K. G. BALAKRISHNAN, CJI. ( 1 ) LEAVE granted in SLP (Crl.) No. 3015-3016/2005. The appellants in these two a Prevention of Terrorism (Second) Ordinance, 2001 ppeals are the kith and kin of some persons killed in the Godhra Train Burning incident and in the akshardham Temple attack. They2 have challenged the judgment dated 13. 4. 2005 of the Gujarat High Court in SCA nos. 1103 and 1105/2005 filed by them. For convenience, the appellants in these two appeals will be referred to as the `relatives of victims'. ( 2 ) THE appellants in Criminal Appeal Nos. 1113/2005, 1498-1500/2005, 359/2006, 734/2007, 735/2007 and 736/2007 are persons who have been charged in respect of offences under the provisions of the Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2002, in terrorism related cases. In these appeals, they have also challenged the said judgment dated 13. 4. 2005 of the Gujarat High Court in SCA nos. 1103 and 1105 of 2005, and other judgments of the said High court and the judgment of the Bombay High Court which follow the said decision. The appellants in these appeals will be referred to as `pota accused'. ( 3 ) THESE appeals involve questions relating to the constitutional validity as also the interpretation of section 2 (3)and (5) of Prevention of Terrorism (Repeal) Act 2004. While the relatives of victims are aggrieved by the rejection of their challenge to section 2 (3) and (5) of the said Act, the POTA accused are aggrieved by the direction to read section 2 (3)subject to section 321 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. To appreciate the rival contentions, the reasons that led to enactment of the Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2002 and its repeal, require to be noted. ( 4 ) TO meet the challenge of terrorists indulging in wanton killings, arson, looting, and other heinous crimes in various parts of India, the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention)Act (hereinafter referred to as `tada') was enacted by the parliament in the year 1985. There was widespread criticism that TADA contained some draconian provisions. ( 5 ) THE constitutional validity of TADA was challenged before this Court in KARTAR SINGH Vs. STATE OF PUNJAB - (1994)3 SCC 569 . It was contended before this Court that many of the stringent provisions of TADA were likely to be abused by the police. There was widespread criticism that TADA contained some draconian provisions. ( 5 ) THE constitutional validity of TADA was challenged before this Court in KARTAR SINGH Vs. STATE OF PUNJAB - (1994)3 SCC 569 . It was contended before this Court that many of the stringent provisions of TADA were likely to be abused by the police. In particular, it was submitted that the provisions relating to confession made to the police may lead to illegal extraction of confessions by the police; and that the provision relating to grant of bail were violative of human rights and the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution of India. While upholding the constitutional validity of TADA, this Court observed that it was necessary to ensure that the provisions of the Act were not misused by the security agencies/police. Certain guidelines were set out to ensure that confessions obtained in pre-indictment interrogation by the police will be in conformity with principles of fundamental fairness. This Court also indicated that the Central government should take note of those guidelines by incorporating them in TADA and the rules framed thereunder by appropriate amendments. This Court also held that in order to prevent the misuse of the provisions of TADA, there must be some Screening or Review Committees. In the lead judgment, pandian, J. held (para 265) : "in order to ensure higher level of scrutiny and applicability of TADA Act, there must be a screening Committee or a review Committee constituted by the Central Government consisting of the Home Secretary, Law Secretary and other secretaries concerned of the various Departments to review all the TADA cases instituted by the Central Government as well as to have a quarterly administrative review, reviewing the States' action in the application of the TADA provisions in the respective States, and the incidental questions arising in relation thereto. Similarly, there must be a Screening or review Committee at the State level constituted by the respective States consisting of the Chief Secretary, Home secretary, Law Secretary, Director General of Police (Law and order) and other officials as the respective Government may think it fit, to review the action of the enforcing authorities under the Act and screen the cases registered under the provisions of the Act and decide the further course of action in every matter and so on. " ( 6 ) IN 1995, TADA was allowed to lapse. " ( 6 ) IN 1995, TADA was allowed to lapse. A few years later, the prevention of Terrorism Ordinance, 2001, was promulgated on 24. 10. 2001, followed by Prevention of Terrorism (Second)Ordinance promulgated on 30-12-2001. In 2002, the Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2002, (`pota' for short) was enacted replacing the Prevention of Terrorism (Second) Ordinance, 2001. Section 60 of POTA provided for constitution of Review Committees to discharge the functions specified in sections 19 (4), 40 and 46 of pota. The said section is extracted below : "60. Review Committee : (1) The Central Government and each State Government shall, whenever necessary, constitute one or more Review Committee for the purposes of this Act. (2) Every such Committee shall consist of a Chairperson and such other members not exceeding three and possessing such qualifications as may be prescribed. (3) A Chairperson of the Committee shall be a person who is, or has been, a Judge of a High Court, who shall be appointed by the Central Government, or as the case may be, the State Government, so however, that the concurrence of the Chief Justice of the High Court shall be obtained in the case of a sitting Judge: provided that in the case of a Union Territory, the appointment of a person who is a Judge of the High Court of a State shall be made as a Chairperson with the concurrence of the Chief Justice of the concerned High Court. ( 7 ) POTA was amended by the Prevention of Terrorism (Amendment) Ordinance, 2003, promulgated on 27. 10. 2003. By the said ordinance sub-sections (4) to (6) were added in section 60 of POTA entrusting an additional function to the Review committees. The said Ordinance was replaced by the Prevention of Terrorism (Amendment) Act 2003 (Act 4 of 2004) which inserted sub-sections (4) to (6) as also further sub-section (7) in section 60 with retrospective effect from 27-10-2003. The sub-sections (4) to (7) of section 60 read as under : " (4) Without prejudice to the other provisions of this Act, any review Committee constituted under sub-Section (1) shall, on an application by any aggrieved person, review whether there is a prima facie case for proceeding against the accused under this Act and issue directions accordingly. The sub-sections (4) to (7) of section 60 read as under : " (4) Without prejudice to the other provisions of this Act, any review Committee constituted under sub-Section (1) shall, on an application by any aggrieved person, review whether there is a prima facie case for proceeding against the accused under this Act and issue directions accordingly. (5) Any direction issued under sub-section (4) :- (i) by the Review Committee constituted by