JUDGMENT P.R. Raman, J. 1. The applicants in EA 353/2007 and 354/2007 in EP 340/2003 in OS 55/1994 are the petitioners in this writ petition. EA 353/2003 is an application for impleadment of the petitioners as additional decree holders 2 to 6. EA 354/2003 is filed seeking consequent amendment to be made. Petitioners, in order to prove that they are the legal heirs of the decree holder, produced family membership certificate issued by the Officer concerned. The Court below, by Ext. P3 order, following the decision of this Court in Ramakrishnan Nair v. Easwari Amma, 1979 KHC 133 : 1979 KLT SN 60 : AIR 1979 Ker. 231 : 1979 KLN SN 27 : 1979 KLT 401 and also the decision in M. C. Sreedharan v. Pattieri Kumaran, 1981 KHC 430 : 1980 KLN SN 58 : AIR 1981 Ker. 51 held that the petitioners cannot be allowed to be impleaded as additional decree holders to proceed with the application except on production of succession certificate and hence the case was adjourned to 28/05/2007 for production of such succession certificate. Petitioners seek to quash Ext. P3 order on the ground that they are not liable to produce any succession certificate as contemplated under S.214 of the Indian Succession Act. They also seek for a direction to the Court below to permit them to get themselves impleaded as additional decree holders in EP 340/2003 and continue the execution proceedings without insisting for the production of succession certificate. The matter came up for consideration before a learned Judge of this Court, who considered the decisions cited supra as also various other decisions rendered by various other High Courts and held that in view of the various pronouncements which holds the view that succession certificate is not necessary when the decree holder dies pending execution petition and opined that the matter requires reconsideration. Accordingly the case was referred for decision by a Division Bench and that is how the matter come up for consideration before us. 2. According to the learned counsel appearing for the writ petitioners, the decision of the Court below insisting for production of succession certificate, in the facts and circumstances of the case, is wrong. Accordingly the case was referred for decision by a Division Bench and that is how the matter come up for consideration before us. 2. According to the learned counsel appearing for the writ petitioners, the decision of the Court below insisting for production of succession certificate, in the facts and circumstances of the case, is wrong. It was also contended that the provisions contained in S.214(b) of the Indian Succession Act and the bar created thereunder for proceeding with an execution application by a person claiming to be so entitled to' execute a decree for realization of a debt except on production of a succession certificate will apply only to a substantive application filed for executing the decree by such person and will not apply to a case where the death occurred during the pendency of the proceedings in which the legal representatives are entitled to be impleaded to continue the proceedings already initiated by the decree holder. In this connection, reference was also made to O.21 R.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure to contend that by virtue of the above provisions, on making deposit of the decree amount before the execution Court and in the absence of any objection on the side of the decree holder, the judgment debtor gets discharged of his liability under the decree, As such there is no further debt existing as against the decree holder and in this case, at the time when the application EA 353/2007 and 354/2003 were filed, amounts were already deposited by the judgment debtor and reported the same to the Court and except withdrawal of the said amount which is in deposit, no further proceeding remained to be completed. Hence in any view of the matter, the provisions contained in S.214 of the Indian Succession Act is not attracted. They also contended that the decision in Ramakrishnan Nair's case, 1979 KLT 401 1 is not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case. He also placed reliance on some of the decisions by various High Courts. 3. The learned Government Pleader, on the other hand, supported the finding of the Court below, based on the decision reported in Ramakrishnan Nair's case, 1979 KLT 401 1. We heard both sides. 4. Before proceed to consider the rival submissions, we may state few more facts which we think, have bearing in deciding the case on hand. 3. The learned Government Pleader, on the other hand, supported the finding of the Court below, based on the decision reported in Ramakrishnan Nair's case, 1979 KLT 401 1. We heard both sides. 