JUDGMENT Honble Shishir Kumar, J.—This writ petition has been filed for quashing the award dated 24th April, 1998, passed in Adjudication Case No. 146 of 1995, contained in Annexure 1 to the writ petition passed by respondent No. 2. 2. The facts as stated in the writ petition are that petitioner-Triveni Engineering & Industries Limited, Deoband, Saharanpur is a company incorporated under the Indian Companies Act, 1956, having its registered office at Deoband, Saharanpur. The company formally known as ‘Gangeshwar Limited, Deoband, Saharanpur. Petitioner is engaged in the manufacture of crystal sugar through ‘vacuum pan process’. 3. Petitioner is a seasonal industry and relationship between the sugar factory and its employees is regulated and governed by Standing Orders issued under Section 3 of the Act for vacuum pan industries known as Standing Orders covering the condition of employment of workmen in Vacuum Pan Sugar Factories in U.P. The workmen, who are classified in Class B of the Standing Orders are thus : “B. Classification of workmen : (i) Permanent, (ii) Seasonal, (iii)Temporary, (iv) Probationers, (v) Apprentices, and (vi) Substitutes.” 4. When there is an excess sugarcane, sugar factory necessarily needs more man-power to deal with the production and supply of sugarcane and when there is a shortage of sugarcane in any given year, the need of employee-workmen also goes down. It has been stated that to meet these exigencies of service, requirement keeps fluctuating and that there is a temporary need, it is open to the sugar factory to engage temporary hands to meet the temporary need. The respondent No. 3 was engaged as an apprentice/causal labour to meet the exigencies of services from time to time. However, the respondent No. 3 had a reference raised stating that he has been deprived of work from season 1994-95. The workman filed a written statement on 19th January, 1996. Petitioner also filed his written statement clearly stating therein that respondent No. 3 Luxman Singh has worked as a causal labour to meet the requirements of work. Rejoinder statement has also been filed clearly stating therein that workman had never worked beyond 21st October, 1993 and therefore, had no cause of action for filing the case. In paragraph 17 of the rejoinder statement, petitioner has clearly stated the period in which respondent No. 3 had worked as a temporary/causal workman and, therefore, no cause of action arose in the season 1994-95. In paragraph 17 of the rejoinder statement, petitioner has clearly stated the period in which respondent No. 3 had worked as a temporary/causal workman and, therefore, no cause of action arose in the season 1994-95. The evidence was adduced and the award has been given in favour of respondent No. 3 for reinstatement with full back wages. 5. It has been submitted on behalf of petitioner that workman concerned was unable to establish that he had worked for the whole of the second half of crushing season 1993-94 because unless the workman would established that he has worked for season 1993-94 up to end he would have no right to be called as seasonal workman in coming season in 1994-95. Although labour Court has recorded a finding that respondent workmen has shifted his stand from time to time yet has given no reason for believing the pleadings and evidence as given by workmen. Although from the award, it clearly appears that labour Court has refused respondent No. 3 as seasonal workmen but has given him benefit as seasonal workman and directed the petitioner to reinstate him in the status of permanent work. The said order of labour Court is contrary to the judgment of the Apex Court reported in JT 1995 (6) SC 547, Morinda Co-op. Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Ram Kisan and others. From perusal of the Standing Orders of the vacuum pan Sugar Factories under Clause 2-K of special condition, which governs the seasonal workman is defined. Petitioner submits that labour Court has not examined the issue whether the workman concerned had infact fulfilled the requirement of Clause 2-K in giving benefit under Clause 2-K. As workman concerned is unable to establish that he has worked for whole of the second half of crushing season 1993-94, he would have no right to be called as seasonal workman in coming season 1994-95. In the absence of the aforesaid finding labour Court has no jurisdiction to pass order in favour of workman concerned. 6. In the absence of the aforesaid finding labour Court has no jurisdiction to pass order in favour of workman concerned. 