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2008 DIGILAW 1853 (PNJ)

Jarnail Singh S/o Nathi Ram v. State of Haryana

2008-11-04

SHAM SUNDER

body2008
JUDGMENT Sham Sunder, J 1. This appeal is directed against the judgment of conviction dated 14.3.1995, and the order of sentence dated 15.3.1995, rendered by the Court of Addl. Sessions Judge, Jagadhri, vide which it convicted the accused (now appellant), and sentenced him as under : Name of the accused Offence for which Sentence Awarded (now appellant) convicted Jarnail Singh 376(g) IPC RI for 10 years, and to pay a fine of Rs.200/-, in default of payment of fine, to undergo another RI for 3 months. 366 IPC RI for 7 years, and to pay a fine of Rs.150/-, in default of payment of fine, to undergo another RI for 3 months. Name of the accused Offence for which Sentence Awarded (now appellant) convicted 120-B IPC RI for 7 years, and to pay a fine of RS.150/-, in default of payment of fine, to undergo another RI for 3 months. However, all the substantive sentences, were ordered to run concurrently. Nanu, co-accused, was, however, declared proclaimed offender. 2. The facts, in brief, are that Jagdish Chander, father of the prosecutrix, and the complainant, is a resident of Village Jathlana, and is a labourer. He has got two daughters, and three sons. His elder daughter (the prosecutrix), was aged about 16 years, at the relevant time. On 25.3.1993, as usual, Jagdish Chander went to sleep, in his drawing room, at about 10.00 PM. His wife Savitri Devi, alongwith the prosecutrix, and other children, went to sleep in the house. On 26.3.1993, at about 6.00 AM, his wife told him, that the prosecutrix was missing, from the house, on the night intervening 25/26.3.1993. Jarnail Singh, accused, was also found missing. The complainant expressed his suspicion, against Jarnail Singh, accused. He made a complaint, when the prosecutrix could not be traced, on the basis whereof, the FIR was registered. 3. On 29.3.1993, the prosecutrix was recovered, from the custody of the accused, from the house of Shashi Bhan. She was brought back. The accused was arrested. The prosecutrix, and the accused were got medico-legally examined. The statement of the prosecutrix, under Section 164 Cr.P.C., was also recorded by the Court of Judicial Magistrate, Jagadhri. After the completion of investigation, the accused were challaned. 3A. On his appearance, in the Court of the Committing Magistrate, the copies of documents, relied upon by the prosecution, were supplied to the accused. The statement of the prosecutrix, under Section 164 Cr.P.C., was also recorded by the Court of Judicial Magistrate, Jagadhri. After the completion of investigation, the accused were challaned. 3A. On his appearance, in the Court of the Committing Magistrate, the copies of documents, relied upon by the prosecution, were supplied to the accused. After the case was received by commitment, in the Court of Sessions, charge under Sections 376, 366 and 120-B IPC, was framed against the accused, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed trial. 4. The prosecution, in support of its case, examined Dr. Kanta Dhankar (PW-1), Dr. Satnam Singh (PW-2), Moti Ram (PW-3), Satpal (PW-4), Tara Chand (PW-5), the prosecutrix (PW-6), O.P.Verma, JMIC, (PW-7), Jagdish Chander, father of the prosecutrix, (PW-8), and Sadhu Ram, SI (PW-9). Thereafter, the Addl. Public Prosecutor, for the State, closed the prosecution evidence. 5. The statement of the accused under Section 313 Cr.P.C., was recorded, and he was put all the incriminating circumstances, appearing against him, in the prosecution evidence. He pleaded false implication. It was stated by him, that due to party faction, in the village, he was falsely involved, in this case. He, however, did not lead any evidence, in his defence. 6. After hearing the Addl. Public Prosecutor for the State, the Counsel for the accused, and, on going through the evidence, on record, the trial Court, convicted and sentenced the accused, as stated hereinbefore. 7. Feeling aggrieved, against the judgment of conviction, and the order of sentence, rendered by the trial Court, the instant appeal, was filed by the appellant. 8. I have heard the learned Counsel for the parties, and have gone through the evidence and record of the case, carefully. 