ORDER A.S. Bopanna, J.— The petitioner in all these petitions, is before this Court claiming that he was the dealer of the respondent Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. for Petrol/Diesel outlet at Mandya under an agreement dated 7.10.1993. After the death of his lather, petitioner-Sri M.S. Venkatesh i.e., party-in-person is said to have operated the dealership until the same was terminated. The grievance is regarding the termination of dealership. 2. In the first petition in W.P. No. 14109/2005, the grievance made by the petitioner is with regard to the termination of the dealership agreement dated 7.10.1993. The dealership, at the first instance, was terminated by Territory Manager of the respondent by order dated 28.5.2001. The petitioner was before this Court in W.P. No. 21910/01 wherein the main grievance was with regard to the violation of principles of natural justice. This Court, by its order dated 28.5.2004 allowed the Writ Petition by setting aside the impugned order and had remanded the matter by directing General Manager (South), Chennai to consider the objections of the petitioner and pass appropriate orders in accordance with law. This Court had directed the General Manager (South) to consider the matter since at that point of time, the petitioner had alleged bias against the Territory Manager, who had initially passed the order. After such remand, the petitioner has filed additional objections and on reconsideration, the General Manager (South) by his order dated 21.7.2004 has arrived at his findings and has terminated the dealership agreement dated 7.10.1993. The petitioner is therefore before this Court once again questioning the said order dated 21.7.2004. 3. In this petition, the petitioner is now making allegations against the General Manager (South) and is seeking for a prayer to quash the order dated 21.7.2004 (Annexure-C) and to issue a writ of mandamus directing the Additional Secretary (Marketing) in the Ministry of Petroleum to examine the whole case afresh and grant dealership immediately to the petitioner. The petitioner-party-in-person, apart from making allegations against the General Manager (south) that he has only covered up the matter to protect the Territory Manager, would also contend that none of the reasons assigned in the impugned order are based on records. The petitioner-party-in-person, apart from making allegations against the General Manager (south) that he has only covered up the matter to protect the Territory Manager, would also contend that none of the reasons assigned in the impugned order are based on records. It is also contended that since reasons assigned by the General Manager (south) do not constitute sufficient reasons for termination of the dealership agreement, as contained in the marketing guidelines, the petitioner would be in a position to prove that none of the reasons assigned could be substantiated by the respondent with records. It is further contended that even with regard to the issue relating to allegation of spurious lubricants being sold and the alleged short delivery from the pump, civil suits have been instituted by the petitioner. The petitioner therefore refers to certain statements which have already been made before the Civil Court to contend that the respondent cannot at this stage, act contrary to the same. It is in that context contended that all the reasons assigned by the General Manager are contrary to the Marketing Discipline Guidelines. Therefore, the same cannot constitute misconduct for the purpose of terminating the dealership agreement Even if the said reasons are established, the marketing guidelines provide that opportunity is to be granted to rectify the same and only thereafter the termination is possible and not at the first instance as done by the respondent-Corporation. The petitioner further contends that even though the matter was remanded by this Court to consider the objections of the petitioner to the show cause notice dated 9.5.2001, the additional objections filed by the petitioner has not been considered by the respondent It is also alleged that since corrigendum dated 22.5.2001 has been issued subsequently, the same should be considered as the show cause notice. If the same is considered, none of the allegations, which are now stated as established by the respondent in the impugned order are contained in that notice. Further, this Court, while remanding the matter, had expressed that the General Manager (South) would examine the case independently without being influenced by any of the allegations and counter allegations and therefore, the perusal of the impugned order would indicate that there is no such independent examination. Further, this Court, while remanding the matter, had expressed that the General Manager (South) would examine the case independently without being influenced by any of the allegations and counter allegations and therefore, the perusal of the impugned order would indicate that there is no such independent examination. The petitioner has also referred to the Annexures produced in 'L' series, in an attempt to point out that he would be in a position to establish by the said documents the reasons assigned by the General Manager could be disproved. 