V. K. SHUKLA, J. Present writ petition has been filed by petitioner ques tioning the validity of the order dated 13. 8. 2008 passed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer/additional City Magistrate (2nd),district Kanpur Nagar declaring the vacancy in question in respect of Premises No. 44, Harrisganj, Rail Bazar, Kanpur Nagar. 2. Brief background of the case is that petitioner was tenant of first floor of House No. 44, Harrisganj, Rail Bazar, Kanpur Nagar, Prakash Kanaudiya was owner of the premises in question. Petitioner submits that rent in question was not accepted, as such proceeding under section 30 of the Act No. 13 of 1972 was undertaken and therein orders were passed on 28. 5. 2002 for making deposit. Said property in question was sold away to Abdul Moveed. Petitioner submits that qua the said landlord also application under section 30 of the U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972 was moved and same has been allowed and rent in question is being deposited. Application for allotment was moved on 23. 2. 2008, by Mohammad Ayub. Rent Control and Eviction Inspector, Kanpur Nagar was asked to submit his reply after making spot inspection. On 20. 3. 2008, report was submitted men tioning therein that there is deemed vacancy in the premises in question. Petitioner filed his objection on 31. 5. 2008 mentioning therein that there is no deemed vacancy. On 13. 8. 2008 order has been passed declaring vacancy under section 12 (3) of U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972. At this juncture present writ petition has been filed. 3. Sri Satya Prakash, learned Counsel for petitioner contended with ve hemence that in the present case vacancy in question could not have been declared, as qua premises in question, which was said to have been purchased by the wife of the petitioner, namely Premises No. A-1971 L. I. G. Avas Vikas Hanspuram Navbasta, Kanpur Nagar, there was already agreement to sale, as such view taken is totally incorrect view and same is liable to be quashed. 4. 4. Smt. Rama Goel, learned Counsel for the respondent on the other hand contended that admitted position is that house in question has been purchased in the name of the wife of petitioner and theory, set up in respect of agreement to sale is nothing but camouflage in order to dilute the provision under section 12 (3) of U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972, as such writ petition in question is liable to be dismissed. After respective arguments have been advanced, facts of the present case are being adverted to. 5. Undisputed position is that petitioner has been staying as tenant at the first floor of House No. 44, Harrisganj, Rail Bazar, Kanpur Nagar. As rent in question as per petitioner was not being accepted, proceeding under section 30 of U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972 had been undertaken and thereafter rent was being de posited. Property in question thereafter has been purchased by the another in cumbent Abdul Moveed. Petitioner submits that qua the said landlord also ap plication under section 30 of U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972 was moved and same has been allowed and rent in question is being deposited. Application by one Mohd. Ayub for allotment was moved on 23. 2. 2008. Thereafter, Rent Control and Eviction Inspector, Kanpur Nagar inspected the premises in question and sub mitted report mentioning therein that there is deemed vacancy in the premises in question. Thereafter, on the basis of the material available on record va cancy has been declared. Categorical finding of fact has been returned and which has not been disputed that name of wife of the petitioner house in ques tion has been purchased being House No. A-1971 L. I. G. Avas Vikas Hanspuraum Navbasta, Kanpur Nagar on 15. 3. 2003. Petitioner has tried to make out case that qua the said house in question he has entered into agreement to sale dated 30. 8. 2006 in favour of one Mahendra Kumar Shukla. Said agree ment to sell is of no consequence, as acquiring property by tenant or his family member has its own consequence and moment tenant or his family members ac quires the house, which is situated in the same municipality, then vacancy is deemed to be there. 8. 2006 in favour of one Mahendra Kumar Shukla. Said agree ment to sell is of no consequence, as acquiring property by tenant or his family member has its own consequence and moment tenant or his family members ac quires the house, which is situated in the same municipality, then vacancy is deemed to be there. Unregistered agreement to sell theory has been set up as per which possession was to be handed over after instrument in question was exe cuted. Thereafter stand has been sought to be taken that possession has been handed over. Admitted position is that sale deed in question has not been exe cuted and circumstances are speaking for itself, that to save from rigors of the provision which provides for declaration of the vacancy, such stand has been taken, which in the facts of the case cannot be accepted. 6. This Court in the case of Yukti Bhadra Dixit v. Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Allahabad and others, 1993 (2) ARC 150 considered the meaning of the word "acquires" as used under section 12 (3) of the Act and qua the same took the view that same has wide meaning of the vacancy contemplated under section 12 (3) of the Act and same comes into existence immediately after taking of the possession in vacant state of the building by the person contemplated under sec tion 12 (3) of the Act and such vacancy comes into existence by operation of law and the legal fiction envisaged under section 12 (3) of the Act. Relevant paras 10, 11,12 and 13 are being extracted below: 10. Section 12 (3) of the U. P. Act No. 13 of the 1972 is to the following effect. " (3 ). Relevant paras 10, 11,12 and 13 are being extracted below: 10. Section 12 (3) of the U. P. Act No. 13 of the 1972 is to the following effect. " (3 ). In the case of a residential building, if the tenant or any member of his family builds or otherwise acquires in a vacant state or gets vacated a residential building in the same city, municipality, notified area or town area in which the building under tenancy is situate, he shall be deemed to have ceased to occupy the building under his tenancy : Provided that if the tenant or any member of his family had built any such residential building before the date of commencement of this Act, then such tenant shall be deemed to have ceased to occupy the building under his tenancy upon the expiration of a period of one year from the said date. Explanation.-For the purposes of this sub-section (a) a person shall be deemed to have otherwise acquired a building, if he is occupying a public building for residential purposes a tenant, allottee or licensee. (b) the expression "any member of family, in relation to a tenant, shall not include a person who has neither been normally residing with nor is wholly dependent on such tenant. " 11. In a decision of this Court in the case of Rajendra Prasad v. IXth Additional District Judge, Kanpur, 1982 (U. P.) RCC 265 it had been clarified that the word acquires as used in the aforesaid provisions has a wide meaning. It was observed that in order to understand its meaning, one should not only go by the dictionary but also to let up the context. This Court went up to observed that looking to the context and surrounding circumstances, the proper inter pretation to be placed on sub-section (3) of section 12 appears to be that it covers within its ambit the case of acquiring a house by allotment as well. It as held in that case that section 12 (3) of the Act created a legal fiction and the fiction created by it had to be given full effect irrespective of the consequences. 12. It may further be noticed that the word acquires refers to obtain or get as ones own, by ones own exertions. 13. It as held in that case that section 12 (3) of the Act created a legal fiction and the fiction created by it had to be given full effect irrespective of the consequences. 12. It may further be noticed that the word acquires refers to obtain or get as ones own, by ones own exertions. 13. In the fact and circumstances of the present case the fact that the Allahabad Development Authority had allotted the house to the wife of the petitioner for residential purpose in the Sulem Sarai Housing Scheme is apparent from the copy of the agreement executed between Smt. Prem Dixit and the Allahabad Development Authority to which a reference has already been made above. From the affidavit of the petitioner himself it is apparent that Smt. Prema Dixit had obtained vacant possession of the aforesaid premises. The case of the petitioner is that after obtaining the possession of the allotted house Smt. Prema Dixit had allowed it to be oc cupied by certain registered societies. If a residential accommodation is ac quired envisaged under section 12 (3) of the Act but the person who acquires it puts the same to a use other than residential, of his own is that event the accrual of the vacancy which takes place immediately on the taking of vacant possession of the building cannot be deemed to be nullified by such voluntary change of user of the said accommodation. Vacancy contemplated under section 12 (3) of the Act comes into existence immediately on the taking of the possession in vacant state of the building by the person contemplated under section 12 (3) of the Act and such a vacancy which comes into existence by operation of law and the legal fiction envisaged un der section 12 (3) of the Act cannot be deemed to have ceased to be in exis tence merely on account of the change of user by the person who acquires the residential building in a vacant state or non user of the said building by him. 7. This Court in the case of Hirdai Narain Misra v. Raj Narain Shukla and others, 2001. (1) ARC 272=2001 (42) ALR 545 took the view that deemed vacancy under section 12 (3) arises the moment tenant obtains another premises and gets vacant possession of the same and subsequent changes are hardly relevant. 