JUDGMENT Sham Sunder, J.:-This judgment shall dispose of Crl. Appeal No. 103-SB of 1994, filed by Mandip Singh, Sewa Singh and Raghbir Singh, against the judgment of conviction and the order of sentence dated 22.02.1994, rendered by the Court of Additional Sessions Judge, Kapurthala, vide which it convicted them, for the offence, punishable under Section 15 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (hereinafter referred to be as the ‘Act’ only) and sentenced them to undergo RI for a period of 10 years each and to pay a fine of Rs.1 lac each, in default of payment of fine to undergo further rigorous imprisonment, for a period of 1-1/2 years each, for having been found in possession of 18 bags each containing 30 Kgs 250 grams poppy husk, without any permit or licence, and Criminal Appeal No. 1077-SB of 2000, filed by Manjit Singh, appellant against the judgment of conviction and the order of sentence dated 19.09.2000, rendered by the Judge, Special Court, Kapurthala, vide which he convicted him, for the offence, punishable under Section 15 of the Act and sentenced him to undergo RI for a period of 10 years and to pay a fine of Rs. 1 lac, in default of payment of fine to undergo further rigorous imprisonment, for a period of 1 year, for having been found in possession of 18 bags each containing 30 Kgs and 250 grams poppy husk, without any permit or licence. 2. The facts, in brief, are that on 07.01.1990 Puran Singh, SI/ SHO, Police Station Kotwali Kapurthala along with Surinder Singh, ASI and other Police officials held a picket on the metalled road, near village Dainwind, where at about 8.30 pm, a tractor trolley from the side of Kartarpur, came. The tractor was being driven by Manjit Singh, accused. Puran Chand, S.I. gave a signal by flashing his torch to stop the tractor, the make whereof was international. The truck was stopped by the driver thereof. Mandip Singh, Sewa Singh and Raghbir Singh, accused, were found sitting in the trolley. The accused were told by Puran Chand, Sub Inspector, that he wanted to conduct the search of tractor-trolley. Thereafter, he conducted the search of the same, as a result whereof, 18 bags , each containing 30 Kgs 250 grams poppy husk, were found lying therein, which had been covered under the dry paddy straw. The accused were told by Puran Chand, Sub Inspector, that he wanted to conduct the search of tractor-trolley. Thereafter, he conducted the search of the same, as a result whereof, 18 bags , each containing 30 Kgs 250 grams poppy husk, were found lying therein, which had been covered under the dry paddy straw. From each bag, he took out a sample of 250 grams poppy husk. The remaining poppy husk came to be 30 Kgs in each bag. The same was kept in those bags. The bags, and the samples, were converted into parcels, duly sealed, and taken into possession, vide a separate recovery memo. The tractor trolley was also taken into possession, vide a separate recovery memo. The site plan was prepared. All the accused, aforesaid, were arrested. The statements of the witnesses were recorded. After the completion of investigation, the accused were challaned. 3. On their appearance, in the Court, the accused were supplied the copies of documents, relied upon by the prosecution. Charge under Section 15 of the Act, was framed against the accused, to which they pleaded not guilty and claimed judicial trial. 3-A. It is pertinent to mention here that, a separate trial of Manjeet Singh, accused, was held, as he absented from the Court, during the course of prosecution evidence, and was declared proclaimed offender. Later on he was arrested. 4. The prosecution, in support of its case, examined Subhash Chander, Clerk, DTO Office, Kapurthala, (PW-1), Puran Chand, Inspector, (PW-2), and Skattar Singh, HC, (PW-3), in the Sessions case, out of which Criminal Appeal No. 103-SB of 1994 arose. 4-A. In the Sessions case, out of which Criminal Appeal No. 1077-SB of 2000 arose, the prosecution examined Puran Chand, retired DSP, (PW-2), Sukhdev Singh, MHC, (PW-3), Chanan Singh, C. (PW-4), Rajinder Singh, ASI, (PW- 5), and Surinder Singh, ASI, (PW-6). Thereafter, the Additional Public Prosecutor for the State, closed the prosecution evidence. 5. The statements of the accused, under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, were recorded. They were put all the incriminating circumstances, appearing against them, in the prosecution evidence. They pleaded their false implication. Mandip Singh, accused, in his statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C., stated that his father had a dispute with his uncle Partap Singh. It was further stated by him that they were involved in this case, at the instance of Bhagat Singh, Inspector. 6. They pleaded their false implication. Mandip Singh, accused, in his statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C., stated that his father had a dispute with his uncle Partap Singh. It was further stated by him that they were involved in this case, at the instance of Bhagat Singh, Inspector. 6. The same plea was taken up by Sewa Singh and Raghbir, accused, in their statements, recorded, under Section 313 Cr.P.C. In their defence, they placed reliance on the statement of Kashmir Singh, Constable, who produced the case diary dated 07.01.1990 of Police Station Kotwali, copy whereof Ex.DA. 6-A. Manjit Singh, accused, in his statement, recorded, under Section 313 Cr.P.C., stated that nothing was recovered from him, but he was falsely implicated. He also examined Sahib Singh, DW-1, and Charanjit Singh, DW-2, in his defence. Thereafter, the accused, closed their defence evidence. 