ORDER K.K. SASIDHARAN, J. 1. The petitioner has preferred the above Contempt Petition with a prayer to punish the respondent for their failure to comply with the direction as contained in the judgment dated 14.9.2005 in O.S.A. No. 162 of 2005. While considering the Contempt Application, the Registry entertained a doubt as to whether the contempt application is maintainable on account of absence of specific direction in the judgment in O.S.A. No. 162 of 2005 so as to attract the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act . The papers returned by the Registry were represented by the petitioner with a prayer to post the matter before the Bench for maintainability and accordingly the matter has come before us. 2. In the affidavit filed in support of the application, it is the case of the petitioner that he is an exporter of onion and in the course of the said business, he took a Marine Insurance Policy from the respondent, in respect of the goods so exported. Since the goods dispatched by the petitioner for export were decayed and destroyed due to negligence of the carrier, the petitioner claimed the amount from the respondent being the insurer and the said claim was repudiated by the respondent. Subsequently, the petitioner preferred a complaint before the Insurance Ombudsman and there was a direction by the Ombudsman to the respondent to dispose the claim after reconsideration as per order dated 9.5.2001. Accordingly, all the documents were submitted for fresh consideration by the respondent, but however, the respondent failed to dispose the claim made for a sum of Rs. 12,92,280/- with interest. Therefore, treating the award dated 9.5.2001 as an executable award, the petitioner filed Execution Petition before this Court and the said application was rejected as not maintainable by the Master as per order dated 19.7.2004. The said order was challenged by the petitioner in Appeal No. 396 of 2004 and the said appeal was dismissed as per order dated 24.9.2004. Therefore, treating the award dated 9.5.2001 as an executable award, the petitioner filed Execution Petition before this Court and the said application was rejected as not maintainable by the Master as per order dated 19.7.2004. The said order was challenged by the petitioner in Appeal No. 396 of 2004 and the said appeal was dismissed as per order dated 24.9.2004. The order of dismissal dated 24.9.2004 was taken up in O.S.A. No. 162 of 2005 and it is the case of the petitioner that in paragraph 11 of the judgment dated 14.9.2005 in O.S.A. No. 162 of 2005, this Court had granted relief in his favour and in spite of the said direction, the respondent failed to settle the claim and as such the respondent is liable to be punished under Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. 3. The prayer in the writ petition is for a mandamus directing the respondent to pay a sum of Rs. 12,92,280/- with interest at 12% from the date of order with cost. The facts as narrated in the writ petition is the same as in the affidavit filed in support of the application for initiating contempt proceedings against the respondent. 4. This Court as per order dated 27.9.2007 issued notice to the respondent in the contempt proceedings and accordingly the respondent had entered appearance and filed counter disputing the contentions of the petitioner. 5. The matter was heard on 5.2.2008 and in view of the issues involved in the matter and to resolve the dispute, the matter was referred to Lok Adalath and as the parties failed to arrive at a compromise, the matter has come up again for consideration. 6. The issue that arise for consideration is as to whether the contempt petition is maintainable in the absence of positive direction in the judgment dated 14.9.2005 in O.S.A. No. 162 of 2005. 7. It is not in dispute that the petitioner had preferred a complaint before the Insurance Ombudsman, Chenhai and the said complaint was disposed off by the Ombudsman as per Award dated 9.5.2001 with a direction to the respondent to process and dispose the claim immediately and it was further stated in the said Award that the complaint is treated as allowed for statistical purpose. It appears that the claim was again processed by the respondent and the same was rejected as per order dated 25.9.2001. It appears that the claim was again processed by the respondent and the same was rejected as per order dated 25.9.2001. The matter was taken up again by the petitioner before the Insurance Ombudsman and ultimately as per Award No. 10 dated 27.2.2002, the complaint was dismissed. However, without disclosing the dismissal of the complaint as per Award dated 27.2.2002 on the file of Insurance Ombudsman, Chennai, the petitioner filed an Execution Petition before the Original side of this Court for a direction to execute the award dated 9.5.2001. Having found that there is no executable award, the application was rejected by the Master as per order dated 19.7.2004 in E.P. Diary No. 10438 of 2004 and the said order was taken up in appeal and the appeal was dismissed as per order dated 24.9.2004 in Appeal No. 3015 of 2004. Aggrieved by the said order, the petitioner has filed O.S.A. No. 162 of 2005 before this Court. In the judgment dated 14.9.2005 in O.S.A. No. 162 of 2005, this Court found that there was no specific direction in the award against the Insurance Company to accept the claim of the petitioner and direction was only to dispose the claim afresh. The claim was again considered by the Insurance Company and the claim was once again negatived. This Court rejected the contention of the petitioner and the appeal was accordingly dismissed. However, liberty was granted to the petitioner to invoke other remedies available to him as per law and the petitioner was also permitted to submit further representation if he is so advised and the respondent was directed to consider the same without reference to the earlier orders passed in the said proceedings. The liberty granted by this Court as per para 11 of the judgment in O.S.A. No. 162 of 2005 and the direction given to the respondents to consider the claim in accordance with law and on merits appears to have been taken as a positive direction by the petitioner which resulted in filing the contempt petition, having found that the claim has not been settled by the respondent. 