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2008 DIGILAW 18 (UTT)

National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Rajat Kumar Jain

2008-01-08

RAJESH TANDON

body2008
JUDGMENT : Rajesh Tandon, J.-Heard Mr. I.P. Kohli, counsel for the appellant and Mr. D.C.S. Rawal, counsel for the claimants-respondent Nos. 1 and 3 and Mr. B.S. Parihar, counsel for respondent No. 4. 2. By the present A.O. filed u/s 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, the appellant has prayed for setting aside the award dated 12.3.2007 passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal/District Judge, Udham Singh Nagar in Motor Accident Claim Case No. 176 of 2005, Joginder Kaur v. Narendra Singh, whereby a sum of Rs. 2,66,000 has been awarded to the claimants towards compensation. 3. Briefly stated, a claim petition was filed by the claimant being M.A.C. Case No. 176 of 2005, Joginder Kaur v. Narendra Singh, u/s 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, claiming a sum of Rs. 10,00,000 towards compensation. 4. According to claimants, on 24.7.2005, when Harvilas Singh (hereinafter referred to as 'the deceased') was going to Nainital from Kashipur with his friends Hitank Jain and Ankur Gupta by driving Maruti Esteem car No. PB 10-AA 0967 (hereinafter referred to as 'the vehicle in question'), as soon as he reached near Bhotia Parao bend, a vehicle came in the mid of the road and as there were stones lying on the road and in escaping from the same, the vehicle in question got unbalanced and fell down into a ditch 500 ft deep. In this accident, the deceased and one Hitank Jain died on the spot and when Ankur Gupta was being treated, he also succumbed to the injuries. Post-mortem was conducted on 24.7.2005 at Soban Singh Jeena Base Hospital. First information report of the said incident was lodged at P.S. Tallital. At the time of the accident, the deceased was 24 years of age and was earning a sum of Rs. 84,000 per annum. 5. Narendra Singh has filed a written statement, paper No. 21 Kha, where it has been admitted that he is the registered owner of the vehicle and it has been stated that the vehicle in question was insured with National Insurance Co. Ltd. It has also been stated that at the time of accident, the driver of the vehicle in question was having valid driving licence, therefore, the liability to pay compensation is of the insurance company. 6. Ltd. It has also been stated that at the time of accident, the driver of the vehicle in question was having valid driving licence, therefore, the liability to pay compensation is of the insurance company. 6. Insurance company has filed a written statement, paper No. 17 Kha that at the time of accident, the driver of the vehicle in question was not having valid driving licence and the insurance company was not given any information about the accident. Further, it has been stated that the amount claimed by the claimants is excessive and the deceased was gratuitous passenger in the car, thus, the insurance company is not liable to pay compensation. 7. On the pleadings of the parties, the Claims Tribunal has framed the following issues: (Omitted as in vernacular) 8. On behalf of the claimants, Joginder Kaur has been examined as PW 1. Towards the documentary evidence, per list 7Ga/1 copy of the G.D., panchnama, post-mortem report, driving licence, insurance cover note and copy of the mark-sheet of the B.Com. have been filed. 9. On behalf of opposite parties, Vijay Kumar Arora has been examined as DW 1. Towards the documentary evidence, the opposite party No. 1 has filed per list 22 Ga insurance cover note, driving licence, copy of the registration certificate. Opposite party No. 2 has filed per list 27 Ga insurance policy and copy of the report of advisory committee. 10. While deciding the issue No. 1 as to whether the accident had taken place by Maruti Esteem car No. PB 10-AA 0967 in escaping from the vehicle coming from the opposite direction and as there were stones lying on the road, the Claims Tribunal has taken into consideration the statement of Joginder Kaur, PW 1 and copy of the G.D., paper No. 7Ga/l. PW 1 has stated in her statement that she is not the ocular witness of the incident. Her statement has not been believed. Claims Tribunal has relied upon the general diary, where it has been stated that in saving the vehicle coming from the opposite direction and there were stones lying on road, the vehicle in question got unbalanced and fell down into the gorge. Her statement has not been believed. Claims Tribunal has relied upon the general diary, where it has been stated that in saving the vehicle coming from the opposite direction and there were stones lying on road, the vehicle in question got unbalanced and fell down into the gorge. Relying upon the aforesaid document, the Claims Tribunal has recorded a finding that the accident had taken place on 24.7.2005 at about 4 p.m. in the area of P.S. Tallital, District Nainital by Maruti Esteem car No. PB 10-AA 0967 in escaping from the vehicle coming from the opposite side and as there were stones lying on the road, in which Harvilas Singh died. This issue has been decided in favour of the claimants. 11. While deciding the issue No. 2 as to whether at the time of accident, the driver of the vehicle in question was not holding valid driving licence, Claims Tribunal has relied upon the photocopy of the driving licence of Harvilas Singh, paper No. 19Ga/3, which shows that the same was valid at the time of accident. This issue has been decided accordingly. 