7. After hearing the Additional Public Prosecutor for the State, the Counsel for the accused, and, on going through the evidence, on record, the trial Courts, convicted and sentenced the accused, as stated hereinbefore. 8. Feeling aggrieved, against the judgments of conviction, and the orders of sentence, rendered by the trial Courts, the instant appeals, were filed by the appellants. 9. I have heard the Counsel for the parties, and have gone through the evidence and record of the case, carefully. 10. The Counsel for the appellants, at the very outset, contended that no independent witness was joined, despite availability, and, as such, the case of the prosecution became doubtful. The submission of the Counsel for the appellants, in this regard, does not appear to be correct. No secret information had been received, against the accused that they were coming in a tractor-trolley, loaded with bags, containing poppy husk, and could be apprehended, if a picket was held. The Police party held a picket, in routine, when the tractor-trolley, loaded with bags, containing poppy husk, came. The driver, thereof, was Manjit Singh accused, and the other accused, were sitting in the trolley. It was, thus, a chance recovery. No doubt, Puran Chand, SI/SHO, the Investigating Officer, when appeared in the witness box as PW-2, in the Sessions case, out of which, Criminal Appeal No. 1077-SB of 2000 has arisen, during the course of cross-examination, stated that passengers were boarding the buses, and getting down therefrom. It was, thus, a chance recovery. No doubt, Puran Chand, SI/SHO, the Investigating Officer, when appeared in the witness box as PW-2, in the Sessions case, out of which, Criminal Appeal No. 1077-SB of 2000 has arisen, during the course of cross-examination, stated that passengers were boarding the buses, and getting down therefrom. Puran Chand, retired DSP, when appeared in the witness box as PW-2, in the Sessions Case, out of which, Criminal Appeal No. 103-SB of 1994, has arisen, during the course of cross-examination, stated that there was a liquor vend, near the bus stand. He further stated that there was also a tea stall, at the bus stand. He further stated that flour mill was also there, but all these establishments were closed, at that time. He further stated that he sent an official to village Dainwind to associate witnesses from the public, but none was available. It means that an effort was made, to join an independent witness, but the Investigating Officer did not succeed. There is nothing, on the record, that at the time of recovery, any independent witness was available, but he was not intentionally and deliberately joined. If despite efforts, having been made by the Investigating Officer, he was not successful, in joining an independent witness, then his conduct could not be said to be blame-worthy. In Akmal Ahmed Vs. State of Delhi, 1999(2) RCC 297 (S.C.), it was held that, it is now well-settled that the evidence of search or seizure, made by the police will not become vitiated, solely for the reason that the same was not supported by an independent witness. In State of NCT of Delhi Vs. Sunil (2000)I S.C.C. 748, it was held as under:- “It is an archaic notion that actions of the Police officer, should be approached with initial distrust. It is time now to start placing at least initial trust on the actions and the documents made by the Police. At any rate, the Court cannot start with the presumption that the police records are untrustworthy. As a proposition of law, the presumption should be the other way round. The official acts of the Police have been regularly performed is a wise principle of presumption and recognized even by the Legislature.” 10-A. In Appa Bai and another Vs. At any rate, the Court cannot start with the presumption that the police records are untrustworthy. As a proposition of law, the presumption should be the other way round. The official acts of the Police have been regularly performed is a wise principle of presumption and recognized even by the Legislature.” 10-A. In Appa Bai and another Vs. State of Gujrat, AIR 1988 S.C. 696, it was held that the prosecution story cannot be thrown out, on the ground, that an independent witness had not been examined, by the prosecution. It was further held, in the said authority, that the civilized people, are generally insensitive, when a crime is committed, even in their presence, and they withdraw from the victims’ side, and from the side of the vigilant. They keep themselves away from the Courts, unless it is inevitable. Moreover, they think the crime like a civil dispute, between two individuals, and do not involve themselves, in it. The principle of law, laid down, in the aforesaid authorities, is fully applicable to the facts of the present case. In these circumstances, mere non-joining of an independent witness, when the evidence of the prosecution witnesses, has been held to be cogent, convincing, creditworthy, and reliable, and there was no reason, on their part to falsely implicate the accused, no doubt, is cast on the prosecution story. In this view of the matter, the submission of the Counsel for the appellants, being without merit, must fail, and the same stands rejected. 