JUDGMENT S.B. Sinha, J. — 1. Leave granted. 2. The short question that arises for consideration in this appeal is as to whether the Courts below were correct in decreeing the suit only on the premise that defendant No.2-appellant could not prove his title. 3. The basic fact of the matter is not in dispute. The plaintiff-respondent No.1 purchased the suit property in the year 1991 from one T. Bayarappa. Apparently plaintiff-respondent No.2 was in permissive possession thereof. As despite request he refused to vacate the licensed premises, the suit was filed. 4. On the other hand, the defence of the appellant before us was that he had been in lawful possession of the property in his own right. Appellant, inter alia, contended that the original owner of the property, viz., Shri T. Bayrappa had entered into an agreement of sale with one Shri Krishnamurthy. A Power of Attorney was also executed in his favour. The said Krishnamurthy has assigned his rights under an agreement in favour of denfendant No.1, (late Shri G. Srinivas) and delivered possession of the property to him. Shri Srinivas raised constructions thereupon. Shri Krishnamurthy allegedly as an agent of T. Bayrappa assigned his rights in favour of G. Srinivas on 10.5.1997. He filed a suit for specific performance of contract. It was furthermore claimed that Shri Srinivasan entered into an agreement with the petitioner to convey the property for a total consideration of Rs.9,60,000/-. A joint written statement was filed in the said suit by the contesting defendants. Admittedly, however, the said suit for specific performance of contract was withdrawn. An additional written statement was filed by the petitioner claiming his title under the aforementioned agreement entered into by and between him and the defendant No.1 5. The learned Trial Court framed a large number of issues. Parties adduced their respective evidences on the said issues. The suit was decreed and the first appeal filed thereagainst was also dismissed by the High Court by reason of the impugned judgment. 6. Mr. Nageshwar Rao, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant, in support of the appeal at the outset, drew our attention to the fact that although plaintiff purported to have purchased the suit property in the year 1994 but from the records it would appear that he allegedly entered into an agreement for sale with Shri T. Bayrappa in the year 1991. The Power of Attorney was also executed in his favour authorizing him to encumber and alienate the said property. It was pointed out that from the record it would furthermore appear that the plaintiff-first respondent filed a writ petition before the High Court of Karnataka alleging that Bangalore Development Authority had been making attempts to dispossess him and demolish the structures on the land when his application for regularization of construction was pending before the said Authority. Learned counsel would contend that from the said records, thus, it would appear that the land in question had been acquired by the Bangalore Development Authority and, thus, the plaintiff having lost his title, the question of defendant No.2’s being in permissive possession thereof would not arise and thus, the suit filed by the plaintiff claiming title over the property could not have been decreed. 7. Mr. P.V. Shetty, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent, on the other hand, would support the judgment. 8. Both the courts below have concurrently found the contentions of the plaintiff-respondent that he had purchased the property from the rightful owner T. Bayrappa. Even according to the appellant, the purported transaction between Shri T. Bayrappa and Shri Krishnamurthy and defendant No.1 did not result in execution of a registered deed of sale in his favour. Admittedly, the defendant No.1 himself filed a suit for specific performance of the contract against his vendor. It has concurrently been found by both the courts that the defendant No.2 cannot be said to have acquired any title over the property, particularly when the defendant No.1 himself withdrew the suit for specific performance of contract. It was furthermore noticed that even the purported agreement for sale was not produced before the trial court by the defendant No.1. 10. When questioned, Mr. Nageshwar Rao conceded that there is nothing on record to show that the Bangalore Development Authority at any point of time has acquired the property in suit in terms of the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 or otherwise. Admittedly, the plaintiff’s vendor was in possession of the suit property. It is only through him, the defendant No.1 and defendant No.2 claimed possession. As the original owner has transferred his title in favour of the plaintiff-respondent, the court was required to go into the question of inter se claim between the parties on or over the land in dispute. Admittedly, the plaintiff’s vendor was in possession of the suit property. It is only through him, the defendant No.1 and defendant No.2 claimed possession. As the original owner has transferred his title in favour of the plaintiff-respondent, the court was required to go into the question of inter se claim between the parties on or over the land in dispute. Even if plaintiff and his vendor has been in prior possession, the defendant No.2 who came in permissive possession of the property through him cannot be said to have acquired a better title than the plaintiff. This aspect of the matter has been considered in Somnath Burman v. Dr. S.P. Raju & Anr.1 [ (1969) 3 SCC 129 ] wherein this Court held : “It was next contended on behalf of the appellant that in a suit for possession brought on the basis of title, the plaintiff cannot succeed unless he proves his title to the suit property as well as its possession within twelve years. According to the appellant, except in a suit under Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act, the plaintiff for succeeding in the suit, has to prove both existing title to the suit property and its possession within twelve years. We are unable to accept this contention as correct. In our opinion the possession of the plaintiff prior to 1945 is a good title against all but the true owner. The defendants who are mere trespassers cannot defeat the plaintiff’s lawful possession by ousting him from the suit property. Possessory title is a good title as against everybody other than the lawful owner.” 