JUDGMENT Hon’ble Bharati Sapru, J.—The controversy involved in these three applications is identical and with the consent of parties, the same are being heard and decided by a common judgment treating the Civil Misc. Application No. 674 of 2008 (Munna Lal Sharma and Bablu v. Life Insurance Corporation of India) as leading application. 2. The leading application No. 674 of 2008, as stated earlier, is being heard finally at this stage with the consent of both parties. 3. The respondent Life Insurance Corporation of India has expressed no desire to file counter affidavit in the matter as most of the material is already on record of the application. 4. This application has been filed by the applicants under Article 227 of the Constitution of India arising out of the judgment and order of the Addl. District & Sessions Judge, Agra dated 11.4.2008 passed in Misc. Appeal No. 71 of 2005, (Munna Lal Sharma and Bablu v. Bharti Jeevan Bima Nigam). By this order, the appellate Court has dismissed the appeal filed by the applicants Munna Lal Sharma and Bablu and has confirmed the judgment and order dated 8.4.2005 passed by the Estate Officer, Agra in Public Premises case No. A.43/2003, (Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Munna Lal Sharma) by which the authority under the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the Act of 1971) has allowed the petition of the respondent Corporation for the eviction of the applicants and has further directed the applicants to pay Rs. 46,533/- as damages and has also fixed future damages at Rs. 2000/- per month with interest at 10% p.a. 5. Thus, the present proceedings arise out of the order passed by the Estate Officer as affirmed by the appellate authority constituted under the Act of 1971. 6. Both the authorities have decided concurrently against the applicants and have come to the conclusion that the applicants are in unauthorised occupation of the public premises and having declared them to be one have fixed damages upon them as stated earlier. 7. The facts of the case are that the respondent Life Insurance Corporation of India came into existence and was incorporated through a Legislation known as the Life Insurance Corporation of India Act, 1956. 7. The facts of the case are that the respondent Life Insurance Corporation of India came into existence and was incorporated through a Legislation known as the Life Insurance Corporation of India Act, 1956. After coming into force of the said Act, unauthorized properties which were vested with the private Life Insurance Companies with the Corporation and by virtue of such transfer by operation of law, the Corporation became owner of the said properties. 8. The respondent Corporation thus also became owner of the property No. B-90 New Agra bearing Corporation No. 36/116 and 36/52 known as Hindustan Mutual Quarter, New Agra (hereinafter referred to premises in dispute). 9. The facts as stated in the application are that the applicants claim that their uncle Sri R.D. Sharma was a tenant of the erstwhile owner, a private Insurance Company, which later on merged with the present Corporation and therefore by operation of law, the premises in dispute along with other assets of that private company merged and vested in the respondent Corporation. 10. On 25.3.2003 the applicants Munna Lal Sharma and Bablu were put to notice by the respondent corporation to vacate the premises in dispute within a period of thirty days of the receipt of notice. By this notice, which is on record as Annexure 1 to the writ petition, in para 3, the applicants were informed that they were occupying the premises unauthorisedly and they had no right to occupy the said premises. The notice further declares that the occupation of the applicants is absolutely unauthorised and since they claim tenancy being the heirs of R.D. Sharma, a notice of termination of tenancy was being served on them. 11. The applicants replied to the said notice through their lawyer on 22.4.2003, which is also on record. In the said reply, the applicants denied that they were in unauthorised occupation of the premises in dispute. In para 7 of the said reply is quoted hereinbelow : “7. That the para 6 of your notice is wrong and denied. The tenancy of my client cannot be legally terminated through this notice and the tenancy of my client still subsists.” 12. Thus, by virtue of reply, the applicants claimed that the tenancy subsisted on that date and claimed that they continued to be tenants. 13. That the para 6 of your notice is wrong and denied. The tenancy of my client cannot be legally terminated through this notice and the tenancy of my client still subsists.” 