6. Aggrieved by the aforesaid order, writ petition was filed before this Court and by order dated 30.10.2003, this Court has passed an order that subject to petitioner’s reinstating respondent No. 3 within three weeks from today and paying back wages from the date of award till the date of reinstatement and continuing to pay the same in future as and when the same falls due, further execution of award shall remain stayed. Petitioner submits that in view of the order passed by this Court, respondent No. 3 has been reinstated and order of this Court has been complied with. But as regards the back wages prior to the date of award is concerned, in the facts and circumstances of the case, petitioner submits that he is not entitled for the same. Reliance has been placed upon a judgment of M.P. Electricity Board v. Hariram, (2004) 8 SCC 246 . Paragraphs 4, 5, 8 and 10 are being reproduced below : “4. The appellant-Board denied the allegations made in the said application which had termed the non-employment as retrenchment of their service by contending that the question of retrenchment does not arise in the nature of employment because the service of the respondents were on work requirement basis. Before the Labour Court, an application was made by the respondents to produce the Muster Rolls for the period 1987 to 1992. That apart no other material was produced by the respondents to establish a fact that they had worked for 240 days continuously in any given year. Though some other applicants examined themselves before the Labour Court no other document was produced. While the appellant-Board examined three witnesses who are Engineers-in-Charge of the Project and produced the Muster Rolls for the period between 1986 to 1990 but did not produce the Muster Rolls for the later period. The Labour Court after examining the entries in the Muster Rolls came to the conclusion that the respondents-applicants had not worked for 240 days continuously in any given year, hence, they cannot claim permanency nor could they term their non-employment as a retrenchment. On the said basis, it rejected the applications of the respondents. 5. The Labour Court after examining the entries in the Muster Rolls came to the conclusion that the respondents-applicants had not worked for 240 days continuously in any given year, hence, they cannot claim permanency nor could they term their non-employment as a retrenchment. On the said basis, it rejected the applications of the respondents. 5. Being aggrieved by the said rejection of their application, the respondents preferred an appeal before the Industrial Court at Bhopal Bench. The Industrial Court noticing the fact that though the application for production of the Muster Rolls was for the years 1987 to 1992, the appellant had only produced the Muster Rolls for the year ending 1990. Therefore, an adverse inference against the appellant was drawn and solely based on the said adverse inference it accepted the case of the Respondents that they had worked for 240 days continuously in a given year, hence, proceeded to grant relief, as stated hereinabove. 8. In these appeals, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant-Board contended that the Courts below could not have drawn any adverse inference against the Board for not having produced the Muster Rolls for the year 1990-1992 when it complied with the request of the respondent by producing the Muster Rolls for the year 1980-90. It is submitted that the said Muster Rolls which were produced before the Court clearly indicated that the respondents had not worked continuously for 240 days in a year, at any point of time between 1988-90. It is argued that it is not the case of the respondents that between the year 1990-92 for which period the Muster Rolls were not produced they had worked for 240 days continuously only in those years. Their entire case was that between 1988 and 1992 they have been working in 240 days continuously in a year which having not been established at least for the years 1988 and 1990 without there being a specific allegation that between 1990 and 1992 there was such continuous employment a mere non-production of the Muster Rolls for the said year could not have been made the basis of drawing an adverse inference by the Courts below. It is also argued that the non-employment of a daily wager when there is no work would not amount to retrenchment. It is also argued that the non-employment of a daily wager when there is no work would not amount to retrenchment. Learned counsel also submitted that the nature of work that was being done by the appellant was a work for a project and that project having come to an end, question of regularising the services of the respondents or making them permanent did not arise. 10. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and having perused the documents, we notice that the case of the appellant that these respondents were employed for the purpose of digging pits for erecting electric poles in the course of drawing electric wire from one point to another point is not disputed. It is an accepted finding of the Courts below that the employment of the respondents have been discontinuous and intermittent during the period from 1982 till their employment was discontinued. We can take judicial notice of the fact that drawing of an electric line is in the nature of project work and once the polls are erected and the electric wire is drawn from the starting pole to the ending pole that work comes to an end. Therefore, it cannot be contended that the nature of work which was only to dig pits for the purpose of erecting poles could be construed as a permanent