11. Mr. Nageshwar Rao, however, drew our attention to a decision of this Court in Ramchandra Sakharam Mahajan v. Damodar Trimbak Tanksale (Dead) & Ors.2 [ (2007) 6 SCC 737 ], wherein it was held : “13. The suit is for recovery of possession on the strength of title. Obviously, the burden is on the plaintiff to establish that title. No doubt in appreciating the case of title set up by the plaintiff, the court is also entitled to consider the rival title set up by the defendants. But the weakness of the defence or the failure of the defendants to establish the title set up by them, would not enable the plaintiff to a decree. There cannot be any demur to these propositions.” 12. But the weakness of the defence or the failure of the defendants to establish the title set up by them, would not enable the plaintiff to a decree. There cannot be any demur to these propositions.” 12. The said decision, thus, itself is an authority for the proposition that the court is entitled to take into consideration the defence of the defendants. The sole question which arose for consideration before the Court therein was as to which of the parties had a better title. 13. For the reasons aforementioned, there is no merit in this appeal. It is dismissed accordingly. press provisions of law which are necessary for proper discharge of functions and duties imposed upon them by law. That is the doctrine which finds expression in the section which merely recognizes and preserves inherent powers of the High Courts. All courts, whether civil or criminal possess, in the absence of any express provision, as inherent in their constitution, all such powers as are necessary to do the right and to undo a wrong in course of administration of justice on the principle “quando lex aliquid alicui concedit, concedere videtur et id sine quo res ipsae esse non potest” (when the law gives a person anything it gives him that without which it cannot exist). While exercising powers under the section, the court does not function as a court of appeal or revision. Inherent jurisdiction under the section though wide has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in the section itself. It is to be exercised ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone courts exist. Authority of the court exists for advancement of justice and if any attempt is made to abuse that authority so as to produce injustice, the court has power to prevent abuse. It would be an abuse of process of the court to allow any action which would result in injustice and prevent promotion of justice. In exercise of the powers court would be justified to quash any proceeding if it finds that initiation/continuance of it amounts to abuse of the process of court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice. When no offence is disclosed by the complaint, the court may examine the question of fact. In exercise of the powers court would be justified to quash any proceeding if it finds that initiation/continuance of it amounts to abuse of the process of court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice. When no offence is disclosed by the complaint, the court may examine the question of fact. When a complaint is sought to be quashed, it is permissible to look into the materials to assess what the complainant has alleged and whether any offence is made out even if the allegations are accepted in toto. 15. In R. P. Kapur v. State of Punjab ( AIR 1960 SC 866 ) this Court summarized some categories of cases where inherent power can and should be exercised to quash the proceedings. (i) where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance e.g. want of sanction; (ii) where the allegations in the first information report or complaint taken at its face value and accepted in their entirety do not constitute the offence alleged; (iii) where the allegations constitute an offence, but there is no legal evidence adduced or the evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge. 16. In dealing with the last case, it is important to bear in mind the distinction between a case where there is no legal evidence or where there is evidence which is clearly inconsistent with the accusations made, and a case where there is legal evidence which, on appreciation, may or may not support the accusations. When exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court would not ordinarily embark upon an enquiry whether the evidence in question is reliable or not or whether on a reasonable appreciation of it accusation would not be sustained. That is the function of the trial Judge. Judicial process should not be an instrument of oppression, or, needless harassment. Court should be circumspect and judicious in exercising discretion and should take all relevant facts and circumstances into consideration before issuing process, lest it would be an instrument in the hands of a private complainant to unleash vendetta to harass any person needlessly. At the same time the section is not an instrument handed over to an accused to short-circuit a prosecution and bring about its sudden death. At the same time the section is not an instrument handed