12. Thus, by virtue of reply, the applicants claimed that the tenancy subsisted on that date and claimed that they continued to be tenants. 13. On 14.4.2003, the respondent Corporation filed a petition under Sections 4 and 7 of the Act of 1971 in which they sought the relief of eviction of applicants from the premises in dispute along with a decree for the grant of future and pendente lite mesne profits. 14. Thereafter on 20.10.2003 the Estate Officer issued a show cause notice to the applicants under Section 4 of the Act of 1971 and stated the grounds on which the tenancy was to be terminated. The applicants were called upon to show cause on or before 4.11.2003 why an order of eviction should not be made and also called upon the applicants to appear before him along with evidence, which the applicants intended to produce in support of the cause to be shown on 4.11.2003. 15. The applicants were also issued a notice to show cause under Section 7 of the Act of 1971 on the same date, by which damages in respect of unauthorised use and occupation of premises in dispute were sought to be imposed on them. The date for hearing of this notice was also fixed on 4.11.2003 and the case was registered as case No. A-43 of 2003. 16. On 12.2.2004 the applicants filed their written statement before the Estate Officer. The written statement as filed by the applicants is on record as Annexure 5 and in para 2 and 3 of the written statement, the applicants admitted the relationship of the landlord and tenants between the applicants and the respondent. 17. The applicants have also placed on record order-sheet dated 13.4.2004, which reflects that four issues were framed on the basis of the pleadings of the parties before the Estate Officer. The respondent Corporation filed its evidence in the shape of affidavit sworn by one Brij Mohan and the applicants were granted time to file evidence and reply to the affidavit of evidence as filed by the Corporation. 18. The respondent Corporation filed its evidence in the shape of affidavit sworn by one Brij Mohan and the applicants were granted time to file evidence and reply to the affidavit of evidence as filed by the Corporation. 18. The applicants have further placed on record as Annexure 7 order-sheet dated 4.11.2004, which is reproduced below : “4.11.2004 On behalf of O.P. Advocate Sri On behalf of A.P. Corporation Sri Shabya AAO Estate and Sri P.K. Singhal and Advocate Sri R.K. Jain are present. P.K. Gulati is present. Evidences on behalf of O.P. is already filed on 17.8.0 and O.P. counsel could not file remaining evidence as desired by him on last date. O.P.’s counsel does not want to file further evidence. AP requested to file its rejoinder affidavit. Next date is fixed on 1.12.04 at 10.30 A.M.” 19. Thereafter the respondent Corporation was granted time to file rejoinder affidavit and on 1.12.2004 an opportunity was granted to the applicants to file written argument by 6.1.2005. 20. On 8.4.2005 an order was passed by the Estate Officer under Section 5 (1) as well as Section 7 of the Act of 1971 granting time to the applicants to vacate the disputed public premises within 15 days from the date of publication of the said order. The damages were also imposed at the rate of Rs. 2000/- per month for unauthorised use and occupation and damages were fixed at Rs. 46,533/- for the period from 1.5.2003 to 8.4.2005. The order dated 8.4.2005 declared the applicants to be unauthorised occupants and therefore held that the Corporation was entitled to vacate the applicants from the premises. 21. Being aggrieved by the order dated 8.4.2005, the applicants filed an appeal under Section 9 of the Act of 1971 before the District Judge, Agra being Misc. Appeal No. 71 of 2005 and the appeal of the applicants was also dismissed confirming the order of the Estate Officer by which the applicants were held to be unauthorised occupants. 22. Learned counsel for the applicants has very strenuously argued mainly three points—Firstly that the Estate Officer acted without jurisdiction; secondly the Estate Officer did not follow the procedure as prescribed under the Act of 1971; and thirdly the respondent Corporation which is statutory Corporation did not act fairly as is expected of statutory Corporation. 23. 22. Learned counsel for the applicants has very strenuously argued mainly three points—Firstly that the Estate Officer acted without jurisdiction; secondly the Estate Officer did not follow the procedure as prescribed under the Act of 1971; and thirdly the respondent Corporation which is statutory Corporation did not act fairly as is expected of statutory Corporation. 