JUDGMENT Mahesh Grover, J. 1. The claimants have filed the instant appeal against award dated 30.9.1989 passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Faridabad (for short, `the Tribunal') purportedly on the basis of the compromise arrived at between the parties in M.V.A. Case No.6 of 18.1.1989. 2. On 30.9.1989, a joint statement of the counsel for the claimants-appellants and Shri P.K.Banerjee, Deputy Manager, M/S Oriental Insurance Company with Shri P.P.Gosain, Advocate was got recorded before the Tribunal, which is extracted below:- “We have arrived at an amicable settlement in this case through the efforts of Lok Adalat. In terms of that settlement, a total sum of Rs.60,000/-be awarded as compensation in favour of claimants to be shared by them equally and against M/S Oriental Insurance Company, respondent. A period of one month be allowed to Insurance Company to make payment of that amount, failing which the claimants shall also be entitled to recover interest at the rate of 12% per annum from the date of claim petition till realization.” Pursuant to the above reproduced statement, the impugned award came into existence. The same is also reproduced hereunder:- “In terms of compromise arrived at between the parties, a total sum of Rs.60,000/- is awarded as compensation in favour of claimants, to be shared by them equally and against M/S Oriental Insurance Company-respondent. A period of one month is allowed to the Insurance Company to make payment, failing which the claimants shall also be entitled to recover interest at the rate of 12% per annum from the date of petition till realization. No orders as to costs.” 3. On 23.9.2008, C.M.No.19085-CII of 2008 was moved under the provisions of Order 22 Rule 3 read with Section 151 of the C.P.C. for impleading the applicants as legal representatives of Smt.Pushpa Rani, one of the appellants, who has been stated to have expired on 11.6.2007. It is allowed subject to all just exceptions. 4.
No orders as to costs.” 3. On 23.9.2008, C.M.No.19085-CII of 2008 was moved under the provisions of Order 22 Rule 3 read with Section 151 of the C.P.C. for impleading the applicants as legal representatives of Smt.Pushpa Rani, one of the appellants, who has been stated to have expired on 11.6.2007. It is allowed subject to all just exceptions. 4. The primary contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellants is that the counsel for the claimants before the Tribunal could not have given a statement and in any eventuality, the same being contrary to the provisions of Order 23 Rule 3 of the C.P.C. could not have been given effect to as the compromise was not reduced into writing under the signatures of the parties and the same has resulted in the denial of fair and just compensation to them to which they were entitled to. In support of his contention, he placed reliance on Gurpreet Singh Versus Chatur Bhuj Goel, AIR 1988 S.C. 400; Sushma Lata Versus Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Jaipur and others 1989 A.C.J. 352 (Raj.); United India Fire & Genl.Ins.Co.Ltd. Versus Pallapu Sridevi and others, 1993 A.C.J. 575 (A.P.); Nagappa Versus Gurudayal Singh and others; 2003 A.C.J. 12 (S.C.); and Raju Adityan Versus Oriental Insurance Co.Ltd. and another; 1998 A.C.J. 488 (Karnakaka). 5. To the contrary, learned counsel for the respondents contended that once the Lok Adalat had got settled the matter, no appeal was maintainable against the award passed on the basis of such settlement and that the parties having accepted the terms of the compromise could not resile therefrom. 6. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have perused the record. 7. The impugned award and the proceedings leading to it even if accepted, shows that it is not an award passed by the Lok Adalat in the first instance. It is an award which has come into existence pursuant to the provisions of Section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. 8. The law relating to the grant of compensation is primarily propelled with the sole objective of providing just compensation to the aggrieved.
It is an award which has come into existence pursuant to the provisions of Section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. 8. The law relating to the grant of compensation is primarily propelled with the sole objective of providing just compensation to the aggrieved. Any proceedings which tend to defeat this cardinal principle of the grant of compensation have, therefore, to be viewed with circumspection by the Courts as it can often mean an unsuspecting trap for the gullible persons, manoeuvered by the persons whose motives are best served by the defeat of such principle. 9. In the instant case, the son of the claimants, aged 22 years, had died in a motor vehicular accident due to rash and negligent driving of the bus belonging to Haryana Roadways by respondent no.1-Raghubir Singh. In this view of the situation, the statement of the counsel for the parties without their being any record of the statement of the claimants clouds the mind of the Court with suspicion. 10. Even if these facts were not thereon, an appeal having been preferred by the claimants, the Court is not precluded to peep into the facts of the case and arrive at a decision to ensure that they are granted just compensation for the death of their young son. 11. In Nagappa Versus Gurudayal Singh and others (supra), their Lordships of the Supreme Court held that the Tribunal/ Court is to award `just' compensation which is reasonable on the basis of evidence on record. 12. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case and the law laid down in the judgments relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellants including the aforementioned judgment, I am of the opinion that the appeal deserves to succeed. 13. Now, this Court is confronted with the situation where ordinarily, the matter ought to be remanded back for decision of the claim petition on merits as the evidence of the parties was yet to be recorded, but considering the fact that the accident took place in the year 1988 and twenty years have elapsed since then, it would be grossly unjust to compel the claimants to face the ordeal of the proceedings as it is apparent that they would be fairly advanced in years by now. 14.
14. In so far as the issue of negligence in causing the accident is concerned, the same was not seriously disputed by the counsel for the respondents. Even otherwise, when they had offered to settle the matter, they had tacitly acquiesced to the factum of the accident being a result of their negligence. 15. Therefore, the question which is to be determined relates to the quantum of compensation that should be awarded to the claimants. 16. As noticed above, the claim petition was disposed of on the basis of the statement of the counsel for the parties and, therefore, this Court has been robbed of the benefit of evidence in support of the claim of the claimants regarding the quantum of compensation. 17. The deceased was a young man of 22 years. The claimants are his parents. The claim petition was filed in January,1989. At that point of time, a labourer was expected to earn at least Rs.1100/-per month. When the income is meagre, one may not strictly apply the norms of 1/3rd or 1/4th as deduction as personal expenses. It would be just and appropriate to assess the dependency at Rs.950/-per month, i.e., Rs.11400/-per annum. A multiplier of `10' should be just and adequate considering the fact that the deceased would have got married and dependency qua the appellants would have reduced. 18. In this manner, the compensation comes to Rs.1,14,000/-. 19. A sum of Rs.20,000/-is awarded on account of funeral expenses and loss of love and affection. 20. Thus, the appellants are held entitled to receive a sum of Rs.1,34,000/- as compensation. 21. The enhanced amount of compensation is directed to be paid to the claimants along with interest at the rate of 9% per annum from the date of claim petition till the date of realisation. 22. The liability to pay the enhanced compensation and interest shall be jointly as well as severally of the respondents. The impugned award is modified to the aforementioned extent and the appeal is allowed in the above terms. Appeal allowed.