JUDGMENT Coram : Hon. V.K. Gupta, C.J. Hon. J.C.S. Rawat, J. Per : Hon. J.C.S. Rawat, J. Since there is a common question of law and fact involved in all the petitions, therefore, all these petitions have been heard together and are being disposed of by this common judgment. 2. The main controversy is in between the Adhoc Junior Engineers (hereinafter referred as ‘Adhoc J.Es.’), who were appointed by the State Government pursuant to the advertisement in the year 1983 and were regularized from the date of their initial appointments under the U.P. Regularization of Adhoc Appointments Rules, 1979 on 14.02.1990 and 27.07.1990 and the Directly Recruited Junior Engineers (hereinafter as ‘Direct Recruits’), who were appointed through the Public Service Commission after the regularization of Adhoc J.Es. 3. It is admitted case of the parties that in view of the shortage of Junior Engineers in Hill Districts of the erstwhile State of Uttar Pradesh, the Government of Uttar Pradesh vide order dated 05.05.1982 took a decision to fill up the posts by Ad-hoc appointments and authorized the Head of the Department to proceed with the appointment process. The Engineer-in-Chief, PWD, Lucknow invited applications for the posts of Junior Engineers on Ad-hoc basis for a maximum period of one year vide an advertisement issued and published in the newspapers. The private respondents in claim petition before the Tribunal (Adhoc J.Es.) having applied and gone through the selection process were selected on the posts on Ad-hoc basis. The appointment of Ad-hoc J.Es. were made in the year 1983. In the meanwhile, the Public Service Commission invited applications for 1400 posts of Junior Engineers (1000 posts for plain area and 400 posts for hill area). After going through the selection process, the Public Service Commission recommended the names of claim petitioners (direct recruits) before the Tribunal to the State Government on 15.02.1990. In the meantime, the Ad-hoc J.Es. were regularized under the U.P. Regularization of Ad-hoc Appointments Rules, 1979 on 14.02.1990 and 27.07.1990. The Ad-hoc J.Es. were placed on probation from the date of their initial appointments and they were made permanent and their seniority were also fixed above the direct recruits. The Direct Recruits were appointed by the Government on 27.07.1990. Having considering the different representations, a combined seniority list dated 19.02.1994 was issued by the Government in which the Adhoc J.Es. were shown as senior to the Direct Recruits. The Direct Recruits were appointed by the Government on 27.07.1990. Having considering the different representations, a combined seniority list dated 19.02.1994 was issued by the Government in which the Adhoc J.Es. were shown as senior to the Direct Recruits. Feeling aggrieved from the said seniority list, a Writ Petition No. 37269 of 1995 (Dinesh Singh & Others Vs. State & Others) was preferred before the Allahabad High Court by some Direct Recruits/claim petitioners and the same was disposed of vide order dated 20.12.1995 directing the authorities to decide the representations of the Direct Recruits. When the authorities did not decide the inter-se seniority between the Direct Recruits and the Ad-hoc appointees, another Writ Petition No. 27905/1996 was filed before the Allahabad High Court, which was disposed of vide order dated 20.08.1996 directing the authorities to ensure the compliance of the order dated 20.12.1995 passed in W.P. No. 37269/1995. In compliance of the Allahabad High Court’s order, the Engineer-in-Chief vide order dated 06.03.1997 decided the representations of the directly recruited J.Es. holding that the Ad-hoc appointees were regularized under Rules 1979 on 14.02.1990 and 27.07.1990, hence, Ad-hoc appointees who were given appointment upto 27.07.1990 shall be senior to Direct Recruits. Feeling aggrieved by the said order, Writ Petition No. 15109 of 1997 (New No. 5631 of 2001) was preferred before the Allahabad High Court by some of the Direct Recruits and the same was received on transfer to this High Court for its disposal under the U.P. Reorganization Act, 2000. This Court vide order dated 22.06.2006 while disposing of the petition directed the Direct Recruits to approach the Public Service Tribunal. After creation of the State of Uttaranchal (now ‘Uttarakhand’), an inter-se seniority list of Adhoc appointees and Direct Recruits showing the Adhoc J.Es. as senior were issued on 09.01.2002. Feeling aggrieved by seniority list issued in the year 2002 some of the Direct Recruits preferred Writ Petition No. 1961/2005 (S/S) which was disposed of directing the authorities to consider their representations. However, some of the Direct Recruits also preferred a Writ Petition No. 714 of 2004 (S/S) before this Court and the said petition was transferred to the Public Service Tribunal, Uttarakhand for its disposal vide order dated 09.06.2005. 4. However, some of the Direct Recruits also preferred a Writ Petition No. 714 of 2004 (S/S) before this Court and the said petition was transferred to the Public Service Tribunal, Uttarakhand for its disposal vide order dated 09.06.2005. 