over to an accused to short-circuit a prosecution and bring about its sudden death. The scope of exercise of power under Section 482 of the Code and the categories of cases where the High Court may exercise its power under it relating to cognizable offences to prevent abuse of process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice were set out in some detail by this Court in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal (1992 Supp (1) 335). A note of caution was, however, added that the power should be exercised sparingly and that too in rarest of rare cases. The illustrative categories indicated by this Court are as follows: “(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the Act concerned (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or Act concerned, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the Act concerned (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or Act concerned, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.” As noted above, the powers possessed by the High Court under Section 482 of the Code are very wide and the very plenitude of the power requires great caution in its exercise. Court must be careful to see that its decision in exercise of this power is based on sound principles. The inherent power should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. The High Court being the highest court of a State should normally refrain from giving a prima facie decision in a case where the entire facts are incomplete and hazy, more so when the evidence has not been collected and produced before the Court and the issues involved, whether factual or legal, are of magnitude and cannot be seen in their true perspective without sufficient material. Of course, no hard-and-fast rule can be laid down in regard to cases in which the High Court will exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction of quashing the proceeding at any stage. (See: Janata Dal v. H. S. Chowdhary ( 1992 (4) SCC 305 ), and Raghubir Saran (Dr.) v. State of Bihar ( AIR 1964 SC 1 ). It would not be proper for the High Court to analyse the case of the complainant in the light of all probabilities in order to determine whether a conviction would be sustainable and on such premises arrive at a conclusion that the proceedings are to be quashed. It would be erroneous to assess the material before it and conclude that the complaint cannot be proceeded with. In a proceeding instituted on complaint, exercise of the inherent powers to quash the proceedings is called for only in a case where the complaint does not disclose any offence or is frivolous, vexatious or oppressive. It would be erroneous to assess the material before it and conclude that the complaint cannot be proceeded with. In a proceeding instituted on complaint, exercise of the inherent powers to quash the proceedings is called for only in a case where the complaint does not disclose any offence or is frivolous, vexatious or oppressive. If the allegations set out in the complaint do not constitute the offence of which cognizance has been taken by the Magistrate, it is open to the High Court to quash the same in exercise of the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code. It is not, however, necessary that there should be meticulous analysis of the case before the trial to find out whether the case would end in conviction or acquittal. The complaint has to be read as a whole. If it appears that on consideration of the allegations in the light of the statement made on oath of the complainant that the ingredients of the offence or offences are disclosed and there is no material to show that the complaint is mala fide, frivolous or vexatious, in that event there would be no justification for interference by the High Court. When an information is lodged at the police station and an offence is registered, then the mala fides of the informant would be of secondary importance. It is the material collected during the investigation and evidence led in court which decides the fate of the accused person. The allegations of mala fides against the informant are of no consequence and cannot by themselves be the basis for quashing the proceedings. (See: Dhanalakshmi v. R. Prasanna Kumar (1990 Supp SCC 686), State of Bihar v. P. P. Sharma ( AIR 1996 SC 309 ), Rupan Deol Bajaj v. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill ( 1995 (6) SCC 194 ), State of Kerala v. O. C. Kuttan ( AIR 1999 SC 1044 ), State of U.P. v. O. P. Sharma ( 1996 (7) SCC 705 ), Rashmi Kumar v. Mahesh Kumar Bhada ( 1997 (2) SCC 397 ), Satvinder Kaur v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) ( AIR 1996 SC 2983 ) and Rajesh Bajaj v. State NCT of Delhi ( 1999 (3) SCC 259 . 17. The above position was recently highlighted in Zandu Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. & Ors. v. Mohd. Sharaful Haque and Another ( 2005 (1) SCC 122 ). 18. of NCT of Delhi) ( AIR 1996 SC 2983 ) and Rajesh Bajaj v. State NCT of Delhi ( 1999 (3) SCC 259 . 17. The above position was recently highlighted in Zandu Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. & Ors. v. Mohd. Sharaful Haque and Another ( 2005 (1) SCC 122 ). 18. In the instant case the only conclusions arrived at by the High Court is in para 23 of the judgment which have been quoted above. The High Court has wrongly come to the conclusion that the matter in issue has to be decided by a Civil Court or the Company Law Board. The High Court had referred to the four types of allegations. Some of the allegations are certainly not adjudicable by the Civil Court or the Company Law Board. That being so the exercise of jurisdiction by the High Court in terms of Section 482 Cr.P.C. cannot be maintained. The impugned order is indefensible and is set aside. 19. The appeal is allowed.