the Central government, shall be binding on the Central government, the State Government and the police officer investigating the offence; and (ii) by the Review Committee constituted by the State government, shall be binding on the State government and the police officer investigating the offence. (6) Where the reviews under sub-section (4) relating to the same offence under this Act, have been made by a Review Committee constituted by the Central government and a Review Committee constituted by the State Government, under sub-section (1), any direction issued by the Review Committee constituted by the Central government shall prevail. (7) Where any Review Committee constituted under sub-section (1) is of opinion that there is no prima facie case for proceeding against the accused and issues directions under sub-section (4), then, the proceedings pending against the accused shall be deemed to have been withdrawn from the date of such direction. " The effect of the amendment was to make any direction issued by the Review Committee on review, about the existence of prima facie case for proceeding against the accused under POTA, binding on the Central Government as well as State Government and the police officer investigating the offence. ( 8 ) THE constitutional validity of sub-sections (4) to (7) of section 60 inserted by the Prevention of Terrorism (Amendment)Act, 2003 was challenged by the Government of Tamil Nadu in the Madras High Court. It was contended, inter alia, that enacting a provision that made the decisions of the Review committee binding on the State Government was an encroachment upon the power and authority of the State to prosecute an offender. It was contended, inter alia, that enacting a provision that made the decisions of the Review committee binding on the State Government was an encroachment upon the power and authority of the State to prosecute an offender. It was also contended that a provision that a proceeding pending in a court shall be deemed to have been withdrawn when the Review Committee opined that there is no prima facie case for proceeding against the accused, would amount to interference with judicial functions and encroachment of `judicial power' by the executive, in violation of the constitutional scheme. ( 9 ) THE High Court of Madras upheld the validity of sub-sections (4) to (7) of Section 60 of POTA. But it further held that the opinion rendered by the Review Committee would not result in automatic withdrawal of cases pending in court; that as the opinion was binding on the State government, the State government was bound to instruct the Public Prosecutor to withdraw the prosecution under Section 321 of the Code; that the public prosecutor should apply his mind and then file an application seeking the consent of the court; and that only on such consent being given, the proceedings shall stand withdrawn. The High Court held: "the exercise of power by the Review committee cannot be termed as scuttling the judicial process. . . Criminal cases are deemed to be pending and can be concluded only on the delivery of judgment. Upto that stage, the prosecution can always be withdrawn subject to such limitations as are prescribed in section 321 Cr. PC. . . . A plea made to the public Prosecutor to withdraw the proceedings cannot be construed as an encroachment on the judicial power. At any stage before the pronouncement of the judgment in a criminal case, the State Government can instruct the Public prosecutor to withdraw the prosecution. In POTA also, the state Government can exercise such power. But if it is not willing to do so, it does not bar the Review Committee exercising the powers under Section 60 thereof and the review Committee can always decide as to whether, in its opinion, the case is a fit one to proceed further even if it is in part-heard stage. But if it is not willing to do so, it does not bar the Review Committee exercising the powers under Section 60 thereof and the review Committee can always decide as to whether, in its opinion, the case is a fit one to proceed further even if it is in part-heard stage. If the Review Committee comes to the conclusion that the case is fit to be withdrawn from prosecution under POTA, it can address the State government, which, in turn, has to instruct the Public prosecutor to invoke section 321 of Code of Criminal procedure. The role of Review Committee is limited only that far and no further. When the role of the Review Committee ends, then it is for the Public Prosecutor to apply his mind independently according to the well settled legal principles interpreting section 321 of Code of Criminal Procedure and ultimately it is for the Special Court trying the cases to decide whether the plea of the Public Prosecutor to withdraw the prosecution, if made, is acceptable or not. . . . . It is only section 321 of Cr. PC, which is applicable for withdrawing prosecution under POTA. Hence, we hold that upto the stage of formulating an opinion regarding prima facie case under pota, the Review Committee's decision, one way or the other, cannot amount to interference in the judicial process. " ( 10 ) THE State of Tamil Nadu challenged the judgment of the division Bench of Madras High Court by filing Special Leave petition before this Court. While dismissing the Special Leave petition on 8-3-2004 this Court observed as follows :- "by the amendment, the decision of the Review Committee is made binding on the Central Government, State governments and the Police Officers investigating the offence. The High Court has held, in our-view correctly, that these amendments are based on the recommendations made by the Constitution Bench of the Court in Kartar Singh Vs. State of Punjab reported in (1994) 3 SCC 569 and the judgment of this Court in R. M. Tiwari Vs. State (1996) 2 SCC 610 . These are the provisions which provide safeguards against misuse of' the stringent provisions of such an Act. In our view, the High Court has correctly held that the challenge cannot be sustained. State of Punjab reported in (1994) 3 SCC 569 and the judgment of this Court in R. M. Tiwari Vs. State (1996) 2 SCC 610 . These are the provisions which provide safeguards against misuse of' the stringent provisions of such an Act. In our view, the High Court has correctly held that the challenge cannot be sustained. The High Court has also correctly held that the directions given by the Review committee could only be subject to Section 321 of the criminal Procedure Code". ( 11 ) IN view of adverse reports about the misuse of the provisions of POTA in some States, the Parliament repealed pota, by the Prevention of Terrorism (Repeal) Ordinance, 2004 promulgated on 21. 9. 