9. It is settled principle of Criminal jurisprudence, that the prosecution, is required to prove its case, against the accused, beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court is not required to act on mere suspicion, conjectures or surmises or suspicious circumstances, to bring home the guilt to the accused. Reasonable doubt should not be stretched too far, to suspect everything so as to defeat the ends of justice. In Gurbachan Singh vs. Sat Pal AIR 1990 Supreme Court 209, the principle of law, laid down, was to the effect, that reasonable doubt, is simply that degree of doubt, which could permit a reasonable and just man to come to a conclusion. In Gurbachan Singh vs. Sat Pal AIR 1990 Supreme Court 209, the principle of law, laid down, was to the effect, that reasonable doubt, is simply that degree of doubt, which could permit a reasonable and just man to come to a conclusion. Reasonableness of the doubt must be commensurate with the nature of offence to be investigated. Exaggerated devotion to the rule of benefit of doubt, must not nurture fanciful doubts, and lingering suspicions and thereby destroy social defence. Justice cannot be made sterile, on the plea, that it is better to let hundred guilty escape, than punish an innocent. Letting guilty escape is not doing justice according to law. In State of Uttar Pradesh vs. Anil Singh, AIR 1988 Supreme Court 1998, the principle of law, laid down, was to the effect, that it is necessary to remember that a judge does not preside over a criminal trial merely to see, that no innocent man is punished. A Judge also presides to see that guilty man does not escape. One is as important, as the other. Both are public duties, which the Judge has to perform. 10. Before touching the merits of the case, in the light of the evidence, on record, in the first instance, it must be stated, as to what approach, the Court should adopt, while evaluating the prosecution evidence, particularly the evidence of the prosecutrix, in sex related offence. Is it essential that the evidence of the prosecutrix should be corroborated in material particulars, before the Court bases a conviction on her testimony? Does the rule of prudence demand that in all cases save the rarest of rare, the Court should look for corroboration before acting on the evidence of the prosecutrix? Let us see, if the Evidence Act, provides the clue to this riddle. Under the Evidence Act, evidence means and includes all statements, which the Court permits or requires to be made before it, by the witnesses, in relation to the matters of fact, under inquiry. Under Section 59 of the Evidence Act, all facts, except the contents of documents, may be proved by oral evidence. Section 118 then illustrates, as to who may give oral evidence. Under Section 59 of the Evidence Act, all facts, except the contents of documents, may be proved by oral evidence. Section 118 then illustrates, as to who may give oral evidence. According to that Section, all persons are competent to testify, unless the Court considers that they are prevented from understanding the questions, put to them, or from giving rational answers to those questions, by tender years, extreme old age, disease, whether of body or mind, or any other cause of the same kind. Even, in the case of an accomplice, Section 133 provides that he/she shall be a competent witness, against an accused person, and the conviction is not illegal, merely because it proceeds upon the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice. However, illustration (b) to Section 114, which lays down a rule of practice, says that the Court may presume that an accomplice is unworthy of credit, unless he is corroborated, in material particulars. Thus, under Section 133, which lays down a rule of law, an accomplice is a competent witness, and the conviction based solely on his uncorroborated evidence, is not illegal, although in view of Section 114 illustration (b), the Courts do not, as a matter of practice, do so, and look for corroboration, in material particulars. This is the conjoint effect of Sections 133 and 114 illustration (b). 10-A. In State of Maharashtra vs. Chandraprakash Kewalchand Jain with Stree Atyachar Virodhi Parishad vs. Chandraprakash Kewalchand Jain & Anr. 1990(2) Chandigarh, Law Reporter 228 (SC), it was held as under:- “A prosecutrix of a sex-offence cannot be on par with an accomplice. She is in fact a victim of the crime. The evidence Act nowhere says that her evidence cannot be accepted unless it is corroborated in material particulars. She is undoubtedly a competent witness under Section 118 and her evidence must receive the same weight as it attached to an injured in cases of physical violence. The same degree of care and caution must atach in the evaluation of her evidence, as in the case of an injured complainant or witness and no more. What is necessary is that the Court must be alive to and conscious of the fact that it is dealing with the evidence of a person, who is interested in the outcome of the charge levelled by her. What is necessary is that the Court must be alive to and conscious of the fact that it is dealing with the evidence of a person, who