D.S.R. VARMA, J :-Heard the learned Standing Counsel appearing for the petitioner in C.C.C. A.M.P. No.350 of 2007 and the appellant in C.C.C.A. (SR) No.6808 of 2007-Charrninar Co-operative Urban Bank Limited and the learned Standing Counsel appearing for the first respondent in both the CCC AMP No.350 of 2007 and CCCA(SR) No.6808 of 2007-State Bank of Hyderabad, only, since none appears on behalf of the second respondent-General Manager, South Central Railway, Rail Nilayam, Secunderabad, and there is no representation on his behalf, despite service of notice. 2. CCCA MP No.350 of 2007 is filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, seeking to condone the delay of 1189 days in filing the present appeal, while CCCA (SR) No.6808 of 2007 is filed challenging the judgment and decree, dated 10.11.2003, passed by the I Additional Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Secunderabad, decreeing the suit O.S. No.1 I of 2002, ex parte. 3. Petitioner in CCCA MP No.350 of 2007 and the appellant in CCCA (SR) No.6808 of 2007 is the first defendant, the first respondent is the plaintiff and the second respondent is the second defendant, in the suit, before the Court below. 4. For the sake of convenience, in this common judgment, the parties will be referred to as per their array in the suit. 5. The plaintiff filed the suit for recovery of money against the first and second defendants. 6. It is the case of the plaintiff that one Sri B. Krishna Murthy opened a Current Account, bearing No.448, with its Branch at King Koti and by indulging in forgery and material alteration of cheques, he had been issued various cheques by the second defendant-South Central Railways, for a total sum of Rs.66,00,000/-. The further details set forth in the plaint are not necessary to be mentioned. Therefore, the plaintiff filed the said suit for recovery of money against the first and second defendants. 7. Be that as it may, despite service of suit summons on the defendants, none appeared for the first defendant, nor there was any representation on its behalf, on the dates when the suit came up for hearing. Eventually, the first defendant was ex parte and an ex parte decree was passed on 10.11.2003. Subsequently, after receipt of notices in the execution petition, the first defendant came to know about the filing of the suit and also passing of ex parte decree. Eventually, the first defendant was ex parte and an ex parte decree was passed on 10.11.2003. Subsequently, after receipt of notices in the execution petition, the first defendant came to know about the filing of the suit and also passing of ex parte decree. Therefore, the first defendant had filed an application I.A. No.1461 of 2004 under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (for brevity "the Act") to condone the delay in filing the application under Order IX Rule 13 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (for brevity "CPC") to set aside the ex parte decree, dated 10.11.2003, which was dismissed by the Court below. Aggrieved by the same, the 1 first defendant had filed a revision CRP 1 No.1760 of 2005, which was also dismissed c by this Court. In view of the dismissal of CRP No.1760 of 2005, having no other alternative, the present appeal came to be g filed, however, with a delay of 1189 days. That is how the present application is before e us to condone the delay of 1189 days in filing the present appeal. 8. Admittedly, while dismissing CRP No.1760 of 2005, by order, dated 30.4.2007, a learned Single Judge of this Court observed as under : "The trial Court passed a decree on 10.11.2003. The application to condone the delay was filed on 23.6.2004. There was a delay of 190 days in filing the application to set aside the ex parte decree. In the application, it is mentioned that after receipt of the summons in the suit, the Standing Counsel was instructed to make his appearance and defend in the suit. The Standing Counsel has not taken steps for appearing on behalf of the petitioner bank and the result of the same is the petitioner bank herein has been set ex parte on 22.7.2002 and the suit was decreed ex parte. After receipt of the E.P. notice, the respondent took immediate steps without any delay in filing the application." 9. From the above, it is obvious that the decree was passed on 10.11.2003 and the application to condone the delay was filed on 23.6.2004 with a delay of 190 days in filing the application to set aside the ex parte decree. 10. From the above, it is obvious that the decree was passed on 10.11.2003 and the application to condone the delay was filed on 23.6.2004 with a delay of 190 days in filing the application to set aside the ex parte decree. 10. The most important and conspicuous aspect on record, which was noticed by a learned Single Judge of this Court, is that in the very application filed, seeking to condone the delay, it was categorically mentioned that after receipt of suit summons, the Standing Counsel concerned was instructed to make his appearance and defend the suit. But, somehow, no steps for appearance had taken by the Standing Counsel resulting in passing of an ex parte decree and consequently filing of execution petition. 11. But, it is to be noticed that the ground for condonation of delay in filing the application under Order IX Rule 13 CPC, was that the suit summons were not received, therefore, the first defendant had no knowledge about the filing of the suit and consequently there was no occasion for them to contest the suit on merits, and for j the first time only after the receipt of notices in the execution petition, they came to know about the filing of the suit and passing of the ex parte decree. 