Judgment The short issue involved in this Criminal Application for bail is as under :- "Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, the applicants/ accused are entitled for bail under section 167 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short "Cr.P.C." or "Code"), for want of order by the learned Magistrate taking cognizance of the offence before expiry of the period stipulated in the said Section (180 days in this case) although the charge sheet was filed before expiry of such period?" FACTUAL MATRIX 2. Admitted facts are in narrow compass. The applicants/accused were arrested on 6th November, 2006 for the alleged violation of Narcotics Drugs & Psychotropic Substances Act ( for short "NDPS Act") since they were found in possession of commercial quantity weighing 11 kg. Subsequent to the arrest applicants were produced before the Magistrate on 7th November, 2006. Their custody was sought under section 167 of Cr.P.C, which was granted. The charge-sheet was filed on 5th May, 2007 i.e. on 180th day; however, order directing issuance of process against the accused under section 8C, 20 and 28 of the NDPS Act was passed on 7th May, 2007., since 6th May, 2007 was Court holiday being Sunday. Before order directing process could be passed, accused/ applicants moved an application under section 167 (2)(a) of Cr.P.C. for bail on default. RIVAL SUBMISSIONS: 3. The learned counsel for the applicants/accused submits that under section 167(2) (a) of Cr.P.C. not only charge-sheet is required to be filed within the period stipulated therein but cognizance of the offence is also required to be taken within that prescribed period. Since no cognizance was taken before the expiry of such period mentioned therein, the applicants/ accused were and are entitled to be released on bail. 4. Learned counsel for applicants placed reliance on various unreported orders/judgments of this Court, viz. Vijay Baban Babar Vs. State of Maharashtra (Criminal Application No.303/1992 decided on 4th March, 1992 ); Prakash @ Pintya Dinanath Pisal and another Vs. State of Maharashtra (Criminal Application No.1419/1992 decided on 7th July, 1992); Joaqium M. Correia Vs. State of Goa (Criminal Misc. Application No.88/1988 decided on 18th July, 1998). In addition to these unreported judgments, reliance is also placed on the reported decision of this Court in the case of Khimbahadur Thapa Vs. State of Maharashtra (Criminal Application No.1419/1992 decided on 7th July, 1992); Joaqium M. Correia Vs. State of Goa (Criminal Misc. Application No.88/1988 decided on 18th July, 1998). In addition to these unreported judgments, reliance is also placed on the reported decision of this Court in the case of Khimbahadur Thapa Vs. State of Maharashtra (1989(3) Crimes 542) together with the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of CBI Vs. Anupam J. Kulkari, 1992 SCC (Criminal) 554 in support of the submission. 5. Learned counsel for applicants took me through various relevant provisions of the Cr.P.C. and went on to demonstrate two types of custodies -one under section 167 and the other under section 309 of Cr.P.C., which, according to him, fall under different chapters of Cr.P.C. He submits that custody under section 309 of Cr.P.C. is after cognizance of the offence is taken; whereas custody under section 167 (2) is prior to taking cognizance of the offence. According to him provision of Section 167(2) clearly lays down that the period of detention should not exceed the period stipulated therein. In his submission not only the charge sheet is required to be filed within the period stipulated under section 167(2) of Cr.P.C. but cognizance of the offence is also required to be taken before the expiry of that period He, thus, submits that in the case at hand, though charge sheet was filed within the period stipulated but no cognizance of the offence was taken during the prescribed period as such, accused/ applicants are entitled to be released on bail. 6. Per contra, learned .P.P. relying on the judgments of Division Bench of this Court in the case of Shravan Undirwade Vs. State of Maharashtra, 1976 Mh.L.J. 654 and Abdul wahid Vs. State of Maharashtra, 1991 Mh.L.J. 1219, together with two other judgments of learned single Judges of this Court, viz; Biju Varghese Vs. State of Maharashtra 1994 Mh.L.J. 671; and Avinash Sanas Vs. State State of Maharashtra in Criminal Bail Application No. 3108/2003 decided on 11th December 2003 (unreported) (which have taken view contrary to the submission advanced by the learned counsel for applicants) has urged that once the chargesheet has been filed within the stipulated period, then, the right of the accused to claim bail on default gets exhausted. State State of Maharashtra in Criminal Bail Application No. 3108/2003 decided on 11th December 2003 (unreported) (which have taken view contrary to the submission advanced by the learned counsel for applicants) has urged that once the chargesheet has been filed within the stipulated period, then, the right of the accused to claim bail on default gets exhausted. Learned A.P.P. also relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of