23. In support of the first argument, the learned counsel for the applicants has argued that the notice issued by the Corporation under Section 4 read with Section 7 of the Act of 1971 is illegal. He placed reliance on the provisions of Section 2 (g) of the Act aforesaid, which is quoted below : “2 (g) “unauthorised occupation”, in relation to any public premises, means the occupation by any person of the public premises without authority for such occupation, and includes the continuance in occupation by any person of the public premises after the authority (whether by way of grant or any other mode of transfer) under which he was allowed to occupy the premises has expired or has been determined for any reason whatsoever.” 24. Learned counsel for the applicants has also argued that the notice, which was issued on 25.3.2003 firstly stated that the applicants were unauthorised occupants because they had claimed tenancy being the heirs of erstwhile tenants and thereafter the tenancy of the applicants was terminated. Therefore the argument is that the respondent Corporation did not admit the applicants to be tenants and in fact stated that the alleged tenancy was being terminated. Therefore his argument is that really speaking the L.I.C. did not admit the applicants as tenants and therefore the ground of eviction as mentioned in the notice that the tenancy stands terminated is beyond the pleadings made by the respondent corporation. Therefore no ground exists for termination of tenancy.Therefore the arguments as advanced by the learned counsel for the applicants leads to the conclusion that the alleged notice dated 25.3.2003 cannot be regarded as a valid notice of termination of tenancy. 25. Therefore no ground exists for termination of tenancy.Therefore the arguments as advanced by the learned counsel for the applicants leads to the conclusion that the alleged notice dated 25.3.2003 cannot be regarded as a valid notice of termination of tenancy. 25. Learned counsel for the applicants further argued that the notice under Section 7 of the Act of 1971 as issued for damages was also bad because the period for damages was limited i.e. from 1.5.2003 to 14.8.2003 and from 15.8.2003 to 20.10.2003 whereas in the prayer clause only mesne profits at the rate of Rs.10,000/- per month besides taxes, cost of notice and also future and pendente lite mesne profits together with interest at the rate of 15% per annum had been claimed. Both the arrears of rent and damages for the period 15.8.2003 to 20.10.2003 had been claimed and therefore he has argued that the Estate Officer has not applied his mind fully to the issue in hand and as such the notice was bad. 26. The second argument of the learned counsel for the applicants was that the procedure as adopted by the Estate Officer was illegal and the Estate Officer did not fix any date for recording of evidence. He has argued that the order-sheet dated 4.11.2004 reflects only an affidavit of evidence was given but no opportunity to cross-examine the witness was given to the applicants. 27. Thereafter on 1.12.2004 time was granted upto 6.1.2005 to file written argument but the Estate Officer did not record any evidence. For this purpose the learned counsel for the applicants has relied heavily on the decision in the case of New India Assurance Company Ltd. v. Nusli Neville Wadia and another, (2008) 3 SCC 279 and has relied on the said decision to advance his argument that the witness who intends to prove the facts has a right to cross examine the witness and even though the Statute may not specifically provide for cross-examination but it is a part of the principles of affording an opportunity of the natural justice to cross-examine and therefore it is indefeasible right. 28. 28. Learned counsel for the applicants further argued that in the memo of appeal filed by the applicants, a specific objection has been taken in para 3 of the said appeal that the Estate Officer has failed to adhere to, the procedure as laid down under the Act and in fact the Estate Officer has not conducted a proper trial. 29. Learned counsel for the applicants has argued that the appellate Court did not either consider this objection nor did it give any finding on this and therefore the Court below failed to comply with the provisions of Rule 5 of the relevant rules. 30. Learned counsel for the applicants has relied on decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Raghunath Jewat Bhapur v. Estate of Orissa and others, JT 1998 (8) SC 483. 31. Learned counsel has argued that in a situation where the Court below has failed to consider the evidence properly, it would be open to the High Court to interfere with the conclusion of such inferior tribunal. For the said purpose, he has relied on another decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Trimak Ganga Dhar Telang and another v. Ram Chandra Ganesh Bhide, AIR 1977 SC 1222 . 