8. It is true that in a proceeding for contempt, the Court is concerned only with the compliance of its binding decision. 8. It is true that in a proceeding for contempt, the Court is concerned only with the compliance of its binding decision. Neither it is possible for the Court to undertake scrutiny of its own order nor for the contemnor to agitate the legality or correctness of the decision in contempt proceedings. The remedy of the aggrieved is only to challenge the decision before the higher Court in the manner known to law. In case the decision had become final, there is no other alternative for the party against whom such directions were given than to comply with the order in its letter and spirit. 9. However, things would be different when there is no positive direction issued by the Court for due compliance. Without giving a positive direction in case the matter is left to be decided by the authorities on merits and in accordance with law, and in the event of taking a decision by the authority one way or the other, it cannot be said that they have violated the orders of the Court giving rise to an action for contempt of Court. Very often Courts are issuing mandamus to statutory authorities and other authorities within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India without considering the claim of the parties on merits. There is no occasion for the Court in such cases to examine the legality or otherwise of the claim and the matter is left to the decision of the concerned authority. In the event of disposal of such matters by the authorities in a particular manner, the remedy of the aggrieved party is only to challenge the decision before the appropriate forum. There is no room for initiating contempt proceedings in such matters even if the decision is erroneous or unsustainable in law. 10. While disposing the appeal in O.S.A. No 162 of 2005 this Court merely permitted the petitioner to submit representation to the respondent and (sic) the respondent was directed to consider the same on merits and in accordance with law. In fact, the appeal was dismissed on merits and it was only with a view to give further opportunity to the petitioner to submit documents in support of his claim that this Court granted liberty as per para 11 of the judgment. In fact, the appeal was dismissed on merits and it was only with a view to give further opportunity to the petitioner to submit documents in support of his claim that this Court granted liberty as per para 11 of the judgment. There was no positive direction given by this Court to consider the claim in a particular manner so as to give cause of action to the petitioner to initiate contempt action in the event of repudiation of claim once again by the respondent. The present contempt proceeding is unwarranted and is clearly not maintainable. 11. The Apex Court in Rajesh Kumar Singh v. H.C. of Judicature of M.P., Gwalior (2008) 1 MLJ (Crl) 915 : 2007 (9) SCALE 44 considered the question of exercise of contempt jurisdiction and held thus at p. 924 of MLJ: “18. This Court has repeatedly cautioned that the power to punish for contempt is not intended to be invoked or exercised routinely or mechanically, but with circumspection and restraint. Courts should not readily infer an intention to scandalize Courts or lowering the authority of Court unless such intention is clearly established. Nor should they exercise power to punish for contempt where mere question of propriety is involved. In Rizwanul-Hasan v. State of Uttar Pradesh 1953 SCR 581 , this Court reiterated the well settled principle that jurisdiction in contempt is not to be invoked unless there is real prejudice which can be regarded as a substantial interference with the due course of justice. Of late, a perception that is slowly gaining ground among public is that sometimes, some Judges are showing over-sensitiveness with a tendency to treat even technical violations or unintended acts as contempt. It is possible that it is done to uphold the majesty of Courts, and to command respect. But Judges, like everyone else, will have to earn respect. They cannot demand respect by demonstration of ‘power’. Nearly two centuries ago, Justice John Marshall, the Chief Justice of American Supreme Court warned that the power of Judiciary lies, not in deciding cases, nor in imposing sentences, nor in punishing for contempt, but in the trust, confidence and faith of the common man. The purpose of the power to punish for criminal contempt is to ensure that the faith and confidence of the public in administration of justice is not eroded. The purpose of the power to punish for criminal contempt is to ensure that the faith and confidence of the public in administration of justice is not eroded. Such power, vested in the High Courts, carries with it great responsibility. Care should be taken to ensure that there is no room for complaints of ostentatious exercise of power. Three acts, which are often cited as examples of exercise of such power are: (i) punishing persons for unintended acts or technical violations, by treating them as contempt of Court; (ii) frequent summoning of Government Officers to Court (to sermonize or to take them to task for perceived violations); and (iii) making avoidable adverse comments and observations against persons who are not parties. It should be remembered that exercise of such power, results in eroding the confidence of the public, rather than creating trust and faith in the judiciary. Be that as it may.” 12. It is trite that proceeding under Contempt of Courts Act is quasi criminal in nature. As such, contempt proceeding cannot be taken so lightly and in a routine manner. The primary burden lies on the party complaining of violation of the order of the Court or failure to comply with the positive direction given by the Court in a particular matter and contempt machinery could be invoked only on such demonstration of acts of contempt. 