JUDGMENT G. RAJASURIA, J. 1. This appeal is focussed as against the judgment and decree dated 7.3.1994 passed by the learned Subordinate Judge at Tirupathur in L.A.O.P. No. 167 of 1989 in awarding compensation in a sum of Rs. 24,000/- as against the claim of Rs. 1,00,000/- to the plaintiff in O.S. No. 167 of 1989, which was filed by the plaintiff as against the defendants. For convenience sake, the parties are referred to here under according to their litigative status before the trial Court. 2. Pithily and precisely, tersely and briefly, the case of the plaintiff as stood exposited from the plaint could be portrayed thus; (a) The plaintiff got his name registered in the Employment Exchange at Alangayam, North Arcot on 20.9.1978. Again on 5.6.1981 he got his name registered for the post of Conductor. In addition to that, he got his name registered for the post of Typist on 28.4.1983. After passing Pre-University Course, he registered his name on 9.4.1987 under “XOI”. He belongs to Vanniyakula Shatria Community which is found included in the list of Backward Classes at S. No. 110. In the S.S.L.C. Book of the plaintiff, his caste status as Backward class is found recorded and the said fact was known to the third defendant as early as on 20.9.1978 itself. In addition to that, he also produced the Community Certificate from the Tahsildar concerned. Even though juniors to the plaintiff were sponsored for interviews, none the less the plaintiffs name was not sponsored for about a decade, whereupon the plaintiff issued a legal notice dated 9.1.1988 to the defendants expressing his grievance and calling upon them to act swiftly and promptly by sponsoring his name for suitable interviews. (b) However, it evoked no positive response from the defendants but, an untenable reply dated 8.2.1988 was issued on behalf of the defendants, who contended as though the plaintiff belongs to Forward Caste. After exchange of notices and rejoinders, the suit was filed claiming damages for a sum of Rs. 1,00,000/-. 3. Impugning and challenging, denying and refuting the allegations/averments in the plaint, the second defendant filed the written statement, the pith and marrow of it would run thus: (a) After passing S.S.L.C. the plaintiff got his name registered on 20.9.1978 in the Employment Exchange. Thereafter, he produced certificate evidencing his Typewriting (Higher Grade) qualification in Tamil and English. 1,00,000/-. 3. Impugning and challenging, denying and refuting the allegations/averments in the plaint, the second defendant filed the written statement, the pith and marrow of it would run thus: (a) After passing S.S.L.C. the plaintiff got his name registered on 20.9.1978 in the Employment Exchange. Thereafter, he produced certificate evidencing his Typewriting (Higher Grade) qualification in Tamil and English. As such, his name was re-registered on 28.4.1983 for Typist post. On 5.6.1981 the plaintiff produced Conductor licence and subsequently, he produced PUC certificate on 9.4.1987. The plaintiff did not produce the Community Certificate-at the time of getting his name registered on 20.9.1978. In the first page of SSLC book of the plaintiff, his caste status was not found mentioned. Whereas, he produced the Community Certificate at the Employment Exchange concerned only on 17.2.1988 wherefore he was classified under the Backward Class category by the Employment Exchange only with effect from 17.2.1988. In view of the fact that the plaintiff belongs to Backward Class, there is no age limit for seeking employment under the State Government for Clerical type of jobs. As such, he may get chance of appointment in future. Accordingly, they prayed for the dismissal of the suit. 4. The Trial Court framed the relevant issues. During trial, the plaintiff examined himself as P.W.1 and Exhibits A-1 to A-9 were marked. On the side of the defendants, D.W.1-the official concerned was examined and Exhibits B-1 to B-16 were marked. The Trial Court ultimately decreed the suit awarding a sum of Rs. 24,000/- payable by the defendants in favour of the plaintiff with cost. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the judgment and decree of the Trial Court, the defendants filed this appeal on the following grounds among others: (1) The judgment and decree of the Court is against the law and weight of evidence. (2) Despite the plaintiff (P.W.1) has admitted during the cross examination that he did not produce the Community Certificate at the time of his first registration on 20.9.1973, the Trial Court simply ignored it and awarded damages in his favour, payable by the defendants. (3) The plaintiff obtained his Community Certificate only on 10.3.1981 and produced the same on 17.2.1988 at the Employment Office concerned and that too, only after the receipt of the reply notice dated 8.2.1988 from the defendants. (3) The plaintiff obtained his Community Certificate only on 10.3.1981 and produced the same on 17.2.1988 at the Employment Office concerned and that too, only after the receipt of the reply notice dated 8.2.1988 from the defendants. (4) The Trial Court failed to note that the plaintiff had not filed his original SSLC Transfer Certificate at the time of getting his name registered on 20.9.1978. (5) The plaintiff did not prove that candidates who got their names registered with the Employment Exchange, got employment earlier to him. (6) The Trial Court has failed to note that the Employment Exchange concerned sent interview cards for the plaintiff thrice, i.e., on 27.1.1979, 28.11.1988 and 14.10.1998. (7) The Trial Court erroneously held as though the plaintiff crossed the age limit for getting employment in Government service. (8) The compensation awarded by the Trial Court at any rate is excessive and arbitrary. Accordingly, the appellants/defendants prayed for setting aside judgment and decree of the Trial Court. 