12. While deciding the issue No. 3 as to whether the claimant is entitled to get any compensation, the Claims Tribunal has taken into consideration paper No. 29Ga/2 insurance policy of the vehicle in question, which shows that vehicle in question was insured for the period from 14.11.2004 to 13.11.2005 and from the insurance policy it appears that the insured had deposited the premium. Relying upon the aforesaid documents, Claims Tribunal has recorded a finding that the insurance company is liable to pay compensation. The Claims Tribunal has taken Rs. 3,000 as notional monthly income of the deceased as no documentary evidence regarding income of the deceased has been filed and has deducted 1/3rd for personal expenses and has taken Rs. 2,000 as monthly dependency (Rs. 24,000 annual dependency) of the deceased. For selection of multiplier, the Claims Tribunal has taken into consideration the age of the deceased as 24 years and mother as 49. The Claims Tribunal taking into consideration the age of the deceased as well as his parents, selected multiplier of 11. Multiplying the annual dependency with 11, the amount of compensation comes to Rs. 2,64,000. Apart from that the Claims Tribunal has awarded a sum of Rs. The Claims Tribunal taking into consideration the age of the deceased as well as his parents, selected multiplier of 11. Multiplying the annual dependency with 11, the amount of compensation comes to Rs. 2,64,000. Apart from that the Claims Tribunal has awarded a sum of Rs. 2,000 for funeral expenses and thus, Claims Tribunal has awarded a total sum of Rs. 2,66,000 to the claimants towards compensation along with simple interest at the rate of 7 per cent per annum. 13. Counsel for the appellant Mr. V.K. Kohli, Senior Advocate, has submitted that the Tribunal concerned has ignored the ratio of the Hon'ble Apex Court as given in the case of United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Shimla Vs. Tilak Singh and Others, AIR 2006 SC 1576 , in which the Supreme Court has held that the death or injury to a gratuitous passenger travelling in a private vehicle with an insurance policy u/s 147 of the Motor Vehicles Act is not covered and thus, under a statutory liability there is no coverage of gratuitous passenger even in a private vehicle. 14. Further, it has been submitted that the policy was merely a statutory policy and no additional premium for the occupants of the car has been paid, hence, the appellant company is not liable to pay the compensation to the claimants. 15. Counsel for the appellant has submitted that in view of the provisions of Section 147 of the Motor Vehicles Act and the policy issued in the present case as well as decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the gratuitous passengers in a car without payment of extra premium are not covered under the policy and the insurance company is not liable for any injury or death in relation to a gratuitous passenger. 16. A cross-objection has been filed by the claimants-respondents, where following grounds have been taken: (a) Because the amount of Rs. 3,000 as assessed the monthly income of the deceased may not have been enough to sustain the family of deceased but the learned Tribunal ignored this fact. (b) Because the deceased was a young man of about 24 years and the compensation awarded is quite on lower side which requires to be enhanced to the extent as claimed in the claim petition. (b) Because the deceased was a young man of about 24 years and the compensation awarded is quite on lower side which requires to be enhanced to the extent as claimed in the claim petition. (c) Because despite of sufficient evidence in favour of claimants-appellants, the learned Claims Tribunal has failed to award the proper compensation to the claimants-appellants and as such the amount awarded by the learned Claims Tribunal is liable to be enhanced by this Hon'ble court. (d) Because the learned Claims Tribunal has acted illegally in awarding low interest rate, i.e., 7 per cent on the awarded amount. (e) Because the amount awarded to the appellants-claimants is too meagre and same is not in accordance with the guidelines framed by the Hon'ble Apex Court. (f) Because despite of sufficient evidence in favour of claimants-appellants, the learned Claims Tribunal has failed to award the proper compensation to the claimants-appellants and as such the compensation awarded by the learned Tribunal, is liable to be enhanced. 17. Section 147 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 reads as under: 147. Requirements of policies and limits of liability.--(1) In order to comply with the requirements of this Chapter, a policy of insurance must be a policy which: (a) is issued by a person who is an authorised insurer; and (b) insures the person or classes of persons specified in the policy to the extent specified in Sub-section (2): (i) against any liability which may be incurred by him in respect of the death of or bodily injury to any person, including owner of the goods or his authorised representative carried in the vehicle or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of the vehicle in a public place; (ii) against the death of or bodily injury to any passenger of a public service vehicle caused by or arising out of the use of the vehicle in a public place. 