1. These two revision petitions filed by the petitioner/assessee are disposed of jointly because the parties in the cases are same, facts are identical and common questions of law are involved. 2. The material facts giving rise to filing of these revision petitions are that the petitioner/assessee is a forest lessee and deals in the sale and purchase of timber. After cutting trees the petitioner/assessee converted them into scants and sleepers. The petitioner/assessee transferred its stock of different scants of timber valuing Rs, 2,14,800/- to its depot at Pathankot in the accounting year 1982-83. Similarly, the petitioner/assessee transferred its stock of different scants of timber valuing Rs. 20,000/- to its depot at Pathankot during the accounting year 1983-84. The petitioner/assessee claimed these transactions as tax free. The claim of the petitioner/assessee for tax free transactions was not accepted by the Assessing Authority for both the years and the Assessing Authority computed purchase tax under section 4-B of the Act for both the assessment years. The Assessing Authority created tax liability including surcharge amounting to Rs. 9,022/- for the accounting year 1982-83 vide order dated 28-01-1987 and Rs 840/- for accounting year 1983-84 vide order dated 20-01-1988. The Assessing Authority also levied interest upon the petitioner/assessee under section 8(8) of the Act. Aggrieved by the orders of the Assessing Authority, the petitioner/assessee filed two different appeals before the Dy. Commissioner, Sales Tax (Appeals), Jammu which were dismissed vide orders dated 09-03-1988 and and 20-06-1990. 3. The petitioner/assessee challenged the correctness of the impugned orders of the Appellate Authority through the medium of these revision petitions before the learned Commissioner, Sales Tax, J&K on the ground that the process of conversion of standing trees into scants or sleepers is a manufacturing activity and as such does not fall within the ambit of Section 4-B of the Act. 4. These revision petitions were transferred to this Tribunal by the learned Commissioner in pursuant to the amendment made to Section 12(1) of the Act by the J&K GST (Amendment) Act, 2000. 5. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have also perused the record on the file. 6. Mr. S. Dutt, Advocate appearing for the petitioner/assessee, has contended that the process of conversion of standing trees into scants or sleepers is a manufacturing activity and as such Section 4-B of the Act is not attracted. 5. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have also perused the record on the file. 6. Mr. S. Dutt, Advocate appearing for the petitioner/assessee, has contended that the process of conversion of standing trees into scants or sleepers is a manufacturing activity and as such Section 4-B of the Act is not attracted. In support he has relied upon the case titled Commissioner of Income Tax V/s Abdul Ahad Najar reported in 2001, JKLR 131. He has further submitted that no surcharge is leviable on purchase tax. It is also contended that the levy of interest in the matter is unjustified. Mr. M. A Bhat Advocate appearing for the revenue, on the other hand, has submitted that the activity of the petitioner/assessee is not a manufacturing activity and this Tribunal has taken this view earlier in number of cases. He has further submitted that the surcharge and the interest in the cases have been rightly levied against the petitioner/assessee. 7. From the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the parties the following issues arise in the matter:- (1) Whether Section 4-B of the Act is applicable to the case of petitioner/assessee. a. Whether surcharge tax can be charged on purchase tax levied under section 4-B of the Act. b. Whether levy of interest in the matter is justified. Issue No. I :- 8. The learned counsel for the petitioner/assessee has alleged that the petitioner/assessee has cut the standing trees and converted them in the shape of scants as such this activity is a manufacturing activity. In support he has relied upon the judgment of our Hon'ble High Court in case Commissioner of Income Tax V/s Abdul Ahad Nazzar, 2001, JKLR 131. He has also relied upon notifications/circulars issued by the state government from time to time. 9. This Tribunal in earlier cases Mali Ram and Sons V/s Dy. Commissioner and other decided on 31-03-2006 and Sudhir & Co. have held that the activity of cutting standing trees and converted them into sleepers, logs or scants is not a manufacturing activity. This Tribunal came to this decision on the ground that the notifications/circulars referred by the learned counsel for the petitioner/assessee have been superseded by SRO 195 dated 31-03-1978. Commissioner and other decided on 31-03-2006 and Sudhir & Co. have held that the activity of cutting standing trees and converted them into sleepers, logs or scants is not a manufacturing activity. This Tribunal came to this decision on the ground that the notifications/circulars referred by the learned counsel for the petitioner/assessee have been superseded by SRO 195 dated 31-03-1978. This Tribunal further held that the judgment of the Hon'ble High Court is not applicable because in that case the Hon'ble High Court held the activity as a manufacturing activity for the purpose of direct taxation i.e Income Tax Act and not on indirect taxation i.e Sales Tax. It was further held that circular No. 329 dated 22-02-1982 issued by the Government of India for Income Tax purpose was also not applicable to the case in hand. This Tribunal came to the conclusion as under:- In the light of the above discussions, it