4. Thereafter, the Direct Recruits filed a claim petition before the Tribunal under section 4 of the Public Service Tribunal Act for seeking the following reliefs :- “(a) to issue order or direction to the respondents quashing seniority list dated 19.02.1994 and 09.04.2002 passed by respondents; (AA) to declare the initial appointment and subsequent regularization and promotion of the private respondents (Adhoc J.Es.) as illegal, de-hors the rules and violative of Article 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India and further to declare the Clause-5 of the Regularization Rules 1979 related to the non-consultation with the Public Service Commission is illegal and violative of the original Rules, 1951; (AAA) to set-aside the impugned order dated 06.03.1997, 02.11.2002, 15.07.2006 and 24.08.2006 (contained in Annexure nos. 8-A, 8-AA, 8-C, 8-E and 8-F to the claim petition). Further directions are sought to correct the seniority list dated 09.04.2002 and 15.07.2006 and place the petitioners above the ad-hoc persons and also give the benefit of seniority and service benefits w.e.f. the date of their selection i.e. 06.01.1990 made by the Public Service Commission. (b) to issue an order or direction commanding the respondents to declare the petitioners as senior to adhoc Junior Engineers those were conditionally appointed against substantive posts on 12.12.1990, whereas petitioners were directly selected by the Public Service Commission on 06.01.1990 and appointed on 15.02.1990; (c & d) to issue a direction to respondents to correct the seniority list dated 19.02.1994 and subsequent list of seniority to restrain the adhoc J.Es. not to consider promotion on the basis of final seniority lists dated 19.02.1994 & 09.04.2002.” 5. It has been alleged by the claim petitioners (Direct Recruits) in the claim petition that the private respondents (Adhoc appointees) were appointed by the Government on Adhoc basis only for one year and they could not claim their regularization on such posts. The initial appointments of Adhoc J.Es. were also challenged by the Direct Recruits before the Tribunal by way of amendment in the month of September 2006. It was further alleged that the appointments of the Adhoc J.Es. were illegal and de-hors the Rules. The services of Adhoc J.Es. The initial appointments of Adhoc J.Es. were also challenged by the Direct Recruits before the Tribunal by way of amendment in the month of September 2006. It was further alleged that the appointments of the Adhoc J.Es. were illegal and de-hors the Rules. The services of Adhoc J.Es. could not have been regularized under the Rules, 1979. The regularization of the Adhoc J.Es. is also dehors the Rules. The seniority listed issued by the State Government placing the Adhoc regularized J.Es. above the directly recruited candidates appointed through the Commission is violative of the Rules made in this behalf. 6. The written statement was filed on behalf of the State Government alleging therein that the service of those Adhoc J.Es. appointed before 01.10.1986 and completed 3 years of service were only regularized on 14.02.1990 and 27.07.1990 in accordance with the Regularization Rules 1979. It was further alleged that the selection list prepared by the Commission was received on 15.02.1990 and the appointment letters were issued to the Directly Recruits J.E.s by the Government on 27.07.1990 after completing the necessary formalities. 7. The Adhoc J.E.s also filed their separate written statement alleging therein that after completing three yeas of service as Adhoc employees their services were regularized under U.P. Regularization of Ad-hoc Appointments, Rules 1979 as amended from time to time. It was further stated that the seniority list dated 19.02.1994 has attained the finality and therefore, the claim petition is time barred and the Direct Recruits had no right to challenge seniority list after sixteen years. It was further alleged that the Direct Recruits had never challenged the initial appointment and the subsequent regularization of the Adhoc J.E.s before September 2006. The Direct Recruits had challenged the initial appointment and the subsequent regularization of Adhoc J.E.s after a lapse of 22 years and 14 years respectively. The claim petitioners (Direct Recruits) had challenged for the first time the initial appointment and regularization of Adhoc J.Es. by way of amendment in the claim petition in September 2006, therefore, the relief sought before the Tribunal is time barred. 8. After going through the entire record, the learned Tribunal has held that the claim petitioners (Direct Recruits) could not demonstrate before it that any of the Adhoc J.E.s was not qualified on the date of their initial appointments. by way of amendment in the claim petition in September 2006, therefore, the relief sought before the Tribunal is time barred. 8. After going through the entire record, the learned Tribunal has held that the claim petitioners (Direct Recruits) could not demonstrate before it that any of the Adhoc J.E.s was not qualified on the date of their initial appointments. The Tribunal has further observed that the relief of setting aside the initial appointment and subsequent regularization of Adhoc J.Es. is barred by time. The Direct Recruits never challenged the initial appointment of Adhoc J.Es. and did not seek any direction to quash the appointment of Adhoc J.Es. in Writ Petition No. 37269/1995 or in the subsequent petitions filed before the Allahabad High Court. The relief of quashing the initial appointment and subsequent regularization have been incorporated by the Direct Recruits by way of amendment in the claim petition in the month of September 2006 i.e. after a lapse of 22 years of initial appointment and 16 years of the regularization of Adhoc J.Es. The Tribunal did not found it just and appropriate to interfere with the initial appointment and regularization of Adhoc J.Es. after a lapse of time. However, the learned Tribunal further observed that the State Government has violated the Rules while appointing and regularizing the Adhoc J.Es. Hence, the Adhoc J.Es. cannot be treated senior to the Direct Recruits J.Es. 9. After recording the aforesaid findings, the Tribunal partly allowed the claim petition vide