12. Therefore, there is any amount of divergence in the statement made by the first defendant in the application filed to condone the delay in filing the application under Order IX Rule 13 CPC., and the contention raised, inasmuch as, the factum of receipt of suit summons were admitted in the application and further course of action was also suggested to the Standing Counsel. But, altogether a different stand has been taken while arguing the application. This variation in the stand taken by the first defendant, obviously nullifies and cuts across its very contention that since the suit summons were not received, it could not contest the suit on merits and in that process there was a delay of 190 days in filing the application under Order IX Rule 13 CPC. 13. It is rather surprising to note that again the same stand i.e., non-service of suit summons, was taken as the ground for not filing the appeal in time. Of course, an additional ground also had been tried to be projected i.e., the death of the Chairman of the first defendant-Bank. 14. 13. It is rather surprising to note that again the same stand i.e., non-service of suit summons, was taken as the ground for not filing the appeal in time. Of course, an additional ground also had been tried to be projected i.e., the death of the Chairman of the first defendant-Bank. 14. In this context, it is to be noted that the death of the Chairman of the first defendant-Bank was a subsequent event. 15. While arguing the present application, the learned Standing Counsel appearing for the first defendant contends that the Courts should have a liberal approach in deciding the matters on merits, unless it is found that there are absolutely no merits in the case. 16. In order to substantiate his contention, the learned Standing Counsel appearing for the first defendant relies on the judgments of the apex Court in State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani, (1996) 3 SCC 132 = 1996 (2) ALD (SCSN) 40, State of UP. v. Harish Chandra, (1996) 9 SCC 309 and G. Ramegowda v. Special Land Acquisition Officer, (1988) 2 SCC 142 . 17. In Chandra Mani's case (supra), the apex Court observed as under: "......The factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of the governmental conditions would be cognizant to and requires adoption of pragmatic approach in justice-oriented process. The Court should decide the matters on merits unless the case is hopelessly without merit. No separate standards to determine the cause laid by the State vis-a-vis private litigant could be laid to prove strict standards of sufficient cause. The Government at appropriate level should constitute legal cells to examine the cases whether any legal principles are involved for decision by the Courts or whether cases require adjustment and should authorize the officers to take a decision or give appropriate permission for settlement. In the event of decision to file appeal needed prompt action should be pursued by the officer responsible to file the appeal and he should be made personally responsible for lapses, if any...:..." 18. From a reading of' the above observations, it is abundantly clear that, no doubt, in order to meet the ends of justice, the Courts should treat the applications under Section 5 of the Act with liberality, but not in all cases. From a reading of' the above observations, it is abundantly clear that, no doubt, in order to meet the ends of justice, the Courts should treat the applications under Section 5 of the Act with liberality, but not in all cases. It does not mean that absolute and apparent in-diligent attitude also have to be considered in favour of the persons, who approach the Court with unsustainable grounds. 19. Having regard to the peculiar facts and circumstances in the said case, the delay was condoned. 20. In Harish Chandra's case (supra), the apex Court observed as under: "So far as the question of delay is concerned the learned Counsel for the respondents placed reliance on the decision of this Court in the case of CWT v. Amateur Riders Club, 1994 Suppl. (2) SCC 603, and urged that the ground taken for condonation is due to the delay in processing the matter through official channel and cannot be held to be a good ground for condonation. It is undoubtedly true that the applicant seeking for condonation of delay is duty-bound to explain the reasons for the delay but as has been held by this Court in several cases, the very manner in which the bureaucratic process moves, if the case deserves merit the Court should consider the question of condonation from that perspective. ........." 21. The facts of the above case, if gone into, would reveal that there was some negligence on the part of the bureaucrats and, therefore, such negligence on the part of the bureaucrats shall not cause any hindrance to justice. 22. The learned Standing Counsel appearing for the first defendant further relies on a judgment of the apex Court in G. Ramegowda's case (supra), wherein their Lordships have observed as under: "......If there is negligence, deliberate or gross inaction or lack of bona fides on the part of the party or its Counsel there is no reason why the opposite side should be exposed to a time barred appeal. Each case will have to be considered on the particularities of its own special facts. Each case will have to be considered on the particularities of its own special facts. However, the expression 'sufficient cause' in Section 5 must receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice and generally delays in preferring appeals are required to be condoned in the interest of justice where no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides is imputable to the party seeking condonation of the delay." 