32. Learned counsel for the applicants has also argued that the L.I.C. of India has framed guidelines for dealing with matters relating to the L.I.C. and has relied on decision in the case of Persis Kothawala v. L.I.C., 2004 AIHC 2613. In this case, the Hon’ble Bombay High Court has held that the L.I.C. must adhere to the guidelines so fixed by them. However when the matter of Bombay High Court went to the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court did not agree with the view of the Bombay High Court and dismissed the special leave petition. 33. Lastly the learned counsel for the applicants has argued that the status of the applicants was that of a hereditary tenant and has placed various decisions to establish the fact that the applicants were hereditary tenants. He has also relied on the following decisions : (1) Shiv Nath v. Shree Ram Bharose Lal, AIR 1969 All. 333 (FB); (2) Raman Lal v. Bhagwan Das, AIR 1950 All. 583 ; (3) Budhsen v. Sheel Chandra Agrawal, AIR 1978 All. 88 ; (4) P.S. Gandhi v. Commissioner of Wealth Tax, 1983 (2) ARC 509. 34. He has also relied on the following decisions : (1) Shiv Nath v. Shree Ram Bharose Lal, AIR 1969 All. 333 (FB); (2) Raman Lal v. Bhagwan Das, AIR 1950 All. 583 ; (3) Budhsen v. Sheel Chandra Agrawal, AIR 1978 All. 88 ; (4) P.S. Gandhi v. Commissioner of Wealth Tax, 1983 (2) ARC 509. 34. Ultimately the learned counsel for the applicants has argued that although the applicants had a valid tenancy, it had not been determined in accordance with law. 35. In reply to the arguments as advanced by the learned counsel for the applicants, Sri Manish Goyal appearing on behalf of the L.I.C. of India has argued that the points as raised by the applicants are devoid of substance. 36. On the first point, learned counsel for the respondent has replied that the Estate Officer very well acted in accordance with law and exercised jurisdiction properly as vested in him by the law. He has argued that the Estate Officer issued a show cause notice to the applicants on the basis of the petition received from the Corporation, which contained not only the grounds on which he had issued a show cause notice but also indicated the notice issued by the Corporation dated 25.3.2003. 37. Sri Manish Goyal has argued that the notice as issued by the Corporation dated 25.3.2003 was a valid notice of the termination of tenancy and the Estate Officer has rightly come to the conclusion that the tenancy had been terminated by way of the notice dated 25.3.2003. 38. Sri Goyal has argued that the notice dated 25.3.2003 was categorical one and the rights claimed by the applicants as tenants were brought to a legal end by the Corporation by means of the said notice and such rights were specifically terminated by the notice in question. 39. He has argued that the Corporation claimed on one side that the applicants were unauthorised occupants whereas the applicants claimed to be tenants. Thus he has argued that both the ingredients as contained under the provisions of Section 2 (g) of the Act defining “unauthorised occupation” were available in the present case and because the applicants continued to occupy the premises after the termination, they became in unauthorised occupation of the premises in dispute. 40. Thus he has argued that both the ingredients as contained under the provisions of Section 2 (g) of the Act defining “unauthorised occupation” were available in the present case and because the applicants continued to occupy the premises after the termination, they became in unauthorised occupation of the premises in dispute. 40. Therefore Sri Goyal has argued that the Estate Officer has in fact applied his mind and after going through the notice dated 25.3.2003, has clearly specified ground on which the order of the eviction was proposed to be made as contemplated under Section 4 (2)(a) of the Act and similar notice under Section 7 of the Act for damages was also a valid one. 41. In reply to the second point that the Estate Officer did not follow the procedure as prescribed under the Act was also denied by Sri Goyal who stated that in fact the Estate Officer has given a show cause notice dated 20.10.2003 to the applicants to file their affidavit to show cause and had also granted an opportunity to them to produce all evidence in respect of the show cause notice. The show cause notice also gave an opportunity to the applicants for personal hearing. 42. Sri Goyal has next argued that it is also on record that evidence of the Corporation was taken first and thereafter the applicants were allowed to file their reply as well as evidence for rebuttal and was also granted opportunity to file further evidence. In fact he argued that the applicants availed the said opportunity to file evidence but the order dated 4.11.2004 discloses that the applicants did not wish to file further evidence and on the next date, i.e. 1.12.2004 an opportunity was also granted to the applicants to file written argument. 