impugned judgment and order dated 12.07.2007. All the seniority lists declaring the Ad-hoc J.Es. as senior to directly recruited Junior Engineers (original claim petitioners) were quashed by the Tribunal. The Tribunal further directed that a fresh seniority list be prepared on the basis of its judgment and provisions contained in Rule 5 of Seniority Rule 1991 within four months from the date of judgment. It was further held that the promotions already made need not be recalled, but the claim petitioners – Direct Recruits shall be entitled to all the consequential benefits in future promotion, and shall gain their seniority on promotion in promotional grade according to fresh seniority list. 10. Feeling aggrieved by the impugned judgment, the Adhoc appointees have preferred Writ Petition Nos. 178 (S/B) 2007, 193 (S/B) 2007, 194 (S/B) 2007, 195 (S/B) 2007, 196 (S/B) 2007 & 197 (S/B) 2007 for seeking certiorari quashing the impugned judgment. 10. Feeling aggrieved by the impugned judgment, the Adhoc appointees have preferred Writ Petition Nos. 178 (S/B) 2007, 193 (S/B) 2007, 194 (S/B) 2007, 195 (S/B) 2007, 196 (S/B) 2007 & 197 (S/B) 2007 for seeking certiorari quashing the impugned judgment. The State has also filed a Writ Petition No. 299 (S/B) 2007 for quashing the impugned judgment and the State is also supporting the claim of the Adhoc J.Es in the matter of their seniority. 11. The Direct Recruits (some of the claim petitioners) have preferred a Writ Petition No. 248 (S/B) 2007 (Bhuvan Chandra Pandey & others Vs. Public Service Tribunal & others) challenging the impugned judgment in so far as the Tribunal had not granted the relief no. ‘AA’, by which a direction was sought in the claim petition to cancel the initial appointment and regularization of the Adhoc J.Es. A Civil Contempt Petition No. 21 of 2008 (Lalit Mohan Tewari Vs. Utpal Kumar Singh) was filed with the prayer to punish the contemnor for passing the promotion order dated 21.01.2008 committing the disobedience of interim order dated 31.07.2007 passed by this Court in W.P. No. 178 of 2007 by which it was directed that no promotions shall be made to the post of Assistant Engineer in the P.W.D. until further orders. The Direct Recruits have also preferred a Writ Petition No. 65 (S/S) 2007 (Rajeev Sharma & others Vs. State of Uttarakhand & others) with the prayer to quash the Office Order dated 21.01.2008 issued by the State Government and to declare the same illegal, contemptuous and against the law. 12. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 13. The Adhoc appointees were appointed pursuant to the Government Order dated 05.05.1982 and they were regularized on 14.02.1990 and 27.07.1990. The Direct Recruits filed a Writ Peittion No. 37269 of 1995 before the Allahabad High Court for issuance of a writ of mandamus directing the authorities to treat them senior to Adhoc appointees. In that petition, the Direct Recruits had not sought any relief to quash the initial appointment and subsequent regularization of Adhoc J.Es. Thereafter, another Writ Petition No. 27905 of 1996 was filed before the Allahabad High Court by the Direct Recruits in which the initial appointment and subsequent regularization of Adhoc J.Es. were not challenged. In that petition, the inter-se seniority was challenged by the Direct Recruits. Thereafter, another Writ Petition No. 27905 of 1996 was filed before the Allahabad High Court by the Direct Recruits in which the initial appointment and subsequent regularization of Adhoc J.Es. were not challenged. In that petition, the inter-se seniority was challenged by the Direct Recruits. The learned counsel for the Direct Recruits could not demonstrate before us that the direct recruits had challenged the initial appointment and regularization of Adhoc J.Es. prior to the amendment incorporated in the claim petition in the year 2006. Later on, a Writ Petition No. 15109 of 1997 was filed before the Allahabad High Court which was re-numbered as ‘5631 of 2001’ in this Court in which the initial appointment and subsequent regularization of Adhoc J.Es. were also not challenged by the Direct Recruits. Thereafter, the Direct Recruits also preferred two Writ Petitions Nos. 1961 (S/S) 2005 and 714 (S/S) 2005 in which the initial appointment and subsequent regularization of Adhoc J.Es. were also not challenged. The Direct Recruits sought an amendment in the claim petition for the first time in the month of September 2006 after a lapse of 22 and 16 years of initial appointment and regularization of Adhoc J.Es. respectively. 14. It was contended on behalf of the Adhoc J.Es. that having not chosen to do so and having accepted the initial appointment and the subsequent regularization of Adhoc J.Es., the Direct Recruits cannot challenge it after such a long period. However, the challenge was available on earlier occasions to the direct recruits by way of seeking reliefs for quashing the initial appointment and subsequent regularization of Adhoc J.Es. The Direct Recruits remained silent for a long period. Now, they cannot challenge the initial appointment and the subsequent regularization of Adhoc J.Es. The Direct Recruits remained silent for a long period. Now, they cannot challenge the initial appointment and the subsequent regularization of Adhoc J.Es. at all. Learned counsel for the Direct Recruits contended that if the fundamental right of the Direct Recruits is violated even then they can challenge the said right after an inordinate delay. Learned counsel for the Direct Recruits further contended that the Tribunal has specifically held in its judgment that there were violations of the Rules in the initial appointment as well as in the regularization of Adhoc