Research › Search › Judgment

Madhya Pradesh High Court · body

2008 DIGILAW 178 (MP)

Sovaran Singh and others v. State of M. P.

2008-02-01

A.P.SHRIVASTAVA

body2008
ORDER 1. This revision is filed by the applicants under sections 397 read with section 401 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, arising out of the order dated 17.11.2006, passed by the Court of Sessions Judge, Morena (M.P.) in Criminal Revision No. 40 of 2006, by which the Revisional Court directed the learned trial Court to decide the application of the prosecution under section 216 of Cr.PC, dated 22.8.2005. 2. The main grievances of the applicants are that the impugned order passed by Court below is illegal and not sustainable in law because the same was filed against an interlocutory order. Therefore, the Court below was not having jurisdiction to interfere with the order passed by learned trial Court in exercising its revisional jurisdiction. 3. Fact of the case, in brief, is that on the basis of the report lodged by the applicant No.2 at the Police Station Joura bearing Crime No. 355/97, under sections 302, 147, 148, 149 of IPC was registered. Subsequently, the matter was investigated by the CID. On the basis of CID report, the offence under sections 304-A, 201, 177, 182, 211 of IPC was registered against the applicants. The trial Court framed the charges under section 304-A, 201, 211 of IPC and fixed the case for prosecution evidence. The prosecution filed an application under section 216 of Code of Criminal Procedure and averred that, the police has filed the challan under sections 304-A, 201,177, 182,211 of IPC against the accused persons and charges under sections 304-A, 201, 211 have been framed. It was further alleged that, the accused persons have lodged a false report in the police station on 15.10.1997 and have given false information to a public servant thereby earlier a false case was registered against the accused persons and on" the basis of the cm investigation, they have been found innocent whereas a matter of fact, it was prayed that charges under sections 194, 120 (B), 177 and 182 of IPC be further framed against the accused persons. 4. The learned trial Court has not decided the application and fixed the case for evidence. 4. The learned trial Court has not decided the application and fixed the case for evidence. It is pertinent to note that against the order dated 12.12.2005, a revision petition was filed before the Sessions Judge, Morena bearing Criminal Revision No. 40 of 2006 and on 24.3.2006, the Court directed the trial Court to consider the application filed by prosecution under section 2 I 6 of Cr.PC. Against the above impugned order, a Criminal Revision No. 404 of 2006 was filed before this Court. The Hon'ble High Court set aside the order on 18.5.2006 and directed the Sessions Judge to pass an order in accordance with law after giving opportunity of hearing to both the parties. After hearing both the parties, the impugned order was passed on 17th November, 2006. 5. Arguments heard at length. Written arguments have also been filed by the applicants. The gist of arguments is that the order of the Magistrate was interlocutory in nature and, therefore, it could not be challenged before the Sessions Court and the Sessions Judge has passed an erroneous order which is liable to be set aside. In support of the above contentions, learned counsel for the applicants relied on various citations which are as follows: (I) In the case of Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra reported in [ AIR 1978 SC 47 ] in which it is held that the High Court can exercise its inherent power to quash an interlocutory order. (II) In the case of V.C. Shukla v. State through C.B.I. reported in [ AIR 1980 SC 962 ] in which Hon'ble Delhi High Court held that order framing of charge is interlocutory. Appeal against same is incompetent. (III) In the case of Habib v. State of M.P. and others reported in [ 2000 (2) JLJ 72 = 2000 (3) MPHT 464 ] in which it is laid down that Magistrate is empowered under section 216 of Cr.PC to alter or add any charge at any time before the judgment is pronounced. It does not amount reviewing of earlier order. It does not amount reviewing of earlier order. (IV) In the case of Khagesh Kumar Goel v. State of M.P. and others reported in [ 1997 (2) JLJ 276 = 1997 (V-2) MPLJ 690] it is held that the order passed at the time of framing charge negativing plea of accused that no charge is made out and he is entitled to be discharged not an interlocutory order. Jurisdiction to entertain revision in such matter not barred under section 397 (2) of Cr.PC. Where however, the plea of the accused is that a minor charge is made out instead of the charge as framed such an order is an interlocutory order and no revision application challenging such order tenable. (V) Lastly, in the case of Ramchandra S/o Shrilal and others v. State of Madhya Pradesh reported in [1995 (V-4G) MPLJ 669] it is held that regarding framing of charge, factors to be taken into consideration. 6. Counsel for the respondent-State submits that the learned trial Court has not assigned any reason for postponing the application of the prosecution for framing the additional charge .against the accused persons. He is unable to accept the contentions of learned counsel for· the applicants that the impugned order comes within the ambit of an interlocutory order. He also submits that as the petition is kept pending by trial Court, the order passed by learned Sessions Judge suffers no irregularity because the Sessions Judge simply directed the trial Court to decide the application. 7. Regarding the interlocutory matter, the apex Court in the case of Amar Nath and others v. State of Haryana and others [1977 (II) MPWN 434 = AIR 1977 SC 2185 ] discussed and also observed the scope of section 397 (2) of Cr.PC. It is laid down that: "The term "interlocutory order" in section 397 (2) has been used in a restricted sense and not in any broad or artistic sense. It merely denotes orders of a purely interim or temporary nature which do not decide or touch the important rights or the liabilities of the parties. It is laid down that: "The term "interlocutory order" in section 397 (2) has been used in a restricted sense and not in any broad or artistic sense. It merely denotes orders of a purely interim or temporary nature which do not decide or touch the important rights or the liabilities of the parties. Any order which substantially affects the right of the accused or decides certain rights of the parties cannot be said to be an interlocutory order so as to bar a revision to the High Court against that order, because that would be against the very object which formed the basis for insertion of this particular provision in section 397. Thus, for instance, orders summoning witnesses, adjourning cases, passing orders for bail, calling for reports and such other steps in aid of the pending proceeding, may no doubt amount to interlocutory orders against which no revision would lie under section 397 (2). But orders which are matters of moment and which affect or adjudicate the rights' of the accused or a particular aspect of the trial cannot be said to be interlocutory order so as to be outside the purview of the revisional jurisdiction bf the High Court. Case law referred to." 8. It is no doubt that against the framing of charge revision is maintainable and in this case also the prosecution has filed an application to amend the charge against the accused. The learned trial Court without deciding the application postponed the consideration of the application but no reasoned order was passed by the trial Court and it was passed in cryptic way. The Sessions Judge only directed the trial Court to decide the application. But orders which are matters of moment and some affect or adjudicate the rights of the accused or a particular aspect of the trial cannot be said to be interlocutory order so as to be outside the purview of the revisional jurisdiction of the Sessions Court. Further, by directing to dispose of the application will not prejudice the rights of the accused because at the time of disposal of application, the trial Court hears both the sides and then passes the order. Therefore, the objection raised by the applicants cannot be sustainable. Further, by directing to dispose of the application will not prejudice the rights of the accused because at the time of disposal of application, the trial Court hears both the sides and then passes the order. Therefore, the objection raised by the applicants cannot be sustainable. Hence, the order passed by the Sessions Judge is affirmed with a direction that the learned trial Court after giving opportunity of hearing to both sides shall pass reasoned order in accordance with law. The revision is disposed off accordingly.