2004, later replaced by Prevention of terrorism (Repeal) Act, 2004 (`repealing Act' for short ). Section 2 of the Repealing Act reads as follows :- "2. Repeal of Act 15 of 2002 and Saving : The prevention of Terrorism Act, 2002 (hereinafter referred to as the Principal Act) is hereby repealed. (2) The repeal of the principal Act shall not affect - (a) the previous operation of, or anything duly done or suffered under the principal Act, or (b) any right, privilege or obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under the principal Act, or (c) any penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred in respect of any `offence under' the principal act, or (d) any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in respect of any such right, privilege, obligation, liability, penalty, -forfeiture or punishment as aforesaid, and, any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced and any such penalty, forfeiture or punishment may be imposed as if the principal Act had not been repealed. Provided that notwithstanding anything contained in this sub-section or in any other law for the time being in force, no court shall take cognizance of an offence under the principal Act after the expiry of the period of one year from the commencement of this Act. Provided that notwithstanding anything contained in this sub-section or in any other law for the time being in force, no court shall take cognizance of an offence under the principal Act after the expiry of the period of one year from the commencement of this Act. (3) Notwithstanding the repeal of Section 60 of the principal Act, the Review Committee constituted by the central Government under sub-section (1) of that section, whether or not an application under sub-section (4) of that section has been made, shall review all cases registered under the principal Act as to whether there is a prima-facie case for proceeding against the accused thereunder and such review shall be completed within a period of one year from the commencement of this Act and where the Review committee is of the opinion that there is no prima facie case for proceeding against the accused, then- (a) in cases in which cognizance has been taken by the court, the cases shall be deemed to have been withdrawn; and (b) in cases in which investigations are pending, the investigations shall be closed forthwith, with effect from the date of issuance of the direction by such Review Committee in this regard. (4) The Review Committee constituted by the Central government under sub-section (1) of Section 60 of the principal Act shall, while reviewing cases, have powers of a civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 in respect of the following matters, namely :- (a) discovery and production of any document; (b) requisitioning any public record or copy thereof from any court or office. (5) The Central Government may constitute more review Committees, as it may consider necessary, for completing the review within the period specified in sub-section (3 ). " ( 12 ) THE provisions of sub-sections (3) and (5) of section 2 of the Repealing Act were challenged before the High Court of gujarat, by the relatives of victims. By judgment dated 13. 4. 2005, the High Court upheld the constitutional validity of the said provisions of the Repealing Act. The High Court was of the view that the provisions of section 2 (3) of the Repealing Act were similar to the provisions of section 60 (4) to (7) of POTA. By judgment dated 13. 4. 2005, the High Court upheld the constitutional validity of the said provisions of the Repealing Act. The High Court was of the view that the provisions of section 2 (3) of the Repealing Act were similar to the provisions of section 60 (4) to (7) of POTA. Therefore following the decision of Madras High Court relating to the validity of section 60 (4) to (7) of POTA, it held that section 2 (3) of the Repealing Act did not dispense with the requirements of Section 321 of the Code; and where the review Committee, in regard to any case where cognizance had been taken by the court, held that there was no prima facie case for proceeding against the accused under the provisions of pota, such opinion of the Review Committee will not have the effect of deemed withdrawal of the case from the court, until the procedure prescribed in section 321 of the Code was complied with. The said conclusion was based on the following reasoning : "when the Parliament enacted the Repeal Act, it was aware of the fact that the Division Bench of the Madras High Court had made sub-section (7) of section 60 of the 2002 Act subject to section 321 of the Code and the view of the madras High Court had been expressly approved by the supreme Court and yet it did not choose to exclude the applicability of section 321 of the Code from the scheme of section 2 (3) of the Repeal Act. Rather, the language of sub-section (7) read with section 4 of the 2002 Act was substantially retained in the Repeal Act. Thus, the parliament will be deemed to have accepted the interpretation placed by the Madras High Court on the provisions of sub-sections (4) to (7) of section 60 from the scheme of section 2 of the Repeal Act is in our opinion, inconsequential because the language of sub-section (3) of section 2 thereof is substantially similar to sub-section (7) of section 60 of the 2002 Act, in so far as they provide for deemed withdrawal of the pending cases under the 2002 Act. ( 13 ) CONSEQUENTLY, the High Court prescribed the following procedure : that the Review Committee shall forward its opinion to the Public Prosecutor appointed under Section 28 of POTA for being placed before the Special Court; that the Public prosecutor shall then file appropriate application under Section 321 of the Code alongwith the opinion of the Review Committee and other relevant records without any delay; and that the special Court will then pass appropriate orders by giving due weightage to the opinion of the Review Committee, keeping in view the observations of this Court in R. M. TIWARI ADVOCATE vs. State (NCT) OF DELHI - (1996) 2 SCC 610 and SHAHEEN welfare ASSOCIATION Vs. UNION OF INDIA AND ORS.- (1996) 2 SCC 616 . ( 14 ) WE may refer to section 321 of the Code and the observations of this Court in R. M. Tiwari and Shaheen Welfare association referred to by the High Court at this stage. Section 321 of the Code relates to withdrawal from prosecutioin. The relevant portion thereof reads thus : "the public prosecutor or Assistant Public Prosecutor in charge of a case may, with the consent of the court at any time before the judgment is pronounced, withdraw from the prosecution of any person either generally or in respect of any one or more of the offences for which he is tried;. . . " In R. M. Tiwari (supra), a case under TADA, this court observed :"7. It is, therefore, clear that the Designated Court was right in taking the view that withdrawal from prosecution is not to be permitted mechanically by the court on an application for that purpose made by the public prosecutor. It is equally clear that the public prosecutor also has not to act mechanically in the discharge of his statutory function under Section 321 Crpc on such a recommendation being made by the Review Committee; and that it is the duty of the public prosecutor to satisfy himself that it is a fit case for withdrawal from prosecution before he seeks the consent of the court for that purpose. 8. It appears that in these matters, the public prosecutor did not fully appreciate the requirements of Section 321 Crpc and made the applications for withdrawal from prosecution only on the basis of the recommendations of the Review committee. 