5. The points for consideration are as to: (1) Whether the plaintiff at the time of his initial registration as on 20.9.1978 produced evidence that he belonged to Backward class Community and accordingly, got his name registered? (2) Whether the Employment Exchange concerned failed to sponsor his name for interview in violation of the Rules and Regulations governing such sponsoring? (3) Whether the compensation awarded is on the higher side? and (4) Whether there is any infirmity in the judgment of the Trial Court? 6. Heard the learned counsel on either side. 7. The quintessence of the case of the plaintiff is that even though he got his name registered with the third defendant as a backward class candidate by producing the first page of the SSLC Book, nonetheless the third defendant did not sponsored his name for interviews as a Backward Class candidate till the year 1988. 8. 7. The quintessence of the case of the plaintiff is that even though he got his name registered with the third defendant as a backward class candidate by producing the first page of the SSLC Book, nonetheless the third defendant did not sponsored his name for interviews as a Backward Class candidate till the year 1988. 8. On the other hand, the contention on the side of the defendants is that the plaintiff as a genuine and prudent candidate should have produced the caste/community certificate at the earliest, so to say, even, at the time of getting his name registered in the year 1978, but he failed to do so; consequently, he cannot now raise his accusitive finger as against the defendants as though they failed to sponsor his name as a Backward Class candidate; simply two letters, i.e., “B.C” found in the Secondary School Leaving Certificate, would not in any way enure to the benefit of the plaintiff to claim that the defendants should have sponsored his name as a Backward Class candidate; separate Backward Class Certificate was also not produced even though the plaintiff falsely claimed that he gave such a Certificate; the Employment Exchange is only sponsoring the name of the candidates and it is not guaranteeing job for the candidates and in such a case, the lower Court was not justified in awarding such a huge compensation as set out supra. The learned counsel for the defendants would also contend that in the absence of clear evidence that the plaintiff produced community certificate, the lower Court was not justified in holding that the defendants were negligent in not sponsoring the name of the plaintiff. 9. No doubt, the perusal of the whole kit and caboodle of facts and the evidence would clearly indicate and evince that the plaintiff could not produce any clinching evidence that at the time of getting his name registered with the third defendant during 1978, he produced any separate community certificate. The learned counsel for the plaintiff would submit that the endorsement as found in Exhibit A-4 to the effect that he belonged to Backward Class was sufficient. I could see considerable force in the submission made on behalf of the plaintiff for the reason that the Secondary School Leaving Certificate was issued by the Government Authority concerned and in that it is found specified that the plaintiff belonged to backward class. I could see considerable force in the submission made on behalf of the plaintiff for the reason that the Secondary School Leaving Certificate was issued by the Government Authority concerned and in that it is found specified that the plaintiff belonged to backward class. Such a specification simply cannot be phoophooed or belittled or slighted or discarded as though it might be a casual specification. I could see considerable force in the submission made by the learned counsel for the plaintiff that one wing of the Government having issued such School Leaving Certificate specifying him as a Backward Class candidate cannot be ignored by the other wing of the Government. Even for argument’s sake, it is taken that the plaintiff did not produce separately a backward class certificate specifying that he belonged to Vanniyakula Shatriya, yet the Department should have asked the plaintiff to produce the necessary certificate and the plaintiff had he not produced such certificate, despite asking for it, the third defendant should have communicated to him that he would be treated only as a forward community candidate and not as a backward class candidate. 10. No doubt, presently, the procedure is entirely different for issuing backward class certificates; certain norms have been fixed and various safeguards are also there. During the year 1978, Exhibit A-4 revealed that he belonged to the backward class and that would lead to the presumption that the school authorities might have demanded for certificate from the plaintiff and only on being satisfied about the caste status of the candidate, such entry as “B.C” might have emerged in Exhibit A-4. In fact, in Exhibit A-4 the Headmaster of the Government High School in North Arcot District had signed with his seal and the candidate also signed it. In such a case, had the third defendant doubted it, they ought to have demanded in writing from the plaintiff as to why he should not be treated as backward class candidate for being sponsored but that was not done so. 11. In this factual matrix, I am of the considered opinion that even though there is no ill-will, malice or spite on the part of D3 in not sponsoring the plaintiffs name as a backward class candidate, nonetheless, there are laches on the part of D3. 11. In this factual matrix, I am of the considered opinion that even though there is no ill-will, malice or spite on the part of D3 in not sponsoring the plaintiffs name as a backward class candidate, nonetheless, there are laches on the part of D3. The plaintiff, as a candidate, had no reason to believe that he might not have been treated as a backward class candidate and hence, he kept quiet. But on sensing that he had not been sponsored for a pretty long number of years, he issued notice to the third defendant whereupon D3 replied as though the plaintiff was not treated as a backward class candidate, but only as a forward class candidate. In fact, in the plaint itself, the plaintiff would aver to those facts. However, in the written statement, the defendants would plead ignorance about the factum of D3 having sent such a reply. Be that as it may, now, we are concerned with the fact whether there was any justification for the third defendant in not sponsoring the plaintiffs name as a backward class candidate for such long number of years. In my opinion, there were laches on the part of the third defendant in not sponsoring him as a backward class candidate even though the plaintiffs name was sponsored during the year 1979 for the post of Village Co-operative Sales Man and subsequently for Typist post during the year 1988. But on both the occasions, he was sponsored not as a backward class candidate but only as an ordinary candidate. Hence, in this view of the matter, I could see no infirmity in the finding given by the trial Court. 