4. Before proceed to consider the rival submissions, we may state few more facts which we think, have bearing in deciding the case on hand. One C. V. Antony, the predecessor in interest of the petitioners herein, instituted the suit OS 55/1994 for realization of money under a civil contract in connection with the work of a road coming under the Trichur Division within the jurisdiction of Superintending Engineer, PWD (Roads), Central Circle, Aluva. Eventually, a decree was passed. Though an appeal was preferred before this Court, as RFA 244/2004, the same was dismissed with costs. The State filed a Special Leave Petition challenging the judgment of this Court, before the Apex Court, which also ended in dismissal, as per order dated 09/10/2006. Thus, the decree become final. In the meanwhile, pursuant to the decree passed, the decree holder C. V. Antony filed EP 340/2003 in OS 55/1994 for execution of the decree and for realisation of the amount which was due from the respondents. In the execution proceedings, an amount of Rs.5,61,646/- was deposited by the respondents and the same was reported on 11/01/2007. What remained thereafter was only to actually withdraw the said amount when C. V. Antony died. Hence the petitioners herein filed the present applications and it was while considering the said applications that the impugned order was passed. It may be incidentally noticed that to the applications filed by the petitioners produced as Exts. P1 and P2 in this writ petition, there was no objection filed by the respondents herein. So however, the Court below held that in view of the precedents on the matter, it requires that the petitioners can be allowed to be impleaded as additional decree holders only on production of succession certificate. The question that arises for consideration, therefore, is as to whether the production of succession certificate is mandated before allowing the application filed by the petitioners in terms of S.214(1)(b) of the Indian Succession Act and whether the decision reported in Ramakrishnan Nair's case, 1979 KHC 133 : 1979 KLT SN 60 : AIR 1979 Ker. 231 : 1979 KLN SN 27 : 1979 KLT 401 has correctly laid down the law. 5. 231 : 1979 KLN SN 27 : 1979 KLT 401 has correctly laid down the law. 5. In order to appreciate the contentions raised by the parties, it is necessary to refer to the provisions contained in S.214(1)(a) and (b) of the Indian Succession Act, which reads as follows: 214. Proof of representative title a condition precedent to recovery through the Courts of debts from debtors of deceased persons.”(1) No Court shall” (a) pass a decree against a debtor of a deceased person for payment of his debt to a person claiming on succession to be entitled to the effects of the deceased person or to any part thereof, or (b) proceed, upon an application of a person claiming to be so entitled, to execute against such a debtor a decree or order for the payment of his debt, except on the production, by the person so claiming of” (i) a probate or letters of administration evidencing the grant to him of administration to the estate of the deceased, or (ii) a certificate granted under S.31 or S.32 of the Administrator General's Act, 1913 (3 of 1913) and having the debt mentioned therein, or (iii) a succession certificate granted under Part X and having the debt specified therein, or (iv) a certificate granted under the Succession Certificate Act, 1889 (7 of 1889) or (v) a certificate granted under Bombay Regulation No. VIII of 1827, and, if granted after the first day of May, 1889, having the debt specified therein. (2) The word "debt" in sub-section (1) includes any debt except rent, revenue or profits payable in respect of land used for agricultural purposes." 6. On a plain reading of the above provisions, it can be seen that the bar under sub-section (1)(a) of S.214 of the Act applies before passing a decree against a debtor of a deceased person in favour of a person who claims to be entitled to succeed to the effects of the deceased person or to any part thereof. Therefore, at any stage of the proceedings, until a decree is passed, no doubt, the bar will continue to apply. Production of succession certificate is a condition precedent before passing a decree. Therefore, at any stage of the proceedings, until a decree is passed, no doubt, the bar will continue to apply. Production of succession certificate is a condition precedent before passing a decree. As far as sub-section (1)(b) is concerned, it applies to an execution proceeding as per which no Court shall proceed upon an application of the person claiming to be the legal representatives to execute a decree against the debtor except on production of a succession certificate. The expression "proceed upon an application of a person" has come up for consideration and some of the High Courts have taken the view that production of the succession certificate as contemplated under sub-section (1)(b) of S.214 of the Act applies only in a case of substantive application filed by a person claiming to be so entitled stepping into the shoes of the decree holder. 