8. It appears that in these matters, the public prosecutor did not fully appreciate the requirements of Section 321 Crpc and made the applications for withdrawal from prosecution only on the basis of the recommendations of the Review committee. It was necessary for the public prosecutor to satisfy himself in each case that the case is fit for withdrawal from prosecution in accordance with the settled principles indicated in the decisions of this Court and then to satisfy the Designated Court of the existence of a ground which permits withdrawal from prosecution under Section 321 Crpc. 11. It has also to be borne in mind that the initial invocation of the stringent provisions of the TADA Act is itself subject to sanction of the Government and, therefore, the revised opinion of the Government formed on the basis of the recommendation of the High Power Committee after scrutiny of each case should not be lightly disregarded by the court except for weighty reasons such as mala fides or manifest arbitrariness. The worth of the material to support the charge under the TADA Act and the evidence which can be produced, is likely to be known to the prosecuting agency and, therefore, mere existence of prima facie material to support the framing of the charge should not by itself be treated as sufficient to refuse the consent for withdrawal from prosecution. It is in this manner an application made to withdraw the charges of offences under the TADA Act pursuant to review of a case by the Review Committee has to be considered and decided by the Designated Courts. " Shaheen Welfare Association (supra) also related to a case under TADA where this court observed :"the purpose of constituting such committees was to ensure a higher level of scrutiny regarding applicability of the provisions of TADA to the case in point. The need for such committees is amply borne out by the results which have been annexed in the affidavits filed on behalf of the union of India before us relating to the number of cases so reviewed by the Review Committees where it has been found that the provisions of TADA ought not to have been applied. " ( 15 ) THE said decision of the Division Bench of the Gujarat high Court and the decisions following the said judgment are challenged in these appeals. " ( 15 ) THE said decision of the Division Bench of the Gujarat high Court and the decisions following the said judgment are challenged in these appeals. When these matters came up before B. P. Singh and H. S. Bedi JJ, on 22. 2. 2007, being of the view that the provisions of section 60 of POTA were different from the provisions of section 2 of Repealing Act, they directed that the matter should be heard by a larger bench. The reference order (after correcting certain typographical errors)reads thus : "it appears that similar provisions, though not exactly in the same terms, under the earlier Ordinance and the amendment Act came up for consideration before the High courts in India and one of the judgments was appealed against and was disposed of by this Court by its order of 8th march, 2004. This Court noticed that by the amendment of 2002 the decision of the Review Committee is made binding on the Central Government, the State Governments and the Police Officers investigating the offence. This Court went on to observe that the High Court had correctly held that the challenge cannot be sustained. The High Court had correctly held that the direction given by the Review committee could only be subject to Section 321 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. We notice that by reason of the amendment of the Prevention of Terrorism Act, the provisions introduced namely, sub-sections (4) to (7) in Section 60 did provide that if the Review committee was of the opinion that there was no prima facie case for proceeding against the accused and issued directions under sub-Section (4), then the proceeding pending against the accused shall be deemed to have been withdrawn from the date of such direction. Whereas sub-section (7) of section 60 inserted by the Amendment Act used the words "the proceedings pending against the accused shall be deemed to have been withdrawn", sub-Section (3) of section 2 (of the Repealing Act) refers to two types of proceedings pending against the accused namely, cases in which cognizance has been taken by the court and the case which are at the stage of investigation. It is therefore, submitted before us that whatever may have been the ambiguity in sub section (7) of Section 60 of the Prevention of Terrorism Act, that ambiguity has been removed by explicitly providing that even in cases where cognizance has been taken by the Court they shall be deemed to have been withdrawn. To accept the submission urged on behalf of the appellants, we must hold that the provisions of the Repealing Act relied upon by the appellants overrides the provisions of Section 321 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which provides for withdrawal of prosecutions at the instance of the Public prosecutor in-charge of the case and with the consent of the judge trying the accused. However, we feel that in view of the reasons and the observations contained in the earlier order of this Court disposing of the Special Leave Petitions from the judgment and order of the High Court of Gujarat, and later from the high Court of Madras, it would be appropriate if the matters be placed before a larger bench for consideration. " It is in this background these matters are placed before this three Judge Bench. We have heard the submissions of the learned counsel. ( 16 ) ACCORDING to the POTA accused, the provisions of section 2 (3) of the Repealing Act are materially different from the wording of section 60 (4) to (7) of POTA. Under section 2 (3) of the repealing Act, the opinion of the Review Committee is final and conclusive and if the opinion is to the effect that there is no prima facie case for proceeding against the accused under pota, the cases in which cognizance has been taken by the court, shall be deemed to have been withdrawn, and in cases where investigations are pending, the investigations shall be closed forthwith. They contend that the clear legislative intent is that after the repeal of POTA, continuance of any proceedings initiated under POTA in which cognizance has been taken by the court, shall be subject to the opinion of the Review committee under section 2 (3) of the Repealing Act and once the review Committee holds that there was no prima facie case to continue the proceedings against the accused, the case shall be deemed to have been withdrawn with effect from the date of issuance of the direction by such Review Committee. It is submitted that in such cases, Section 321 of the Code would have no application and there is neither any need for the Public prosecutor to file any application for withdrawal from prosecution, nor any need or occasion for the court to consider whether consent should be given for such withdrawal from prosecution, as the proceedings are deemed to have been withdrawn with effect from the date of the issuance of the direction by the Review Committee. ( 17 ) THE counsel for the State of Gujarat, on the other hand, contended that the High Court had rightly held that sub-section (3) of section 2 of the Repealing Act does not dispense with the requirements of Section 321 of the Code for withdrawal and that after the Review Committee formed an opinion, the same will have to be placed before the court by the Public Prosecutor, with an application and the Court will have to independently consider such application and come to a conclusion whether it should consent to the prosecution being withdrawn or not. ( 18 ) THE relatives of victims contend that section 2 (3) and (5) of repealing Act ought to be declared as unconstitutional on the ground that they amount to encroachment on the judicial power of the State. Alternatively they supported the decision of the High Court and contended that once the Special Judge took cognizance of the offence, the proceedings could be withdrawn only under