18. In the case of New India Assurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Satender and Others, AIR 2007 SC 324 , it has been observed as under: (7) In Mallett v. McMonagle 1969 ACJ 312 (HL, England), Lord Diplock has analysed in detail the uncertainties which arise at various stages in making a rational estimate and practical ways of dealing with them. 18. In the case of New India Assurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Satender and Others, AIR 2007 SC 324 , it has been observed as under: (7) In Mallett v. McMonagle 1969 ACJ 312 (HL, England), Lord Diplock has analysed in detail the uncertainties which arise at various stages in making a rational estimate and practical ways of dealing with them. In Davies v. Taylor 1973 ACJ 66 (CA, England), it was held that the court, in looking at future uncertain events, does not decide whether on balance one thing is more likely to happen than another, but merely puts a value on the chances. A possibility may be ignored if it is slight and remote. Any method of calculation is subordinate to the necessity for compensating the real loss. But a practical approach to the calculation of the damages has been stated by Lord Wright in the case of Davies v. Powell Duffryn Associated Collieries Ltd. (1942) 1 All ER 657, in the following words: The starting point is the amount of wages which the deceased was earning, the ascertainment of which to some extent may depend on the regularity of his employment. Then there is an estimate of how much was required to be spent for his own personal and living expenses. The balance will give a datum or basic figure which will generally be turned into a lump sum by taking a certain number of years' purchase. (9) There are some aspects of human life which are capable of monetary measurement, but the totality of human life is like the beauty of sunrise or the splendour of the stars, beyond the reach of monetary tape-measure. The determination of damages for loss of human life is an extremely difficult task and it becomes all the more baffling when the deceased is a child and/or a non-earning person. The future of a child is uncertain. Where the deceased was a child, he was earning nothing but had a prospect to earn. The question of assessment of compensation, therefore, becomes stiffer. The figure of compensation in such cases involves a good deal of guesswork. In cases, where parents are the claimants, relevant factor would be age of parents. (10) In the case of death of an infant, there may have been no actual pecuniary benefit derived by the parents during the child's lifetime. The figure of compensation in such cases involves a good deal of guesswork. In cases, where parents are the claimants, relevant factor would be age of parents. (10) In the case of death of an infant, there may have been no actual pecuniary benefit derived by the parents during the child's lifetime. But this will not necessarily bar the parents' claim and prospective loss will find a valid claim provided that the parents establish that they had a reasonable expectation of pecuniary benefit if the child had lived. This principle was laid down by the House of Lords in the famous case of Taff Vale Rly. v. Jenkins (1913) AC 1 and Lord Atkinson said thus: ...all that is necessary is that a reasonable expectation of pecuniary benefit should be entertained by the person who sues, it is quite true that the existence of this expectation is an inference of fact-there must be a basis of fact from which the inference can reasonably be drawn; but I wish to express my emphatic dissent from the proposition that it is necessary that two of the facts without which the inference cannot be drawn are, first, that deceased earned money in the past and, second that he or she contributed to the support of the plaintiff. These are, no doubt, pregnant pieces of evidence, but they are only pieces of evidence; and the necessary inference can I think, be drawn from circumstances other than and different from them. [See Lata Wadhwa and Others Vs. State of Bihar and Others, AIR 2001 SC 3218 ]. (11) This Court in Lata Wadhwa and Others Vs. State of Bihar and Others, AIR 2001 SC 3218 , while computing compensation made distinction between deceased children falling within the age group of 5 to 10 years and age group of 10 to 15 years. (12) In cases of young children of tender age, in view of uncertainties abound, neither their income at the time of death nor the prospects of the future increase in their income nor chances of advancement of their career are capable of proper determination on estimated basis. The reason is that at such an early age, the uncertainties in regard to their academic pursuits, achievements in career and thereafter advancement in life are so many that nothing can be assumed with reasonable certainty. The reason is that at such an early age, the uncertainties in regard to their academic pursuits, achievements in career and thereafter advancement in life are so many that nothing can be assumed with reasonable certainty. Therefore, neither the income of the deceased child is capable of assessment on estimated basis nor the financial loss suffered by the parents is capable of mathematical computation. 19. Counsel for the appellant Mr. V.K. Kohli, Senior Advocate has vehemently stated that the provisions under which the compensation has been awarded is not applicable as neither the owner nor the driver was driving the vehicle but another person was driving the vehicle and two other persons were sitting along with the driver, therefore, they are not entitled to claim the compensation as they are not third party. In Claim Petition No. 159 of 2007, the Claims Tribunal has very rightly recorded a finding while deciding the issue No. 3 to the following effect: (Omitted as in vernacular) 20. Counsel for the appellant has also submitted that no premium has been paid for occupant and, therefore, the insurance company is not liable to indemnify the loss suffered by the claimants. 21. Section 163-A of Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, reads as under: 163-A. Special provisions as to payment of compensation on structured formula basis.