is interested in the outcome of the charge levelled by her. If the Court keeps this in mind and feels satisfied that it can act on the evidence of the prosecutrix, there is no rule of law or practice incorporated in the Evidence Act, similar to illustration (b) to Section 114 which required it to look for corroboration. If for the same reason the Court is hesitant to place implicit reliance on the testimony of the prosecutrix, it may look for evidence which may lend assurance to her testimony short of corroboration required in the case of an accomplice. The nature of evidence to lend assurance to the testimony of the prosecutrix must necessarily depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. But if a prosecutrix is an adult and of full understanding the Court is entitled to base a conviction on her evidence unless the same is shown to be infirm and not trustworthy. If the totality of the circumstances appearing on the record of the case disclose that the prosecutrix does not have a strong motive to falsely involve the person charged, the Court should ordinarily have no hesitation, in accepting her evidence. We have, therefore, no doubt, in our minds, that ordinarily the evidence of a prosecutrix who does not lack understanding must be accepted. The degree of proof required must not be higher than is expected of an injured witness. For the above reasons we think that exception has rightly been taken to the approach of the High Court as is reflected in the following passage:- “It is only, in the rarest of rare cases if the Court finds that the testimony of the prosecutrix is so trustworthy truthful and reliable that other corroboration may not be necessary.” With respect, the law is not correctly stated. If we may say so, it is just the reverse. Ordinarily, the evidence of prosecutrix, must carry the same weight as is attached to an injured person, who is a victim of violence, unless there are special circumstances which call for greater caution, in which case it would be safe to act on her testimony, if there is independent evidence lending assurance to her accusation. Ordinarily, the evidence of prosecutrix, must carry the same weight as is attached to an injured person, who is a victim of violence, unless there are special circumstances which call for greater caution, in which case it would be safe to act on her testimony, if there is independent evidence lending assurance to her accusation. We think it proper, having regard to the increase in the number of sex-violation cases in the recent past, particularly cases of molestation and rape in custody, to remove the notion, if it persists, that the testimony of a woman who is a victim of sexual violence must ordinarily be corroborated in material particulars, except in the rarest of rare cases. To insist on corroboration except in the rarest of rare cases is to equate a woman who is a victim of the lust of another with an accomplice to crime and thereby insult womanhood. It would be adding insult to injury to tell a woman that her story of woe would not be believed unless it is corroborated in material particulars in the case of an accomplice to a crime. Ours is a conservative society where it concerns sexual behaviour. Ours is not a permissive society as in some of the Western and European countries. Our standard of decency and morality in public life is not the same as in those countries. It is, however, evident that respect for womanhood, in our country is on active and cases of molestation and rape are steadily growing. Indian woman is now required to suffer indignities in different forms. From lewd remarks to eve-teasing, from molestation to rape. Decency and morality in public life can be promoted and protected only if we deal strictly with those, who violate the social norms. The standard of proof to be required by the Court in such cases, must take into account the fact that such crimes are generally committed on the sly and very rarely direct evidence of a person other than the prosecutrix is available. Courts must also realise that ordinarily woman, more so a young girl, will not stake her reputation by levelling a false charge concerning her chastity. Courts must also realise that ordinarily woman, more so a young girl, will not stake her reputation by levelling a false charge concerning her chastity. It is time to recall the observation of this Court made not so far back in Bhaiwaca Bhognibhai Hirjinbhai:- In the Indian setting refusal to act on the testimony of a victim of sexual assault in the absence of corroboration as a rule, is a doing insult to injury. Why should the evidence of the girl or the woman who complains of rape or sexual molestation be viewed with the aid of spectacles fitted with lenses tinged