State of U.P. Vs. Lakshmi Brahman reported in AIR 1983 SC 439 : 1983 Cri.L.J. 839, to contend that filing of the charge-sheet before the trial Court tantamount to the Court taking cognizance and that remand of the accused for a further period of custody is permissible, even if by that act the accused remained in custody beyond the prescribed period of 60, or 90, or 180 days, as the case may be. He went on to urge that between the stage of filing of the charge sheet and committal of the accused to the Court of sessions, the Magistrate is required to hold an inquiry and during this interval the remand of the accused to custody is permissible under Cr.P.C. In other words, his contention is that the accused cannot claim release on bail under the proviso (a) to sub-section (2) of Section 167 if the Magistrate does not take cognizance within the statutory period of 60 days, or 90 days or 180 days (as the case may be) even though the Police had filed the charge-sheet within that period. According to him, an inquiry is deemed to have commenced on the date the charge-sheet is submitted. He, thus, reiterated that the Magistrate has full power to hold accused in custody so long as order taking cognizance is not passed. In his submission merely for want of the order of issuance of process or order taking cognizance of the offence after submitting charge-sheet, the accused is not entitled to be released on bail under section 167 (2) of the Cr.P.C. He, thus, prayed for rejection of prayer for bail on default. 8. With the aforesaid rival submissions, the issue before me is: "whether the accused are entitled for bail under section 167 (2) of Cr.P.C.?" 9. 8. With the aforesaid rival submissions, the issue before me is: "whether the accused are entitled for bail under section 167 (2) of Cr.P.C.?" 9. Before proceeding to examine the issue raised, it is necessary to turn to the record and proceedings so as to decide the legality and validity of the issue canvassed by the rival parties. 10. The order sheets produced on record reads as under : "5.5.2007: APP Mrs.Mane for State present. Adv. Mr.A.R.Khan for accd. present. Accused Nos.1 to 3 not produce from J.C.(only warrant received). Appln. filed by Adv. A.R. Khan requested the Court not to take cognizance in the absence of CA report. Court pass order APP to say. APP requested the Court time to file say and to keep the matter in the afternoon sessions. Matter is KB and will be resumed at 2.30 p.m. L.O. Same appearance. On oral request of APP case adjd. to 07.05.07 for filing say on appln. filed by Adv. A.R.Khan. L.O.: At 4.25 p.m. Prosecution has produced an appln. along with C.A. report. Court pass order. Along with the production of CA report with direction to submit copies of CA report for the accd. Copies furnished. Within time. Adv.A.R.Khan had already left the Court. Since matter was adjd. earlier it appears that the must be left the Court premises. It was called before the Court only to make him aware about the production of CA report today. 7.5.2007: APP Mrs. Mane for State present. Adv. Mr.Rane h/f Adv. Mr. A.R. Khan for accd. Present. Accused nos. 1 to 3 are produced from J/C. Perused the papers produced along with charge-sheet. CA report is already filed on record on 5.5.2007 as per the report submitted through APP on that day. The accd. is in jail. Upon hearing the APP and on perusal of CA report and other documents prima facie material is available to proceed against the accd. Issue process against the accd. U/s 8(c) , 20 and 28 of the NDPS Act. Issue production warrant directing the Supdt. Central Prison, Arthur Road Jail to produce the accd. Before this Court on 14.5.2007 without fail. Case adjd. to 14.5.07. 14.5.2007: APP Ms. Mane present.Accused not brought from jail. Adv. A.R.Khan present for the accd. Adjd. for filing draft charge on 28/05/2007." 11. U/s 8(c) , 20 and 28 of the NDPS Act. Issue production warrant directing the Supdt. Central Prison, Arthur Road Jail to produce the accd. Before this Court on 14.5.2007 without fail. Case adjd. to 14.5.07. 14.5.2007: APP Ms. Mane present.Accused not brought from jail. Adv. A.R.Khan present for the accd. Adjd. for filing draft charge on 28/05/2007." 11. Bearing in mind the statutory provisions of sections 156, 167, 190, 204, 207 and 309 of Cr.P.C., I may refer to some of the relevant judgments relevant to the issue involved herein. 12. In the case of R.R. Chari vs. State of U.P., AIR 1951 SC 207 , the meaning of the term "taking cognizance" was considered. It was stated that it does not involve any formal action or indeed action of any kind but occurs as soon as the Magistrate as such applies to his mind to the suspected commission of offence. 13. In the case of Narayandas Mashavdas Vs. State of West Bengal, AIR 1968 SC 1118, the Supreme Court has observed the mode in which a Magistrate could take cognizance of an offence and stated: "It seems to be clear, however , that before it can be said that any Magistrate has taken cognizance of any offence under section 190 (1)(a) of the Cr.P.C., he must not only have applied his mind to the contents of the petition, but must have done so for the purpose of proceeding in a particular way as indicated in the subsequent provision of this Chapter - proceeding under section 200 and thereafter sending it for enquiry and report under section 202." 