--(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or in any other law for the time being in force or instrument having the force of law, the owner of the motor vehicle or the authorised insurer shall be liable to pay in the case of death or permanent disablement due to accident arising out of the use of motor vehicle, compensation, as indicated in the Second Schedule, to the legal heirs or the victim, as the case may be. Explanation.-For the purposes of this sub-section, 'permanent disability' shall have the same meaning and extent as in the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 (8 of 1923). (2) In any claim for compensation under Sub-section (1), the claimant shall not be required to plead or establish that the death or permanent disablement in respect of which the claim has been made was due to any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of the vehicle or vehicles concerned or of any other person. (2) In any claim for compensation under Sub-section (1), the claimant shall not be required to plead or establish that the death or permanent disablement in respect of which the claim has been made was due to any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of the vehicle or vehicles concerned or of any other person. (3) The Central Government may, keeping in view the cost of living by notification in the Official Gazette, from time to time amend the Second Schedule. 22. Counsel for the appellant has referred to The Oriental Insurance Company Limited Vs. Meena Variyal and Others, AIR 2007 SC 1609 , where the Apex Court has observed as under: (22) In that decision, this Court considered the question whether in a claim for compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, proof of negligence was essential to support a claim for compensation. On the facts in that case, their Lordships found that the appeal was liable to be dismissed subject to certain directions issued therein. But their Lordships, in the light of the fact that the High Court had discussed the law on the question and it was of some importance, felt that it was necessary to state the position in law. Noting that the liability of the owner of the car to compensate the victim in a car accident due to negligent driving of his servant is based on the law of Tort, the court discussed the scheme of the Act of 1939 and the law on the question. Regarding the view of the High Court that it was not necessary to prove negligence, the court held: The reasoning of the two learned Judges is unacceptable as it is opposed to basic principles of the owner's liability for negligence of his servant and is based on a complete misreading of the provisions of Chapter VIII of the Act. The High Court's zeal for what it considered to be protection of public good has misled it into adopting a course which is nothing short of legislation. Their Lordships also noticed that proof of negligence remained the lynchpin to recover compensation. The High Court's zeal for what it considered to be protection of public good has misled it into adopting a course which is nothing short of legislation. Their Lordships also noticed that proof of negligence remained the lynchpin to recover compensation. Their Lordships concluded by saying, 'We conclude by stating that the view of the learned Judges of the High Court has no support in law and hold that proof of negligence is necessary before the owner or the insurance company could be held to be liable for the payment of compensation in a motor accident claim case.' (23) Learned Counsel for the respondent contended that there was no obligation on the claimant to prove negligence on the part of the driver. Learned Counsel relied upon Gujarat State Road Transport Corpn. v. Ramanbhai Prabhatbhai 1987 ACJ 561 (SC), in support. In that decision, this Court clarified that the observations in Minu B. Mehta 's case 1977 ACJ 118 , are in the nature of obiter dicta. But, this Court only proceeded to notice that departure had been made from the law of strict liability and Fatal Accidents Act by introduction of Chapter VII-A of the 1939 Act and the introduction of Section 92-A providing for compensation and the expansion of the provision as to who could make a claim, noting that the application u/s 110-A of the Act had to be made on behalf of or for the benefit of all the legal representatives of the deceased. This Court has not stated that on a claim based on negligence there is no obligation to establish negligence. This Court was dealing with no fault liability and the departure made from Fatal Accidents Act and the theory of strict liability in the scheme of the Act of 1939 as amended. This Court did not have the occasion to construe a provision like Section 163-A of the Act of 1988 providing for compensation without proof of negligence in contradistinction to Section 166 of the Act. We may notice that Minu B. Mehta's case (supra) was decided by three learned Judges and the Gujarat State Road Trans. Corpn. 's case (supra) was decided only by two learned Judges. An obiter dictum of this Court may be binding only on the High Courts, in the absence of a direct pronouncement on that question elsewhere by this Court. We may notice that Minu B. Mehta's case (supra) was decided by three learned Judges and the Gujarat State Road Trans. Corpn. 