JUDGMENT 1. - Whether the power of superintending control conferred on Board of Revenue by section 221 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act 1955 (for short 1955 Act') is similar to the control exercised by the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution is the core question springing up for our consideration in the instant appeal. 2. This question emerges in the circumstances set out below: (i) The land in dispute was recorded as Khudkast land of ancestors of the appellants in Samvat 2007-12. (ii) On March 13, 1953 an application was filed by the respondents under section 145 of Code of Criminal Procedure and land in question was attached. (iii) On April 19, 1955 the Sub Divisional Magistrate Bharatpur decided the matter in favour of the respondents and they were put In possession. (iv) The High Court on Jan. 5, 1956 quashed and set aside the order dated April 19, 1955 and remanded the matter to Sub Divisional Magistrate for fresh decision. (v) On Feb. 13, 1956 the Sub Divisional Magistrate reattached the land in question and issued notice for recovery of sale money. (vi) On August 22, 1958 the Sub Divisional Magistrate Bharatpur again decided the matter in favour of the respondents. However, the High Court again set aside the order dated August 22, 1958 vide order dated September 7, 1960 and remanded the matter. (vii) On October 24, 1960 the land in question was again attached and was given on supurdagi. (viii) On January 30, 1963 the matter was sent for enquiry to Civil Court. (ix) On May 10, 1963 both the parties arrived at a compromise and admitted possession of the appellants upon different parts of land. The Civil Court recorded its findings on the basis of admissions made in the compromise. (x) On May 31, 1963 the SDM disposed of the proceedings under Section 145 Cr.PC. and directed for handing over possession of the different parts of the land to the respective parties and also directed them not to interfere in possession of each other. The attachment was accordingly removed and the sale money was also ordered to be given to the appellants. (xi) On June 6, 1963 the Sub Divisional Magistrate handed over possession of the land to the respective parties. The appellants filed suit on September 18, 1965 for declaration of Khatedari rights, correction of revenue record and permanent injunction. The attachment was accordingly removed and the sale money was also ordered to be given to the appellants. (xi) On June 6, 1963 the Sub Divisional Magistrate handed over possession of the land to the respective parties. The appellants filed suit on September 18, 1965 for declaration of Khatedari rights, correction of revenue record and permanent injunction. Along with the suit application for temporary injunction was also filed which was decided in favour of the appellants. (xii) On March 21, 1970 the respondents filed a cross suit for permanent injunction against the appellants. However, the application seeking temporary injunction was dismissed vide order dated April 2, 1970. (xiii) On July 26, 1970 the suit filed by the respondents was also dismissed in default and was never restored. (xiv) On January 18, 1972 the parties again arrived at a compromise and suit was decreed in terms of compromise. The District Collector initiated proceedings under section 232 of 1955 Act on the ground that decree dated January 18, 1972 was hit by section 42 of 1955 Act. The matter was examined thoroughly and District Collector ultimately found that violation of section 42 was not made. The District Collector, therefore, rejected the prayer of making reference to the Board of Revenue under section 232 on August 16, 1978. (xv) After becoming unsuccessful on all fronts the respondent in 1987, i.e., after 15 years filed application under section 221 of 1955 Act seeking quashing of the decree dated January 18, 1972. The Board of Revenue in exercise of its power of superintending control allowed the application vide order dated Feb. 19, 1997 and set aside the decree. The appellants filed review petition but it was also dismissed on June 30, 1997. After dismissal of writ petition by learned Single Judge on August 24, 2000, the appellants have preferred the instant appeal challenging the jurisdiction of the Board of Revenue to quash a valid decree under the power of superintendence provided by Section 221 of 1955 Act. 3. We have given our anxious consideration to the rival submissions. 4. At the outset it may be noticed that the Board of Revenue is not a constitutional authority. As per sub-section (6) of Section 5 the 'Board' shall mean the Board of Revenue for the State established or constituted under the Rajasthan Board of Revenue Ordinance 1949 or under any other law for time being in force. 4. At the outset it may be noticed that the Board of Revenue is not a constitutional authority. As per sub-section (6) of Section 5 the 'Board' shall mean the Board of Revenue for the State established or constituted under the Rajasthan Board of Revenue Ordinance 1949 or under any other law for time being in force. Turning to the Scheme of 1955 Act we find that the Board has inherent powers to call for the record of any case decided by any subordinate revenue court and pass such orders as it thinks fit. These powers which are in addition to the powers of appeal and revision, have been provided by section 230 of 1955 Act, which reads as under: "230. Power of the Board to call for the cases. -The Board may call for the record of any case decided by any subordinate revenue court in which no appeal lies either to the Board or to a Civil Court under Section 239 and if such court appears (a) to have exercised jurisdiction not vested in it by law: r (b) to have failed to exercise jurisdiction so vested; or (c) to have acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction legally or with material irregularity; The Board may pass such orders in the case as it thinks fit. 5. Section 221 however provides vesting general power of superintendence and control in the Board over all revenue courts. It reads as under: "221. Subordination of revenue courts.