J.Es. but the Tribunal has erred in not interfering with the initial appointment and the regularization of Adhoc J.Es. Learned counsel for the Direct Recruits further contended that the Tribunal has specifically held in its judgment that there were violations of the Rules in the initial appointment as well as in the regularization of Adhoc J.Es. but the Tribunal has erred in not interfering with the initial appointment and the regularization of Adhoc J.Es. 15. It is unequivocally revealed that initially the Direct Recruits were never aggrieved by the initial appointment and subsequent regularization of Adhoc J.Es. It is also evident from the perusal of the record that the initial appointment and regularization were challenged for the first time in the month of September 2006 by way of amendment in the claim petition before the Tribunal. It is evident that the initial appointment as well as the regularization was challenged after a lapse of 22 years and 16 years respectively. Delay or latches is one of the factors which is to be borne in mind while exercising the discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. If a person is not vigilant of his right and acquiesces with the situation the Court can rightly exercise his power not to entertain his writ petition after a long delay. The Direct Recruits have acquiesced in accepting the appointments and subsequent regularization of Adhoc J.Es. for a long period. The Direct Recruits did not challenge the same well within time. If the Direct Recruits would have been vigilant enough, they could have sought the same relief in the earlier writ petitions. Whenever it appears that the claimants lost time or whiled it away and did not rise to the occasion in time for filing the writ petitions, then in such cases, the Court must be slow in granting the relief to the incumbent. In case, the writ petitions after inordinate delay are accepted by the Court and the persons who had been appointed long back and have settled in the services assuming that there is no impediment in their appointments they would be unnecessarily harassed and disturbed after a long gap. If the Court would start to interfere after a long time there would be no certainty in the service and their efficiency would also be disturbed while discharging the official duties. If the Court would start to interfere after a long time there would be no certainty in the service and their efficiency would also be disturbed while discharging the official duties. In such cases, it has also to be taken into consideration the question of acquiescence or waiver on the part of the incumbent whether other parties are going to be prejudiced if the relief is granted. It is apparent from the impugned judgment of the Tribunal that certain Adhoc J.Es. have been promoted by the State Government. The said fact has not been disputed before us by the learned counsel for the Direct Recruits. The Tribunal has observed that the promotions already made did not require to be recalled by virtue of the judgment of the Tribunal. The Direct Recruits had filed the writ petition in the year 1995 before the Allahabad High Court assuming and accepting the initial appointment of Adhoc J.Es.and regularization to be valid. If there was any infirmity or irregularity in the appointments it should be challenged at the earliest before the Court. The aggrieved persons should be vigilant enough to seek their redressal by way of filing the writ petition well within time. We are of the view that the learned Tribunal was justified in holding that the claim petition was barred by time and the Tribunal did not find it just and proper to interfere with the initial appointment and subsequent regularization of Adhoc J.Es. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of G.C. Gupta & others Vs. N.K. Pandey & others 1988 (1) SCC 316 has held as follows :- “29. In the instant case, however, I am not inclined to give any relief to the respondents (petitioners in the writ petition) by directing re-determination of the seniority of the respondents as well as the appellants on the ground of unusual latches and delay. Appellants 1 to 4 were confirmed in 1955 and their seniority was determined by Government Order of 20.7.1956. Out of the petitioners of the writ petition, Petitioners 4 and 5 made representations in 1959 against the aforesaid seniority list. Subsequently, Petitioner 6 filed another representation. Petitioners 6, 7 and 4 made their representation in 1959 and Petitioner 6 gave a reminder in June 1965 and April 1970. The other Petitioners 2, 3, 9 and 10 did not make any representation in the matter of seniority. Subsequently, Petitioner 6 filed another representation. Petitioners 6, 7 and 4 made their representation in 1959 and Petitioner 6 gave a reminder in June 1965 and April 1970. The other Petitioners 2, 3, 9 and 10 did not make any representation in the matter of seniority. It is only in 1970 that Writ Petition no. 2254 of 1970 was moved challenging the confirmation of Petitioners 1 to 34 (appellants in the instant appeal). This challenge was negatived on the ground of laches and delay. An appeal being Special Appeal No. 287 of 1971 was also dismissed on the ground of laches and delay as regards the confirmation of the appellants was concerned. Of course, it had been observed that the seniority in service of these appellants was not questioned in the said writ petition and the Government would consider the representation made by the petitioners of the writ petition (appellants in the instant appeal) as far back as in 1959, which were pending before the Government. Writ Petition No. 1080 of 1973 which gave rise to the civil appeal was moved in 1973 challenging the