43. Learned counsel for the respondent argued that the summary of evidence produced was recorded point-wise and the Estate Officer framed four issues. He has argued that the documentary evidence had been noticed and based on the said documentary evidence, the Estate Officer recorded findings. The order of the Estate Officer is on record as Annexure 9 to the application. 44. In reply to the third argument, the Corporation, which is statutory Corporation has not acted fairly. He has argued that the documentary evidence had been noticed and based on the said documentary evidence, the Estate Officer recorded findings. The order of the Estate Officer is on record as Annexure 9 to the application. 44. In reply to the third argument, the Corporation, which is statutory Corporation has not acted fairly. Learned counsel for the respondent has argued that the applicants, failed to establish by its pleadings in the application as well as in its argument as to how the Corporation has not acted fairly or in accordance with law. 45. On the contrary, learned counsel for the respondent has argued that the applicants were no doubt in unauthorised occupation and had wrongly inducted themselves in public premises as heirs of one late R.D. Sharma and in fact had not been able to establish their locus standi as tenants on the basis of heirship to remain as tenants with the Corporation. 46. Learned counsel for the respondent Corporation has argued that the applicants were in fact a “rank trespasser” and “unauthorised occupants” of the public premises and therefore the Corporation was well within its rights to seek the eviction of the applicants from the public premises. 47. In reply, the learned counsel for the applicants has argued that the L.I.C. had not followed the guidelines framed by it for the conduct of its business. Learned counsel for the respondent Corporation has argued that it is well settled in law that the guidelines are not statutory in nature. In fact he has brought to the notice of the Court on a recent decision in the case of Shree Bhagwan Goyal v. Life Insurance Corporation of India and others, 2008 (1) ARC 734 wherein this Court has come to the conclusion that the guidelines of the L.I.C. are neither statutory nor mandatory in character. Thus the Allahabad High Court has not agreed with the view taken by the Bombay High Court in the case of Persis Kothawala (supra) and in fact Allahabad High Court has expressed agreement with the view of the Division Bench of Delhi High Court in the case of Uttam Prakash Bansal v. Life Insurance Corporation of India and others, (2002) 100 DLT 487. A special leave petition against the judgment of this High Court had been dismissed by the Supreme Court. 48. A special leave petition against the judgment of this High Court had been dismissed by the Supreme Court. 48. In so far as the judgment as cited by the applicants in the case of New India Assurance Company Ltd. v. Nusli Neville Wadia (supra) is concerned, the Supreme Court while considering the matter pertaining to the view of the Delhi High Court in the case of Uttam Prakash Bansal v. LIC of India, (2002) 100 DLT 487 has also recorded conclusion that the guidelines are merely advisory and therefore the learned counsel for the respondents has argued that by necessary implication on the issue of the guidelines, the view of the Bombay High Court has been disapproved by the Supreme Court. Even otherwise the learned counsel has argued that the guidelines were in respect of other business of the L.I.C. and did not concern matters relating to the eviction and renewal of the tenancy under the Act of 1971, which is a special Act. 49. Even otherwise the learned counsel for the respondent has argued that although the learned counsel for the applicant has argued that the guidelines had not been followed, yet the learned counsel for the applicants has failed to lay any foundation in the application to establish how the guidelines were not followed or were violated and as a result of which, the applicants may have suffered any prejudice. 50. The argument of the learned counsel for the applicant as stated, has been simply made for the sake of making it and does not carry any water. 