4. Sri K. Suman, learned Counsel appearing for the respondent would, at the outset, urge that the dealership agreement which is now terminated by the order impugned is a contract between the parties and the same would lie in the purview of common law and as such the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India would not be maintainable as no constitutional right is violated. On this aspect, the learned Counsel would contend that even while the petitioner was before this Court in the earlier writ petition, this Court had noticed that normally this Court would not exercise the writ, jurisdiction in a matter of this nature. However, only on noticing that the petitioner had made allegations against the Territory Manager and since the Territory Manager himself has decided the case, this Court felt that there would be an element of bias and therefore, since there was violation of principles of natural justice, only to that extent, this Court had interfered and the element of bias was removed by directing the General Manager (south) to redo the matter afresh alter considering the additional objections to be filed by the petitioner. The General Manager (south) has thereafter considered the additional objections as averred in the petition itself, and all the other materials available on record has also been considered independently and has come to his conclusion. Though the petitioner did not have any grievance against the General Manager (south) reconsidering the matter, has without basis made allegations in this petition without even making the General Manager (south) personally a party to the petition. Therefore, when the order of termination is made after considering the objections and assessment of the material available, the same cannot be examined in a writ jurisdiction. Therefore, when the order of termination is made after considering the objections and assessment of the material available, the same cannot be examined in a writ jurisdiction. The only remedy would be to file a suit if the evidence is to be reassessed and a finding of fact is to be rendered. Without prejudice to the said contention, the learned Counsel with reference to the records produced before this Court relating to the termination of dealership agreement would point out sufficient documents available on file to contend that the decision is based on records. It is also contended that even otherwise, there are several disputes pending between the parties and the petitioner has penchant for litigation and according to the learned Counsel, as on today, admittedly there are at least 17 cases pending between the parties in civil as well as in criminal Courts even though according to the respondents it is much more. The learned Counsel would also refer to the order impugned in detail to point out that all contentions of the petitioner including the additional objection has been considered by the General Manager (South) and alter proper analysis, has come to his conclusion. Therefore, the same does not call for interference. 5. In reply to the contention regarding the maintainability of the writ petition, the petitioner would contend that this Court, at the earlier instance, had entertained the writ petition, quashed the order and remanded the matter for fresh consideration and as such the same would indicate that it is maintainable. Even otherwise, the termination of dealership agreement could be considered under Article 226 of the Constitution of India as held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Harbanslal Sahnia and Another Vs. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd. and Others, AIR 2003 SC 2120 . 6. Though I have heard both the petitioner and the learned Counsel for the respondent extensively on the merits of the rival contentions regarding the instances which led to the termination of the dealership agreement, the question at the outset would be whether these disputed aspects of the matter could be considered in a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India? 7. 7. In order to appreciate this question, it would be appropriate to notice the order dated 28.5.2004 passed by this Court in W.P. No. 21910/01 at the earner instance, when the petitioner was before this Court questioning the order dated 28.5.2001 passed by the Territory Manager. A perusal of the same would indicate that the main contention of the petitioner before this Court was the allegations of bias against the Territory Manager on the ground that the Territory Manager by his correspondences dated 23.04.2001 and 02.05.2001 had made certain allegations against the petitioner and the petitioner had also made certain allegations against the Territory Manager and therefore the same person could not have decided the dispute with an open mind. In fact, to the said petition, the Territory Manager was impleaded in person as the second respondent and such allegations were made. It was therefore contended that when there were such allegations and counter allegations, if the Territory Manager himself decides the case relating to the termination of dealership agreement, the petitioner cannot expect justice from a person against whom allegations were made since he is likely to look at the case with bias. It is in that regard, it was found that there was violation of principles of natural justice inasmuch as no man shall be a judge in his own cause. On this aspect of the matter, this Court had come to the conclusion that it would be proper for the General Manager (south) to reconsider the matter in order to remove the element of bias. Before stating so, this Court had also specifically stated that normally this Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction would not entertain a petition filed questioning the order made in canceling the dealership agreement that was entered into between the parties. This Court would normally relegate the parties to approach the civil forum for appropriate reliefs. But, the said case was considered as one of the exceptional cases because an Officer of the respondent-Corporation had acted contrary to the rules of natural justice and had given verdict against the other person by accepting his personal bias. 8. Therefore, the said decision itself would indicate that but for the said fact, this Court would not have entertained the writ petition when the dealership agreement was terminated at the earner instance. 