job. Of course, during the course of electrifying more places, job of this nature may be done by the Board continuously in different parts of the State but that does not deviate from the fact that drawing of electric line from one point to another at one part of the State would be a project and not a continuous job. Therefore, employment of people in that local area for the limited job cannot be construed as an employment for a continuous and regular work of the Board. This fact is also recorded in the Muster Rolls which shows that at regular intervals the services of the respondents were sought obviously for the reason that there was no continuous need for such work. A perusal of the Muster Rolls, a copy of which is produced along with the writ appeal which pertains to the respondents in the first appeal clearly indicates the above fact. A perusal of the Muster Rolls, a copy of which is produced along with the writ appeal which pertains to the respondents in the first appeal clearly indicates the above fact. If as an example, we take the case of the respondent in C.A. No. 2240/01 we notice that he worked between 16.11.1987 to 15.12.1987 for 30 days. His next employment was from 16.12.1987 to 15.1.1988 for 26 days. Therefore, it could be said that during the period 16.11.1987 to 15.1.1988 this respondent worked continuously for 56 days. He was then not employed between 15.1.1988 till 16.2.1988. After the said break he was re-employed from 16.2.1988 to 15.9.1988 which is for a period of 106 days. Thereafter, he was not employed till 16.11.1988. From 16.11.1988 he was re-employed till 15.12.1988 for 30 days. Thus it is noticed that the employment during the period 1987 to 1988 was not continuous and his total employed days for one year if taken from 16.11.1987 till 16.11.1988, same comes to 136 days. Similar is the case if we have a look at a subsequent employment during the years 1989-1990, this clearly shows the fact that the employment of the respondent was on a job required basis and was not for any continuous services required by the Board. The respondent, therefore, cannot claim either permanency or regularisation since there is no such permanent post to which he could stake his claim nor could he claim the benefit of completion of 240 days of continuous work in a given year, because as stated above the figures do not show that the respondents whose particulars are referred to hereinabove or the other respondents for that matter have worked for 240 days. In such a factual background, in our opinion, the Industrial Court or the High Court could not have drawn an adverse inference for the non-production of the Muster Rolls for the year 1990 to 1992 in the absence of specific pleading by the respondents-applicants that at least during that period they had worked for 240 days continuously in a given year. The application calling for the production of the documents was for the years 1987 to 1992. As stated above, between the period 1987 to 1990, as a matter of fact, till end of the year 1990 the respondents have not been able to establish the case of continuous work for 240 days. The application calling for the production of the documents was for the years 1987 to 1992. As stated above, between the period 1987 to 1990, as a matter of fact, till end of the year 1990 the respondents have not been able to establish the case of continuous work for 240 days. Considering these facts in our view drawing of an adverse inference for the non-production of the Muster Rolls for the years 1991-92, is wholly erroneous on the part of the Industrial Court and the High Court. We cannot but bear in mind the fact that the initial burden of establishing the factum of their continuous work for 240 days in a year rests with the applicants-respondents.” 7. Further reliance has been placed upon judgment reported in 2005(8) SCC 750 , Surendranagar District Panchayat v. Dahyabhai Amarsinh. Reliance has been placed upon paragraphs 3, 4 and 18 are being quoted below : “3. The respondent examined himself and deposed that he was employed for 10 years at the salary of Rs. 470 per month whereas Mr. Vinod Misra, an official from the appellant side was examined to show that the workman never worked for 240 days in a year. 4. Before the Labour Court, oral evidence was given by the respondent. The Labour Court relied on the oral evidence of the respondent-workman and drew an adverse inference for non-production of muster roll and the salary register from the year 1976 to 1986 and held that the respondent-workman had worked for more than 240 days and therefore his termination was illegal. The Labour Court directed the reinstatement of the workman with back wages of 20% from the date of reference for non-compliance of Sections 25F, 25G and 25H. 18. In the light of the aforesaid, it was necessary for the workman to produce the relevant material to prove that he has actually worked with the employer for not less than 240 days during the period twelve calendar months preceding the date of termination. What we find is that apart from the oral evidence the workman has not produced