determination of seniority of the appellants in the instant appeal. It appears from the affidavit-in-opposition sworn by one of the appellants Shri G.C. Gupta that at the time when the writ petition was moved Appellants 1 to 4 were officiating as Superintending Engineers and Respondents 2 and 3 were officiating as Superintending Engineers but junior to all the four appellants and Respondents 1 and 4 to 12 were then Executive Engineers. At present Appellants 1, 2 and 3 are permanent Superintending Engineers and officiating as Additional Chief Engineers. Appellant 4 is also a permanent Superintending Engineer. At this juncture if the seniority of these appellants vis-à-vis the respondents of this appeal is directed to be determined it will create much administrative difficulties and would amount to depriving the appellants of their valuable rights which have accrued to them. It is pertinent to refer in this connection to the observation made by this Court in the case of Rabindra Nath Bose v. Union of India. It has been observed that the attack to the seniority list-prepared on the basis of 1952 Rules 15 years after the Rules were promulgated and effect given to the seniority list prepared on 1.8.1953 should not be allowed because of the inordinate delay and laches in challenging the said rule. 16. It has been observed that the attack to the seniority list-prepared on the basis of 1952 Rules 15 years after the Rules were promulgated and effect given to the seniority list prepared on 1.8.1953 should not be allowed because of the inordinate delay and laches in challenging the said rule. 16. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of K.R. Mudgal & others Vs. R.P. Singh & others 1986 (4) SCC 531 has held as follows :- “2. At the outset it should be stated that it is distressing to see that cases of this kind where the validity of the appointments of the officials who had been appointed more than 32 years ago is questioned are still being agitated in courts of law. A government servant who is appointed to any post ordinarily should at least after a period of 3 or 4 years of his appointment be allowed to attend to the duties attached to his post peacefully and without any sense of insecurity. It is unfortunate that in this case the officials who are appellants before this Court have been put to the necessity of defending their appointments as well as their seniority after nearly three decades. This kind of fruitless and harmful litigation should be discouraged. 7. The respondents in the writ petition raised a preliminary objection to the writ petition stating that the writ petition was liable to be dismissed on the ground of lakhhes. Although the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench have not disposed of the above writ petition on the ground of delay, we feel that in the circumstances of this case the writ petition should have been rejected on the ground of delay alone. The first draft seniority list of the Assistants was issued in the year 1958 and it was duly circulated amongst all the concerned officials. In that list the writ petitioners had been shown below the respondents. No objections were received from the petitioners against the seniority list. Subsequently, the seniority lists were again issued in 1961 and 1965 but again no objections were raised by the writ petitioners, to the seniority list of 1961, but only Petitioners 6 in the writ petition represented against the seniority list of 1965. No objections were received from the petitioners against the seniority list. Subsequently, the seniority lists were again issued in 1961 and 1965 but again no objections were raised by the writ petitioners, to the seniority list of 1961, but only Petitioners 6 in the writ petition represented against the seniority list of 1965. We have already mentioned that the 1968 seniority list in which the writ petitioners had been shown above the respondents had been issued on a misunderstanding of the Office Memorandum of 1959 on the assumption that the 1949 Office memorandum was not applicable to them. The June 1975 seniority list was prepared having regard to the decision in Ravi Varma case 1 and the decision of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in the writ petitions filed by Respondents 7 and 36 and thus the mistake that had crept into the 1968 list was rectified. Thus the list was finalized in January 1976. The petitioners who filed the writ petition should have in the ordinary course questioned the principle on the basis of which the seniority lists were being issued from time to time from the year 1958 and the promotions which were being made on the basis of the said lists within a reasonable time. For the first time they filed the writ petition in the High Court in the year 1976 nearly 18 years after the first draft seniority list was published in the year 1958. Satisfactory service conditions postulate that there should be no sense of uncertainty amongst the government servants created by the writ petitions filed after several years as in this case. It is essential that anyone who feels aggrieved by the seniority assigned to him should approach the court as early as possible as otherwise in addition to the creation of a sense of insecurity in the minds of the government servants there would also be administrative complications and difficulties. Unfortunately in this case even after nearly 32 years the dispute regarding the appointment of some of the respondents to the writ petition is still lingering in this Court. In these circumstances we consider that the High Court was wrong in rejecting the preliminary objection raise don behalf of the respondents to the writ petition on the ground of