-The general superintendence and control over all revenue courts shall be vested in, and all such courts shall be subordinate to the Board; and subject to such superintendence, control, and subordination (a) x x x (b) all Additional Collectors, Sub Divisional Officers, Assistant Collectors and Tehsildars in a district shall be subordinate to the Collector thereof, (c) all Assistant Collectors, Tehsildars and Naib Tehsildars in a sub-division shall be subordinate to the Sub Divisional Officer thereof, and (d) all Additional Tehsildars and Naib Tehsildars in a Tehsil shall be subordinate to the Tehsildar thereof. 6. The Apex Court had occasion to consider the scope of section 221 in Devi Singh v. Board of Revenue for Rajasthan, (1994) 1 SCC 215 and it was indicated thus (para 4): "4. 6. The Apex Court had occasion to consider the scope of section 221 in Devi Singh v. Board of Revenue for Rajasthan, (1994) 1 SCC 215 and it was indicated thus (para 4): "4. Having heard learned counsel for the appellants, since he alone is here to assist us, and no one is appearing on behalf of State of Rajasthan, we view it with surprise the approach of the Board of Revenue. Section 221 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act provides vesting a general power of superintendence and control in the Board over all revenue courts and all such courts as are subordinate thereto. Besides that provision there are provisions beginning with section 222 upto section 228 which provide for appeals and the manner in which they need be presented in the fora given therein and the Board of Revenue is one such. Section 229 inter alia, thereafter provides that subject to the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 the Board of its own motion or on the application of a party to a suit or proceeding may review and may rescind, alter or confirm any decree or order made by itself or by any of its members. In the face of these provisions it is not understandable how could the Board exercise power of general superintendence under section 221 of the Act.... (Emphasis supplied) 7. Coming to the power of superintending control conferred by Article 227 on the High Court we find that it is similar to the control exercised by the Court of Kings Bench over the inferior Courts of England under the Common Law. The constitutional supervisory power under Article 227 is indefinite in character but unlimited in extent. The power is not only of an administrative nature but is also of a judicial nature and it has been restored to what it was under section 107 of the Government of India Act, 1915 and section 15 of the Charter Act. The object of Article 227 is to make the High Court responsible for entire administration of justice in the State and to vest in the High Court unlimited reserve of judicial power which could be brought into play at any time if the High Court considered it necessary to draw upon the same. 8. The object of Article 227 is to make the High Court responsible for entire administration of justice in the State and to vest in the High Court unlimited reserve of judicial power which could be brought into play at any time if the High Court considered it necessary to draw upon the same. 8. The power of Board of Revenue under section 221 is not akin to the power of the High Court as provided under Article 227 of the Constitution. In the Scheme of 1955 Act there is a clear demarcation of the judicial and administrative powers of the Board. While section 230 provides for the judicial power, Section 221 confers only administrative power and in exercise of administrative power no decree or judicial order could be set aside. The Apex Court in Devi Singh v. Board of Revenue Rajasthan (supra) also indicated that in-the face of the provisions under sections 222 to 229 the power of general superintendence under section 221 could not be exercised. In Hanja Ram v. State of Rajasthan, 2007 Rajasthan Revenue Decisions 187 the Division Bench of this Court did not properly consider the Scheme of 1955 Act and ratio indicated in Devi Singh Board of Revenue (supra) escaped its notice. Thus we find the judgment rendered in Hanja Ram v. State of Rajasthan (supra) as per in curiam. (Emphasis supplied) 9. In the instant matter, since the Board of Revenue in exercise of administrative power under Section 221 set aside the decree of a competent court, the order can not be sustained. Learned Single Judge also failed to appreciate the true scope of section 221 and the impugned order of learned Single Judge also deserves to be quashed. 10. For these reasons we allow the appeal and set aside the impugned order dated August 24, 2000 of the learned Single Judge as well as the judgment dated February 19, 1997 rendered by the Board of Revenue, Ajmer.There shall be no order as to costs.Appeal Allowed-Order of Single Judge Set Aside. *******