23. There is absolutely no difficulty in the comprehension of the judgments of the apex Court rendered from time to time that the delay condonation petitions should be treated liberally, depending upon the facts and circumstances and also in order to meet the ends of justice. 24. That apart, the most important aspect to be considered is that there shall not be deliberate negligence on the part of the person, who makes such application, which had been explained in G. Ramegowda's case (supra). 25. The apex Court, however, held that the bureaucratic lethargy shall not cause any injustice to the litigating parties, which means, the justice shall not suffer at the hands of bureaucrats in their negligent approach. 26. The observations made by the apex Court, in the judgments, referred to supra, are unexceptionable. However, from a conjoint reading of the above judgments, no doubt, it is the consistent view of the apex Court that wherever justice is warranted and the aspect of delay comes in the way in rendering justice, such delay shall be condoned in order to proceed towards justice. 27. Coming back to the case on hand, as already pointed out by the learned Single Judge of this Court, in the order, dated 30.4.2007, in CRP. No.1760 of 2006; that in the very application filed before the Court below, seeking condonation of delay, it was stated that the first defendant had received the suit summons and the Standing Counsel also was instructed to take appropriate steps, but since such steps were not taken, in time, the delay had been caused. But, quite contrary to the said admission, it was argued that the delay was caused because of non-service of suit summons on the first defendant. Therefore, the stands taken by the first defendant are incompatible to each other. 28. Surprisingly, same is the contention raised in the present application also. But, quite contrary to the said admission, it was argued that the delay was caused because of non-service of suit summons on the first defendant. Therefore, the stands taken by the first defendant are incompatible to each other. 28. Surprisingly, same is the contention raised in the present application also. The only intervening factor, which was brought to the notice of this Court, in this regard, is the death of the Chairman of the first defendant. 29. Therefore, the original delay of 190 days on the ground of non-service of suit summons was rejected by the Court below and the same was confirmed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in the order, dated 30.4.2007, in CRP No.1760 of 2007. Having failed to satisfy both the Court below, by filing an application, and also this Court, in the revision petition, the first defendant, in our view, cannot be permitted to take the same ground in order to maintain the present appeal with an inordinate delay of 1189 days. In other words, what it could not achieve before the Court below and in the revision before this Court, on a particular ground, the same cannot be achieved by way of First Appeal along with an application to condone the delay, on the same grounds. 30. The reason for condoning the delay in filing the application under Order IX Rule 13 C.P.C., before the Court below, and the reason for the delay in filing the appeal before this Court are one and the same, which reason is factually incorrect, as could be seen not only from the record, but also from the affidavit, filed in support of the application, before the Court below. 31. Therefore, we are of the view that the first defendant is trying to harp on the same ground, which was not considered both by the Court below as well as this Court, while exercising jurisdiction under Section 115 CPC, in the present case also. We cannot assign a different reason for condoning the delay than the reason assigned by the Court below as well as by the learned Single Judge of this Court, in the revision petition. 32. As already pointed out, the only intervening fact i.e., the death of the Chairman of the first defendant cannot be a ground to prosecute the proceedings with diligence. 32. As already pointed out, the only intervening fact i.e., the death of the Chairman of the first defendant cannot be a ground to prosecute the proceedings with diligence. Furthermore, the death of the Chairman of the first defendant had taken place during the pendency of the suit itself. Therefore, the same cannot be considered as a valid reason for filing the present appeal with an inordinate delay of 1189 days. 33. We are of the view that though it is the contention of the learned Standing Counsel appearing for the first defendant that substantial interest of the first defendant as well as the public, as alleged, are involved, it is for the first defendant to contest the suit with due diligence and taking a wrong ground in the affidavit, filed in support of the application itself, is a good reason for us to reject the present application and consequently the present appeal. 34. For the foregoing, there are no merits in the present application and the same is liable to be dismissed. 35. In the result, the application CCCA MP No.350 of 2007 is dismissed. 36. Consequently, the appeal CCCA (SR) No.6808 of 2007 shall stands dismissed. However, there shall be no order as to costs.