51. Learned counsel for the respondent has in fact in furtherance of his argument argued that the respondent Corporation has acted in accordance with law and fairly and the orders of both the Courts below are well reasoned and justified. He has placed reliance on a decision of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Shree Bhagwan Goyal v. Life Insurance Corporation of India and others, (supra) for demonstrating that the guidelines are neither statutory nor mandatory in nature and the action of the Corporation cannot be termed to be unjustifiable by not observing the said guidelines. In fact he has argued that the guidelines are not binding upon the Corporation. In any case, the guidelines are not instructions in which the proceedings are to be conducted under the provisions of Act of 1971, which is a special Act. In fact he has argued that the guidelines are not binding upon the Corporation. In any case, the guidelines are not instructions in which the proceedings are to be conducted under the provisions of Act of 1971, which is a special Act. 52. Learned counsel for the respondent has placed before this Court an order of the Apex Court dated 14.3.2008 by which the Apex Court did not interfere with the judgment of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Shree Bhagwan Goel (supra). 53. Learned counsel for the respondent has relied in the case of Jiwan Dass v. Life Insurance Corporation of India, 1994 Supp (3) SCC 694 wherein the Supreme Court held that Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act does not contemplate of giving any reason for terminating the tenancy. Equally the definition of “unauthorized occupation” as given in Section 2 (g) of the Act of 1971 postulates that the tenancy has been determined in any reason whatsoever and therefore when the Statute itself has given wide power to the public authorities under the Act of 1971 to determine the vacancy, it is not permissible to cut width of the powers by reading into it the reasonable and justifiable grounds for initiating action for terminating the tenancy under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. The extract of para 4 of the reports is reproduced below : “……If it is so read Section 106 of T.P. Act and Section 2 (g) of the Act would become ultra vires. The statute advisedly empowered the authority to act in the public interest and determine the tenancy or leave or licence before taking action under Section 5 of the Act. If the contention of the appellant is given acceptance he would be put on a higher pedestal than a statutory tenant under the Rent Act. Take for example that a premises is let out at a low rent years back like the present one. The rent is unrealistic. With a view to revise adequate market rent, tenant became liable to ejectment. The contention then is, action is violative of Article 21 offending right to livelihood. This contention too is devoid of any substance. An owner is entitled to deal with his property in his own way profitable in its use and occupation. The rent is unrealistic. With a view to revise adequate market rent, tenant became liable to ejectment. The contention then is, action is violative of Article 21 offending right to livelihood. This contention too is devoid of any substance. An owner is entitled to deal with his property in his own way profitable in its use and occupation. A public authority is equally entitled to use the public property to the best advantage as a commercial venture. As an integral incidence of ejectment of a tenant/licensee is inevitable. So the doctrine of livelihood cannot indiscriminately be extended to the area of commercial operation. Therefore, we do not find any substance in the contentions of the appellant. The appeal is accordingly dismissed. No costs.” 54. Learned counsel for the respondent has also placed reliance on a decision of the Apex Court in the case of M/s. Jain Ink Manufacturing Company v. Life Insurance Corporation of India, AIR 1981 SC 670 . In this decision, the Apex Court has considered the scope and effect of Section 2 (g) of the Act of 1971 and has held that the procedure under the said Act is summary in nature and therefore the law as held in this case still holds field and it being the special Act will override all other Acts. Para 8 of the reports is reproduced below : “8. In the light of the principles laid down in the aforesaid cases, we would test the position in the present case. So far as the Premises Act is concerned, it operates in a very limited field in that it applies only to a limited nature of premises belonging only to particular sets of individuals, a particular set of juristic persons like companies, corporations or the Central Government. Thus, the Premises Act has a very limited application. Secondly, the object of the Premises Act is to provide for eviction of unauthorised occupants from public premises by a summary procedure so that the premises may be available to the authorities mentioned