Section 321 of the Code. It was contended that the review Committee being purely a committee appointed by the executive, has no right to determine the innocence or otherwise of an accused. It was submitted that merely because the chairman of the Review Committee is a retired Judge, the committee does not become a judicial authority. It was further submitted that the Committee could only be characterized as an external body and such a Committee cannot be a clothed with a judicial power to withdraw the pending cases from the court. Reference to various decisions of this Court was made wherein this Court delineated the scope and ambit of Section 321 of the Code. Our attention was drawn to the following observations of Justice V. R. Krishna Iyer in BALWANT SINGH and ORS. Vs. Reference to various decisions of this Court was made wherein this Court delineated the scope and ambit of Section 321 of the Code. Our attention was drawn to the following observations of Justice V. R. Krishna Iyer in BALWANT SINGH and ORS. Vs. STATE OF BIHAR - (1977) 4 SCC 448 :- "the Court has to be vigilant when the case has been pending before it and not succumb to executive suggestion made in the form of application for withdrawal with a bunch of papers tacked on. Moreover, the State should not stultify the Court by first stating that there is a true case to be tried and then make a volte face to the effect that on a second investigation the case has been discovered to be false. " Reliance was also placed to the following observations of justice V. R. Krishna Iyer in SUBHASH CHANDER Vs. STATE (CHANDIGARH ADMINISTRATION) and ORS - (1980) 2 SCC 155 : "when a case is pending in a criminal court, its procedure and progress are governed by the Criminal Procedure Code or other relevant statute. To intercept and recall an enquiry or trial in a court, save in the manner and to the extent provided for in the law, is itself a violation of the law. Whatever needs to be done must be done in accordance with the law. The function of administering justice, under our constitutional order, belongs to those entrusted with judicial power. One of the few exceptions to the uninterrupted flow of the court's process is Section 321 Cr. P. C. , 1973. But even here it is the Public Prosecutor, and not any executive authority, who is entrusted by the Code with the power to withdraw from a prosecution, and that also with the consent of the court. We repeat for emphasis. To interdict, intercept or jettison an enquiry or trial in a court, save in the manner and to the extent provided for in the Code itself, is lawlessness. The even course of criminal justice cannot be thwarted by the executive, however, high the accused, however sure government feels a case is false, however unpalatable the continuance of the prosecution to the powers-that-be who wish to scuttle court justice because of hubris, affection or other noble or ignoble consideration. Justicing, under our constitutional order, belongs to the judges. The even course of criminal justice cannot be thwarted by the executive, however, high the accused, however sure government feels a case is false, however unpalatable the continuance of the prosecution to the powers-that-be who wish to scuttle court justice because of hubris, affection or other noble or ignoble consideration. Justicing, under our constitutional order, belongs to the judges. Among the very few exceptions to this uninterrupted flow of the court process is Section 494, Cr. P. C. 1898. Even here, the Public Prosecutor -not any executive authority- is entrusted by the Code with a limited power to withdraw from a prosecution, with the Court's consent whereupon the case comes to a close. What the law has ignited, the law alone shall extinguish reference was next made to SHEONANDAN PASWAN Vs. STATE OF BIHAR AND ORS.- (1987) 1 SCC 288 and other decisions of this Court taking a similar view, to contend that proceedings pending in a court, where cognizance has already been taken against the accused, could be withdrawn only in the manner contemplated in section 321 of the Code and therefore, there can be no automatic withdrawal from prosecution on the basis of sub-section (3) of Section 2 of the Repealing Act. It was submitted that the appointment of the Review Committee and the opinion expressed by such Committee would only enable the Public Prosecutor to take steps for withdrawal from prosecution; and that once the Court takes cognizance, the proceedings against the accused shall have to be continued until the Court give consent to a withdrawal under section 321 of the Code, on being satisfied that there are valid grounds for withdrawal from prosecution. ( 19 ) IN so far as Union of India is concerned, we find that there is a slight shift from the stand taken before the High Court. In the High Court, Union of India contended that the power of the review Committee under section 2 (3) of the Repealing Act was subject to section 321 of the Code. ( 19 ) IN so far as Union of India is concerned, we find that there is a slight shift from the stand taken before the High Court. In the High Court, Union of India contended that the power of the review Committee under section 2 (3) of the Repealing Act was subject to section 321 of the Code. In fact, Union's stand was accepted and upheld by the High Court, as is evident from the following observations of the High Court : "we are inclined to agree with the learned Additional Solicitor general that the impugned provisions should be read in conjunction, with Section 321 of the Code and the same do not, in any manner, encroach upon the judicial power of the state and that the opinion formed by the Review Committee on the prima-facie nature of the case under the 2002 Act has to be given due weightage by the Special Court and accepted unless there are exceptional reasons for not doing so. " But before us the Union has taken a stand, which in principle supports the contention of the POTA accused, though the union has not challenged the decision of the High Court. The stand of the Union, as set out in its counter is extracted below :"however, in view of the difference in language between section 60 (5), 60 (6) and 60 (7) as added by POTA (Amendment) 2003 and Sec. 2 (3) of the Repeal Act, the issues raised by the petitioners necessitate examination. It is respectfully submitted that the language used in sub section 2 (3) of the Repeal Act ex-facie reveals that Section 60 (5) of the amended POTA (2003) has been omitted by the legislature in the provisions of Section 2 (3) of the Repeal Act. Section 60 (5) of the former Act made the opinion of the review Committee binding on the Central Government, State government and the Police Officer investigating the case. Section 2 (3) of the Repeal Act is a new provision, enacted by the legislature, which provides for deemed withdrawal of a case (even if cognizance has been taken by the court), if the review Committee forms an opinion that there is no prima facie case made out. Section 2 (3) of the Repeal Act is a new provision, enacted by the legislature, which provides for deemed withdrawal of a case (even if cognizance has been taken by the court), if the review Committee forms an opinion that there is no prima facie case made out. " ( 20 ) THE learned Additional Solicitor General elaborating upon the said stand submitted that the power exercised by the review Committee under section 2 (3) of the Repealing Act, though not subject to the supervising power