's case (supra) was decided only by two learned Judges. An obiter dictum of this Court may be binding only on the High Courts, in the absence of a direct pronouncement on that question elsewhere by this Court. But as far as this Court is concerned, though not binding, it does have clear persuasive authority. On a careful understanding of the decision in Gujarat State Road Trans. Corpn.'s case (supra) we cannot understand it as having held that in all claims under the Act proof of negligence as the basis of a claim is jettisoned by the scheme of the Act. In the context of Sections 166 and 163-A of the Act of 1988, we are persuaded to think that the so-called obiter observations in Minu B. Mehta's case (supra) govern a claim u/s 166 of the Act and they are inapplicable only when a claim is made u/s 163-A of the Act. Obviously, it is for the claimant to choose under which provisions he should approach the Tribunal and if he chooses to approach the Tribunal u/s 166 of the Act, we cannot see why the principle stated in Minu B. Mehta's case (supra), should not apply to him, we are, therefore, not in a position to accept the argument of learned Counsel for the respondents that the observations in Minu B. Mehta's case (supra) deserve to be ignored. (24) We think that the law laid down in Minu B. Mehta v. Balkrishna Ramchandra Nayan 1977 ACJ 118 , was accepted by the legislature while enacting the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 by introducing Section 163-A of the Act providing for payment of compensation notwithstanding anything contained in the Act or in any other law for the time being in force that the owner of a motor vehicle or the authorised insurer shall be liable to pay in the case of death or permanent disablement due to accident arising out of the use of the motor vehicle, compensation, as indicated in the Second Schedule, to the legal heirs or the victim, as the case may be, and in a claim made under Sub-section (1) of Section 163-A of the Act, the claimant shall not be required to plead or establish that the death or permanent disablement in respect of which the claim has been made was due to any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of the vehicle concerned. Therefore, the victim of an accident or his dependants have an option either to proceed u/s 166 of the Act or u/s 163-A of the Act. Once they approach the Tribunal u/s 166 of the Act, they have necessarily to take upon themselves the burden of establishing the negligence of the driver or owner of the vehicle concerned. But if they proceed u/s 163-A of the Act, the compensation will be awarded in terms of the Schedule without calling upon the victim or his dependants to establish any negligence or default on the part of the owner of the vehicle or the driver of the vehicle. 23. As will appear from the aforesaid judgment of the Apex Court that the Apex Court has distinguished the liability in order to indemnify by the insurance company after taking into consideration the judgment of the Minu B. Mehta's case 1977 ACJ 118 and the case has been referred u/s 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act. 24. In view of the aforesaid, principles of law as contained u/s 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, will not apply in the present case. 25. Counsel for the appellant has also referred the judgment of United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Shimla Vs. Tilak Singh and Others, AIR 2006 SC 1576 . 26. 24. In view of the aforesaid, principles of law as contained u/s 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, will not apply in the present case. 25. Counsel for the appellant has also referred the judgment of United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Shimla Vs. Tilak Singh and Others, AIR 2006 SC 1576 . 26. This was a case u/s 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, therefore, principles will not apply in the present case. 27. Counsel for the appellant has also referred New India Assurance Company Vs. Smt. Kusum and Others, (2003) 4 KarLJ 545 . The aforesaid case was not a case u/s 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, therefore, the principles of law as contained in the said section will not apply. 28. Counsel for appellant has referred Ramashray Singh Vs. New India Assurance Co. Ltd. and Others, AIR 2003 SC 2877 . The case is not u/s 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, therefore, principles of law as contained in the said section will not apply. 29. The counsel for the appellant has referred National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Bommithi Subbhayamma and Others. In the said case, the passenger was travelling in a lorry, but in the present case, the passenger was travelling in a private car, thus, the aforesaid case-law is not applicable in the present case. 30. Counsel for the appellant has further referred Appaji (since deceased) and Another Vs. M. Krishna and Another, (2004) ACJ 1289. In the said case, the death of the deceased has caused due to his own negligence, but in the present case, the deceased was not at fault, thus, the facts of the said case are totally different and the case-law is not applicable in the present case. 31. Hon'ble Apex Court in Skandia Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Kokilaben Chandravadan 1987 ACJ 411 , has observed as under: (11) The question, therefore, deserves to be examined afresh on its own merits on principle. 