with doubt, disbelief or suspicion? To do so is to justify the charge of male chauvinism in a male dominated society. We must analyse the argument in support of the need for corroboration and subject it to relentless and remorseless cross-examination. And we must do so with a logical, and not an opinionated eye in the light of probabilities with our feet firmly planted on the soil of India and with our eyes focussed on the Indian horizon. We must not be swept off the feet by the approach, made in the Western world which has its own social milieu, its own permissive values, and its own code of life. Corroboration may, be considered essential to establish a sexual offence in the backdrop of the social ecology of the Western World. It is wholly unnecessary to import the said concept on a turn-Key basis and to transplant it on the Indian soil regardless of the altogether different atmosphere, attitudes, mores, responses of the Indian Society and its profile. The identities of the two worlds are different. The solution of problems therefore, cannot be identical. Further this Court said : Without the fear of making two wide a statement or of over-stating the case it can be said that rarely will a girl or a woman in India false allegations of sexual assault.... The statement is generally true in the context of the urban as also rural society. It is also by the and large true in the context of the sophisticated, not so sophisticated, and unsophisticated society. Only very rarely can one conceivably come across an exception or to and that too possibly from amongst the urban elites. Because (1). The statement is generally true in the context of the urban as also rural society. It is also by the and large true in the context of the sophisticated, not so sophisticated, and unsophisticated society. Only very rarely can one conceivably come across an exception or to and that too possibly from amongst the urban elites. Because (1). A girl or a woman in the tradition bound non-permissive society of India would be extremely reluctant even to admit that any incident which is likely to reflect on her chastity had ever occurred. (2) She would be conscious of the danger of being ostracised by the society or being looked down by the society including by her own family members, relatives, friends and neighbours. (3) She would have to brave the whole world. (4) She would have to brave the whole world. (4) she would face the risk of losing the love and respect of her own husband and near relatives, and of her matrimonial home and happiness being shattered. (5) If she is unmarried she would apprehend that it would be difficult to secure an alliance with a suitable match from a respectable or an acceptable family. (6) It would almost inevitably and almost invariably result in mental torture and suffering to herself. (7) The fear of being taunted by others will always haunt her. (8) She would feel extremely embarrassed in relating the incident to others being over powered by a feeling of shame on account of the upbringing in a tradition bound society whereby and large sex is taboo. (9) The natural inclination would be to avoid giving publicity to the incident lest the family name and family honour is brought into controversy. (10) The parents of an unmarried girl as also the husband and members of the husband's family of a married woman would also more often than not, want to avoid publicity on account of the fear of social stigma on the family name and family honour. (11) The fear of the victim herself being considered to the promiscuous or in some way responsible for the incident regardless of her innocence. (12) The reluctance to face interrogation by investigating agency, to face the Court to face the cross-examination, by Counsel for the culprit, and the risk of being disbelieved, acts as a deterrent. 11. (11) The fear of the victim herself being considered to the promiscuous or in some way responsible for the incident regardless of her innocence. (12) The reluctance to face interrogation by investigating agency, to face the Court to face the cross-examination, by Counsel for the culprit, and the risk of being disbelieved, acts as a deterrent. 