7. This Court in the case of Hirdai Narain Misra v. Raj Narain Shukla and others, 2001. (1) ARC 272=2001 (42) ALR 545 took the view that deemed vacancy under section 12 (3) arises the moment tenant obtains another premises and gets vacant possession of the same and subsequent changes are hardly relevant. Relevant paras 9 and 10 are being extracted below : 9. It would be of no consequence that on the date on which the vacancy was declared the petitioner had ceased to own and occupy Daboli house. A deemed vacancy under the provisions of section 12 (3) of the Act, arises the moment tenant obtains another premises. Subsequent changes are hardly relevant. In Sri Rajendra Prasad v. 9th Additional District Judge, Kanpur and others, 1980 ACJ 194 it was held that the relevant date is the date when the va cancy occurred and not subsequent fact or subsequent user of the property. The matter also came to be discussed in another decision in Surendra Prakash Gael v. 1st Additional District Judge, Muzaffarnagar and others, 1987 (13) ALR 359 in which it was observed that as soon as tenant acquires in a vacant state or get vacated a residential house, a vacancy validly arises under section 12 (3) of the Act and if after acquiring in vacant state his own residential house he lets it out or parts with its possession without any objection the ef fect of the vacancy so arising is not wiped out or even suspended. For the application of section 12 (3), all that is required to be established is, firstly that the tenant builds or otherwise acquires a residential building in the same city, and secondly, gets vacant possession of the same or gets it va cated. On the proof of these two facts, a vacancy comes into being/under sec tion 12 (3) read with section 12 (4) of the Act authorizing the Rent Control and Eviction Officer to allot the building under the tenancy of the tenant. The Apex Court has also taken similar view in Smt. Mohini Badhwar v. Raghunandan Saran Ashok Scran, 1989 (2) ARC 223 (SC ). The Apex Court has also taken similar view in Smt. Mohini Badhwar v. Raghunandan Saran Ashok Scran, 1989 (2) ARC 223 (SC ). In that case, acquisition of residence in vacant possession by tenant was not denied but it was pleaded that soon af ter acquiring possession, the tenant sold it and, therefore, it was not avail able on the date of petition was filed occupation by the tenant in a vacant state. It was held that the fact that the tenant lost possession of acquired residence when petition for eviction was filed would not protect the tenant against section 14 (1) (h) of Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958. Taking inspira tion from the aforesaid decisions, I have no hesitation in coming to the con clusion that the fact that the petitioner had sold Daboli house which he acquired in a vacant state in the year 1998 to Anurag Sharma and thus lost its possession would hardly be germane or relevant for declaring vacancy of the tenanted accommodation. The fiction of deemed vacancy under section 12 (3) of the Act is now well settled. In Harish Tandon v. Additional District Magistrate, Allahabad and others, 1995 (25) ALR 184 (SC) it was observed by the Apex Court that when a suit creates a fiction saying that something shall be deemed to have been done which in fact, in truth, has not been done, Court has to examine and ascertain as to for what purpose and between what per sons such statutory fiction is to be resorted to. Thereafter, full effect has to be given to such a statutory fiction and it has to be carried to its logical con clusion. 10. The sufficiency or otherwise of the accommodation acquired by the tenant in a vacant state is also not required to be gone into or sifted while declaring deemed vacancy under section 12 (3) of the Act. This aspect of the matter was considered by the Apex Court in a decision dated 23rd April, 1997 in Civil Appeal No. 15575 of 1996, Prakash Chandra Rastogi v. Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Kanpur Nagar and others. This aspect of the matter was considered by the Apex Court in a decision dated 23rd April, 1997 in Civil Appeal No. 15575 of 1996, Prakash Chandra Rastogi v. Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Kanpur Nagar and others. In that case, an ar gument was raised on behalf of the tenant that the room constructed by him was quite small and insufficient for residential use and therefore, the con struction of the said room should not be treated as construction of a residen tial structure so that the deemed vacancy under the Act can be declared. The Apex Court did not accept the said contention because house itself was residential one and the construction made in the open terrace, even thought small could not be held to be not at all suitable for residential purposes. 8. Thus, in the present also there can be no escape from the conclusion that on account of acquisition of the House No. A-1971 L. I. G. Avas Vikas Hanspuram Navbasta, Kanpur Nagar deemed vacancy under section 12 (3) of the Act oc curred. Plea, which has been set up by petitioner that there is agreement to sale, was merely an eye wash to do away with rigors of the provision. The or der of vacancy has been passed after taking into account stand taken by the pe titioner and the material which was available on record. In the fact of the pre sent case, there is no occasion to interfere with the same. 9. Consequently, writ petition is dismissed. 10. No order as to costs. Petition Dismissed. .