7. In Representatives of Harmanbhai Lallubhai v. Maganbhai, AIR 1990 Guj. 100 the High Court of Gujarat, after considering the provisions in O.22 R.12 and S.47 of the Code of Civil Procedure, held that under the Civil procedure Code there is nothing to indicate that the legal representatives of the deceased decree holder should obtain probate or letter of administration or succession certificate as provided under S.214(1)(b) for continuing the execution proceedings and if the legal representatives of the deceased decree holder wish to continue the execution proceedings initiated by the decree holder during his life time they are not covered by the provisions of S.214(1)(b) of Succession Act. The Court took the view that if the provisions of S.214 are read carefully, it becomes evident that the restriction contained therein apply to the institution of execution application and not for proceeding with the execution application which may have been initiated by the judgment creditor himself during his life time. Once the judgment creditor himself has instituted the execution application, all that would be necessary for persons claiming to be heirs and legal representatives of the judgment creditor would be to comply with the requirements of the relevant provisions of CPC. It was also held that objection or concession on the part of the other side does not determine the right of the legal representatives of the deceased decree holder to pursue further execution proceedings. Nor such objection or concession remove the bar of provisions of S.214(1)(b) if there be any. It was also held that objection or concession on the part of the other side does not determine the right of the legal representatives of the deceased decree holder to pursue further execution proceedings. Nor such objection or concession remove the bar of provisions of S.214(1)(b) if there be any. The right of the legal representatives of the deceased decree holder to continue the execution proceedings has its roots in the provisions of CPC. 8. In Ramanatha Reddy v. K. V. Kuppuswami, AIR 1971 Madras 419 a Single Bench of the Madras High Court held that a legal representative need not produce a succession certificate to continue the execution initiated by the deceased decree holder. Application for substitution cannot be treated as a fresh application for execution so as to attract S.214. In Akula Mabukhan v. Rajamma, AIR 1963 AP 69 the Andhra Pradesh High Court held that the continuance of execution application by legal representative of deceased decree holder who had initiated the same is not hit by S.214(1)(b) of the Act. It is only an application for execution filed by a person that comes within the prohibition enacted in S.214(1)(b) and it does not apply to a person, who seeks to come on record as the legal representative of a decree holder for the purpose of continuing that application. Consequently the continuance of an execution petition filed by the decree holder himself, by his legal representatives after the death of the decree holder is not hit at by S.214(1)(b) and the legal representative need not produce succession certificate to continue the execution. It considered the divergent opinion expressed by different High Courts and dissented from the contrary view expressed in Tejraj Rajmal v. Rampyari, AIR 1938 Nagpur, 528 and T. Chacko v. K. Varghese, AIR 1956 Trav. Co. 183 and placed reliance on the decision of the Calcutta High Court in Kshetra Mohan v. Azizullah Mea, AIR 1920 Cal. 580 and Raghubir Narain Singh v. Raj Rajeswari Prasad Singh, AIR 1957 Pat. 435 . In Benode Chatterjee v. Purnendu Nath Tagore, AIR 1973 Cal. Co. 183 and placed reliance on the decision of the Calcutta High Court in Kshetra Mohan v. Azizullah Mea, AIR 1920 Cal. 580 and Raghubir Narain Singh v. Raj Rajeswari Prasad Singh, AIR 1957 Pat. 435 . In Benode Chatterjee v. Purnendu Nath Tagore, AIR 1973 Cal. 352 a Single Bench of the Calcutta High Court also held that S.214 of the Succession Act applies only when persons claiming on succession themselves apply for the execution of the decree against the J.D. for payment or recovery of deceased's debt and where the application for execution is affirmed by the original decree holder continuation of that application by his Legal Representatives on his death is not barred under the section. 9. In the decision in Shrinath Khandelwal v. Bishwanath Prasad, AIR 1972 All. 321 the same view was taken by the Allahabad High Court. In para 3 of that judgment, reference was made to the dissenting view expressed by the other High Courts in Tejraj Rajmal v. Rampyari, AIR 1938 Nagpur 528, T. Chacko v. K. Varghese, AIR 1956 Trav. Co. 183 and P. L. Basappa v. Siddamma, AIR 1966 Mys 198 among which the Nagpur decision was the leading case. The relevant passage there in was quoted which is reproduced as hereunder: "If the above authorities are analysed they disclose two main reasons for holding that on the death of the decree holder his legal representative cannot continue the execution proceedings by mere substitution of his name without obtaining a succession certificate. The first ground mentioned is that the fundamental object of making provision for the production of a certificate of succession in S.214 is to protect the interests of a debtor making payment to persons claiming to be entitled to the effects of the decree holder. In case the production of succession certificate is not insisted on, the judgment debtor can always apprehend a danger of being forced to make payment twice or even more to other claimants of the decree holder. The ratio of the decisions is that it is for safeguarding the interest of the judgment debtor that the provision is made that the legal representative of the deceased decree holder should not be allowed to execute a decree till he produces a certificate of succession. This argument