12. Relating to the awarding of damages of Rs. 24,000/- payable by the defendants to the plaintiff, I would hold that ex-facie and prima facie, the methodology adopted by the trial Court is not acceptable legally. The trial Court proceeded on the assumption that because of such non-sponsoring, the candidate might have lost his monthly income, which could be quantified at Rs. 200/- and accordingly, per year the lower Court quantified the damages in a sum of Rs. 2,400/- and for 10 years, such damages of Rs. 24,000/- was awarded. There is no certainty that the plaintiff would have secured employment even had he been sponsored by D3. 200/- and accordingly, per year the lower Court quantified the damages in a sum of Rs. 2,400/- and for 10 years, such damages of Rs. 24,000/- was awarded. There is no certainty that the plaintiff would have secured employment even had he been sponsored by D3. In jure, non remota causa sed proxima spectatur – (In law, the proximate, and not the remote, cause is regarded). Simply because that the plaintiff could not get an opportunity of getting sponsored, he cannot develop his argument to the effect that had he been sponsored, he would have been selected earlier for some post and that cannot be linked with the laches on the part of D3 in not sponsoring unwittingly. At this juncture, my mind is redolent with the maxim ubijus ibi remedium – (where there is a right, there is a remedy. It is said that the rule of primitive law was the reverse: Where there is a remedy, there is a right). His right to get sponsored was denied and as such as per the cited principle, he is entitled to damages, without pleading and proving specifically what was the actual quantum of damage, which he suffered. The famous treatise Salmon on the Law Of Torts, 17th Edition by R.F.V. Heuston could rightly be referred to in this connection. An excerpt from page No. 530 of it, would run thus: “(i) Nominal or real: Nominal damages are a small sum of money - for example, one pound – awarded not by way of compensation for any actual loss suffered, but merely by way of recognition of the existence of some legal right vested in the plaintiff and violated by the defendant. Real damages, on the other hand, are those which are assessed and awarded as compensation for damage actually suffered by the plaintiff, and not simply by way of mere recognition of a legal right violated – injuria sine damno. Damages are not nominal merely because they are very small. If actual damage, however small, is proved, and damages, however small, are awarded in respect of it, such damages are real and not nominal. They represent damnum, and not merely injuria. Damages are not nominal merely because they are very small. If actual damage, however small, is proved, and damages, however small, are awarded in respect of it, such damages are real and not nominal. They represent damnum, and not merely injuria. Nominal damages must also be distinguished from contemptuous damages: the former term is appropriate in a case where the plaintiff is not concerned with his – actual loss (if any), but brings his action with the sole and proper object of establishing his right; the latter term indicates that in the opinion of the jury the action should not have been brought at all.” A mere perusal of the cited excerpts, would speak volumes that in a case of this nature, nominal damages could be awarded and that too, in view of the subsequent developments. Admittedly and incontrovertibly, indubitably and unassailably, the fact is that the plaintiff got employment in Tamil Nadu Judicial Department as Judicial Subordinate Service staff and it appears that he is now working in the Sub-Court, Thirupathur and that too, he got promotion also, in such a case, the alleged damage sustained by him due to non sponsoring by D3 got relegated to the maximum. As such, awarding of nominal damages in the facts and circumstances would be more appropriate. 13. Learned Special Government Pleader would strenuously argue that even awarding of nominal damages will give a wrong signal to the misguided unemployed youths to file frivolous suits against the Government and claim damages. I am of the view that now the situation is different, as computers are used to a larger extent and the procedures adopted are also entirely different from the one adopted during the year 1978. 14. Hence, I am of the considered view that awarding of nominal damages in favour of the plaintiff would not tantamount to giving wrong signal to others to come forward with spate of frivolous suits. Taking into consideration the over all circumstances in this case, I am of the considered view that a consolidated sum of Rs. 10,000/- could be awarded as nominal damages payable by the defendants and that would meet the ends of justice. 15. Accordingly, the judgment and decree of the trial is modified to the effect that the defendants shall pay a sum of Rs. 10,000/- could be awarded as nominal damages payable by the defendants and that would meet the ends of justice. 15. Accordingly, the judgment and decree of the trial is modified to the effect that the defendants shall pay a sum of Rs. 10,000/- (Rupees ten thousand only) towards nominal damages to the plaintiff and the rest of the judgment and decree of the trial Court shall hold good. The parties are ordered to bear their respective costs. 16. This appeal is disposed of on the above terms. Appeal disposed of.