any evidence to prove the fact that he has worked for 240 days. No proof of receipt of salary or wages or any record or order in that regard was produced; no co-worker was examined; muster roll produced by the employer has not been contradicted. What we find is that apart from the oral evidence the workman has not produced any evidence to prove the fact that he has worked for 240 days. No proof of receipt of salary or wages or any record or order in that regard was produced; no co-worker was examined; muster roll produced by the employer has not been contradicted. It is improbable that workman who claimed to have worked with the appellant for such a long period would not possess any documentary evidence to prove nature of his engagement and the period of work he had undertaken with his employer. Therefore, we are of the opinion that the workman has failed to discharge his burden that he was in employment for 240 days during the preceding 12 months of the date of termination of his service. The Courts below have wrongly drawn an adverse inference for non-production of the record of the workman for ten years. The scope of enquiry before the Labour Court was confined to only 12 months preceding the date of termination to decide the question of continuation of service for the purpose of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act. The workman has never contended that he was regularly employed in the Panchayat for one year to claim the uninterrupted period of service as required under Section 25B(1) of the Act. In the fact and situation and in the light of the law on the subject, we find that the workman-respondent is not entitled for the protection or compliance of Section 25F of the Act before his service was terminated by the employer. As regards non-compliance of Sections 25G and 25H suffice is to say that witness Vinod Mishra examined by the appellant has stated that no seniority list was maintained by the department of daily wagers. In the absence of regular employment of the workman, the appellant was not expected to maintain seniority list of the employees engaged on daily wages and in the absence of any proof by the respondent regarding existence of the seniority list and his so called seniority no relief could be given to him for non-compliance of provisions of the Act. The Courts could have drawn adverse inference against the appellant only when seniority list was proved to be in existence and then not produced before the Court. The Courts could have drawn adverse inference against the appellant only when seniority list was proved to be in existence and then not produced before the Court. In order to entitle the Court to draw inference unfavourable to the party, the Court must be satisfied that evidence is in existence and could have been proved.” 8. Reliance has been placed upon a judgment reported in 2007(115) FLR 619, Ganga Kisan Sahkari Chini Mills Ltd. v. Jaivir Singh (Paragraphs 4, 6, 8, 11 and 12) and another judgment reported in 2005 (8) SCC 481 , Batala Coop.Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Sowaran Singh and reliance has been placed upon paras 4, 6, 8,11 and 12. The same are being reproduced below : “4. The Labour Court was of the view that though the stand of the employer was that the respondent-workman was employed on casual basis on daily wages for specific work and for specific period, yet evasive reply was given in respect of the workmans stand that he was appointed in April 1986. It was observed that no attendance record was produced. There was also no material to show that the workman had left the job on his own accord and in any event the employer had not proved that the workman had worked for less than 240 days in 12 calendar months preceding the date of termination. Accordingly, it was held that there was violation of Section 25F of the Act. Direction was given to re-instate the workman with 50% back wages. 6. In support of the appeal, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that both the Labour Court and the High Court fell in grave error by acting on factually and legally erroneous premises. The definite stand of the appellant was that the workman was engaged on casual basis on daily wages for specific work and for specific period. Details in this regard were undisputedly filed. Therefore, the provisions of Section 2(oo) (bb) of the Act are clearly applicable. In addition, the onus was wrongly placed on the employer to prove that the workman had not worked for 240 days in 12 calendar months preceding the alleged date of termination. No material was placed on record by the workman to establish that the workman had offered himself for job after 12-2-1994. The award of the Labour Court does not speak of the requirement to maintain the muster roll. No material was placed on record by the workman to establish that the workman had offered himself for job after 12-2-1994. The award of the Labour Court does not speak of the requirement to maintain the muster roll. This point was taken up suo motu by the High Court without any opportunity to the appellant to have its say. 8. We find that the High Courts judgment is unsustainable on more than one count. In Morinda Co-op. Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Ram Kishan and others, (1995) 5 SCC 653 , it was observed as follows : “4. It would thus be clear that the respondents were not working throughout the season. They worked during crushing seasons only. The respondents were taken into work for the season and consequent to closure of the season, they ceased to work. 5. The question is whether such a cessation would amount to retrenchment. Since it is only a seasonal work, the respondents cannot be said to have been retrenched in view of what is stated in clause (bb) of Section 2 (oo) of the Act. Under these circumstances, we are of the opinion that the view taken by the Labour Court and the High Court is illegal. However, the appellant is directed to maintain a register for all workmen engaged during the seasons enumerated hereinbefore and when the new season starts the appellant should make a publication in neighbouring places in which the respondents normally live and if they would report for duty, the appellant would engage them in accordance with seniority and exigency of work.” 11. The materials on record clearly establish that the engagement of the workman was for specific period and specific work. 12. In view of the position as highlighted in Morinda Co-op. Sugar Mills and Anil Bapuraos cases (supra), the relief granted to the workman by the Labour Court and the High Court cannot be maintained.” 9. In support of the aforesaid contention learned counsel for petitioner submits that award given by labour Court is liable to be set aside. 10. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents submits that on the basis of relevant record, labour Court has given a finding of fact that the respondent No. 3 being a seasonal employee was entitled to be called for 1994-95 season. 11. 10. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents submits that on the basis of relevant record, labour Court has given a finding of fact that the respondent No. 3 being a seasonal employee was entitled to be called for 1994-95 season. 11. The award of labour Court is based on unfair labour practice adopted by petitioner by engaging respondent No. 3 in employment since 1985 when regularisation of his services which were passed on admission of documents filed by workmen respondent No. 3. 12. I have considered the submission made on behalf of petitioner as well as respondent and have perused the record. 13. From the perusal of the record, it is clear that on the basis of application State Government has referred the dispute to the labour Court under Section 4-K of the Industrial Disputes Act, same is reproduced below:- “KYA SEWAYOJAKO DWARA APNE SHRAMIK SRI LAKSHMAN SINGH PUTRA SRI JAIPAL SINGH KO VARSH 1994-95 KA SEASON PRARAMBH HONE PAR KARYA SE PRITHAK/VANCHIT KIYA JANA UCHIT TATHA / ATHWA VAIDHANIK HAI, YADI NAHI, TO SAMBANDHIT SHRAMIK KYA HITLABH/ANUTOSH (RELIEF) PANE KA ADHIKARI HAI TATHA ANYA VIVRAN VA TITHI SAHIT.” 14. Meaning thereby the claim of respondent No. 3 was that he has not been called to work in the season 1994-95. The labour Court has recorded a finding that from the statement of one Narendra Kumar, time keeper, respondent No. 3 has worked in the season 1992-93. A finding to this effect has also been recorded that from the oral evidence of the parties it is clear that respondent No. 3 has worked up to 1992-93 season, a finding to this effect has also been recorded that there is a mistake in the referring order. But it has been stated that this will not effect the right of respondent-workman. In paragraph 8 of the written statement filed on behalf of petitioner, it has clearly been mentioned that “respondent No. 3 had never worked even for a single day beyond the end of crushing season 1993-94 hence no cause of action arises to the respondent No. 3 on the alleged date mentioned in the reference order.” The labour Court has misread the statement mentioned in the written statement. In spite of the finding recorded that respondent No. 3 workman is changing the stand from time to time but in spite of the aforesaid fact, has given an award in his favour for reinstatement as well as full back wages. The Apex Court in cases mentioned above has clearly held that in such circumstances, the labour Court cannot grant the relief of reinstatement because the status of seasonal employee and temporary employee are different. 15. But as the facts remains, the respondent No. 3 has been reinstated and the back wages from the date of award till the date of reinstatement has been paid as informed by the counsel for the parties, therefore, at this stage, after a lapse of about six or seven years, when the respondent No. 3 is working, it will not be appropriate to pass an order to set aside the award. But in the facts and circumstances of present case award dated 24.4.1998 is modified to the extent that respondent No. 3 will not be entitled for any back wages from 1994 till the date of award. 16. The writ petition is disposed of. 17. No order as to costs. ————