does not appeal to me. The ratio of the decisions is that it is for safeguarding the interest of the judgment debtor that the provision is made that the legal representative of the deceased decree holder should not be allowed to execute a decree till he produces a certificate of succession. This argument does not appeal to me. In my opinion the apprehensions of the judgment debtor on this score are somewhat illusory. Normally in all cases however high the stakes may be, if the original party who instituted or contested the proceedings dies the question of persons competent to continue those proceedings on the same footing is always settled by an enquiry in the nature of proceedings under O.22 of the Code of Civil Procedure. I am unable to appreciate as to how the present case stands in any manner on a different footing from that of other cases. Once the matter of substitution of the legal heirs or representatives of the deceased decree holder is decided after full contest and recording of evidence, the rights of the contestants are fully protected and there are no chances of a miscarriage of justice. Moreover, this argument loses sight of the proposition of law that once a decree is satisfied in favour of the applicant in execution and the execution is struck off, any other person coming forward and claiming a right in respect of the same decree cannot revive the execution to the detriment of the judgment debtor. So far as the judgment debtor is concerned, his liability is fully discharged once the decree is satisfied and the execution is struck off ..........................." 10. Then the argument which proceeded based on the literal interpretation of the language of S.214(1)(b) of the Indian Succession Act was considered in para 5 of the judgment in Shrinath Khandelwal's case and it was held that if one has to read into clause (b) of S.214(1) a complete bar to proceed with any application which is made by a person for continuing the proceedings, then the word 'application' is to be given a wide meaning and the words "claiming to be so entitled" are regarded as the key words of the section and are juxtaposed with 'application'. According to the Court, the crucial words in clause (b) are 'application' and 'to execute' and they should be read together to comprehend the real inhibition enacted by this provision. According to the Court, the crucial words in clause (b) are 'application' and 'to execute' and they should be read together to comprehend the real inhibition enacted by this provision. The emphasis of the Legislature seems to be on the words "to execute". When an application for substitution is made by the legal representatives of the deceased decree holder, it is not an execution application as such. It is merely an ancillary application calculated to enable the appellant to continue the execution already set in motion. Thus, the word "application of a person" occurring in clause (b) of S.214(1) must be construed to mean a substantive application and not an "ancillary application." 11. However, a contrary view is expressed in Thomas Chacko v. Koshy Varghese, AIR 1956 Tra. Co. 183 wherein a Division Bench of the Travancore Cochin High Court held that where after filing execution application, the decree holder dies and his heirs put in a petition for being impleaded as additional defendants and prayed for permission to continue the execution, succession certificate is essential in view of S.214. In Tejraj Rajmal v. Rampyari, AIR 1938 Nag. 528 while considering the contention on behalf of the legal representatives that no such succession certificate need be produced to continue the execution application, it was held by Stone, C. J. and Vivian Bose, J. as follows: "Now it is said she was not proceeding on her application but on his application and therefore S.214(1)(b) does not apply; - Mohamed Yusuf v. Abdul Rahim, 26 Cal. 839 (B) and - Kshetra Mohan v. Azhibullah Mea, 1920 Cal. 580 (AIR V7) (C), which simply follows 26 Cal. 839 (B). 26 Cal. 839 (B), dissents from a Full Bench judgment reported in -- Tateh Chand v. Muhammad Bakhsh, 16 All. 259 (D). The latter case, however, appears to us to be distinguishable, for it was concerned with a suit, not with execution proceedings. Since the new Rule, O.22 R.12, was made, the question whether execution proceedings abate on death has been set at rest. Abatement does not apply to execution proceedings." 12. The Travancore Cochin High Court referred to the above decision and preferred to follow the same and dissented from the contrary view expressed, as per para 5 of that judgment. The Division Bench of the Rajasthan High Court in Ganeshmal v. Anand Kanwar, AIR 1968 Raj. Abatement does not apply to execution proceedings." 