31. Hon'ble Apex Court in Skandia Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Kokilaben Chandravadan 1987 ACJ 411 , has observed as under: (11) The question, therefore, deserves to be examined afresh on its own merits on principle. Now, the proposition is incontrovertible that so far as the owner of the vehicle is concerned, his vicarious liability for damages arising out of the accident cannot be disputed having regard to the general principles of law as also having regard to the violation of the obligation imposed by Section 84 of the Act which provides that no person driving or in charge of a motor vehicle shall cause or allow the vehicle to remain stationary in any public place, unless there is in the driver's seat a person duly licensed to drive the vehicle or unless the mechanism has been stopped and a brake or brakes applied or such other measures taken as to ensure that the vehicle cannot accidentally be put in motion in the absence of the driver. However, in the present case the appellant contends that the exclusion clause is strictly in accordance with the statutorily permissible exclusion embodied in Section 96 (2) (b) (ii) and that under the circumstances the appellant insurance company is not under a legal obligation to satisfy the judgment procured by the respondents. (14) ...Even if one were to make a strictly doctrinaire approach, the very same conclusion would emerge in obeisance to the doctrine of 'reading down' the exclusion clause in the light of the 'main purpose' of the provision so that the 'exclusion clause' does not cross swords with the 'main purpose' highlighted earlier. The effort must be to harmonize the two instead of allowing the exclusion clause to snipe successfully at the main purpose. This theory which needs no support is supported by Carter's Breach of Contract vide para 251. To quote: Notwithstanding the general ability of contracting parties to agree to exclusion clauses which operate to define obligations there exists a rule, usually referred to as the 'main purpose rule', which may limit the application of wide exclusion clauses defining a promissor's contractual obligations. For example, in Glynn v. Margetson & Co. To quote: Notwithstanding the general ability of contracting parties to agree to exclusion clauses which operate to define obligations there exists a rule, usually referred to as the 'main purpose rule', which may limit the application of wide exclusion clauses defining a promissor's contractual obligations. For example, in Glynn v. Margetson & Co. (1893) AC 351, Lord Halsbury, L.C. stated: It seems to me that in construing this document, which is a contract of carriage between the parties, one must in the first instance look at the whole instrument and not at one part of it only. Looking at the whole instrument, and seeing what one must regard...as its main purpose, one must reject words, indeed whole provisions, if they are inconsistent with what one assumes to be the main purpose of the contract. Although this rule played a role in the development of the doctrine of fundamental breach, the continued validity of the rule was acknowledged when the doctrine was rejected by the House of Lords in Suissee Atlantique Societe D'Armement Maritime S.A. v. N.V. Rotterdamsche Kolen Centrale (1967) 1 AC 361. Accordingly, wide exclusion clauses will be read down to the extent to which they are inconsistent with the main purpose, or object of the contract. 32. On the other hand counsel for the respondents-claimants has referred Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. Vs. Nakirikanti Narendra Babu and Others, (2006) 5 ALD 11, where High Court of Andhra Pradesh has observed as under: (11) Further in the present case, the claimant is an inmate in the car, who as per the evidence on record, has not hired or paid any reward for his travel in the car. At this juncture, it is necessary to consider 'Section II-Liability to third parties' in the insurance policy. The relevant portion under the said provision in the insurance policy, Exh. B1 is extracted as under for better appreciation: Section II. At this juncture, it is necessary to consider 'Section II-Liability to third parties' in the insurance policy. The relevant portion under the said provision in the insurance policy, Exh. B1 is extracted as under for better appreciation: Section II. Liability to third parties.- (1) The company will indemnify the insured in the event of accident caused by or arising out of the use of the motor car against all sums including claimant's costs and expenses which the insured shall become legally liable to pay in respect of, (a) death of or bodily injury to any person including occupants carried in the motor car provided that such occupants are not carried for hire or reward but except so far as is necessary to meet the requirements of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, the company shall not be liable where such death or injury arises out of and in the course of employment of such person by the insured. (12) From the above provision in the insurance policy, it is clear that insurance company is liable to third parties in case of their death or bodily injuries including occupants carried in the motor car provided that such occupants are not carried for hire or reward and the insurance company is not liable in case such death or injury arises out of and in the course of employment of such person by the insured. In the present case, as already noted above, as per the unrebutted evidence on record, the claimant who was travelling has not either hired the car or paid any reward. Further there is also no evidence on record to show that he was employed by the insured. In the light of the above provision and also in the light of the available evidence on record, the insurance company cannot disown its liability to the claimant who is a third party. A learned single Judge of High Court of Karnataka in National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Smt. Rasheeda and Another, (1997) ILR (Kar) 2697, considering Section 147 of the Act and the words 'any person' occurring in Sub-clause (i) of Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 147 of the Act, held as under: (6) .. .The expression used as "any person" is of wide connotation and includes in itself and within the framework of expression "third party" used in it any person other than the insurer and the insured. .The expression used as "any person" is of wide connotation and includes in itself and within the framework of expression "third party" used in it any person other than the insurer and the insured. It may include in itself a traveller in a private vehicle. It may also include in itself the person who is a pedestrian and has died or has been injured by the use of private vehicle on the road. It may also include the case of a pedestrian/injured or a pedestrian who has died on account of injury caused to him by the use of a vehicle, may be a public service vehicle or private vehicle. But so far as the passengers in a public service vehicle are concerned their category has been mentioned separately. The distinction in the use of two expressions in the two clauses per se reveal that any person may include a traveller in a private vehicle. The learned Counsel contended that it does not include in itself a traveller in private vehicle. I am unable to accept this contention. The private vehicle is also required to be properly insured. The object behind the provisions requiring compulsory insurance is to protect the members of community travelling in vehicles or using roads from the risk attendant upon the user of motor vehicle on roads and to make the realization of compensation a reality in terms of money to the injured as well as to the heirs or the legal representatives of the deceased who dies on account of motor accident. If two interpretations are possible it has been held that interpretation beneficial to the subject, i.e., injured or heirs of the deceased and the one which promotes object and purpose of the Act is to be adopted.... To buttress the above conclusion the learned single Judge has relied on the judgment of the Apex Court reported in Skandia Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Kokilaben Chandravadan 1987 ACJ 411 . The relevant portion of the judgment of Apex Court at para 13, is re-extracted as under for better appreciation: In order to divine the intention of the legislature in the course of interpretation of the relevant provisions there can scarcely be a better test than that of probing into the motive and philosophy of the relevant provisions keeping in mind the goals to be achieved by enacting the same. Ordinarily, it is not the concern of the legislature whether the owner of the vehicle insures his vehicle or not. If the vehicle is not insured any legal liability arising on account of third party risk will have to be borne by the owner of the vehicle. Why then has the legislature insisted on a person using a motor vehicle in a public place to insure against third party risk by enacting Section 94. Surely the obligation has not been imposed in order to promote the business of the insurers engaged in the business of automobile insurance. The provision has been inserted in order to protect the members of the community travelling in vehicles or using the roads from the risk attendant upon the user of motor vehicles on the roads. The law may provide for compensation to victims of accidents who sustain injuries in the course of an automobile accident or compensation to the dependants of victims in the case of a fatal accident. However, such protection would remain a protection on paper unless there is a guarantee that the compensation awarded by the courts would be recoverable from the persons held liable for the consequences of the accident. A court can only pass an award or a decree. It cannot ensure that such an award or decree results in the amount awarded being actually recovered from the person held liable who may not have the resources. The exercise undertaken by the law courts would then be an exercise in futility. And the outcome of the legal proceedings which by the very nature of things involve time cost and money cost invested from the scarce resources of the community would make a mockery of the injured victims or the dependants of the deceased victim of the accident, who themselves are obliged to incur not inconsiderable expenditure of time, money and energy in litigation. To overcome this ugly situation the legislature has made it obligatory that no motor vehicle shall be used unless a third party insurance is in force. To use the vehicle without the requisite third party insurance being in force is a penal offence. The legislature was also faced with another problem. The insurance policy might provide for liability walled in by conditions which may be specified in the contract of policy. To use the vehicle without the requisite third party insurance being in force is a penal offence. The legislature was also faced with another problem. The insurance policy might provide for liability walled in by conditions which may be specified in the contract of policy. In order to make the protection real, the legislature has also provided that the judgment obtained shall not be defeated by the incorporation of exclusion clauses other than those authorised by Section 96 and by providing that except and save to the extent permitted by Section 96 it will be the obligation of the insurance company to satisfy the judgment obtained against the person insured against third party risks (vide Section 96). In other words, the legislature has insisted and made it incumbent on the user of a motor vehicle to be armed with an insurance policy covering third party risk which is in conformity with the provisions enacted by the legislature. It is so provided in order to ensure that injured victims of automobile accidents or the dependants of the victims of the fatal accidents are really compensated in terms of money and not in terms of promise. Such a benign provision enacted by the legislature having regard to the fact that in the modern age the use of motor vehicles notwithstanding the attendant hazards, has become an inescapable fact of life, has to be interpreted in a meaningful manner which serves rather than defeats the purpose of the legislation. The provision has, therefore, to be interpreted in the twilight of the aforesaid perspective. 