of the Special court under section 321 of the Code, is amenable to the power of judicial review of the High Court under Article 226. He therefore submitted that there are adequate safeguards against any misuse or abuse of power by the Review Committee under section 2 (3 ). ( 21 ) ON the contentions urged the questions that arise for our consideration are : (i) Whether sub-section (3) and (5) of section 2 of the Repealing Act are unconstitutional and therefore invalid; and (ii) Having regard to section 2 (3) of the Repealing Act, when the Review Committee records an opinion that there is no prima facie case for proceeding against the accused under POTA, whether the proceedings shall be deemed to have been withdrawn against such accused or whether it is necessary for the Public Prosecutor to file an application seeking consent of the court for withdrawal from prosecution under Section 321 of the Code. ( 22 ) THE following well settled principles have to be kept in view while examining the constitutional validity of section 2 (3) and (5)of the Repealing Act : (a) Parliament has the exclusive competence to legislate on terrorism and terrorist and disruptive activities which threaten the security, integrity and sovereignty of the country, as they fall under Entry 1 of List I of the seventh Schedule to the Constitution. Alternatively, they would fall under the residuary power conferred on parliament under Article 248 read with Entry 97 of List I of Seventh Schedule (vide Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab- 1994 (3) SCC 569 ). (b) There is always a presumption in favour of the constitutionality of an enactment and the burden is upon him who attacks it, to show that there has been a clear transgression of the constitutional principles. (b) There is always a presumption in favour of the constitutionality of an enactment and the burden is upon him who attacks it, to show that there has been a clear transgression of the constitutional principles. (Vide State of Jammu and Kashmir vs. Triloki Nath Kosha - 1974 (1)SCC 19 ) (c) A law made by the Parliament can be struck down by courts on two grounds and two grounds alone : (1)lack of legislative competence; and (2) violation of fundamental rights guaranteed under Part-III of the constitution or any other constitutional provision. There is no third ground. (Vide State of Andhra Pradesh vs. Mcdowell and Co.- 1996 (3) SCC 709 ). (d) The power and competence of Parliament to make laws in regard to the subjects covered by the legislative fields committed to it, carries with it the power to repeal laws on those subjects. The power of the Parliament to repeal a law is co-extensive with the power to enact such a law. (See Justice G. P. Singh's Principles of Statutory interpretation - 11th Edition, Page 633 ). (e) The Legislature may prescribe special procedure to meet special situations and to meet special objectives so long as they are not arbitrary or discriminatory. [kathi raning Rawat v. The State of Saurashtra - 1952 SCR 435 and In Re : The Special Courts Bill, 1978 - 1979 (1) SCC 380 ]. (f) If any Central Act is repealed, without making any provision for savings, the provisions contained in section 6 of General Clauses Act, 1897 will apply. But where the repealing Act itself contains specific provisions in regard to savings, the express or special provision in the repealing Act will apply. Section 6 of General Clauses act makes it clear that it will not apply, when a different intention appears in the Repealing Statute. Where the provision relating to savings is excluded, the repeal will have the effect of complete obliteration of the statute. (vide State of Orissa v. M. A. Tullock and Co.- 1964 (4) SCR 461 , Nar Bahadur Bhandari v. State of Sikkim - 1998 (5)SCC 39 and Southern Petrochemicals Industries Co. Ltd. v. Electricity Inspector - 2007 (5) SCC 447 ). ( 23 ) THE Repealing Act contains an exhaustive provision relating to savings in sub-sections (2) to (5) of section 2. Ltd. v. Electricity Inspector - 2007 (5) SCC 447 ). ( 23 ) THE Repealing Act contains an exhaustive provision relating to savings in sub-sections (2) to (5) of section 2. Therefore the savings from repeal will be governed by section 2 (2) to 2 (5) of the repealing Act and not by section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. ( 24 ) THE Parliament in its plenary power, can make an outright repeal which will not only destroy the effectiveness of the repealed act in future, but also operate to destroy all existing inchoate rights and pending proceedings. This is because the effect of repealing a statute is to obliterate it completely from the record, except to the extent of savings. If the Parliament specifically excludes any saving clause in a Repealing Act, or severely abridges the provision for savings, which it has the power to do, the effect would be that after the repeal of the statute, no proceeding can continue, nor can any punishment be inflicted for violation of the statute during its currency. When Parliament has the power to repeal a law outright without any savings and thereby put an end to all pending prosecutions and proceedings forthwith (without any need to comply with section 321 of the code), can it be said that it does not have the power to make a provision in the Repealing Act for the pending proceeding to continue, but those proceedings to come to an end, when a duly constituted Review Committee with a sitting or retired Judge of the High Court as Chairman, reviews the cases registered under the repealed Act and reaches the opinion that there is no prima facie case for proceeding against the accused ? Surely, the wider and larger power includes the narrower and smaller power. It should be remembered that continuation of a proceedings in respect of any offence under an Act, after the repeal of such Act, is itself as a result of a deeming fiction. Natural consequence of repeal, as noticed above, is complete obliteration including pending proceedings. Continuation of a pending proceeding is possible only on account of the deeming fiction created by the savings clause in the Repealing Act which provides for continuation of the proceedings as if the Principal Act had not been repealed. Natural consequence of repeal, as noticed above, is complete obliteration including pending proceedings. Continuation of a pending proceeding is possible only on account of the deeming fiction created by the savings clause in the Repealing Act which provides for continuation of the proceedings as if the Principal Act had not been repealed. Therefore any provision in the Repealing Act for saving a pending proceeding, with any further provision for termination of such pending proceedings, is a provision relating to `winding up' matters connected with the Repealed Act. By no stretch of imagination such a provision can be termed as interference with judicial power, even assuming that such a provision in a live unrepealed statute may be considered as interference with judicial power. It is therefore unnecessary to examine whether section 2 (3) of the Repealing Act is an encroachment of judicial power, though such an examination was done with reference to the challenge to section 60 (4) to (7) of pota. Many tests applied for deciding the constitutional validity of live and current statutes, may not apply to `winding up' provisions in a savings clause of a Repealing Act, dealing with repeal. The Parliament has the legislative competence to make the Repealing Act. The Repealing Act repeals POTA and provides for certain savings from repeal, to meet the special features of the repealed statute. It does not violate any constitutional provisions. Hence the Repealing Act and in particular section 2 (3) and (5)thereof are valid and constitutional. ( 25 ) THIS takes us to the second question as to the true import of section 2 (3) of the Repealing Act. Sub-section (2) of section 2 of the Repealing Act makes it clear that the repeal of POTA will not affect any investigation or legal proceeding in respect of any penalty or punishment under the principal Act, and any such investigation or legal proceedings may be instituted or continued, as if the principal Act had not been repealed. The proviso to sub-section (2) of section 2 makes it clear that no court shall take cognizance of an offence under the principal act after the expiry of the period of one year from the commencement of the Repealing Act. The Repealing Act came into force on 21. 