11. It was next submitted by the Counsel for the appellants, that only one sample of poppy husk, instead of two samples, from each of the bags, was taken, and as such, a prejudice was caused to the accused. The submission of the Counsel for the appellants, in this regard, does not appear to be correct. There is no requirement under the provisions of the Act, as also the Rules, framed thereunder, that two samples out of each bag, containing poppy husk, recovered from the accused, should be taken. Since there is no requirement of law, in this regard, in my opinion, taking of one sample from each of the bags, did not at all infringe either any vire of the Act or the Rules framed thereunder. Since there is no requirement of law, in this regard, in my opinion, taking of one sample from each of the bags, did not at all infringe either any vire of the Act or the Rules framed thereunder. The main object of taking the sample, is that the same should contain sufficient quantity of the contraband, so as to enable the Chemical Examiner to analyze the same, and come to the conclusion, as to whether, the same constituted a particular contraband or not. In the instant case, when the sample parcels were sent to the Chemical Examiner, he found the quantity thereof to be sufficient for the purpose of conducting analysis. The Chemical Examiner, conducted the analysis of the contents of the sample parcels, sent to it, and, ultimately, came to the conclusion that the same constituted poppy husk. No prejudice , in my considered opinion, was caused on account of taking of only one sample from each of the bags. Under these circumstances, the submission of the Counsel for the appellants, being without merit, must fail, and the same stands rejected. 12. It was next submitted by the Counsel for the appellants that CFSL form, was not prepared, at the spot, by the investigating officer, and, as such, the link in the chain of prosecution evidence, became incomplete. The submission of the Counsel for the appellants, in this regard, does not appear to be correct. There is no provision in the Act, as also in the Rules, framed thereunder that the aforesaid form, should be prepared, at the spot, and if it is not so prepared, then the trial, conviction and sentence shall stand vitiated. The form is required to be prepared, so as to send the same along with the sample parcels. Under these circumstances, if the same was not prepared, at the spot, that did not transgress any provision of the Act or the Rules framed thereunder. Under these circumstances, the Investigating Officer, did not commit any irregularity or illegality, in not preparing the form, aforesaid, at the spot, and rather preparing the same later on, at the time of sending the sample parcels to the Chemical Examiner. The submission of the Counsel for the appellants, being without merit, must fail, and the same stands rejected. 13. Under these circumstances, the Investigating Officer, did not commit any irregularity or illegality, in not preparing the form, aforesaid, at the spot, and rather preparing the same later on, at the time of sending the sample parcels to the Chemical Examiner. The submission of the Counsel for the appellants, being without merit, must fail, and the same stands rejected. 13. It was next submitted by the Counsel for the appellants, that though the alleged recovery was effected in this case on 07.01.1990, yet the samples were sent to the office of the Chemical Examiner on 16.01.1990 i.e. after the delay of 09 days, which remained unexplained, as a result whereof, the possibility of tampering with the same, until the same reached the Laboratory, could not be ruled out. The submission of the Counsel for the appellants, in this regard, does not appear to be correct. It is, no doubt, true that there is no explanation, with regard to delay, in sending the samples to the office of the Chemical Examiner. However, mere delay, in itself, is not sufficient to come to the conclusion, that the sample parcels were tampered with, until the same reached the office of the Laboratory. The other evidence, produced by the prosecution, has been held to be cogent, convincing, reliable and trustworthy. From the other evidence, it was proved that none tampered with the samples, until the same reached the office of the Chemical Examiner. Even, there is report of the Chemical Examiner Ex.P-E, which clearly proves that the seals on the exhibits were intact on arrival, till the time of their analysis, and agreed with the specimen impression of the seals. The report, referred to above, is per-se admissible, in toto, under Section 293 of the Code of criminal Procedure. There is no challenge to the report of the Chemical Examiner, in this case. In State of Orissa Vs. Kanduri Sahoo 2004(1) RCR (Criminal) 196 (S.C.), it was held that mere delay in sending the samples to the Laboratory, is not fatal, where there is evidence that the seized articles remained in safe custody. Since, it was proved that none tampered with the samples, until the same were received in the office of the Chemical Examiner, the submission of the Counsel for the appellants, merely based on conjectures, does not hold good. Since, it was proved that none tampered with the samples, until the same were received in the office of the Chemical Examiner, the submission of the Counsel for the appellants, merely based on conjectures, does not hold good. The principle of law, laid down, in the aforesaid authority, is fully applicable to the facts of the instant case. The submission of the Counsel for the appellants, in this regard, being without merit, must fail, and the same stands rejected. 