lakhhes. The facts of this case are more or less similar to the facts in R.S. Makashi v. I.M. Menon. In these circumstances we consider that the High Court was wrong in rejecting the preliminary objection raise don behalf of the respondents to the writ petition on the ground of lakhhes. The facts of this case are more or less similar to the facts in R.S. Makashi v. I.M. Menon. In the said decision this Court observed at p. 100 of the Reports thus : (SCC p. 400, para 30). “In these circumstances, we consider that the High Court was wrong in overruling the preliminary objection raised by the respondents before it, that the writ petition should be dismissed on the preliminary ground of delay and lakhhes, inasmuch as it seeks to disrupt the vested rights regarding the seniority, rank and promotions which had accrued to a large number of respondents during the period of eight years that had intervened between the passing of the impugned resolution and the institution of the writ petition. We would accordingly hold that the challenge raised by the petitioners against the seniority principles laid down in the Government Resolution of March 22, 1968 ought to have been rejected by the High Court on the ground of delay and lakhhes and the writ petition insofar as it related to the prayer for quashing the said Government Resolution should have been dismissed.” 17. Learned counsel for the Direct Recruits could not demonstrate before us as to why they have not initially challenged the initial appointment and subsequent regularization of Adhoc J.Es. in the claim petition before the Tribunal. If the delay has not been explained the Tribunal should have dismissed the claim petition on this score alone. The Direct Recruits have failed to explain the delay in seeking the relief for setting aside the initial appointment and subsequent regularization of Adhoc J.Es. We feel that in the facts and circumstances of the case that the relief sought by the Direct Recruits for quashing the initial appointment and subsequent regularization of Adhoc J.Es. should be rejected on the ground of latches and delay alone. 18. We feel that in the facts and circumstances of the case that the relief sought by the Direct Recruits for quashing the initial appointment and subsequent regularization of Adhoc J.Es. should be rejected on the ground of latches and delay alone. 18. Apart from this, it is also settled position of law that any matter which might or ought to have been made a ground of challenge in a former petition shall be deemed to have been a matter directly or substantially in issue in such petition and adjudication is conclusive and final not only as to the actual matter determined as to every other matter which the parties might or ought to have litigated and have had it decided as instantly to or essentially connected with the subject matter of the petition every matter coming within the legitimate purview of the original petition both in respect of the matters of claim or the defence. If the parties have had an opportunity of putting a claim before a competent authority in the earlier writ petition and it cannot be raised in a subsequent petition. The Hon’ble Supreme Court while dealing with this issue in the State Bank of India Vs. K.C. Tharakan & others 2005 (8) SCC 428, in which respondent (K.C. Tharakan) was a Clerk-cum-Typist in the Bank-appellant in the year 1963. In the year 1968 the respondent appeared in the C.A.IIB Examination conducted by the Indian Institute of Bankers (IIB for short). During the examination, the invigilator found him copying from books. The I.I.B. acted on the report of invigilator and cancelled the result of the examination of the respondent. The I.I.B. also debarred the respondent from appearing in the examination for three years vide order dated 05.03.1969. Thereafter, on 08.04.1969 the appellant-bank issued a chargesheet against the respondent and discharged him from the service in the year 1969. He challenge the discharge order and the Government of India referred the matter to the Industrial Tribunal. He raised a preliminary objection before the Tribunal that the charge framed by the disciplinary authority did not constitute the misconduct. The Tribunal rejected the said objection vide order dated 27.12.1974. The respondent challenged this order by filing writ petition before the High Court and the same was dismissed in the year 1988. After the dismissal of the writ petition, the Tribunal dismissed the claim of the respondent on merit. The Tribunal rejected the said objection vide order dated 27.12.1974. The respondent challenged this order by filing writ petition before the High Court and the same was dismissed in the year 1988. After the dismissal of the writ petition, the Tribunal dismissed the claim of the respondent on merit. After more than four years he filed a review petition for setting aside the ex-parte award and tried to justify the delay of more than 4 years on the ground that his father was ill and ultimately died, as such; he could not file the review petition in time. The review petition in year 1998 seeking the prayers to quash the award passed in the year 2007 and 1990 by the Presiding Officer; to quash the chargesheet and dismissal order issued in the year 1969; and to quash the order passed in the year 1969 by the I.I.B. canceling the result of the examination. The respondent challenged the order passed by I.I.B. in the year 1969 after 29 years. The High Court allowed the petition. Feeling aggrieved by this, the appellant filed the appeal before the Hon’ble Supreme Court and the Hon’ble Supreme Court while allowing the appeal has held as follows :- “23. ……………..Thus the Court itself notes that the respondent