JUDGMENT S.U. KHAN, J. Heard learned Counsel for the parties. 2. The tenant-petitioner was unnecessarily questioning the landlord-ship of respondent No.3 Raj Kumar Shukla. However, learned Counsel for the petitioner categorically states that from now onwards tenant will riot raise any objection against landlord-ship of respondent No.3 Raj Kumar Shukla. Whatever amount has been deposited by the petitioner before 1 Additional J.S.C.C. Kanpur Nagar in Case No. 16 of 1996 shall at once be permitted to be withdrawn by Raj Kumar Shukla by the Court concerned ever though that amount in respect of building in dispute, is deposited in the name of another person (learned Counsel for the tenant states that rent is still being deposited in the name of previous landlady Smt. Maul Shree Shukla), who died in 1997. Let the said amount be withdrawn by the respondent No.3 Raj Kumar Shukla. 3. Original landlady late Smt. Maul Shree Shukla filed application for release under section 21 of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 against tenant petitioner, which was dismissed in default. Thereafter, in the year 1991, respondent No. 3 Raj Kumar Shukla claiming that late Smt. Maul Shree Shukla had executed a Will in his favour filed release application under section 16 of the Act before RC. & E.O/ Additional City Magistrate (1), Kanpur Nagar, in the form of Case No. 238 of 1999. Vacancy was declared on 1.11.1999 and house in dispute was released in favour of respondent No.3 through order dated 15.11.1999. Said orders have been challenged through this writ petition. Against release order, Rent Revision No. 103 of 1999 was filed, which was dismissed on 27.11.1999 by In-charge District Judge, Kanpur Nagar. Said order has also been challenged through this writ petition. 4. Landlord-respondent No.3 categorically stated that house in dispute was vacant because it was let out in the year 1982 without any allotment order. R.C. & E.O has also declared vacancy only on the said ground. After placing reliance upon Supreme Court authority in Mansaram v. S.P. Pathak,1 I have held in Rajdhari v. Smt. R. Gupta,2 that release/allotment application on the ground of vacancy is not maintainable after 12 years of alleged deemed vacancy particularly when vacancy came into existence due to letting out of the building by the landlord to the tenant without any allotment order. 5. 5. Learned Counsel for the petitioner further states that vacancy came into existence due to reason that previously Shri Shyam Charan Srivastava was the tenant, who vacated the building in 1981 and illegally handed over possession to the petitioner. However, on enquiry from the Court, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 3 admits that Smt. Maul Shree Shukla, previous landlady started accepting the rent from the petitioner. In view of this, the petitioner cannot be deemed to be tenant without the consent of the landlady. The only defect was absence of allotment order, which stood cured due to lapse of 12 years and non-initiation of any allotment or release proceedings within 12 years. 6. However, learned Counsel for the respondent No.3 states that after decision by R.C. & E.O., petitioner purchased a house and also got possession of another house in the name of his son, which also gives rise to vacancy. This is a new fact, which requires investigation, hence liberty is granted to the petitioner to file a fresh release application under section 16 of the Act before R.C. & E.O. on the ground that the house in question is vacant under section 12 (3) of the Act. If such an application is filed, the same shall be decided after hearing both the parties and providing they full opportunity to adduce evidence. 7. Writ petition is allowed. All the impugned orders are set aside. 8. House in dispute is situating on the first floor of Kanpur Nagar, which is most expensive city of the U.P. The accommodation in dispute contains two rooms, kitchen, covered verandah, common latrine and bathroom. Existing rent of Rs. 250/- per month is highly inadequate for such an accommodation. 9. I have held in Khursheeda v. A.D.J.3 and H.M. Kichlu v. A.D.J.4 that while granting relief against eviction to the tenant in respect of building covered by Rent Control Act or while maintaining the• said relief already granted by the Courts below, Writ Court is empowered to enhance the rent to a reasonable extent. 10. In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda (supra). I placed reliance upon the Supreme Court Authority of M. V. Acharya v. State of Maharashtra,1 where it was held that it was essential to 'provide for periodical enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Acts. 10. In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda (supra). I placed reliance upon the Supreme Court Authority of M. V. Acharya v. State of Maharashtra,1 where it was held that it was essential to 'provide for periodical enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Acts. The Supreme Court has further held that frozen rents are giving rise to lawlessness and landlords out of frustration are approaching muscle man to get the 'premises vacate and Courts of law are becoming redundant in this sphere. 11. This authority has recently been followed by the Supreme Court in Satyawati Sharma (dead) by LRs. v. Union of India and another,2 part of Para 29 and Para 34 of which are quoted below: "29. It is trite to say that legislation which may be quite reasonable and rationale at the time of its enactment may with the lapse of time and/or due to change of circumstances become arbitrary, unreasonable and volatile of the doctrine of equity and even if the validity of such legislation may have been upheld at a given point of time, the Court may, in subsequent litigation, strike down the same if it is found that the rationale of classification has become non-existent. 34. In Malpe Vishwanath Acharya and others v. State of Maharashtra and another (supra). the Court found that the criteria for determination and fixation of rent by freezing or by pegging down of rent as on 1.9.1940 or as on first date of letting, had, with the passage of time become irrational and arbitrary but did not strike down the same on the ground that extended period of Bombay Rent Act was coming to an end on 31.3.1998. 12. Under D.P. Rent Control Act, there is no provision of enhancement of rent after October, 1972 (Except where landlord is public charitable pr public religious institution (Section 9-A) or Government is tenant (Section 21 (8)]. In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I have also place reliance upon the authority of Supreme Court in Shangrila Food Products Ltd. v. Life Insurance Corporation of India,3 paragraph 11 of which is quoted below: "It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. This jurisdiction of the High Court, being extraordinary, is normally exercisable keeping in mh1a the principles of equity. One of the ends of the equity is to promote honesty and fair play If there be any unfair advantage gained by a party priorily, before invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court, the Court can take into account the unfair advantage gained and can require the party to shed the unfair gain before granting relief." 13. Thereafter in para 8 of the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I held as under: "Rent Control Act confers a reasonable advantage upon the tenant of protection against arbitrary eviction. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, sub-letting and material alteration etc. This advantage is also coupled with the advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent. The latter advantage cannot be said to be either reasonable or equitable. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid authority of S.F.P. v. L.I.C. l has laid down that while granting relief to a party the Writ Court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. By slightly extending the said doctrine it may safely be held that while granting the reasonable advantage to the tenant conferred upon him by the Rent Control Act the tenant may be asked to shed the unreasonable arbitrary advantage conferred upon him by the said Rent Control Act. The Writ Court therefore, while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the un-reasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him in the from of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be. Tenant will have to shed the undue advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Act to barter his protection from arbitrary eviction provided for by the said Act." 14. Thereafter in H.M. Kitchlu V. A.D.J.,2 I have held that the same principle of enhancement of rent to a reasonable extent may be made applicable while dismissing the writ petition of the landlord for the reason that by doing so Writ Court approves the protection of Rent Control Act granted to the tenant by the Courts below. 15. Thereafter in H.M. Kitchlu V. A.D.J.,2 I have held that the same principle of enhancement of rent to a reasonable extent may be made applicable while dismissing the writ petition of the landlord for the reason that by doing so Writ Court approves the protection of Rent Control Act granted to the tenant by the Courts below. 15. Accordingly, it is directed that w.e.f. September, 2008 onwards, petitioner shall pay rent to the landlord-respondent No.3 @ Rs. 1,000/- per month. No further amount as water tax etc., over and above Rs. 1,000/- per month shall be payable. 16. Writ petition is accordingly allowed with the above directions. Petition Allowed.