9. The proviso to sub-section (2) of section 2 makes it clear that no court shall take cognizance of an offence under the principal act after the expiry of the period of one year from the commencement of the Repealing Act. The Repealing Act came into force on 21. 9. 2004 and the period of one year from the date of repeal having also elapsed, no fresh offence punishable under the POTA can be taken cognizance of by the court from 21. 9. 2005. Certain further provisions are made in regard to pending proceedings in sub-section (3) of section 2 [sub-sections (4) and (5) of section 2 of the Repealing Act are merely supplemental to sub-section 93) of section 2 and have no existence independent of section 2 (3)]. Sub-section (3) provides that notwithstanding the repeal of Section 60 of the principal act, the Review Committee constituted by the Central government under sub-section (1) of Section 60, shall review within one year from the commencement of the repealing Act, all cases registered under the principal Act as to whether there is a prima facie case for proceeding against the accused thereunder; and where the Review Committee is of the opinion that there is no prima facie case for proceeding against the accused, then, in cases in which cognizance has been taken by the Court, the cases shall be deemed to have been withdrawn, and in cases in which investigations are pending, the investigations shall be closed forthwith, with effect from the date of issuance of the direction by such Review Committee. Section 2 (3) of the Repealing Act does not contemplate or provide for compliance with section 321 of the Code, before the withdrawal comes into effect. The clear intention of section 2 (3)of the Repealing Act is that when the Review Committee opines that there is no prima facie case for proceeding against the accused, on review of the pending POTA cases, such cases, even though cognizance has been taken by the court, shall be deemed to have been withdrawn without anything further to be done. In view of expression of such clear legislative intent in section 2 (3) of the Repealing Act, there is no question of bringing section 321 of the Code into play. In view of expression of such clear legislative intent in section 2 (3) of the Repealing Act, there is no question of bringing section 321 of the Code into play. If section 321 is held to be applicable, then the provision in section 2 (3) that the cases shall be deemed to be withdrawn, is rendered nugatory and the cases are not actually withdrawn until the requirements of section 321 are complied with. That would amount to rewriting section 2 (3) which is clearly impermissible. ( 26 ) THE High Court proceeded on the basis that section 2 (3) of the repealing Act is similar to section 60 (4) to (7) of POTA, and therefore it should be interpreted and dealt with in the same manner as section 60 (4) to (7) of POTA. It noted that the madras High Court had upheld the validity of section 60 (4) to (7) of POTA by holding that the decision of the Review committee was binding only on the State Government and the investigating Officer and not on the Public prosecutor or the court, and that the procedure prescribed by section 321 of the code will have to be complied with, even after the decision by the Review Committee that there was no prima facie case to proceed against the accused. It held that the said declaration of law would also apply to section 2 (3) of the Repealing Act. It therefore upheld the validity of section 2 (3) of the Repealing Act subject to a rider that even where Review Committee has opined under section 2 (3) that there was no prima facie case, the deemed withdrawal will be subject to fulfilment of the requirements of section 321 of the Code. But the question is whether the High Courts were justified in assuming in the impugned judgments that the provisions of section 2 (3) of the repealing Act are similar to sections 60 (4) to (7) of POTA, and the decision of the Madras High Court as upheld by this Court, will not apply while interpreting section 2 (3) of the Repealing act. ( 27 ) THE Madras High Court proceeded on the basis that the exercise of power by the Review Committee in regard to review of POTA cases, was governed by sub-sections (4) to (6) of section 60 of POTA. ( 27 ) THE Madras High Court proceeded on the basis that the exercise of power by the Review Committee in regard to review of POTA cases, was governed by sub-sections (4) to (6) of section 60 of POTA. It found that these sub-sections provided that the decision of the Review Committee on review, was binding only on the State Government and police officers and not on the public prosecutor or the court. The Madras High court got over sub-section (7) of section 60 of POTA (which provided that when the Review Committee opines that there is no prima facie case, then the proceedings pending against the accused shall be deemed to have been withdrawn from the date of such direction), by holding that the said sub-section did not create any new right other than those mentioned in sub-sections (4) to (6) of section 60, and was only in the nature of an explanation spelling out the effect of the exercise of the power in sub-sections (4) to (6) of section 60 of POTA. It held that sub-section (7) of section 60 cannot be read independently by itself. It further held that sub-section (7) of section 60 of pota had to be understood only in the context of section 321 of the Code, to mean that if the Review Committee forms an opinion that the prosecution of the accused did not attract the provisions of POTA, the State Government which was bound by the direction, will have to address the Public Prosecutor to withdraw the prosecution; and as the public prosecutor was not bound by the direction of the Review Committee, he could formulate his independent opinion under section 321 of the code. ( 28 ) BUT the scheme of section 2 (3) of the Repealing Act is different from the scheme of sub-sections (4) to (7) of section 60 of POTA. The scheme under sub-sections (4) to (7) of section 60 under POTA (which applied to proceedings initiated under pota when the Act was in force) was as follows : (a) the Review committee was required to review a POTA case under section 60 (4), only when an application was made by an aggrieved person; (b) any direction issued by the Review Committee on such review, was binding on the concerned Government and investigating officer, but not the public prosecutor or the court under section 321 of the