in the Premises Act which constitute a class by themselves. Thus, the Premises Act has a very limited application. Secondly, the object of the Premises Act is to provide for eviction of unauthorised occupants from public premises by a summary procedure so that the premises may be available to the authorities mentioned in the Premises Act which constitute a class by themselves. That the authorities to which the Premises Act applies are a class by themselves is not disputed by the counsel for the appellant as even in the case of Northern India Caterers Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Punjab, (1967) 3 SCR 399 : AIR 1967 SC 1581 such authorities were held to form a class and, therefore, immune from challenge on Article 14 of the Constitution. Similarly, the summary procedure prescribed by the Premises Act is also not violative of Art. 14 as held by this Court in Maganlal Chhagganlal (P) Ltd. v. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay, (1975) 1 SCR 1 : ( AIR 1974 SC 2009 ).” 55. Learned counsel for the applicants has placed heavy reliance on the case of New India Assurance Company Ltd. v. Nusli Neville Wadia (supra) but this case is completely distinguishable from the case of the applicants because this case was heard and decided at the interlocutory stage where the opportunity to lead evidence was denied and it was not a final order. 56. Sri Goyal argued that in this case itself two categories of “unauthorised occupation” were classified—one was of ‘rank trespasser’ and second was a matter where there was a breach of conditions of tenancy and in such case there was no necessity to lead any evidence by the landlord. It was only in the first category of the case in the case of rank trespasser that positive evidence might be required to be led by the landlord. 57. Thirdly, in the said judgment it has also been held that the guidelines are merely advisory in character and not mandatory. 58. Fourthly, the learned counsel for the respondent has argued that the said judgment did not take into account the judgment of Supreme Court in the case of M/s. Jain Ink Manufacturing Co. AIR 1981 SC 670 (supra) and also it did not consider Jiwan Dass (supra) 1994 Supp (3) SCC 694. 59. I have heard both sides at length and also have perused the materials on record as well as two orders passed by the Court below. AIR 1981 SC 670 (supra) and also it did not consider Jiwan Dass (supra) 1994 Supp (3) SCC 694. 59. I have heard both sides at length and also have perused the materials on record as well as two orders passed by the Court below. 60. I have also perused four issues as framed in para 5 of the order passed by the Estate Officer, which are as under : (i) Whether notice terminating the tenancy of the O.P.’s is valid and legal ? (ii) Whether O.P.’s are in arrears of rent if so at what rate ? (iii) Whether O.P.’s are unauthorized occupants and are liable to be evicted. (iv) Whether O.P.’s are liable to pay damages if so at what rate? 61. From the perusal of the order passed by the Estate Officer, it is abundantly clear that the Estate Officer went into the matter point by point and he came to the conclusion that the notice sent by the respondent corporation to the applicants dated 25.3.2003 was a valid and legal notice and it conclusively brought to an end the so-called tenancy of the applicants and the requirement of law has been fully complied with. 62. In so far as the arrears of rent was concerned, also the Estate Officer came to the correct conclusion that on the basis of the decision of the Supreme Court that it is open to a landlord to bring the tenancy to a legal end even if there is no arrears of rent. 63. On the third issue also, the Estate Officer has rightly came to the conclusion that because the notice dated 25.3.2003 effectively brought to an end the so-called tenancy of the applicants thirty days thereafter, they became unauthorised occupants within the meaning of Section 2 (g) of the Act and were therefore liable to be evicted. 64. On the fourth issue which relates to the damages, the Estate Officer has also examined the matter thoroughly and came to the conclusion that looking into the location of the disputed property and its current market rate of rent, the damages were fixed at the rate of Rs. 2000/- per month. 65. Thus in my opinion the order and conclusion of the Estate Officer on all four issues were correctly arrived at. 2000/- per month. 