Oral Judgment (Per K.J. Rohee, J.) : 1. Heard. Admit. Heard forthwith by consent of parties. 2. The appellant was appointed as Peon on probation for a period of two years by respondent No.1 by order dated 1-4-1991. It is not disputed that the date of birth of the appellant is 24-8-1953 and obviously on the date of his appointment, he was overaged. Subsequently by resolution dated 10-4-1993, the services of the appellant were confirmed as they were found satisfactory. On 26-6-1995, respondent No.1 sent a letter to the Director, Higher Education, Maharashtra State, Pune, for condoning the age of the appellant. The last para of the said letter shows that the work of the appellant was satisfactory, that the appellant completed four years of service, that his services were required by the College and that if approval is not given, the Management will have to suffer financial difficulties. It seems that the said prayer was not granted. Thereafter on 6-9-1995, respondent No.1 issued a notice of termination to the appellant mentioning therein that he was appointed purely on temporary basis and that his services shall cease to continue from 7-10-1995. This termination was challenged by the appellant before the University and College Tribunal by preferring an appeal. By judgment dated 29-10-1996, the Tribunal allowed the appeal, quashed the order of termination dated 6-9-1995 and directed reinstatement of the appellant along with arrears of salary, allowances and other benefits. The Management challenged the said judgment by preferring writ petition. The learned Single Judge allowed the writ petition by judgment 5-12-2006 by holding that the judgment rendered by the Tribunal was unsustainable. The said judgment is challenged by the appellant. 3. It was urged by the learned counsel for the appellant that it was never urged by the Management that the appellant suppressed his date of birth or the fact that he was overaged at the time of his initial appointment on 1-4-1991. It is not disputed by the Management that the appellant rendered satisfactory service and that is why his services were confirmed. Not only that, the Management moved the State authorities for condoning the overage of the appellant, as his services were very much needed by the Management. It seems that only after this request was turned down by the State authorities, the Management proceeded to terminate the services of the appellant. Not only that, the Management moved the State authorities for condoning the overage of the appellant, as his services were very much needed by the Management. It seems that only after this request was turned down by the State authorities, the Management proceeded to terminate the services of the appellant. It may be noted that no reason for termination of the services of the appellant is mentioned in the termination notice dated 6-9-1995 except that his appointment was purely on temporary basis. It is not disputed that there was no departmental enquiry held prior to the issuance of termination notice dated 6-9-1995. In view of these circumstances, the impugned order of termination cannot be sustained. 4. It was urged by the learned counsel for respondent No.1 that the appellant was overaged at the time of his initial appointment itself and hence the Management was justified in terminating his services. It may be noted that it was the sweet-will of the Management to appoint the appellant though he was overaged at the time of his initial appointment. Not only that, as pointed earlier, the Management moved the State authorities for condonation of overage of the appellant. Having failed in its attempt to secure approval, the Management terminated the services of the appellant. By supporting the notice of termination, the Management wanted to justify its own illegal action in appointing the appellant, who was overaged. Now the Management cannot be allowed to turn round and take advantage of its own wrong by getting rid of the services of the appellant. The impugned judgment shows that the learned Single Judge principally relied on judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in Anna Manikrao Pethe v. Presiding Officer, School Tribunal, reported at 1997(3) Mh.L.J. 697 , to conclude that the College Tribunal should have first ascertained that the appointment of the petitioner had been duly approved. This judgment has been overruled by a Full Bench of this Court in St. Ulai High School v. Devendraprasad, reported at 2007(1) Mh.L.J. 597 . We are aware that the learned Single Judge did not have the advantage of this Full Bench judgment when he rendered the impugned judgment. Even so since law pronounced in judgments relates back to the time of enactment, the judgment of the learned Single Judge cannot stand in view of the pronouncement of the Full Bench. We are aware that the learned Single Judge did not have the advantage of this Full Bench judgment when he rendered the impugned judgment. Even so since law pronounced in judgments relates back to the time of enactment, the judgment of the learned Single Judge cannot stand in view of the pronouncement of the Full Bench. We are, therefore, satisfied that the notice of termination cannot be upheld and it will have to be quashed and set aside. We, therefore, proceed to pass the following order. 5. The appeal is allowed. The judgment of the learned Single Judge is quashed and set aside and that of the University and College Tribunal is restored. 6. The appeal is disposed of accordingly.