14. It was next submitted by the Counsel for the appellants that the seal, after use, was handed over to a Police official, by the Investigating Officer, as a result whereof, the possibility of tampering with the sample parcels, which were sent to the office of the Chemical Examiner, after a period of nine days, could not be ruled out. The submission of the Counsel for the appellants, in this regard, does not appear to be correct. As stated above, no independent witness could be joined, as none was available, at the time of search and seizure. It was, under these circumstances that the seal after use was handed over to another Police official, a member of the party. Thus, the possibility of the tampering with the sample parcels, until the same reached the office of the Chemical Examiner, did not at all arise. In Piara Singh Vs. The State of Punjab 1982 C.L.R. (2) 447, a case decided by a Full Bench of this Court, the seal, on the sample of illicit liquor, recovered from the accused, was not entrusted to an independent person forthwith. Similarly, the independent person, though entrusted with the seal, by the Investigating Officer, later on, was not produced as a witness. In these circumstances, it was held that this fact alone, was not sufficient to affect the merits of the trial, and the prosecution case, could not be thrown out, on that score alone. It was further held, in this case, that it was not incumbent upon the Police Officer, to hand over the seal, to a third person forthwith, and even, in cases, where he had done so, it was not obligatory upon him, to produce such person, as a witness, during trial, as there is no statutory requirement, whatsoever, to this effect. The principle of law, laid down, in the aforesaid authority, is fully applicable to the facts of the present case. The principle of law, laid down, in the aforesaid authority, is fully applicable to the facts of the present case. From the cogent, convincing, reliable, and trustworthy evidence, produced by the prosecution, the completion of link evidence was proved. In this view of the matter, the finding of the trial Court, is endorsed. 15. It was next submitted by the Counsel for the appellants that the conscious possession of the accused, in respect of the contraband, was not at all proved, by the prosecution. He further submitted that the mere fact that Manjit Singh, accused, was allegedly driving the tractor and the other accused were sitting in the trolley, did not mean that they were either in possession of the contraband, or in conscious possession thereof. . The submission of the Counsel for the appellants, in this regard, does not appear to be correct. As many as 18 bags, containing poppy husk, were lying in the trolley. One of the accused was driver of the tractor, and the others were sitting on the bags, lying in the trolley. It was not a small quantity of poppy husk, which was lying in the tractor-trolley, and could escape the notice of the accused. It was a big haul of poppy husk, which was lying in the tractor-trolley. It could not possibly escape the notice of the accused. The accused were having special means of knowledge, with regard to the bags, containing poppy husk, lying in the trolley. It was for the accused to explain, as to how, the bags, containing poppy husk, were lying in the trolley and to which destination, the same were being transported. The accused, however, failed to explain the circumstances, aforesaid. The accused were, thus, found in possession of, and in control over the bags, containing poppyhusk, lying in the tractor-trolley. Once the possession of the accused, and their control over the contraband, was proved, then statutory presumption under Sections 54 and 35 of the Act, operated against them, that they were in conscious possession thereof. Thereafter, it was for them, to rebut the statutory presumption, by leading cogent and convincing evidence. However, the appellants, failed to rebut the said presumption, either during the course of cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses, or by leading defence evidence. In these circumstances, the trial Court was right, in holding that they were in conscious possession of the contraband. Thereafter, it was for them, to rebut the statutory presumption, by leading cogent and convincing evidence. However, the appellants, failed to rebut the said presumption, either during the course of cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses, or by leading defence evidence. In these circumstances, the trial Court was right, in holding that they were in conscious possession of the contraband. Section 54 of the Act ibid reads as under :- “Presumption from possession of illicit articles:- In trials under this Act, it may be presumed, unless and until the contrary is proved, that the accused has committed an offence under this Act, in respect of:- a) any narcotic drug or psychotropic substance or controlled substance; b) any opium poppy, cannabis plant or coca plant growing on any land which he has cultivated; c) any apparatus specially designed or any group of utensils specially adopted for the manufacture of any narcotic drug or psychotropic substance or controller substance; or d) any materials which have undergone any process towards the manufacture of a narcotic drug or psychotropic substance or controlled substance, or any residue left of the materials from which any narcotic drug or psychotropic substance or controlled substance has been manufactured,for the possession of which he fails to account satisfactorily.” 