33. As will appear from the aforesaid, the insurance company cannot escape from its liability to indemnify the compensation to the claimants as the son of the claimants who was travelling has not either hired the car or paid any reward. Further there is also no evidence on record to show that he was employed by the insured. Thus, in the light of the available evidence on record, the insurance company cannot disown its liability to the claimants who is a third party. 34. Further counsel for the appellant has submitted that the multiplier, which has been selected, is on the higher side, which should not have been more than 10 as the deceased was unmarried. 35. Counsel for the appellant has further referred the judgment of The Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay Vs. 34. Further counsel for the appellant has submitted that the multiplier, which has been selected, is on the higher side, which should not have been more than 10 as the deceased was unmarried. 35. Counsel for the appellant has further referred the judgment of The Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay Vs. Shri Laxman Iyer and Another, AIR 2003 SC 4182 , where the Apex Court has observed as under: (7) At this juncture, it is necessary to refer to the 'doctrine of last opportunity'. The said doctrine is said to have emanated from the principle enunciated in Davies v. Mann 1842 (10) M&W 546, which has often been explained as amounting to a rule that when both parties are careless, the party which has the last opportunity of avoiding the results of the other's carelessness is alone liable. However, according to Lord Denning it is not a principle of law, but test of causation. [See Davies v. Swan Motor Co. (Swansea) Ltd. (1949) 2 KB 291]. Though in some decisions, the doctrine has been applied by courts, after the decisions of the House of Lords in The Volute (1922) 1 AC 129 and Swadling v. Cooper (1931) AC 1, it is no longer to be applied. The sample test is, what was the cause or what were the causes of damage. Act or omission amounting to want of ordinary care or in defiance of duty or obligation on the part of the complaining party which conjointly with the other party's negligence was the proximate cause of the accident renders it one to be the result of contributory negligence. (11) This Court in M.S. Grewal and Another Vs. Deep Chand Sood and Others, AIR 2001 SC 3660 , has clearly observed that decision in Lata Wadhwa and Others Vs. State of Bihar and Others, AIR 2001 SC 3218 , is definitely a guiding factor in the matter of award of compensation wherein children die under an unfortunate accident. The said observation was made after taking into consideration the conclusions arrived in Lata Wadhwa's case (supra), regarding the compensation which was to be paid and the multiplier which was to be applied in relation to the death of a child. This Court in General Manager, Kerala State Road Transport Corporation, Trivandrum Vs. Mrs. The said observation was made after taking into consideration the conclusions arrived in Lata Wadhwa's case (supra), regarding the compensation which was to be paid and the multiplier which was to be applied in relation to the death of a child. This Court in General Manager, Kerala State Road Transport Corporation, Trivandrum Vs. Mrs. Susamma Thomas and others, AIR 1994 SC 1631 , held that the proper method of compensation is the multiplier method and the same view was reiterated in M.S. Grewal's case (supra) observing that 'needless to say that multiplier method stands accepted by this Court in the said decision'. (12) Keeping in view the observations made by this Court in various cases, several other factors need to be taken note of. The deceased was unmarried. The contribution to the parents who had their separate earnings being employed and educated has relevance. Possibility of reduction in contribution once a person gets married is a reality. Compensation is relatable to the loss of contribution or the pecuniary benefits. The multiplier adopted by the Tribunal and confirmed by the High Court is certainly on the higher side. Considering the age of the claimants, it can never exceed 10 even by the most liberal standards. Worked out on that basis the amount comes to Rs. 3,60,000 at the monthly expected income fixed by the Tribunal and confirmed by the High Court. Looking into the nature of the contributory negligence of the deceased after making an appropriate deduction which can reasonably be fixed at 25 per cent, the compensation amount payable by the Corporation can be fixed at Rs. 3,00,000 including the amount awarded by the Tribunal and confirmed by the High Court for loss of expectation of life. Interest at the rate as awarded by the High Court is maintained from the date of application for compensation. 36. In view of the above, keeping in view the evidence available on the record the multiplier of 11 is reduced to 10. Thus, the insurer will be liable to pay compensation to the extent of Rs. 2,42,000. Rest of the conditions will remain the same. 37. Subject to aforesaid, A.O. is dismissed. No order as to costs. The cross-objection is dismissed too.