14. Tula Ram and others Vs. Kishore Singh reported in AIR 1977 SC 2401 , crystalised the ambit of the powers of the Magistrate under sections 156, 190, 200 and 202 in the following words : It seems to us that there is no special charm or magical formula in the expression "taking cognizance" which merely means judicial application of a mind of the Magistrate to the facts mentioned in the complaint with a view to taking further action. Thus, what section 190 contemplates is that the Magistrate takes cognizance once he makes himself fully conscious and aware of the allegations made in the complaint and decides to examine or test the validity of the said allegations. Thus, what section 190 contemplates is that the Magistrate takes cognizance once he makes himself fully conscious and aware of the allegations made in the complaint and decides to examine or test the validity of the said allegations. The Code prescribes several modes in which a complaint can be disposed of, after taking cognizance, in the first place, cognizance can be taken on the basis of three circumstances: (a) upon receiving a complaint or facts which constitute such offence. (b) upon a Police report of such facts; and (c) upon information received from any person, other than the Police officer or upon his own knowledge , that an offence has been committed. (d) Where a Magistrate orders investigation by the Police before taking cognizance under section 156 (3) of the Code and receives the Report, he can act on the report and discharge the accused or straightway issue process against the accused or apply his mind to the complaint filed before him and take action under section 190 as described above. By referring to the earlier decision in the case of Devarapalli Laxminarayan Reddy and others, AIR 1976 SC 1672 ), the Apex Court in the case of Tula Ram (supra) crystallized the ambit of the powers of the Magistrate under section 156 , 190, 200 and 202 in the following words : (a) that a magistrate can order investigation under section 156(3) only at the pre-cognizance stage i.e. to say, before taking cognizance under section 190, 200 and 204 and where a Magistrate decides to take cognizance under the provisions of Chapter XIV , he is not entitled in law, to order any investigation under section 156(3) though in cases not falling within the proviso to section 202, he can order an investigation by the Police which would be in the nature of an inquiry as contemplated by section 202 of the Code. (b) Where a Magistrate chooses to take cognizance, he can adopt any of the following alternatives : (i) He can peruse the complaint and, if satisfied that there was sufficient ground for proceeding, he can straightaway issue process to the accused, but before he does so, he must comply with the requirements of section 200 and record the evidence of the complainant or his witnesses. (ii) The Magistrate can postpone the issue of process and direct an enquiry by himself. (ii) The Magistrate can postpone the issue of process and direct an enquiry by himself. (iii) The Magistrate can postpone the issue of process and direct an enquiry by any other person or an investigation by the Police. (c) In case the Magistrate, after considering the statement of the complainant and the witnesses or as a result of the investigation and the enquiry ordered, is not satisfied that there was sufficient grounds for proceeding, he can dismiss the complaint. (d) Where a Magistrate orders investigation by the Police before taking cognizance under section 156 (3) of the Code and receives the Report, he can act on the report and discharge the accused or straightaway issue process against the accused or apply his mind to the complaint filed before him and take action under section 190 as described above. 15. Having seen the meaning of the term "taking cognizance", now let me turn to the period during which cognizance is required to be taken. 16. In order to consider this aspect of the matter, it is relevant to take note of the Two Judge Bench judgment of the Apex Court in the case of C.B.I. Vs. Anupam Kulkarni (supra); wherein the question for consideration was whether a person arrested and produced before nearest magistrate as required under section 161 (1) of Cr.P.C. can still be remanded to police custody after initial period of 15 days. While considering this issue, the Apex Court has observed as under : "9. At this juncture we want to make another aspect clear namely the computation of period of remand. The proviso to section 167 (2) clearly lays down that the total period of detention should not exceed ninety days in cases where the investigation relates to serious offences mentioned therein and sixty days in other cases and if by that time cognizance is not taken on the expiry of the said periods the accused shall be released on bail as mentioned therein. (Emphasis supplied) 17. The learned A.P.P. submits that period during the period during which cognizance is required to be taken by the Magistrate was not the issue before the Apex Court. He, thus, submits that the aforesaid observations, on which heavy reliance was placed by the applicants, cannot be said to be the ratio of the judgment. (Emphasis supplied) 17. The learned A.P.P. submits that period during the period during which cognizance is required to be taken by the Magistrate was not the issue before the Apex Court. He, thus, submits that the aforesaid observations, on which heavy reliance was placed by the applicants, cannot be said to be the ratio of the judgment. However, he does not dispute that even the obiter of the Apex Court would bind this Court. 