has not been able to give any special reason for filing a writ petition against IIB after such a long delay. The oral explanation that the order passed by IIB and by the appellant Bank is arising out of the same incident and emanating from a common enquiry is one which was merely required to be stated to be rejected. It is beyond comprehension as to how the learned Single Judge could have accepted such an explanation. The respondent had raised a dispute which had been referred to the Industrial Tribunal. The only question which had been referred to was whether the action of the management in discharging the respondent was justified. In such proceedings IIB’s order would neither be considered nor dealt with. Even if the respondent had succeeded before the Tribunal, the order of IIB would have still stood. The respondent could have challenged that order in a court of competent jurisdiction if he had so desired. Such a challenge had nothing to do with the action taken by the appellant Bank. The enquiry was also not the same. Even if the respondent had succeeded before the Tribunal, the order of IIB would have still stood. The respondent could have challenged that order in a court of competent jurisdiction if he had so desired. Such a challenge had nothing to do with the action taken by the appellant Bank. The enquiry was also not the same. IIB passed its order on the basis of some inquiry conducted by it. The appellant Bank did not act on that inquiry or the report. From the inquiry report, it can be seen that the respondent had asked for a copy of the report of IIB. It had been held that inquiry report was entirely irrelevant for the purposes of the disciplinary proceedings initiated by the appellant Bank. Further, the action of the appellant Bank was not arising out of the same incident. IIB took action on the ground that the respondent had cheated during the course of the examination. The appellant Bank took action on the ground that serious allegations were made against a senior officer which affected the interest of the Bank. The two causes of action were separate and distinct. It is surprising that the learned Single Judge could not understand such a basic thing and has chosen to pass an order against IIB after a period of 29 years. The learned Single Judge has also overlooked the fact that IIB is a private body against whom a writ could not lie. What was also ignored was that in the earlier Writ Petition No. 615 of 1975 the respondent had made IIB as party but had chosen not to ask for any reliefs against them. Having chosen not to ask for any reliefs in the earlier writ petition, it was not open to the respondent to claim reliefs in another writ petition filed subsequently. The order passed against IIB is entirely unsustainable and unjustified. 19. In the case of State of Punjab & another Vs. Varinder Kumar 2005 (12) SCC 435, the respondent was appointed as a daily wager by the appellant (State) in the year 1988 and he worked for about 170 days. Seven years later in 1995, a demand notice was served by the respondent on the appellants claiming reinstatement and back wages. In the case of State of Punjab & another Vs. Varinder Kumar 2005 (12) SCC 435, the respondent was appointed as a daily wager by the appellant (State) in the year 1988 and he worked for about 170 days. Seven years later in 1995, a demand notice was served by the respondent on the appellants claiming reinstatement and back wages. The dispute was referred to the Labour Court and the Labour Court directed the appellant to reinstate the respondent without continuity of service and with back wages amounting to Rs. 7000/- by way of a lumpsum amount. The appellants challenged the award in a writ petition which was dismissed. A special leave petition was preferred by the appellants before the Hon’ble Supreme Court and the same was rejected. Pursuant to the said order dated 02.01.2001 the respondent was reinstated and the Labour Court’s award was given effect to by the appellants. After being reinstated, a writ petition was filed by the respondent before the High Court challenging the award in so far as it had not granted continuity of service and back wages. The High Court granted continuity of service and full back wages to the respondent. When the matter came up before the Supreme Court, while allowing the appeal it has been held as follows :- “6. Being aggrieved, the appellants preferred this special leave petition. We are of the view that the High Court was entirely wrong in entertaining the writ petition filed by the respondent after the respondent had not in any way chosen to challenge the award of the Labour Court when the matter was being agitated before the various for a by the appellants. Having not chosen to do so and having allowed the award to become final by such affirmation, the respondent cannot be permitted to file a fresh writ petition and challenge the award taking grounds which were available to the respondent by way of objection when the writ petition was filed by the appellants. Accordingly, the decision of the High Court is set aside on this ground alone.” 20. In the case in hand, the Direct Recruits have not challenged the initial appointment and the regularization of Adhoc appointees in the earlier petitions. The Direct Recruits (claim petitioners) cannot be permitted to challenge at a later stage in subsequent petition. Such relief is barred by the principle of constructive resjudicata. In the case in hand, the Direct Recruits have not challenged the initial appointment and the regularization of Adhoc appointees in the earlier petitions. The Direct Recruits (claim petitioners) cannot be permitted to challenge at a later stage in subsequent petition. Such relief is barred by the principle of constructive resjudicata. Thus, the Tribunal was absolutely correct in holding that the initial appointment and the regularization of Adhoc J.Es. cannot be quashed. 