8. Therefore, the said decision itself would indicate that but for the said fact, this Court would not have entertained the writ petition when the dealership agreement was terminated at the earner instance. Now, after reconsideration, no doubt, the petitioner has made certain allegations against the General Manager (south) in this petition to contend that he also has not acted fairly. Though the said allegations are made, it is to be noticed that the General Manager (south) has not been impleaded in person as a party, but is shown as a person representing the Corporation. Therefore, any of the personal allegations cannot be noticed by this Court, since that is the settled position of law. In any event, when this Court remanded the matter for fresh consideration by the General Manager (south), the petitioner did not make out any grievance or complaint against the General Manager (south) either prior to this proceedings or prior to the disposal of the earner writ petition. There was no interaction between the General Manager (south) and the petitioner by way of any complaint or allegations as had occurred in the case of the Territory Manager. The petitioner, for the first time, has made certain allegations against the General Manager only after the decision has been rendered against the petitioner. The said allegations appear to be more of convenience rather than of substance considering the point at which it made. Therefore, at the outset, the very same consideration, which was available when the earlier writ petition was disposed of is not available at this stage. As such, the impugned order in this petition cannot be looked at from the point of view of violation of principles of natural justice. Therefore, the main ingredient for entertaining the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is not available to the petitioner at this juncture. 9. The next aspect of the matter would be to examine as to whether the writ petition could be entertained by considering that the order impugned as one being arbitrary and as to whether the dealership agreement has been terminated on irrelevant and non-existent grounds so as to call for interference as contended by the petitioner by relying on the decision in the case of Harbanslal (cited supra). On this aspect, Sri. On this aspect, Sri. K. Suman, learned Counsel appearing for the respondent would place reliance on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Radhakrishna Agarwal and Others Vs. State of Bihar and Others, AIR 1977 SC 1496 , wherein it has been held as hereunder: But the discrimination complained of must be involved right at the threshold or at the time of entry into the field of contract regarding consideration of person with whom the Government would contract. At this stage, no doubt, the State acts purely in its executive capacity and is bound by the obligations which dealings of the State with the individual citizens import into every transaction entered into m exercise of its constitutional powers. But, after the State or its agents have entered into the field of ordinary contract, the relations are no longer governed by the constitutional provisions but by the legally valid contract which determines rights and obligations of the parties inter se. No question arises of violation of Article 14 or of any other constitutional provision when the State or its agents, purporting to act within this field, perform any act. In this sphere, they can only claim rights conferred upon them by contract and are bound by the terms of the contract only unless some statute steps in and confers some special statutory power or obligation on the State m the contractual field which is apart from contract. 10. The decision in Radhakrishna Agarwal (supra) would indicate that the Hon'ble Supreme Court has stated that the scope of examination under Article 226 is at a stage prior to the entering into the contract But, after the contract is entered into, the relations are no longer governed by the Constitutional provisions, but by the legally valid contract, which determines rights and obligations of the parties inter se which would bind the parties. On noticing the said decision, no doubt, this Court will also have to take note of the met that if certain statutory contracts are entered into, still this Court would have jurisdiction. But, in the instant case, the contract between the petitioner and the respondent-Corporation is not a statutory contract. The said decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court would therefore be applicable to the facts of this case. Further, the learned Counsel has placed reliance on a decision of this Court in Unity Service Station Indian Oil Dealers rep. But, in the instant case, the contract between the petitioner and the respondent-Corporation is not a statutory contract. The said decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court would therefore be applicable to the facts of this case. Further, the learned Counsel has placed reliance on a decision of this Court in Unity Service Station Indian Oil Dealers rep. by its Partners Sri J.S. Shivaram Bhat and Sri A.V. Dattathreya Bhat Vs. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. rep. by its General Manager and The Chief Divisional Retail Sales Manager, ILR (2007) KAR 3431 wherein this Court, while dealing with regard to a similar dealership agreement, has come to the conclusion that in view of the existence of the arbitration clause for resolution of the dispute, the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution would not be maintainable in view of the alternate remedy. In fact, this Court while coming to the said conclusion has noticed the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Harbanslal's case which is relied on by the petitioner. In any event, on the said decision relied on by the petitioner, the learned Counsel for the respondent would seek to distinguish that the Hon'ble Supreme Court has come to the said conclusion after clearly noticing that the jurisdiction to interfere despite availability of alternative remedy is only in the three contingencies stated therein and none of the contingencies exist in the present case. Further, the Hon'ble Supreme Court had examined a specific instance in the said case, which had fatten within those exceptions. Therefore, according to the learned Counsel the said decision cannot be applicable to the present case. 11. Since the petitioner has placed strong reliance on the said decision, I deem it proper to examine this aspect further even though this Court in the case of Unity Service Station, cited supra had noticed and distinguished the same while considering the termination of dealership agreement In the case of HARBANSLAL, the Hon'ble Supreme Court was considering a situation of existence of the arbitration clause as an alternative remedy and further the specific instance of the sample taken was the only instance due to which the termination of the agreement was made and that instance was analysed as an irrelevant and non-existent ground on that specific instance about the reading recorded and the manner in which the sample test was done. It is in that context, the Hon'ble Supreme Court came to the conclusion that the same fell within the exceptions stated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. 12. On the other hand, in the instant case, first and foremost, this Court is not concerned with the question of existence of alternative remedy by way of arbitration. But what is to be considered is that the terminated dealership agreement is a contract between the parties and therefore, the enforcement of any of the terms would he within the realm of the Civil Court. Secondly, if there are disputed questions of fact, which require evidence to be tendered and assessment of such evidence, the proper forum would be the Civil Court. Further in the instant case, even though the question of samples not conforming to the standards, inasmuch as there is an allegation that spurious lubricants was sold, that is not the only reason on which the dealership agreement has been terminated. Therefore, keeping these aspects in mind, if the order dated 21.7.2004 which is impugned in this petition is noticed, on the face of it, the same would indicate that as directed by this Court in the earlier writ petition, the petitioner had filed additional objection statement to the show cause notice dated 9.5.2001 and each of the contentions put forth by the petitioner and the records regarding the omissions and commissions by the petitioner has been considered by the General Manager (south). Bach of the aspects has thereafter been adverted to with reference to the clause contained in the Marketing Discipline Guidelines and the provisions of the Petroleum Act and thereafter, on analysis of the rival contentions, the General Manager (south) has come to his conclusion. With regard to breaches committed by the petitioner, in respect of the dealership agreement, even though the petitioner contends that in the corrigendum these aspects were not indicated, it is difficult to accept that the show cause notice dated 9.5.2001 was given a go-bye and only the corrigendum would arise for consideration since the penultimate paragraph of the order impugned would clearly indicate that both the show cause notices dated 9.5.2001 and 22.5.2001 have been considered. Further this Court in the earner writ petition has directed consideration of the show cause notice dated 9.5.2001 and the additional objection to be filed to the same. Further this Court in the earner writ petition has directed consideration of the show cause notice dated 9.5.2001 and the additional objection to be filed to the same. Therefore, the corrigendum dated 22.5.2001 cannot be considered to be in supersession of the notice dated 9.5.2001, but is an additional opportunity granted. 13. Though in a normal circumstance, the above discussion would have been sufficient, for rendering my decision, since the petitioner appeared party-in-person and made repeated pleas that the reasons assigned by the General Manager (south) is not based on records, but has been made only to cover up the allegations made by the Territory Manager, I have proceeded to examine as to whether it was an empty formality as contended by the petitioner. In that regard apart from the fact that there were certain correspondences addressed by the earner Territory Manager during the year 2000 which has been referred in the impugned order itself, an attempt has been made by me to examine this aspect of the matter also by looking into the records maintained by the respondent-Corporation. Therefore, in order to satisfy myself as to whether the reasons contained in the impugned order are irrelevant or non-existent grounds, which would call for interference, I have perused the records. While undertaking this exercise, it is noticed that there are several disputes between the parties and the trouble has been brewing for quite some time and already