18. With the above judgment, another two Bench judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Lakshmi Brahman (supra) also needs to be looked into. At one stage learned counsel for the applicants tried to contend that both the above judgments operate in two different fields, as such, it has no application to the case in hand. Whereas learned A.P.P. for the State tried to reconcile both views. 19. The Apex Court in the case of Laxmi Brahman (supra) did not approve following observations of the Division Bench of Allahabad High Court, in which it was observed that :- "These sections (207 209) do not contemplate that before committing the case to Sessions, the Magistrate should conduct some proceeding with a view to ascertain or verify facts. Section 209 of the Code merely required the Magistrate, taking cognizance of an offence on the basis of a police report, to look into the report and if he finds that the case is triable exclusively by Court of Sessions to make an order committing the case to Sessions. Since in such a case the Magistrate taking cognizance of the offence is not required to conduct any proceeding for ascertaining or verifying facts with a view to commit the case to Sessions, it cannot be said that the provisions contained in Sec. 204, 207 to209 of the Code contemplate an inquiry under the Code." 20. The Apex Court did not approve the above observations and went on to discuss provisions of sections 204 to 209 of the Code and the scheme engrafted therein in paras- 12 to 14 and the purpose behind such scheme. The relevant portion of paras-12 to 14 of the said judgment relevant for deciding the issue raised herein reads as under :- "12. ...... The relevant portion of paras-12 to 14 of the said judgment relevant for deciding the issue raised herein reads as under :- "12. ...... When the Magistrate receives the report and the accused is produced before him it is necessary for him to pass some order for his further detention subject to provisions contained in Chapter XXXIII as to Bails and Bonds. The view taken by the High Court makers it a necessity for the Magistrate to release the accused on bail even if the accused is not otherwise entitled to the discretionary order of bail nor he applies for nor is ready to furnish bail only because the Magistrate has no jurisdiction to keep the accused in custody till an order committing the accused for trial is made. The High Court referred to Sec. 209 which provides that the Magistrate shall commit the accused to the Court of Session and subject to the provisions of the Code relating to bail, remand the accused to custody during and until the conclusion of the trial. This according to the High Court implies that the Magistrate can exercise power to release on bail or remand to the custody the accused only after making the order of commitment but the Magistrate has no such power anterior to the order of commitment and during the interregnum since the receipt of the charge-sheet. This dichotomy read by the High Court in Secs. 207 and 209 is certainly not borne out by the provisions of the Code...... 13. Now, if under Sec. 207, the Magistrate is performing a judicial function of ascertaining whether copies have been supplied or not, it would undoubtedly be an enquiry for the purpose of satisfying himself that Sec. 207 has been complied with the letter and spirit. That satisfaction has to be judicial satisfaction. It is not a trial but something other than a trial and being judicial function it would necessarily be an inquiry. The making of an order committing the accused to the Court of Session will equally be a stage in the enquiry and the inquiry culminates in making the order of commitment. That satisfaction has to be judicial satisfaction. It is not a trial but something other than a trial and being judicial function it would necessarily be an inquiry. The making of an order committing the accused to the Court of Session will equally be a stage in the enquiry and the inquiry culminates in making the order of commitment. Thus, from the time the accused appears or is produced before the Magistrate with the police report under Sec.170 and the Magistrate proceeds to enquire whether Sec. 207 has been complied with and then proceeds to commit the accused to the Court of Session, the proceeding before the Magistrate would be an inquiry as contemplated by sec. 2 (g) of the Code. We find it difficult to agree with the High Court that the function discharged by the Magistrate under Sec. 207 is something other than a judicial function the Magistrate is not holding an inquiry as contemplated by the Code. If the Magistrate is holding the inquiry obviously Sec. 309 would enable the Magistrate to remand the accused to the custody till the inquiry to be made is complete. Sub-sec.