Code. The scheme under section 2 (3)of the Repealing Act is categorical. The review by the Review committee is not dependent upon an application by any aggrieved person. The Review Committee had to make a general review of all cases registered under POTA which were pending at the time of repeal, irrespective of whether an application for review was made by the accused or not. The purpose of such general review was to identify the cases where there was no prima facie case for proceeding against the accused, so that they could be withdrawn. If the Review Committee expressed the opinion that there is no prima facie case for proceeding against the accused, then the cases pending in court, even where cognizance has been taken by the court, shall be deemed to have been withdrawn with effect from the date of issuance of direction by such Review Committee. The express provision in section 2 (3) of the Repealing Act that even where cognizance has been taken by the court, the cases shall be deemed to have been withdrawn, is not found in section 60 (4) to (7) of POTA. Once the law made by the Parliament specifically states that wherever the Review Committee is of the opinion that there is no prima facie case for proceeding against the accused, the cases shall be deemed to have been withdrawn. If the parliament wanted to make the provisions of section 2 (3) of the repealing Act subject to Section 321 of the Code, it would have been done by making appropriate provisions therefor. As that is not done, plain meaning of the words of the legislation has to be given effect to. ( 29 ) SECTION 2 (3) of the Repealing Act also contains clear indications which exclude section 321 of the Code. They are : (i)The review is by Review Committee with a sitting or retired judge of the High Court as the Chairman, having the power of a civil court in respect of discovery and production of documents and requisitioning records. They are : (i)The review is by Review Committee with a sitting or retired judge of the High Court as the Chairman, having the power of a civil court in respect of discovery and production of documents and requisitioning records. (ii) All cases registered under POTA are required to be reviewed irrespective of whether any application was made by an aggrieved person or not, so as to find out whether there is a prima facie case for proceeding against the accused under POTA; (iii) The sub-section clearly provides that where a Review Committee opines that there is no prima facie case for proceeding against the accused, cases pending in court also shall be deemed to have been withdrawn with effect from the date of issuance of such direction by the review Committee. The wording is clear and unambiguous and does not contemplate or provide for a further application of mind by the Public Prosecutor or grant of consent by the court under section 321 Cr. P. C. We are therefore of the view that the high Court was not right in assuming that the decision of the madras High Court approved by this Court with reference to section 60 (4) to (7) of POTA will apply in regard to section 2 (3)of the Repealing Act. ( 30 ) AN apprehension was expressed that if the review committee reaches a wrong opinion there will be no remedy. It was pointed out that if section 321 Cr. P. C. was applicable, there will at least be a judicial scrutiny before the opinion resulted in withdrawal. The scope of the role played by a court under Section 321 of the Code was explained in SHEONANDAN paswan (supra), thus: "since Section 321 finds a place in this chapter immediately after Section 320, one will be justified in saying that it should take its colour from the immediately preceding section and in holding that this Section, which is a kindred to Section 320, contemplates consent by the court only in a supervisory manner and not essentially in an adjudicatory manner, the grant of consent not depending upon a detailed assessment of the weight or volume of evidence to see the degree of success at the end of the trial. All that is necessary for the court to see is to ensure that the application for withdrawal has been properly made, after independent consideration, by the Public Prosecutor and in furtherance of public interest. . . . . . . . . The section does not insist upon a reasoned order by the Magistrate while giving consent. All that is necessary to satisfy the section is to see that the Public Prosecutor acts in good faith and that the magistrate is satisfied that the exercise of discretion by the public Prosecutor is proper. " ( 31 ) THE opinion of the Review Committee is open to judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution. Any person aggrieved by the opinion can challenge it in a writ petition. As long as an aggrieved person could challenge the opinion expressed by the Review Committee by invoking judicial review, the apprehension that there will be no remedy in the event of wrong opinion by Review committee, is unwarranted. The opinions of the Review Committee under section 2 (3) of the repealing Act are limited in number and are required to be given as an one time measure with reference to a repealed statute. The availability of judicial review under Article 226 in the event of errors and abuse, is a sufficient safeguard and deterrent against any wrong doing by the Review Committee. ( 32 ) WE therefore hold that once the Review Committee on review under section 2 (3) of the Repealing Act, expresses the opinion that there is no prima facie case for proceeding against the accused, in cases in which cognizance has been taken by the Court, such cases shall be deemed to have been withdrawn. The only role of the Public Prosecutor in the matter is to bring to the notice of the court, the direction of the Review committee. The court on satisfying itself as to whether such an opinion was rendered, will have to record that the case stands withdrawn by virtue of section 2 (3) of the Repealing Act. The court will not examine the correctness or propriety of the opinion nor exercise any supervisory jurisdiction in regard to such a opinion of the Review Committee. The court on satisfying itself as to whether such an opinion was rendered, will have to record that the case stands withdrawn by virtue of section 2 (3) of the Repealing Act. The court will not examine the correctness or propriety of the opinion nor exercise any supervisory jurisdiction in regard to such a opinion of the Review Committee. But we make it clear that if the opinion of the Review Committee is challenged by any aggrieved party in writ proceedings and is set aside, the court where the proceedings were pending, will continue with the case as if there had been no such opinion. ( 33 ) IN view of the above the appeals are disposed of as follows: (i) The judgments under challenge to the extent they declare section 2 (3) and (5) of the Repealing Act are not unconstitutional, are upheld. (ii) The judgments under appeal are set aside to the extent they hold that in spite of deemed withdrawal of the cases, the procedure under section 321 of the Code has to be followed for withdrawal. (iii) The appeals filed by POTA accused are allowed in part accordingly. The appeals by the relatives of victims are disposed of reserving liberty to challenge the opinions of the Review Committee, wherever they are aggrieved. (iv) We do not express any opinion on the merits of the cases of the POTA accused or in regard to the opinions expressed by the Review Committee. --- *** --- . .