11. Adverting to the facts of the instant case, now let us see, as to whether, the prosecution was able to successfully prove, that the accused committed rape with the prosecutrix, beyond a reasonable doubt, or not. The brief narration of the evidence produced by the prosecution is, thus, required to be made. The prosecutrix, appeared as PW-6. She stated that on 9.11.1994, the date on which she deposed in the Court, she was aged about 17 years. It was stated by her, that on 25.3.1993, at about 11.00 PM, she came outside the house for urination, in the street. Jarnail Singh, and three other persons came, picked her up, and took her away to the fields, from the street. Thereafter, she was taken away, in a tanker, towards Raipur side in Uttar Pradesh. She further stated that Jarnail Singh, and his companions, committed rape with her. On 26.3.1993, she was recovered from Raipur, by the Police, from the custody of the accused. At that time, Moti Ram, Omi Lal, her uncle, and Jagmal were with the Police. She was put such questions, as are put, during the course of examination, by the Public Prosecutor for the State, with the permission of the Court, as she was making statement, contradictory to the one, made by her earlier. During the course of such cross-examination, she admitted that allurement was given by the accused, to her. She also admitted that she was taken to Raipur, and was kept in the house of Shashi Bhan. Jagdish Chander, father of the prosecutrix (PW-8), proved the application, Ex.PO, moved by him, to the Police, on the basis whereof, FIR was recorded. He also supported the statement of the prosecutrix, to a large extent. The statement of the prosecutrix, was duly corroborated by Dr. Kanta Dhankar (PW-1), who medico-legally examined her on 29.3.1993, at 3.00 PM. She stated that no blood or seminal stain, was seen with naked eye examination. The pubic hair were present, with no blood, or seminal stain. He also supported the statement of the prosecutrix, to a large extent. The statement of the prosecutrix, was duly corroborated by Dr. Kanta Dhankar (PW-1), who medico-legally examined her on 29.3.1993, at 3.00 PM. She stated that no blood or seminal stain, was seen with naked eye examination. The pubic hair were present, with no blood, or seminal stain. No mark of injury was seen, on external genitalia or vagina. She found hymen of the prosecutrix ruptured, and vagina admitting two three fingers easily. The clothes of the prosecutrix, as also swabs and pubic hair, were sent to the Forensic Science Laboratory, to find out, as to whether, there was any semen, and blood stain, thereon. It is evident from, Ex.PL, report of the Forensic Science Laboratory, that human semen was detected on trouser (salwar), pubic hair, and under-wear of the prosecutrix. The trouser was also found stained with a few medium and small blod stains. From, Ex.PL/1, the report of the Serologist, it was found that the origin of blood on the trouser (salwar) of the prosecutrix, was human. The statement of Dr. Kanta Dhankar (PW-1), therefore, corroborated the ocular version of the prosecutrix, that the rape was committed with her. The prosecutrix, and Jagdish Chander, her father, were thoroughly cross-examined, but nothing of consequence, could be got elicited from their mouth, which may go to discredit their evidence. They stood the test of touch-stone of all probabilities, during the course of their cross-examination. No doubt, some minor discrepancies, and contradictions, occurred in their statements, but the same did not affect the merits of the case, as they in one voice deposed with regard to the occurrence. Even otherwise, there was no reason, on the part of the prosecutrix, and her father, to depose falsely. The prosecutrix at the relevant time, was below 16 years of age, as would be duly discussed in the subsequent paragraphs. Before lodging the report, she and her parents must have thought 100 times, as the honour of an unmarried minor girl was involved. They must have thought that if the allegations, were proved to be false, then the prosecutrix, as also her entire family, shall be looked down upon in the society. They must have thought, in that event, they will be ostracized from the society. They must have thought that if the allegations, were proved to be false, then the prosecutrix, as also her entire family, shall be looked down upon in the society. They must have thought, in that event, they will be ostracized from the society. They must have also given a thought to the factum, that, in case, the allegations were found to be untrue, then the chances of the marriage of the prosecutrix, would be very bleak. No minor unmarried girl, would stake her honour, by making false allegations, against the accused, that he committed rape with her. The evidence of the prosecutrix, duly corroborated by Jagdish Chander, her father, and Dr. Kanta Dhankar, as also the report of the Forensic Science Laboratory, was rightly held to be cogent, convincing, reliable, and trustworthy, by the trial Court. On indepth scrutiny of the evidence of the prosecution witnesses, this Court also comes to the same conclusion. The trial Court was, thus, right in coming to the conclusion, that the accused committed rape with the prosecutrix. 