12. The Travancore Cochin High Court referred to the above decision and preferred to follow the same and dissented from the contrary view expressed, as per para 5 of that judgment. The Division Bench of the Rajasthan High Court in Ganeshmal v. Anand Kanwar, AIR 1968 Raj. 273 held that S.214(1)(a) comes into play at the stage where a suit is pending in a Civil Court and where a decree still remains to be passed. It would be proper to read clause (b) of S.214(1) in this context. The words "so entitled" appearing in clause (b) mean "claiming on succession to be entitled to the effects of the deceased person" used in clause (a) and nothing else. Similarly, the words "such a debtor" appearing in clause (b) mean "a debtor of a deceased person" used in clause (a). The main purpose of S.214 is to protect the debtor from vexatious proceedings and from being harassed at different times by different persons claiming to be the successors of the plaintiff or the decree holder. Just as clause (a) of S.214(1), so also, clause (b) means to provide protection to the judgment debtor against rival claimants, if any, to the effects of the deceased decree holder. If this basic principle underlying the provisions of S.214 is kept in view then the natural interpretation of clause (b) would be that no Court shall proceed to execute a decree or order for payment of debt against a debtor in case the decree holder expires, unless the person claiming to be entitled to execute the decree in place of the deceased decree holder obtains a succession certificate and produces it in the Court. 13. Even in a case where an execution application is pending and his legal representative presents an application to be substituted in his place, it is, in substance, his application to the Court to execute the decree or order. The word 'application' in clause (b) therefore, was not meant to convey the sense of only a fresh application for execution of the decree, but it also included an application for continuing the pending application for execution of the decree presented by the deceased decree holder. 14. In Abdul Majid v. Shamsherali Fakruddin, AIR 1940 Bom. The word 'application' in clause (b) therefore, was not meant to convey the sense of only a fresh application for execution of the decree, but it also included an application for continuing the pending application for execution of the decree presented by the deceased decree holder. 14. In Abdul Majid v. Shamsherali Fakruddin, AIR 1940 Bom. 285 a EM vision Bench of the Bombay High Court, while considering the object behind S.214 of the Indian Succession Act, held that it is not correct to say that S.214 of the Succession Act does not apply where the suit was originally instituted by the creditor himself but only applies where it is instituted by his legal representatives. S.214 applies even if the suit was started by a creditor who died pending the suit and his legal representatives were brought on record under O.22 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The necessity for obtaining a succession certificate cannot be waived by the parties. The obligation is not merely one in favour of the debtor, it benefits also those interested in the deceased's estate by requiring that moneys forming part of the estate shall only be paid to a person who has been considered suitable for the grant of a succession certificate. 15. The Delhi High Court in Tosh and Sons India Ltd. v. Khanna, 2006 KHC 667 : 2006 (2) KLT 716 drew a distinction between a deposit made by the judgment debtor for obtaining a stay and the payment made to a decree holder under R.1, R.21 of the Code of Civil Procedure and held that the payment under O.1 R.21 CPC satisfies a decree holder whereas a deposit in Court to avoid execution keeps the amount beyond the reach of the decree holder and leaves him waiting for its release. (O.21 sub-rule 1 of R.1 clause (a) and sub-rule 4). 16. In Radhakrishna Pai v. Kesava Pillai, 1997 KHC 121 : 1997 (1) KLJ 436 : ILR 1997 (2) Ker. 830 : 1997 (1) KLT 645 this Court held that under O.21 R.2 an attaching decree holder or even an assignee decree holder executing the decree can raise the plea the contention that unless recorded by Court under O.21 R.2 the plea that the decree has been satisfied cannot be raised. 17. 830 : 1997 (1) KLT 645 this Court held that under O.21 R.2 an attaching decree holder or even an assignee decree holder executing the decree can raise the plea the contention that unless recorded by Court under O.21 R.2 the plea that the decree has been satisfied cannot be raised. 17. In Ouseph Joseph v. Thresia, 1998 KHC 467 : 1998 (2) KLT 854 a learned Judge of this Court, while considering the provisions of S.214 and O.21 CPC, held as follows: "The objection that the legal representatives of the decree holder, before seeking delivery should obtain a succession certificate does not appeal to me. According to me, the executing Court is right in holding that after the sale is confirmed and the decree holder is proceeding for delivery, there is no call for the production of any succession certificate as envisaged by S.214 of the Indian Succession Act. S.214 of the Indian Succession Act contemplates the production of a succession certificate in a case where a debt is sought to be recovered. The fact that the suit was for money and therefore, it was a suit for recovery of a debt does not have any relevance once the suit has ended in a decree and in execution of the decree, the property is sold and the decree holder purchases the property in satisfaction of the decree. Thereafter, it is only a question of delivering the property in execution to a purchaser at a Court auction, though he might have also the character of