suits and other criminal proceedings are pending between the parties. Though the petitioner contends that the documents which are available on file do not reflect the correct picture of the matter and made an attempt to contend that the documents produced by the petitioner at V series would disprove the contention of the respondents, I have deliberately refrained myself from specifically referring to each document and discussing the evidentiary value of the same, since I do not wish to pronounce on the same as they are all disputed questions of met and matters for evidence and appreciation of the same would not be possible in a writ petition while this Court is exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In tact, the contents of the file would indicate that the respondents have placed reliance on certain materials to come to their conclusion while the petitioner disputes the correctness of the same and as such, a matter of this nature cannot be decided on oath against oath, but the parries would have to tender evidence and establish their respective cases. But all that can be said is that it is not an empty formality but based on materials which is to be reassessed by the appropriate forum. 14. One other aspect of the matter is, admittedly even according to the petitioner, with regard to the allegation regarding selling spurious lubricants and also with regard to the allegation of short delivery alleged by the respondents, the petitioner has already instituted suits in O.S. Nos. 191/2000 (now said to be pending in Regular Appeal) and 291/04 which would only indicate that the petitioner has taken recourse to civil suits in respect of the terms of the very same contract and the guidelines regulating the dealership in question. Therefore, the only irresistible conclusion that could be arrived at is that since the order impugned does not admit of violation of principles of natural justice nor arbitrariness, but, if for any reason, the conclusion reached is contrary to the terms of the agreement, the same can only be decided by a competent Civil Court and not by this Court, while exercising writ jurisdiction. 15. At this juncture, it is necessary to clarify that even though the petitioner has argued regarding the non-delivery of part loads despite there being no prohibition in the agreement and guidelines; that demand drafts were delivered for supply on 7.4.2001 seeking for supply of 4KL of MS and a subsequent demand draft dated 13.4.2000 was made over for supply of 4000 KL diesel; and that the Depot Manager not only did not issue receipt but had failed to make the supply and therefore, the Bunk had become dry; the dishonour of the cheque as alleged was not a fact since the payment of the cheque had been stopped by the petitioner for short supply of the materials indicated in the invoice; the short, delivery from the pump was due to the mechanical defect in the pump which had been immediately stopped etc. I have thought it fit not to enter into this controversy since I have already come to the conclusion that the Writ Petition is not the remedy and the petitioner has to agitate the matter in the civil proceedings. Any observation on this aspect of the matter is likely to affect the case of the parties before the appropriate forum not only if the petitioner chooses to file a suit but in the suits which are already pending relating to certain of those issues. 16. The other aspect which requires to be noticed is, the petitioner has prayed that the Additional Secretary (Marketing) in the Ministry of Petroleum be directed to reconsider the case afresh. No doubt the Additional Secretary (Marketing), Ministry of Petroleum would have an overall supervisory control over the oil corporations, being an authority under the Government, but nothing is pointed out to indicate that the Additional Secretary could act as an adjudicating/competent authority in the matter of termination of the dealership agreement As such without there being jurisdiction, this Court normally would not direct such authority to decide. However, it is made clear that if the Additional Secretary (Marketing) Ministry of Petroleum has the supervisory power to examine the issue, though not in the nature of enquiry, it would always remain open dehors the manner of the present enquiry. Therefore, notwithstanding the present issue to be decided by a Court of Civil jurisdiction, it would always be open to the petitioner to make an appropriate representation to the Additional Secretary (Marketing) who may choose to dispose of the same in accordance with law or treat the same as an appeal if it is permissible to do so in law. If such course is adapted, the respondents would have the liberty of having their say before the Additional Secretary (Marketing). 17. In W.P. No. 21858/05, the petitioner has sought for writ of mandamus to direct the respondents to provide the copy of all the documents and other connected materials as requested in Annexure-A and B to the petition. If such course is adapted, the respondents would have the liberty of having their say before the Additional Secretary (Marketing). 17. In W.P. No. 21858/05, the petitioner has sought for writ of mandamus to direct the respondents to provide the copy of all the documents and other connected materials as requested in Annexure-A and B to the petition. The second prayer made in the said Writ Petition is to direct the third respondent to provide entire details of the breaches as well as financial indiscipline and violation of Marketing Discipline and Guidelines committed by Narmada Service from the date of appointment as dealer, till the present date so as to enable the petitioner to appraise the Ministry of Petroleum and Vigilance cell to expose the second respondent's unlawful acts. 18. Firstly what is to be noticed is that the petitioner has impleaded three respondents by name and has sought this Court to issue writ against individual persons instead of impleading the Corporation and staring that the corporation is represented by such of those persons. Therefore, at the outset, the issue of writ to individual persons would not arise. 