12. The next question, that arises for consideration, is as to what was the age of the prosecutrix, at the time of occurrence. Ex.PG, is the School Leaving Certificate, of the prosecutrix. This certificate, was proved by Satpal, Headmaster, Government High School, Jathlana. He stated that, as per the record, the date of birth of the prosecutrix, is 15.5.1977. This certificate was prepared, on the basis of the record, maintained by the officials of the School, in the due discharge of their official duties. This certificate, therefore, carried a presumption of correctness. No evidence was led to prove that this certificate was, in any way, incorrect. Even further corroboration to this certificate, was provided from the medico-legal report, wherein the age of the prosecutrix was written as 15 years. Even the prosecutrix, when she deposed in the Court, in the year 1994, stated her age as 16/17 years. In the absence of any other documentary evidence, to the contrary, the certificate Ex.PG, could be said to be conclusive, to prove the age of the prosecutrix. Even if, it is taken that the occular evidence is contradictory, with regard to the age of the prosecutrix, that hardly matters, in the face of the certificate, Ex.PG. In the absence of any other documentary evidence, to the contrary, the certificate Ex.PG, could be said to be conclusive, to prove the age of the prosecutrix. Even if, it is taken that the occular evidence is contradictory, with regard to the age of the prosecutrix, that hardly matters, in the face of the certificate, Ex.PG. Since, the prosecutrix was below 16 years of age, when she was kidnapped from the lawful guardianship of her parents, with an intent to force her to sexual intercourse, the consent or no consent of the prosecutrix was of no significance. 13. The Counsel for the appellant, however, submitted that no offence, punishable under Section 376(2)(g) of the IPC, was made out, and, as such, the trial Court, was wrong in recording conviction, of the accused, for that offence. The submission of the Counsel for the appellant, in this regard, does not appear to be correct. The prosecutrix, in clear-cut terms, in her statement, under Section 164 Cr.P.C., as also in her statement, made in the Court, stated that the accused alongwith his three companions, forcibly took her away, and committed rape with her. Nanu Ram, one of the accused, has already been declared Proclaimed Offender, as is evident from the record. It means that there was more than one person, who committed rape with the prosecutrix. Not only this, for attracting the provisions of Section 376(2)(g) of the IPC, it is not necessary that all the accused, should commit rape with the prosecutrix. Even if, one accused commits rape with the prosecutrix, and the others just stand by, they can also be held liable, for the offence, punishable under Section 376(2)(g) of the IPC. The trial Court was, thus, right in recording conviction, under Section 376(2)(g) of the IPC. The submission of the Counsel for the appellant, being without merit, must fail, and the same stands rejected. 14. It was next submitted by the Counsel for the appellant, that the prosecurtix remained with the accused for 4 days. He further submitted that it, therefore, could be said to be a case of consent. The submission of the Counsel for the appellant, in this regard, does not appear to be correct. It has been held above, that the age of the prosecutrix, at the time of occurrence, was below 16 years. She was, thus, minor. He further submitted that it, therefore, could be said to be a case of consent. The submission of the Counsel for the appellant, in this regard, does not appear to be correct. It has been held above, that the age of the prosecutrix, at the time of occurrence, was below 16 years. She was, thus, minor. Under these circumstances, her consent or no consent was hardly of any consequence. Even if, it is assumed that she was above 16 years of age, the mere fact that the accused after alluring her took her away, to some other place, and he alongwith his co-accused, committed rape with her, did not mean that the prosecutrix was a consenting party. Even, no such plea was taken up by the accused, in his statement, under Section 313 Cr.P.C. Under these circumstances, he cannot set up the plea of consent, at this belated stage. The submission of the Counsel for the appellant, being without merit, must fail, and the same stands rejected. 