13. On a perusal of the award given by the Insurance Ombudsman as well as the judgment of this Court in O.S.A. No. 162 of 2005 dated 14.9.2005 we are of the considered opinion that there was no positive direction in those proceedings for compliance by the respondent in a particular manner. The direction was only to consider the representation in accordance with law and on merits without reference to the earlier (orders passed in those proceedings. Such being the case, there is no room for initiating contempt proceedings against the respondent on the basis of the allegations as found mentioned in the affidavit in support of the contempt petition. As such, we are inclined to reject the contempt petition as not maintainable. 14. In the result, the contempt petition P.D. No. 10814 of 2006 is rejected and the objection raised by the registry is sustained. W.P. No. 5821 of 2008 15. The writ petition has been preferred by the very same petitioner in Contempt Petition PD. As such, we are inclined to reject the contempt petition as not maintainable. 14. In the result, the contempt petition P.D. No. 10814 of 2006 is rejected and the objection raised by the registry is sustained. W.P. No. 5821 of 2008 15. The writ petition has been preferred by the very same petitioner in Contempt Petition PD. No. 10814 of 2006 for a writ of mandamus directing the respondent to pay the amount as per the award dated 9.5.2001 on the file of the Insurance Ombudsman, Chennai. 16. We have heard the petitioner who appeared in person as well as Thiru K.S. Narasimhan, learned counsel for the respondent. 17. According to the petitioner, the Insurance Ombudsman had considered the claim and the same was allowed with a direction to the respondent to pay the amount. The petitioner further contended that the said direction had the approval of this Court as per judgment dated 14.9.2005 in O.S.A. No. 162 of 2005 and as such the petitioner is entitled for a writ of mandamus to be issued to the respondent to pay the claim amount. 18. We have gone through the award of the Insurance Ombudsman dated 9.5.2001 and 27.2.2002 as well as the judgment dated 14.9.2005 in O.S.A. No. 162 of 2005. 19. It is true that the claim of the petitioner was considered by the Insurance Ombudsman and ultimately the matter was returned by the respondent with a direction to process and dispose the claim immediately and the petitioner had also submitted the relevant documents as made mentioned in the said award for consideration by the respondent. The complaint was treated as allowed for statistical purpose. Subsequently, it appears that the claim was re-considered by the respondent and they have rejected the claim once again as per proceedings dated 25.9.2001. The matter was taken up again by the petitioner before the Insurance Ombudsman, Chennai and on consideration of the rival contentions, the Insurance Ombudsman was pleased to dismiss the complaint as per Award No. 10 dated 27.2.2002. However, without explaining in so many words about the subsequent developments, the petitioner appears to have filed Execution Petition before this, Court and the same was rejected by the Master culminating in filing an appeal by the petitioner and the said appeal was also dismissed by order dated 24.9.2004 in Appeal No. 3015 of 2004. However, without explaining in so many words about the subsequent developments, the petitioner appears to have filed Execution Petition before this, Court and the same was rejected by the Master culminating in filing an appeal by the petitioner and the said appeal was also dismissed by order dated 24.9.2004 in Appeal No. 3015 of 2004. It was only the said order dated 29.4.2004 in Appeal No. 3015 of 2004 which was challenged before this Court and the Division Bench of which one of us was a party (Mr. Justice P.K. MISRA,) considered the entire issues raised in the matter including the award dated 9.5.2001 as well as the subsequent award dated 27.2.2002 and accordingly the Original Side Appeal was dismissed. There is a clear finding in the judgment dated 14.9.2005 that there is no specific direction in the award dated 9.5.2001 against the respondent to settle the claim. When there is no positive direction in the award dated 9.5.2001 the petitioner cannot be heard to say that there is a valid award in his favour capable of execution. 20. The claim appears to have been rejected by the respondent mainly on the ground that there was clear violation of policy conditions and various norms for forwarding perishable cargo were not followed by the petitioner. Admittedly, the contract is a non-statutory one and the claim was repudiated by the respondent interpreting the terms and conditions of the policy. Without taking steps to agitate the matter before the Civil Court or before other appropriate forum, the petitioner has filed the writ petition for issue of a writ of mandamus for payment of the amount claimed by him. 21. The Apex Court in Director of Settlements, A.P. and 14 Others v. M.R. Apparao and Another (2004) 4 SCC 638 considered the conditions precedent for issuance of a writ of mandamus and held thus: “17. Coming to the third question, which is more important from the point of consideration of the High Court’s power for issuance of mandamus, it appears that the Constitution empowers the High Court to issue writs, directions or orders