19. Even otherwise, in so far as the petitioner seeking for the documents which have been enlisted in Annexure-A and B, the respondents have filed their objections to the said petition and have indicated the details regarding their inability to furnish the same since the petitioner is in possession of some of the documents. In so far as other documents, it is stated that it is in the nature of interrogatory. The manner in which the direction is sought for issue of said documents, I am of the view that, the same is misconceived for the reason that in a Writ Petition, this Court need not direct furnishing of such document merely because the petitioner desires to have such documents to build up records to make a complaint against a third party. No doubt, in so far as the documents which relate to the case of the petitioner and which may have been the basis for termination of dealership agreement, the petitioner would be in a position to summon the same in accordance with law as per the procedure contemplated in the Civil Procedure code while initiating the suit in the civil jurisdiction, in such circumstances, if the relevant documents are not produced by the respondent-Corporation, the provisions of the Evidence Act would come into play and the Court would have to consider the evidence in that light and as such the petitioner would not be prejudiced if the prayer is not granted in this petition. 20. With regard to the second prayer made in the petition, it is more in the nature of public interest and as such the same does not need consideration. Even otherwise, if the petitioner alleges certain irregularities in respect of another dealer, it is always open to the petitioner to make such complaint to the Ministry with prima facie material and the Ministry itself would seek for such documents from the Corporation. As such the present, petition is devoid of merit. 21. In W.P. No. 23390/2005, the petitioner has sought for issue of writ of mandamus to direct respondent No. 4 i.e., Additional Secretary (Marketing) Ministry of Petroleum & NG, Union of India to refer the same to Vigilance cell and CBI regarding the allegations against the respondent Nos. 1 to 3. 22. The grievance of the petitioner is that the respondent Nos. 1 to 3 are the servants of Bharat Petroleum and they should act fairly during the course of their employment and unethical practice such as corrupt activity, dereliction of duty, failure to follow the guidelines issued by Oil Corporation and the Ministry. 23. It is contended by the petitioner that, the respondents had failed to act fairly and had developed illegal acts which are against the norms of the Corporation. Several other serious allegations are made in the petition. The petitioner has produced copies of the representation said to have been made on 30.8.2003, 16.9/2003 and 19.11.2003. By the said representations, the petitioner has requested the fourth respondent herein and also joint secretary. Ministry of Petroleum to initiate vigilance enquiry. Along with the petition, no document is produced to show that the said representations have been received by the fourth respondent. 24. By the said representations, the petitioner has requested the fourth respondent herein and also joint secretary. Ministry of Petroleum to initiate vigilance enquiry. Along with the petition, no document is produced to show that the said representations have been received by the fourth respondent. 24. The respondent Nos. 1 to 3 have filed objections to the same denying the allegations made against them and also have indicated with regard to the civil disputes as well as criminal oases already pending between the parties. It is therefore contended that the prayer sought for by the petitioner is not bonafide and is made only with the view to wreck vengeance. 25. On hearing the party-in-person and the learned Counsel tor the respondent, I am of the view that the allegations made in the petition would also relate to the dispute between the petitioner and the Bharath Petroleum Corporation with regard to the termination of the dealership agreement with which the petitioner and the Corporation are litigating. 26. In the circumstances of this nature, this Court, cannot issue a mandamus to hold an enquiry. Independent, of the Writ Petition, it is always open for the Additional Secretary (Marketing) to institute such enquiry, if the petitioner makes out a case and establishes his bonafides. 27. Hence, all that can be ordered in this petition is to reserve liberty to the petitioner to bring to the knowledge of the fourth respondent once over with regard to the representation made by the petitioner or in the alternative to make a fresh representation furnishing the details to the fourth respondent. Such representation, if made, shall be considered by the fourth respondent one way of the other in accordance with law. 28. In the result the following: ORDER I) W.P. Nos. 14109/2005, 21858/05 and 23390/05 are dismissed. Rule discharged. II) Liberty is reserved to the petitioner to initiate appropriate proceedings in the manner stated above. If such proceedings are initiated, all contentions of the parties are left open. III) Parties to bear their own costs.