15. It was next submitted by the Counsel for the appellant, that the prosecutrix, made three contradictory statements. He further submitted that since, she made shifting statements, no reliance could be placed, on the same. The submission of the Counsel for the appellant, in this regard, does not appear to be correct. The prosecutrix, in her statement, under Section 164 Cr.P.C., as also in her statement, in the Court, in clear-cut terms, stated that Jarnail Singh, accused, and his companions committed rape with her. No doubt, there are certain contradictions, in her statement, made in the Court, viz-a-viz her statement, under Section 164 Cr.P.C., with regard to the minor details, relating to ancillary matters. The evidence of the prosecutrix, with regard to the subtratum of the case, is not contradictory, in any manner. If, on certain points, which were insignificant and irrelevant, her statements were contradictory, that did not affect the very fabric of the case. The submission of the Counsel for the appellant, being without merit, must fail, and the same stands rejected. 16. It was next submitted by the Counsel for the appellant, that Jagdish Chander, (PW-8), father of the prosecutrix, in his statement, before the Police, on the basis whereof, the FIR was registered, stated that his daughter took away Rs.3000/-. He further submitted that, under these circumstances, it could be said that the prosecutrix herself accompanied Jarnail Singh, accused. 16. It was next submitted by the Counsel for the appellant, that Jagdish Chander, (PW-8), father of the prosecutrix, in his statement, before the Police, on the basis whereof, the FIR was registered, stated that his daughter took away Rs.3000/-. He further submitted that, under these circumstances, it could be said that the prosecutrix herself accompanied Jarnail Singh, accused. The submission of the Counsel for the appellant, in this regard, does not appear to be correct. During the course of cross-examination, it was stated by Jagdish Chander, that it was wrong to suggest that her daughter took away Rs.3000/-from the house, and also took away Jarnail Singh, accused, with her, in order to perform marriage, with him. He voluntarily stated that a sum of Rs.3000/-, which he had mentioned, in his statement, before the Police, was recovered subsequently, by his wife, from the house itself. He further stated that he made a mention of this fact, in his statement, before the Police, when he did not find this amount, at the place, where he had kept the same. When the evidence of Jagdish Chander, is read as a whole, then only one and one conclusion, that can be arrived at, is that, he did not state that his daughter left the house of her own, and took away the amount of Rs.3000/-. No doubt, in the first instance, in his statement, before the Police, he made such a mention, but when he appeared, in the Court, he corrected the same, when he found the amount of RS.3000/-in his house. In this view of the matter, the submission of the Counsel for the appellant, being without merit, must fail, and the same stands rejected. 17. It was next submitted by the Counsel for the appellant, that the appellant has been facing the criminal proceedings, since 1993, and his sentence be reduced. The submission of the Counsel for the appellant, in this regard, does not appear to be correct. The accused by kidnapping the prosecutrix, from the lawful guardianship of her parents, with an intent to induce her, to submit her to sexual intercourse, and committing rape with her, caused a permanent stigma, on her life. The act of commission of rape, by the accused, with the prosecutrix, can be described as depraved and beastly. The accused by kidnapping the prosecutrix, from the lawful guardianship of her parents, with an intent to induce her, to submit her to sexual intercourse, and committing rape with her, caused a permanent stigma, on her life. The act of commission of rape, by the accused, with the prosecutrix, can be described as depraved and beastly. On account of the rise in crime, against women, no leniency is required to be shown, to the appellant, in the matter of sentence. The submission of the Counsel for the appellant, being without merit, must fail, and the same stands rejected. 18. No other point, was urged, by the Counsel for the parties. 19. In view of the above discussion, it is held that the judgment of conviction and the order of sentence, rendered by the trial Court, are based on the correct appreciation of evidence, and law, on the point. The same do not warrant any interference, and are liable to be upheld. 20. For the reasons recorded, hereinbefore, the appeal is dismissed. The judgment of conviction dated 14.3.1995, and the order of sentence dated 15.3.1995, are upheld. If the appellant is on bail, his bail bonds, shall stand cancelled. The Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jagadhri, shall take necessary steps, to comply with the judgment, with due promptitude, and compliance report be sent to this Court, within a period of one month, from the date of receipt of a copy thereof. Appeal dismissed.