(2) of Sec. 309 provides that if the Court after taking cognizance of an offence or commencement of trial, finds it necessary or advisable to postpone the commencement ore adjourn any inquiry or trial, it may, from time to time, for reasons to be recorded, postpone or adjourn the same on such terms as it thinks fit, for such time as it considers reasonable, and may by a warrant remand the accused if in custody. There are three provisos to sub-sec. (2) which are not material. If, therefore, the proceedings before the Magistrate since the submission of the police report under Sec. 170 and till the order of commitment is made under Sec. 209 would be an inquiry and if it is an inquiry, during the period, the inquiry is completed, Section 309 (2) would enable the Magistrate to remand the accused to the custody. Therefore, with respect, the High Court committed an error in holding that "the order remanding the respondents to custody, made after cognizance of offence was taken, cannot be justified under Sections 167(2), 209 and 309 of the Code and no other provision under which the respondents can be remanded to custody at this stage, having been indicated by the learned Govt. Advocate, we feel that it would be proper to accede to the request made by the respondents and to direct that they would be released on bail after furnishing adequate security to the satisfaction of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Banda." 14. The view taken by the High Court introduces a stage of compulsory bail not envisaged by the Code, and therefore, also the view of the High Court cannot be upheld. According to the High Court after the accused is brought before the Court along with the police report, the Magistrate must forthwith commit the accused to the Court of Session because the Magistrate would have no jurisdiction in the absence of any provision to remand the accused to custody till the order committing the case to Court of Session is made. The view, with respect, is wholly untenable and must be set aside." (emphasis supplied) 21. Perusal of the aforesaid extracted portions of the judgment would bare out that the inquiry under sections 204, 207 to 209 has been treated at par by the Apex Court, styling it as "judicial function". The observations of the Allahabad High Court that the Magistrate taking cognizance of the offence is not required to conduct any proceedings with a view to commit the case to the sessions does not contemplate any inquiry under the Code has not been approved by the Apex Court. On the contrary, the Court observed that under sections 207 Magistrate is performing judicial function of ascertaining whether copies have been supplied or not. According to the Apex Court the satisfaction under section 207 has to be a judicial satisfaction. It is not a trial but something other than trial and being judicial function it would necessarily be a judicial inquiry. The Apex Court observed that making of an order committing the accused to the Court of Sessions will equally be a stage in the inquiry and the inquiry, ultimately, culminates in making an order of commitment. Thus, from the time accused appears or is produced before the Magistrate with the police report under section 170 till the Magistrate proceeds to commit the accused to the Court of Sessions, the proceeding before the Magistrate would be an inquiry as contemplated by Section 2(g) of the Code and that his custody would be legal and valid. 22. Thus, from the time accused appears or is produced before the Magistrate with the police report under section 170 till the Magistrate proceeds to commit the accused to the Court of Sessions, the proceeding before the Magistrate would be an inquiry as contemplated by Section 2(g) of the Code and that his custody would be legal and valid. 22. In the teeth of the above view of the Apex Court, one has to compare and consider the nature of inquiry under section 204 (which is required to be conducted while issuing process) in the backdrop of nature of inquiry under section 207 of Cr.P.C., as determined by the Apex Court, and take a logical view of the matter. 23. Section 204 falls in Chapter XVI of Code. This Chapter relates to commencement of proceedings before Magistrate. At the time of issuing process what Magistrate is required to find out is whether there is a prima facie case for issuance of process. The Magistrate has to take into consideration inherent improbabilities appearing on the face of the complaint or in the evidence led by the complainant in support of the allegations. In other words, the Magistrate has to apply his judicial mind to find out whether an offence under the provisions of I.P.C. has been spelt out prima facie or not. Having seen the nature of judicial function the Magistrate is required to discharge; one can safely equate this inquiry under section 167(2) of Cr.P.C. with that contemplated under section 207 of Cr.P.C. This inquiry by no stretch of imagination can be said to be administrative. It is nothing but a judicial inquiry requiring application of judicial mind. 24. Having said so, let me now again go back to two judgments of the Apex Court. 