in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III and for any other purpose under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It is, therefore essentially, a power upon the High Court for issuance of high prerogative writs for enforcement of fundamental rights as well as non-fundamental or ordinary legal rights, which may come within the expression “for any other purpose”. The powers of the High Courts under Article 226 though are discretionary and no limits can be placed upon their discretion, they must be exercised along the recognised lines and subject to certain self-imposed limitations. The expression “for any other purpose” in Article 226 , makes the jurisdiction of the High Courts more extensive but yet the Courts must exercise the same with certain restraints and within some parameters. One of the conditions for exercising power under Article 226 for issuance of a mandamus is that the Court must come to the conclusion that the aggrieved person has a legal right, which entitles him to any of the rights and that such right has been infringed, in other words, existence of a legal right of a citizen and performance of any corresponding legal duty by the State or any public authority, could be enforced by issuance of a writ of mandamus. “Mandamus” means a command. It differs from the writs of prohibition or certiorari in its demand for some activity on the part of the body or person to whom it is addressed. Mandamus is a command issued to direct any person, corporation, inferior Courts or Government, requiring him or them to do some particular thing therein specified which appertains to his or their office and is in the nature of a public duty. A mandamus is available against any public, authority including administrative and local bodies, and it would lie to any person who is under a duty imposed by a statute or by the common law to do a particular act. In order to obtain a writ or order in the nature of mandamus, the applicant has to satisfy that he has a legal right to the performance of a legal duty by the party against whom the mandamus is sought and such right must be subsisting on the date of the petition (Kalyan Singh v. State of U.P.). The duty that may be enjoined by mandamus may be one imposed by the Constitution, a statute, common law or by rules or orders having the force of law. The duty that may be enjoined by mandamus may be one imposed by the Constitution, a statute, common law or by rules or orders having the force of law. When the aforesaid principle is applied to the case in hand, the so-called right of the respondents, depending upon the conclusion that the Amendment Act is constitutionally invalid and, therefore, the right to get interim payment will continue till the final decision of the Board of Revenue, cannot be sustained when the Supreme Court itself has upheld the constitutional validity of the Amendment Act in Venkatagiri case on 6.2.1986 in Civil Appeals Nos. 398 and 1385 of 1972 and further declared in the said appeals that interim payments are payable till determination is made by the Director under Section 39(1) . The High Court in exercise of power of issuance of mandamus could not have said anything contrary to that on the ground that the earlier judgment in favour of the respondents became final, not being challenged. The impugned mandamus issued by the Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the teeth of the declaration made by the Supreme Court as to the constitutionality of the Amendment Act would be an exercise of power and jurisdiction when the respondents did not have the subsisting legally enforceable right under the very Act itself. In the aforesaid circumstances, we have no hesitation to come to the conclusion that the High Court committed serious error in issuing the mandamus in question for enforcement of the so-called right which never subsisted on the date, the Court issued the mandamus in view of the decision of this Court in Venkatagiri case. In our view, therefore, the said conclusion of the High Court must be held to be erroneous.” 22 . In the present case, there is no legal duty cast on the respondent to pay the amount de hors the policy and unless and until it is established by the petitioner on the basis of documents that he is entitled to claim the amount from the respondent, no direction could be given for such payment. It is not as if the respondent had agreed to pay the amount or that a valid award is in operation against the respondent. In fact, the matter requires adjudication by taking evidence in view of the disputed facts involved in the claim. It is not as if the respondent had agreed to pay the amount or that a valid award is in operation against the respondent. In fact, the matter requires adjudication by taking evidence in view of the disputed facts involved in the claim. Admittedly, the claim has already been repudiated by the respondent and as such the burden of proof is on the petitioner to substantiate his claim by adducing evidence and it is not possible in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to resolve such disputes. Therefore, the remedy of the petitioner is to approach the civil Court or other appropriate forum for the purpose of his grievances. 23. In the facts and circumstances of the case, we are not inclined to entertain this writ petition and as such the writ petition is liable to be dismissed. However, the dismissal of this writ petition will not prevent the petitioner from taking appropriate proceedings for realisation of the loss alleged to have been sustained by him and in the event of initiation of such proceedings, it is always open to the petitioner to apply for condonation of delay in preferring such claims in view of the pendency of the proceedings before various forums. 24. The writ petition is dismissed with the above observation. No costs. Writ petition dismissed.