transpires that the word manufacture means making of goods or material different from the original composition by manual or mechanical processes by which a different article with distinct name character or use comes into being. In commercial background this is the meaning of manufacture. In the case under discussion it is an admitted case of the appellant, that his activities after obtaining lease of forests, what he did, was to cut standing trees and convert the trees into scants and sleepers of different dimensions. He was neither converting these cut trees or sleepers/scants into joinery i.e he was not manufacturing doors, windows, frames, almirahs, furniture, shutter tresses, ceiling, rafts, false ceiling, penalling, racks, etc. His input and output in the process remained the same, in the sense that physically & as well as chemically there was no change in the constitution of this end product i.e scants and sleepers. What was his activity, is that he only cut the standing trees & converted them into sleepers, logs/scants which is not manufacture. Trees were cut only for making them transportable. As such this activity of the appellant no where attracts the word "manufacture" and is miles away from it. Therefore, we can safely say that the activity of the appellant in cutting the standing trees and changing them into logs, scants/sleepers does not come within the ambit of manufacture. 10. Trees were cut only for making them transportable. As such this activity of the appellant no where attracts the word "manufacture" and is miles away from it. Therefore, we can safely say that the activity of the appellant in cutting the standing trees and changing them into logs, scants/sleepers does not come within the ambit of manufacture. 10. This tribunal after relying upon dictionary meaning of the word `manufacture' and after referring number of authorities of Supreme Court and High Courts reported in cases, South Bihar Sugar Mills Ltd. V/s Union of India AIR 1968 SC 922 , Hindustan Polymers V/s Collector of Central Excise, (1989) 4 SCC 323 , Ujagar Prints V/s Union of India, (1989) 3 SCC 488 , Collector of Central Excise V/s Kiran Spinning Mills, (1988) 2 SCC 348 , Collector of Central Excise V/s Technoweld Industries, [2003] 155 ELT 209, Collector of Central Excise V/s Rajasthan State Chemical Works, (1991) 4 SCC 473 , Union of India V/s Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. AIR 1963 SC 791 , State of Maharashtra V/s Mohan, (2003) (129) STC 179, Dy. Commissioner of Sales Tax (Law), Board of Revenue Taxes V/s Fargo Food Packages, (1980) 46 STC 63 (SC); State of Orissa V/s Tihaghur Paper Mills, (1985) 60 STC 213 and 87 STC 382 came to the conclusion that `manufacture' means making of goods or material different from the original composition by manual or mechanical processes by which a different article with distinct name character or use comes into being. 11. I am in aggrement with the ratio decidendi and the reasons given by my predecessor. The word `manufacture' has not been defined in the Act. It is to be interpreted as it is understood or used in common parlance. In general `manufacture' is understood as production of a good or article made from raw material by manual or mechanical process, by which a different article with distinct name, character or use comes into being for commercial purpose. In the instant case, the activity of cutting standing trees and converting them into sleepers, logs or scants is not a manufacturing activity because it does not convert or produce any different article than the original one. No different material has been made from the basic components for commercial use. 12. In the instant case, the activity of cutting standing trees and converting them into sleepers, logs or scants is not a manufacturing activity because it does not convert or produce any different article than the original one. No different material has been made from the basic components for commercial use. 12. Notifications/circulars issued under SRO 275 dated 26-06-1963 and SRO 599 dated 06-12-1974 wherein conversion and extraction of timber by the authorized lessee was included as `manufacturing activity' by adding an explanation. These notifications were superseded by SRO 195 dated 31-03-1978 and this explanation was deleted specifically. This shows the intention of the government not to treat such activity as a manufacturing activity. Also this explanation was added when the concept of purchase tax was not in the statute book. After the insertion of provision of purchase tax under section 4-B of the Act, no such notification was issued and such concept was recognized. 13. For the reasons stated above, the activity of the petitioner/assessee in cutting standing trees and converting them into sleepers, logs or scants cannot be said to be a manufacturing activity. 14. Section 4-B of the Act whereby the purchase tax was levied was inserted in the Act in the year 1981 vide Act No. XX of 1981 and it reads as under:- 4-B Levy of purchase tax:- (1) Every dealer who is liable to pay tax under this Act and who--- (a) Purchases taxable goods from any source in the State and uses them in the State in the manufacture of other goods; or (b) Purchases taxable goods from any source in the State and uses them in the State in the manufacture of any other goods and disposes of the manufactured goods in any manner otherwise than by way of sale whether within the state or in the course of interstate trade or commerce or in the course of export out of the territory of the India within the meaning of sub-section (1) of section 5 of the Central Sales Tax Act 1956: or (c) Purchases taxable goods and exports them; in the circumstances in which no tax is payable under any other provision of this Act, shall be liable to pay tax on the purchases of such goods at the same rate at which it would have been leviable on the sale price of such goods under section 4. Such tax shall be charged and paid at such point as may be specified by the Government. 