15-A. Section 35 which relates to the presumption of culpable mental state, is extracted as under:- “Presumption of culpable mental state:- (1) In any prosecution for an offence under this Act, which requires a culpable mental state of the accused, the Court shall presume the existence of such mental state but it shall be a defence for the accused to prove the fact that he had no such mental state with respect to the act charged as an offence in that prosecution. Explanation:- In this section “culpable mental state” includes intention, motive knowledge of a fact and belief in, or reason to believe, a fact. Explanation:- In this section “culpable mental state” includes intention, motive knowledge of a fact and belief in, or reason to believe, a fact. (2) For the purpose of this section, a fact is said to be proved only when the court believes it to exist beyond a reasonable doubt and not merely when its existence is established by a preponderance of probability.” 15-B. From the conjoint reading of the provisions of Sections 54 and 35, referred to hereinbefore, it becomes abundantly clear, that once the accused, are found to be in possession of a contraband, they are presumed to have committed the offence, under the relevant provisions of the Act, until the contrary is proved. According to Section 35 of the Act ibid, the Court shall presume the existence of mental state, for the commission of an offence, and it is for the accused to prove otherwise. In Madan Lal and another Vs. State of H. P. 2003 SCC (Crl.) 1664 it was held as under:- The word “conscious” means awareness about a particular fact. It is a state of mind which is deliberate or intended. Once possession is established, the person who claims that it was not a conscious possession has to establish it, because how he came to be in possession is within his special knowledge. Section 35 of the Act gives a statutory recognition of this position because of the presumption available in law. Similar is the position in terms of Section 54 where also presumption is available to be drawn from possession of illicit articles.” 15-C. The facts of Madan Lal’s case (supra) in brief, were that accused Manjit Singh was driving the Car and the remaining four accused, were sitting therein. One steel container (dolu) in a black coloured bag, was recovered from the said Car, which contained 820 gms. charas. All the accused were convicted and sentenced by the trial Court, holding that they were found in conscious possession of charas, despite the fact, that one of the accused, admitted his conscious possession of the contraband. The Apex Court held that the trial Court, was right, in coming to the conclusion, that the accused were found in conscious possession of charas, as they had failed to explain, as to how they were travelling in a Car together, which was not a public vehicle. The Apex Court held that the trial Court, was right, in coming to the conclusion, that the accused were found in conscious possession of charas, as they had failed to explain, as to how they were travelling in a Car together, which was not a public vehicle. The Apex Court upheld the conviction, and sentence, awarded to the accused. In the instant case, the accused failed to explain, as to how, 18 bags containing poppy husk, referred to above, were found in the tractor-trolley, which was being driven by one of them. The facts of Madan Lal’s case (supra) are similar and identical to the facts of the present case. The principle of law, laid down, in Madan Lal’s case (supra), is fully applicable to the facts of the present case. In the instant case, in their statements, under Section 313 Cr.P.C., the accused/appellants, took up the plea, only of false implication. They did not take up the plea, that they did not know the contents of the bags, lying therein. The driver of the tractor-trolley, did not take up the plea, that he was directed by the owner, to take the bags, to a certain place, and obeying his command, he was taking the same, to that destination. The other accused, did not take up the plea that he merely took a lift in the tractor-trolley, as they knew the driver thereof, and did not know, as to what was contained in the bags. As stated above, the accused, thus, miserably failed to rebut the statutory presumption, referred to above. Thus, their conscious possession, in respect of the contraband, was proved, and, as such, the submission of the Counsel for the appellants, being without merit, must fail, and the same stands rejected. 