a decree holder. I am therefore, satisfied that there is no substance in the contention that the succession certificate is necessary before delivery could be sought for." 18. In Valli v. Madhavan, 1971 KHC 7 : 1971 KLT 42 : 1970 KLR 131 : 1970 KLJ 312 a learned Judge of this Court, after referring to the effect and provisions contained in O.21 R.11 to R.14 and S.214 of the Succession Act, held that the provisions in O.XXI R.11, R.12, R.13 and R.14 lay down the requirements of an application for execution, and if any application presented to Court does not satisfy these rules, it can very well be said that it is not in accordance with law for the purpose of considering limitation under Art.182. The requirement of a succession certificate to enable the legal representative to execute the decree is under the provisions of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 and not under any law relating to execution of decree. O.21 R.17 which provides for the consequences of non compliance with the provisions of O.21 R.11 to R.14 will not cover a case of non production of succession certificate. There is also another argument which can effectively answer the contention that an application to be in accordance with the law when filed by the legal representative of a deceased decree holder, must be accompanied by a succession certificate. It is the provision in S.214 of the Indian Succession Act itself. S.214(1)(b) is the provision that would apply to a case of an application by the legal representative to execute a decree. That section does not prohibit the entertainment of an application for execution by a Court if a succession certificate is not produced along with such application. It only prohibits the Court from proceeding with the execution against the judgment debtor upon an application by the legal representative of the deceased decree holder except on the production of the succession certificate or other certificates mentioned in that section. If the prohibition were to be to the very institution of the application in a Court of law for the purpose of execution, the words would have been "no Court shall entertain" in the place of "no Court shall proceed". Therefore, even in the Indian Succession Act, there is no provision which would warrant the view that the failure to produce the succession certificate along with the application for execution by the legal representative renders the application as one not in accordance with law. Hence it is apparent that the failure to produce the succession certificate along with the execution petition will not be a contravention of either the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure relating to execution of decrees or the provisions of the Indian Succession Act and therefore, such failure will not operate to render the Execution petition not one in accordance with law. Even if that were a requirement under the provisions of the Indian Succession Act the position might not be different, since it is only the failure to comply with the requirements of the law relating to execution of decrees that would render the petition as one not in accordance with law. 19. In Ramakrishnan Nair v. Easwari Amma, 1979 KHC 133 : 1979 KLT SN 60 : AIR 1979 Ker. 231 : 1979 KLN SN 27 : 1979 KLT 401 the question that arose for consideration was as to whether the restriction contained in S.214(1)(b) applies even in a case where the legal representatives seek to continue the execution petition already filed by the decree holder without producing such succession certificate. That was a case where the execution petition was pending before the executing Court when the decree holder died. The matter was posted for farther steps. The legal representative got herself impleaded. When steps under O.21 R.37 was taken the judgment debtor objected disputing the amount claimed and his liability for being arrested. It was also contended that the additional decree holder was not entitled to proceed with the execution except on production of the succession certificate. The petition was dismissed for default against which the matter was taken before this Court. The main contention on behalf of the judgment debtor was that the Court ought to have insisted for production of succession certificate in terms of S.214(1)(b) of the Act. On the other hand, the additional decree holder who is the legal representative of the original decree holder contended that production of succession certificate is necessary only in case where the original decree holder did not move for execution of the decree and the legal representative for the first time moves for execution and not in cases where the decree holder dies pending disposal of the execution petition filed by him and the legal representative is impleaded during the pendency of that execution petition. This Court referred to the decision of the Travancore Cochin High Court in Narayana Pillai v. Narayana Panicker, 1956 KHC 175 : AIR 1957 TC 147 : ILR 1956 TC 1266 : 1956 KLT 852 wherein it was held that the wording clearly indicates that when a fresh execution petition is filed by the successors in interest a succession certificate is essential whatever be the position whether it is a continuation of an