65. Thus in my opinion the order and conclusion of the Estate Officer on all four issues were correctly arrived at. The appellate authority also examined the matter at length and came to the conclusion that the order and conclusion of the Estate Officer had been correctly arrived at. 66. From the facts as revealed from the application and the material on record, it is clear that the notice dated 25.3.2003 clearly terminated the tenancy of the applicants and thirty days thereafter the applicants had become unauthorised occupants under the provisions of Section 2 (g) of the Act of 1971. 67. The fact that the tenancy was brought to an end, is also clear apart from the reply sent by the applicants to the L.I.C. which is also on record. In para 7 of the said reply, the applicants clearly stated that their tenancy could not be terminated by the notice dated 25.3.2003. Here the question arose that in what manner could the alleged tenancy of the applicants be terminated? It seems that the condition is that the status of the applicants as tenants was in a different class altogether. They were not tenants under the Rent Act. Although they claimed tenancy under the Transfer of Property Act, the same could not be terminated under the provisions of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. Then again the question arises as to how the tenancy could have been terminated. 68. In my opinion the answer has been given by the Apex Court in the decision of Jiwan Dass v. Life Insurance Corporation of India (supra) wherein the Apex Court has recognized the validity of the action on the part of the respondent Corporation to take action to terminate the tenancy under the Act of 1971. 69. Therefore in the facts and circumstances of the case, I come to the conclusion that notice as given by the respondent Corporation on 25.3.2003 would justifiably be termed as a proper notice under the provisions of Section 116 of the Transfer of Property Act and thirty days thereafter as given in the notice, the applicants were no doubt in unauthorized occupation of the premises in dispute. 70. 70. In so far as the procedure as adopted by the Estate Officer is concerned, it is also clear that the Estate Officer gave a proper show cause notice and also gave a proper opportunity to the applicants to adduce evidence. The applicants had adduced the evidence and thereafter did not wish to file any further evidence. This is evident from the order-sheet dated 13.4.2004 appended as Annexure 6 to the application. In fact, later on applicants were also given an opportunity to file written argument. As has been held by the Supreme Court in the cases of the referred earlier, the proceedings under the Act of 1971, which is a special Act, are summary in nature and have been made in manner to subserve the purpose for which the Act itself has been enacted. It cannot be said that in this case the applicants were denied any opportunity of hearing or of leading evidence as is required under the provisions of the Act. 71. Thirdly so far as the guidelines are concerned, the guidelines, which have been framed by the L.I.C. are for the conduct of their day-to-day business to deal with it but are not concerned with proceedings under the Act of 1971. 72. In so far as the contention of the applicants that as they have not been dealt with fairly is concerned, the applicants have failed to make out case as what was the unfairness done to them. The applicants do not disclose unfairness to which the applicants may have been subjected to. 73. Lastly the entire tenor of the present application as well as the arguments as made by the learned counsel for the applicants, suggests that the tenancy of the applicants was even above the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act, although they claimed their right under the Transfer of Property Act. Learned counsel for the applicants failed to produce before the Court as to under what procedure, their tenancy could have been terminated even though under the provisions of both Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act as well as Section 2 (g) of the Act of 1971, it is open to the landlord owner of the property to terminate even a valid tenancy for any reason whatsoever. 74. 74. I, therefore, come to the conclusion that the arguments as raised by the learned counsel for the applicants have no substance and he has failed to substantiate his case and lead the Court to come to the conclusion that the impugned orders dated 8.4.2005 and 11.4.2008 are illegal or without jurisdiction or need to be interfered with by this Court in its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 75. On the other hand, the contentions of the learned counsel for the respondent are very well founded which lead to the conclusion that the orders passed by the Estate Officer as well as the appellate authority are well established and in accordance with law and require no interference by this Court. 76. The application is devoid of merit and is dismissed. No costs. ————