15. Section 4-B of the Act is attracted when a dealer purchases taxable goods at a stage where such goods are not liable to tax but instead of resale thereof use them in manufacturing other goods or transferring the same to a place outside the state otherwise than by way of sale in the course of interstate trade or commerce or in the course of export out of the country. In the present case also the petitioner/assessee purchases taxable goods from the Forest Department of the State and transferred the goods outside the state in the course of interstate trade or commerce as such transactions are taxable under this Section. 16. For the foregoing reasons, I would hold that the transfer of stock of different scants by the petitioner/assessee to its branch at Pathankot is exigible to purchase Tax under section 4-B of the Act. Issue No. 2:- 17. The learned counsel for the petitioner/assessee has argued that no surcharge tax can be charged on purchase tax. Surcharge tax is a tax levied under section 4-A of the Act and it provides that a surcharge tax equal to 5% of the amount of tax payable under the Act by any dealer shall be charged. The word `tax' has been defined under section 2(m) of the Act as under:- 2(m): -- "Tax" means the tax leviable under [section 4 and Section 4-B] except for the purpose of sub-section (1) of section 4 includes as surcharge payable under section 4-A and tax recoverable under section 8-B In view of this clear definition of tax which includes the tax leviable under section 4-B of the Act, it is clear that surcharge tax is also payable on purchase tax. Thus the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner/assessee has no force and is hereby not accepted. Issue No. 3:- 18. The learned counsel for the petitioner has also challenged the amount of interest demanded on tax on the ground that the interest has been imposed for the period prior to the date of assessment. In support he has relied upon `Amritsari Dhaba's case'. Issue No. 3:- 18. The learned counsel for the petitioner has also challenged the amount of interest demanded on tax on the ground that the interest has been imposed for the period prior to the date of assessment. In support he has relied upon `Amritsari Dhaba's case'. Section 8(2) of the Act prior to its amendment reads as under:- "8(2): -- If the tax or any other amount due under this Act is not paid by the dealer or any other person by whom it is payable within the period specified in demand notice. The dealer or such other person shall be liable to pay interest on the tax or other amount from the date it was payable to the date of actual payment at the following rates:- iii. If the default is for a period of not exceeding three months at 1% per month; iv. If the default is for a period exceeding three months but less than six months at 2 % per month; v. If the default is for a period exceeding six months at 3% per month. Provided that where, as a result of an order under sections 11, 12, 24 or an order of the Court, the amount of tax or other sum on which interest was payable under this sub-section has been reduced, the interest shall be reduced accordingly and excess interst paid, if any, shall be refunded. 19. From the plain reading of the above provision, it is clear that this provision as it existed prior to amendment did not envisage for payment of interest prior to the period of demand notice. The interest can be levied from the date of demand of tax in the demand notice. This controversy was settled by Hon'ble High Court in case of `Amritsari Dhaba'. It was held in that case that the liability to pay interest under section 8 (2) of the Act is only if the tax is not paid within the period as specified in the demand notice. It was further held that interest becomes due only from the last date fixed from the payment of tax mentioned in the demand notice and it cannot be claimed from the date the tax was due. This clearly shows that the interest becomes due from the last date indicated in the demand notice for the payment of the tax. 20. It was further held that interest becomes due only from the last date fixed from the payment of tax mentioned in the demand notice and it cannot be claimed from the date the tax was due. This clearly shows that the interest becomes due from the last date indicated in the demand notice for the payment of the tax. 20. For the foregoing reasons it is held that no interest could have been imposed by the Assessing Authority on the petitioner/assessee prior to the date of demand notice. Thus the Assessing Authority was not justified in charging interest for the prior period of the assessment order 21. The net result of the above findings is that purchase tax and surcharge tax have been properly levied against the petitioner/assessee and there is no illegality in the orders passed by the Assessing Authority and duly confirmed by the Appellate Authority. The orders do not suffer from any infirmity or illegality. However, the orders of levying interest in the cases are illegal and are not justified. 22. Hence these revision petitions are disposed of as observed above. Files of revision petitions be consigned to records and the files of subordinate authorities be sent forthwith. Let a copy of this order be placed on each file.