16. It was next submitted by the Counsel for the appellants that a specific defence was taken up by Mandip Singh, Sewa Singh and Raghbir Singh that they were falsely implicated in the instant case, at the instance of Bhagat Singh, Inspector, with whom the father of Mandip Singh, was having some dispute. He further submitted that the trial Court failed to take into consideration the specific defence, set up, by the accused and the defence evidence produced by them, in support thereof. He further submitted that the trial Court failed to take into consideration the specific defence, set up, by the accused and the defence evidence produced by them, in support thereof. He further submitted that the defence evidence produced by the accused was more probable than the prosecution evidence, but the same was ignored by the trial Court, without any valid reason. The submission of the Counsel for the appellants, in this regard, does not appear to be correct. Kashmir Singh, Constable, DW-1, brought report No.17, and proved the departure and arrival of the Police party. No evidence was produced by Mandip Singh, Sewa Singh and Raghbir Singh, appellants, to prove that there was any enmity between Bhagat Singh, Inspector, in the B.S.F. and the father of Mandip Singh. The mere plea taken up by Mandip Singh, Sewa Singh, and Raghbir Singh accused, in their statements under Sections 313 Cr.P.C. that they were falsely implicated, at the instance of Bhagat Singh, Inspector in the BSF, was of no consequence without any proof thereof through any evidence. Such a plea, taken up by the accused, in their statements under Section 313 Cr.P.C., was hardly of any relevance to prove their innocence. Manjit Singh, accused, examined Sahib Singh, DW-1 and Charanjit Singh, DW-2, in support of his defence. Sahib Singh, DW-1 stated that they were having liquor vend near the bus stand, where the alleged recovery was effected. He further stated that they stay at the liquor vend, in the night. He further stated that on 07.01.1990 no contraband was recovered from any tractor-trolley. Charanjit Singh, DW-2, prepared the site plan Ex.DA of the place of recovery, at the instance of Narender Singh. During the course of cross-examination, Sahib Singh, DW-1 stated that he was not having any proof that he was working at the liquor vend, aforesaid. The recovery in this case was effected on 07.01.1990. Sahib Singh, appeared in the witness box as DW-1 on 24.05.2000. In case, no recovery had been effected from the tractor-trolley, being driven by Manjit Singh, accused, at the relevant time. Sahib Singh, DW-1 could certainly move an application to the higher authorities, or the Illaqa Magistrate that no recovery was effected from the tractor-trolley, nor the same was being allegedly driven by Manjit Singh, accused. He, however, did not move any such application. Sahib Singh, DW-1 could certainly move an application to the higher authorities, or the Illaqa Magistrate that no recovery was effected from the tractor-trolley, nor the same was being allegedly driven by Manjit Singh, accused. He, however, did not move any such application. He kept mum for more than 10 years and, ultimately, came to the Court, to depose that no recovery was effected from the tractor-trolley, aforesaid, the driver whereof was Manjit Singh and three others accused were sitting in the trolley thereof. The mere fact that he kept silent for such a long time, in itself, was sufficient to disbelieve his statement. The trial Court, was right, in not placing reliance on their evidence. This Court, after reappraisal of the evidence of the defence witnesses, also comes to the same conclusion. In this view of the matter, the submission of the Counsel for the appellants, being without merit, must fail, and the same stands rejected. 17. No other point, was urged, by the Counsel for the parties. 18. In view of the above discussion, it is held that the judgments of conviction and the orders of sentence, rendered by the trial Courts, are based on the correct appreciation of evidence, and law, on the point. The same do not warrant any interference. The same are liable to be upheld. 19. For the reasons recorded, hereinbefore, both the appeals are dismissed. The judgments of conviction and the orders of sentence, are upheld. If the appellants are on bail, their bail bonds shall stand cancelled. The Chief Judicial Magistrate, shall take necessary steps, in accordance with the provisions of law, to comply with the judgment, within two months, from the date of receipt of a certified copy of the same, keeping in view the applicability of the provisions of Section 428 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and submit the compliance report immediately thereafter. 20. Vide judgment dated 22.02.1994, passed by Additional Sessions Judge, Kapurthala, it directed that notice be given to Tara Singh, owner of the tractor-trolley, as to why the same be not confiscated. The trial Court, is directed to intimate, as to whether, that notice was further pursued, and final order was passed therein, regarding the confiscation, otherwise by the trial Court or not. The trial Court, is directed to intimate, as to whether, that notice was further pursued, and final order was passed therein, regarding the confiscation, otherwise by the trial Court or not. If that notice was not further pursued, nor any final order was passed therein, with regard to the confiscation or otherwise, by the trial Court, it shall ensure that the proceedings are completed within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of the judgment and report is sent to this Court immediately thereafter. 21. The District & Sessions Judge, Kapurthala, is also directed to ensure that the directions, referred to above, are complied with, by the concerned Courts, within the timeframe, and compliance report is sent immediately thereafter, to this Court. 22. The Registry shall keep track, as to whether, the directions given in this judgment, are complied with, by the Courts concerned. Whether the compliance reports are received or not, within the time stipulated, the papers shall be put up, five days after the expiry of the same, for further action. ----------------