25. The Apex Court in the case of (supra) has observed that the cognizance is required to be taken before the expiry of the period prescribed. The "taking cognizance" contemplates application of mind to the suspected commission of offence. The said judgment, therefore, can be understood as laying down starting the point of application of mind by the Judge flowing from the concept of "taking cognizance". Once police report is filed, the inquiry under section 204 starts, then it can be safely be said that the process of application of mind has commenced. It can, ultimately, culminate in the order directing issuance of process. Once police report is filed, the inquiry under section 204 starts, then it can be safely be said that the process of application of mind has commenced. It can, ultimately, culminate in the order directing issuance of process. It may not be logically concluded during the period stipulated under section 167(2) of the Code. Take for example, charge-sheet is filed just before the end of the Court hours on the last day (i.e. on 60th or 90th or 180th day as the case may be) prescribed under section 167(2) and a legal debate, if raised that the charge-sheet is incomplete, and the Magistrate is called upon to decide legal issue, and arguments spill over next day making it obligatory on the part of the Magistrate to decide rival contentions by a reasoned order, in such event order taking cognizance is bound to be passed after expiry of the period stipulated in section 167(2) of the Code. In such event, can it be said that the accused would be entitled to bail on default for no fault on the part of either of the parties. The answer has to be in negative. Thus, during the period of inquiry, the custody of the accused by no stretch of imagination can be said to be unlawful as held by the Apex Court while considering the nature of inquiry under section 207 of Cr.P.C. 26. Having said so, if one goes back to the order sheets reproduced in para-10 (supra); it would be clearly revealed that on 5.5.2007, the Advocate appearing for the accused requested the Court not to take cognizance in absence of CA report. As a matter of fact, it was open for the applicants- accused to argue and contend that the incomplete charge-sheet is no charge-sheet in the eye of law. the question could have been determined by the Court. On the contrary, applicants prevented Court from taking cognizance by moving an application with a prayer not to take cognizance. The learned A.P.P. was called upon to react to the application by filing his reply. The matter was kept in the post-lunch session. In the afternoon session at the request of learned A.P.P. the case was adjourned to 7.5.2007 for filing his say on the application filed by the accused. On the very same day (i.e. on 180th day) at 4.25 p.m. prosecution has produced an application along with CA report. The matter was kept in the post-lunch session. In the afternoon session at the request of learned A.P.P. the case was adjourned to 7.5.2007 for filing his say on the application filed by the accused. On the very same day (i.e. on 180th day) at 4.25 p.m. prosecution has produced an application along with CA report. Directions were issued to submit copies of CA report for the accused. Copies were, accordingly, furnished by learned A.P.P. Since the accused and their Advocate were not present, the case was adjourned to 7.5.2007 to follow principles of natural justice. 27. On 7.5.2007 after hearing the parties in presence of the Advocate for the accused the order directing issuance of process was passed. 28. The factual matrix would, therefore, reveal that the process of application of mind commenced on 5th May, 2007 (i.e. 180th day) itself; though it, ultimately, culminated in the order directing issuance of process on 7.5.2007. The charge-sheet was already filed before expiry of the period contemplated under section 167 (2) of the Code. The inquiry under section 204 had also commenced well within the statutory period though it culminated on the next working day i.e. 7th May, 2007, since 6th May, 2007 was a Sunday. 29. Even otherwise, on facts as stated in para 26 supra, the applicants prevented the Court from taking cognizance of the offence for want of C.A.Report. They, as indicated, could have argued and sought appropriate orders before expiry of the period stipulated under section 167(2) of the Code. Now, they cannot be allowed to blow hot and cold and take advantage of their own act by which they prevented Court from taking cognizance within prescribed period. 30. In the above view of the matter, in my considered view, the accused /applicants will not be entitled for bail on default under section 167 (2) of Cr.P.C. 31. In result, Application stands rejected. Application dimissed.