21. On the one hand, the Tribunal has held that the relief of setting aside the initial appointment and the regularization of Adhoc J.Es. is barred by time and on the other hand the Tribunal has held that the Direct Recruits shall be the senior to the Adhoc J.Es. The Tribunal has held that the said relief has been incorporated after limitation, so the Tribunal did not find it proper to interfere with the initial appointment and subsequent regularization of Adhoc J.Es. On the other hand, the Tribunal has erred in holding that since the initial appointment and regularization of Adhod J.Es. were in violation of the Rules, their appointments were illegal; and assuming the regularization was made after the recommendations of the Committee still no regularization can be made in respect of illegal appointments and as such the Adhoc appointments were in violation of the Rules. The Tribunal has erred in holding that it is not established from the record that on which date the Adhoc J.Es. have been appointed and took charge in pursuance of the regularization orders. It cannot be concluded that either in the case of Adhoc J.Es. or the Direct Recruits the seniority would be reckoned from the date of their joining. In the former case, the date of their regularization would be deemed to be the date of appointment and in the latter case the inter-se seniority would be fixed according to the recommendation made by the Public Service Commission in its recommendation. The Tribunal ought to have dismissed the claim petition of the Direct Recruits on the ground of delay and latches outrightly. The Tribunal has erred in taking a self-contradictory view that the appointments are violative of the Rules and the Adhoc J.Es. cannot claim their seniority over the Direct Recruits. Learned Tribunal has erred in holding that the Direct Recruits should be senior to the Adhoc J.Es. The Tribunal has erred in taking a self-contradictory view that the appointments are violative of the Rules and the Adhoc J.Es. cannot claim their seniority over the Direct Recruits. Learned Tribunal has erred in holding that the Direct Recruits should be senior to the Adhoc J.Es. As such, the impugned judgment of the Tribunal is liable to be quashed. 22. So far as the Writ Petition No. 65 (S/S) 2007 and Contempt Petition No. 21/2008 are concerned, both the petitions are arising out of the interim order dated 31.07.2007 passed by this Court in W.P. No. 178/2007 (S/B). On hearing the interim relief application in W.P. No. 178/2007 (S/B), this Court vide order dated 31.07.2007 while staying the operation of impugned judgment of the Tribunal directed the State Government that no promotion shall be made to the post of Assistant Engineer in the P.W.D. until further orders. However, the State Government vide its order dated 21.01.2008 have given full time officiating charge of Assistant Engineer (Civil) to 88 persons violating the Court’s order dated 31.07.2007. By means of W.P. No. 65 (S/S) 2008 and Contempt Petition no. 21/2008, the Direct Recruits have challenged the said act of the State Government. During the pendency of W.P. No. 178 (S/S) 2007, the affidavit dated 27.02.2008 was filed by the State Government in which it has been categorically stated that no promotion was made, due to exigencies by way of that order dated 21.01.2008 a temporary office arrangement was made in order to run the work of the P.W.D. smoothly; it was also indicated in the order itself that such arrangement would not be treated as a promotion and no benefits of promotion to such persons shall be provided. It was further alleged that the State Government could not take prior permission from the Court due to mistake and such mistake on the part of the State Government was not deliberate and it happened in a bona-fide manner without any malafide on the part of State Government. It was further alleged that the order dated 21.01.2008 has already been withdrawn vide order dated 25.02.2008. The copy of the same has been annexed with CLMA No. 754/2008. The State Government has further prayed that by inadvertence the said order was passed and it may be condoned as the same has already been withdrawn by the State Government. It was further alleged that the order dated 21.01.2008 has already been withdrawn vide order dated 25.02.2008. The copy of the same has been annexed with CLMA No. 754/2008. The State Government has further prayed that by inadvertence the said order was passed and it may be condoned as the same has already been withdrawn by the State Government. In view of the above, the writ petition No. 65 (S/S) 2007 has become infructuous as the impugned order dated 21.01.2008 has already been withdrawn by the State Government. The apology tendered by the contemnor is hereby accepted. Therefore, the notices issued against the contemnor is hereby discharged. In view of the above, we hold as follows :- (A) Writ petitions of Adhoc J.Es. i.e. W.P. Nos. 178 (S/B) 2007, 193 (S/B) 2007, 194 (S/B) 2007, 195 (S/B) 2007, 196 (S/B) 2007, 197 (S/B) 2007 and writ petition No. 299 (S/B) 2007 filed by the State are liable to be allowed and are allowed accordingly. The impugned judgment dated 12.07.2007 passed by the Tribunal is hereby quashed and set aside accordingly. (B) Writ Petition No. 248 (S/B) 2007 filed by the Direct Recruits is hereby dismissed. (C) Writ Petition No. 65 (S/S) 2008 is dismissed as infructuous. (D) The aforesaid Contempt Petition is disposed of as mentioned above. 23. No order as to costs.