accused from producing the said sale deed and proving that the share of the complainant was not 50%. Therefore, the judgments in the cases of Kundanlal Rallaram, M.S. Narayan Menon and K.P.O. Moideenkutty Hajee, do not advance the case of the accused. 17. Moreover, nothing prevented the accused from producing the said sale deed and proving that the share of the complainant was not 50%. Therefore, the judgments in the cases of Kundanlal Rallaram, M.S. Narayan Menon and K.P.O. Moideenkutty Hajee, do not advance the case of the accused. 17. By placing reliance upon the judgment in K.P.O. Moideenkutty Hajees case (supra), Mr. Sardessai submitted that since the complainant pleaded different consideration, the presumption under Section 139 of The Act, was not available. I have already held that the complainant was not bound to plead in the complaint or in examination-in-chief regarding his share in the property and therefore, it cannot be said that the complainant has pleaded different consideration than the one mentioned in the complaint. 18. The next argument of Mr. Sardessai, is that the evidence led by the complainant that the cheque was issued, is barred under Sections 91 and 92 of the Indian Evidence Act. It is pertinent to note that in the sale deed, the shares of the parties have not been mentioned. What is mentioned therein is that out of Rs.18 Lacs, Rs.14 Lacs have been paid to the accused and Rs.4 Lacs were paid to the complainant. This is clear from the Schedule II of the sale deed. Heavy reliance has been placed by Mr. Sardessai on the following statement made by the complainant in his cross-examination. "It is true that as per the sale deed Exh.21, the accused is not due and liable to pay me any amount." In my opinion, the said statement does not advance the case of the accused. What was stated in the sale deed, was clear and unambiguous and the sale deed did not mention that any amount was due to the complainant. Therefore, this statement in cross-examination, would not help the accused. In so far as bar under Sections 91 and 92 of the Evidence Act is concerned, I am of the opinion that the same has no merit. As stated above, in the sale deed, no respective shares of the vendors, have been mentioned and only amounts paid to vendors, have been mentioned. If the share of the complainant was to be mentioned in the sale deed then it would have been different matter. In such an eventuality, bar under Sections 91 and 92 of the Evidence Act, would have been attracted. If the share of the complainant was to be mentioned in the sale deed then it would have been different matter. In such an eventuality, bar under Sections 91 and 92 of the Evidence Act, would have been attracted. The case set up by the complainant that the cheque was issued towards his share in the property, cannot be said to be inconsistent with the terms mentioned in the sale deed. Therefore, the evidence led by the complainant, cannot be said to be in conflict with the terms of the sale deed. The judgments in the cases of Mula Sahakari Sakhar Karkhana Ltd. and Bhandari Construction Company (supra), therefore, are not applicable in the present case. The complainant by leading evidence that the cheque was issued towards his share, was not trying to contradict the terms of the sale deed which did not specify respective shares of the vendors. 19. The next argument advanced by Mr. Sardessai is that the alleged agreement pursuant to which the cheque was alleged 'to have been issued by the accused, is opposed to public policy since the object of the agreement was to avoid or evade the tax. To buttress this argument, reliance has been placed on the suggestion put by the complainant to the accused in his cross-examination which reads thus: "It is not true to suggest that I had informed the Complainant that in order to save tax I had changed the mode of payment being a senior citizen that no tax will be charged upon receiving the payment in my name." The suggestion put, only establishes that it was the case of the complainant that mode of payment was changed at the instance of the accused, who had represented to the complainant that by the proposed mode of payment, no tax would be charged upon receiving the payment in his name being a senior citizen. Firstly, it cannot be said that the proposal made by the accused which according to the complainant, was accepted, would factually result in avoidance or evasion of tax or for that matter, the same was opposed to any public policy. Secondly, the amount was paid to the complainant by cheque and not in cash and as such the question of avoiding or evading tax, would not arise. Secondly, the amount was paid to the complainant by cheque and not in cash and as such the question of avoiding or evading tax, would not arise. Thirdly, the suggestion regarding the change of mode of payment, was made by the accused himself to which the complainant claims to have agreed. In this factual background, I am unable to accept the submission of Mr. Sardessai that the alleged agreement pursuant to which the cheque was issued, was opposed to public policy and, therefore, the complainant was not entitled to succeed. The judgments in the cases of Commissioner of Income Tax Vs. Balubhai Nanubhai reported in 1996(220) Gujarat 334; Chowgule and Company Ltd. Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax reported in 1992(195) Bombay 810 and Madan Mohan's case (supra), do not advance the case of the accused. Similarly, the judgments in Ratanchand Hirachand and Mcdowell and Company Ltd. (supra) upon which reliance has been placed on behalf of the accused, do not advance the case of the accused. I find it difficult to hold that the agreement pursuant to which the complainant claims that the cheque was issued, was opposed to public policy or was entered into with an object of avoiding or evading tax. The evidence on record only establishes that the accused represented to the complainant that he would be benefited, if the amount of Rs.14 Lacs, was paid to him instead of Rs.9 Lacs and the complainant agreed to sign the sale deed only after the accused gave him the cheque of Rs.5 Lacs. The judgment in the case of Canbank Finance Services Ltd. [2004(5) ALL MR (S.C.) 547] (supra), is not applicable since in the said judgment, it has been held that if a contract is partly lawful and partly unlawful and both parties are severable, the lawful part can be given effect. 20. In Krishna J anardan Bhat Vs. Dattatraya Hegde reported in 2008(4) SCC 54 : [2008 ALL MR (Cri) 1164 (S.C.)], the Apex Court has held that the Court must be on guard to see that on the application of presumption as contemplated under Section 139 of the Act, the same may lead to injustice or mistaken conviction. 20. In Krishna J anardan Bhat Vs. Dattatraya Hegde reported in 2008(4) SCC 54 : [2008 ALL MR (Cri) 1164 (S.C.)], the Apex Court has held that the Court must be on guard to see that on the application of presumption as contemplated under Section 139 of the Act, the same may lead to injustice or mistaken conviction. In the present case, the accused has not only been able to rebut the presumption under Section 139 of the Act, but also the complainant has not led cogent evidence to prove that the cheque was issued towards the discharge of legally enforceable liability. 21. Mr. Sardessai is right in submitting that if two views are possible, the Appellate Court should not reverse the order of acquittal. The Appellate Court in a catena of decision, has held so. However, in the present case, upon appreciation of the evidence, oral and documentary, led by the complainant and the accused, the accused has not been able to rebut the presumption under Section 139 of the Act, but on the contrary the complainant has proved by cogent evidence, which has been discussed above, that the cheque was issued towards his share in the property. 22. For the reasons afore said, I find that the Lower Appellate Court has not exercised jurisdiction in accordance with settled principles and has not properly appreciated the evidence. The findings recorded by the learned Magistrate while convicting the accused, are well founded and the Lower Appellate Court has without any justification, reversed the findings given by the learned Magistrate. 23. The appeal is, therefore, liable to be allowed and is, accordingly allowed. Consequently, the judgment and order dated 21.08.2006 passed by the Additional Session Judge, Margao in Criminal Appeal No.25/2006, is quashed and the judgment and order dated 09/06/2006 passed by the learned Magistrate in Criminal Case No.821/0A/NIA/2005, is maintained. The bail bond executed by the respondent No.1 stands discharged. 24. At this stage, Mr. Rodriguese appearing on behalf of the respondent No.1, who is present in the Court, seeks time of four weeks to surrender since the respondent No.1 desires to approach the Apex Court against the judgment passed today. 25. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case and since the acquittal recorded by the lower appellate Court is being reversed, I deem it appropriate to grant time of four weeks to surrender. 25. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case and since the acquittal recorded by the lower appellate Court is being reversed, I deem it appropriate to grant time of four weeks to surrender. The respondent No.1 shall appear before the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Vasco on 16/0112009 at 10.00 a.m. In case no orders are obtained from the Apex Court before the expiry of four weeks and the accused does not appear as directed, the learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Vasco shall take steps to take the respondent No.1 into custody for serving sentence imposed on him. Appeal allowed.