execution filed by the original decree holder. After referring to the various case law on the subject, this Court preferred to follow the view taken by the High Courts of Nagpur, Travancore Cochin and Rajasthan ( AIR 1956 TC 183 , AIR 1938 Nagpur 528 and AIR 1968 Rajasthan 273). In that context, it was held as follows: "If the purpose of S.214(1) is to protect the interest of the debtor and to see that the real person entitled to succeed to the assets of the deceased alone is allowed to realise the debt there is no reason in saying that for the continuation of proceedings a succession certificate need be produced only in the former case and not in the latter. If that be so, the word "application" in S.214(1)(b) should be interpreted to mean not only a fresh application for execution but also an application for continuation of the execution petition already filed. Such an interpretation gains strength from the meaning given to the word 'proceed' in Chambers's Twentieth Century Dictionary 1977 Edn. at page 872. The word means "to go on, to continue, to advance, to pass on, to begin and go on, to act according to a method, to go from point to point to take legal action .......". From the context in which the word occurs in S.214(1)(b) it would include not merely starting of execution proceedings for the first time by the legal representative but also continuation of pending execution proceedings on the application of the legal representative. The context in which the word is used does not warrant the limited meaning given to it by the High Court of Calcutta in Mohamed Yusuf v. Abdur Rahim Depari, ILR XXVI Calcutta 839 and in the other decisions which follow that case." 20. We have considered the divergent views expressed by the Courts while interpreting the provisions contained in S.214(1)(b) of the Indian Succession Act. We have considered the divergent views expressed by the Courts while interpreting the provisions contained in S.214(1)(b) of the Indian Succession Act. To us it appears the view taken by the Travancore Cochin High Court and by the learned Single Judge of this Court in Ramakrishnan Nair v. Easwari Amma, 1979 KHC 133 : 1979 KLT 401 : 1979 KLT SN 60 : AIR 1979 Ker. 231 : 1979 KLN SN 27 is to be accepted as the correct view for the following reasons: S.214 is a mandatory provision. It is not correct to say that, restrictions does not apply except in cases of substantive application. Mere filing of an execution petition will not empower the Court to proceed further with the application, since the restriction is "not to proceed with the application". The word "to proceed with" is to be understood as including continuing with the proceedings. However, it is not condition precedent to file a certificate as prescribed thereunder along with the application for impleadment, but it is sufficient if it is filed / produced later before proceedings are taken. In other words, Court shall not dismiss the application in limine; but grant time for compliance with the provisions and to produce the certificate as required therein. But in the present case, the position is different. We hold that this is the correct view. 21. As we have already indicated, clause (b) of sub-section (1) of S.214 merely debars the Court to proceed with an application for execution of a decree or order against the debtor of a deceased person. The expression "order" appearing in clause (b) is one already passed which is sought to be executed by the legal representatives. Thus it only debars the execution of the order and not disbursement of the amount lying in deposit in Court and it cannot in any way said to be an application for execution of a decree or order. Thus for withdrawing the amount already deposited by the judgment debtor, no such certificate is required to be produced, as S.214(1)(b) only imposes restriction to proceed with the execution. Being a provision restricting the power of the Court, it cannot be interpret in such a manner to impose further restrictions than what is contemplated by the provisions. Thus for withdrawing the amount already deposited by the judgment debtor, no such certificate is required to be produced, as S.214(1)(b) only imposes restriction to proceed with the execution. Being a provision restricting the power of the Court, it cannot be interpret in such a manner to impose further restrictions than what is contemplated by the provisions. Since in the present case, the decree holder himself having filed the execution application, the judgment debtor, without a demur, having deposited the entire amount and since the respondent did not file any objection to Exts. P1 and P2 applications or filed any objection as against the same, the Court below ought not have hold that the restriction contained in S.214(1)(b) would apply to this case. 22. In our considered view, the amount having been deposited already and in the light of the fact that no objection was raised by the judgment debtor, disputing the applicants' right as legal heirs to receive the amount, we hold that the petitioners' applications ought to be allowed. The order passed by the Court below is set aside. We direct the Court below to pass appropriate orders in the light of what is stated above.