Judgment Prabha Sridevan, J. The father of the detenu – Ramajeyam, who has been lodged in the Central Prison, Madurai has filed this Habeas Corpus Petition on the ground that the detenu is entitled to the protection of The Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 and therefore, the detention in prison is illegal. 2. The brief facts of the matter are as follows:- The detenu was taken into judicial custody for the offences under Sections 147, 302 read with Section 34 I.P.C and lodged in prison along with four other adult accused. He was tried by the First Additional Sessions Judge, Madurai in S.C.No.104 of 1991 on 09.10.1991 and convicted for the offence under Section 302 I.P.C and sentenced to life imprisonment and also convicted under Section 147 I.P.C and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for one year. Against this, the detenu along with other accused preferred a Criminal Appeal in C.A.No.762 of 1991 before this Court and the same was dismissed on 21.12.2000. 3. The alleged occurrence took place on 15.07.1990 at 09.00 p.m., According to the petitioner, the detenu was aged only 17 years five months and four days as his date of birth is 11.02.1973. Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that at the time when the detenu is alleged to have committed the offence, he had not completed 18 years of age and therefore, he was only a Juvenile in conflict with law and he should not have been tried along with the other adult accused. According to the learned counsel, the detenu is entitled to the protection of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 (hereinafter referred to as “the 2000 Act”). Learned counsel also submitted that the detenu has been detained in prison for eight years illegally and he must be released and set at liberty forthwith. Learned counsel further submitted that the beneficial provisions of Section 7, 7A and 18 of the 2000 Act should be invoked and the detention should be set aside. Learned counsel for the petitioner also relied on the Judgment of the Supreme Court in PRATAP SINGH ..VS.. STATE OF JHARKHAND AND ANOTHER ( 2005 (3) SC.C. 551 ). 4. Learned counsel further submitted that the beneficial provisions of Section 7, 7A and 18 of the 2000 Act should be invoked and the detention should be set aside. Learned counsel for the petitioner also relied on the Judgment of the Supreme Court in PRATAP SINGH ..VS.. STATE OF JHARKHAND AND ANOTHER ( 2005 (3) SC.C. 551 ). 4. Learned Additional Public Prosecutor on the other hand would submit that the detenu is not entitled to the protection of the 2000 Act since he was not a Juvenile when the 2000 Act came into force. 5. The Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 came into force on 01.04.2001. As per the 2000 Act, the definition of “Juvenile” is as follows:- “2(k) “juvenile” or “child” means a person who has not completed eighteenth year of age. 2 (l) “juvenile in conflict with law” means a juvenile who is alleged to have committed an offence and has not completed eighteenth year of age as on the date of commission of such offence.” By Section 69 of the 2000 Act, the Juvenile Justice Act, 1986 (hereinafter referred to as “the 1986 Act”) was repealed. As per the 1986 Act, the definition of “juvenile” is as follows:- “2(h) “juvenile” means a boy who has not attained the age of sixteen years or a girl who has not attained the age of eighteen years”. By the Amendment Act 2006, Section 7-A was inserted. The following Sections of the 2000 Act are relevant for considering this Habeas Corpus Petition. “3. By the Amendment Act 2006, Section 7-A was inserted. The following Sections of the 2000 Act are relevant for considering this Habeas Corpus Petition. “3. Constitution of inquiry in respect of juvenile who has ceased to be a juvenile:- Where an inquiry has been initiated against a juvenile in conflict with law or a child in need of care and protection and during the course of such inquiry the juvenile or the child ceased to be such, then, notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or in any other law for the time being in force, the inquiry may be continued and orders may be made in respect of such person as if such person had continued to be a juvenile or a child.” “7-A. Procedure to be followed when claim of juvenility is raised before any Court:- (i) Whenever a claim of juvenility is raised before any Court or a Court is of the opinion that an accused person was a juvenile on the date of commission of the offence, the Court shall make an inquiry, take such evidence as may be necessary (but not an affidavit) so as to determine the age of such person, and shall record a finding whether the person is a juvenile or a child or not, stating his age as nearly as may be; Provided that a claim of juvenility may be raised before any Court and it shall be recognized at any stage, even after final disposal of the case, and such claim shall be determined in terms of the provisions contained in this Act and the rules made thereunder, even if the juvenile has ceased to be so on or before the date of commencement of this Act. (2) If the Court finds a person to be a juvenile on the date of commission of the offence under subsection (1), it shall forward the juvenile to the Board for passing appropriate order, and the sentence, if any, passed by a Court shall be deemed to have no effect”. “16. (2) If the Court finds a person to be a juvenile on the date of commission of the offence under subsection (1), it shall forward the juvenile to the Board for passing appropriate order, and the sentence, if any, passed by a Court shall be deemed to have no effect”. “16. Order that may not be passed against juvenile:- (1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law for the time being in force, no juvenile in conflict with law shall be sentenced to death or imprisonment for any term which may extend to the imprisonment for life, or committed to prison in default of payment of fine or in default of furnishing security; Provided that where a juvenile who has attained the age of sixteen years has committed an offence and the Board is satisfied that the offence committed is so serious in nature or that his conduct and behaviour have been such that it would not be in his interest or in the interest of other juvenile in a special home to send him to such special home and that none of the other measures provided under this Act is suitable or sufficient, the Board may order the juvenile in conflict with law to be kept in such place of safety and in such manner as it thinks fit and shall report the case for the order of the State Government. (2) On receipt of a report from a Board under sub-section (1), the State Government may take such arrangement in respect of the juvenile as it deems proper and may order such juvenile to be kept under protective custody at such place and on such conditions as it thinks fit; Provided that the period of detention so ordered shall not exceed in any case the maximum period provided under Section 15 of this Act.” “20. Special provision in respect of pending cases:- Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, all proceedings in respect of a juvenile pending in any Court in any area on the date on which this Act comes into force in that area, shall be continued in that Court as if this Act had not been passed and if the Court finds that the juvenile has committed an offence, it shall record such finding and instead of passing any sentence in respect of the juvenile, forward the juvenile to the Board which shall pass orders in respect of that juvenile in accordance with the provisions of this Act as if it had been satisfied on inquiry under this Act that a Juvenile has committed the offence; Provided that the Board may, for any adequate and special reason to be mentioned in the order, review the case and pass appropriate order in the interest of such juvenile”. “64. Juvenile in conflict with law undergoing sentence at commencement of this Act:- In any area in which this Act is brought into force, the State Government shall direct that a juvenile in conflict with law who is undergoing any sentence of imprisonment at the commencement of this Act, shall, in lieu of undergoing such sentence, be sent to a special home or be kept in fit institution in such manner as the State Government thinks fit for the remainder of the period of the sentence; and the provisions of this Act shall apply to the juvenile as if he had been ordered by the Board to be sent to such special home or institution or, as the case may be, ordered to be kept under protective care under sub-section (2) of Section 16 of this Act. Provided that the State Government, or as the case may be the Board, may, for any adequate and special reason to be recorded in writing, review the case of a juvenile in conflict with law undergoing a sentence of imprisonment, who has ceased to be so on or before the commencement of this Act, and pass appropriate order in the interest of such juvenile”. 6. The dates as far as this Habeas Corpus Petition is concerned are not in dispute. The date of birth of the detenu is 11.02.1973. The date of occurrence is 15.07.1990. 6. The dates as far as this Habeas Corpus Petition is concerned are not in dispute. The date of birth of the detenu is 11.02.1973. The date of occurrence is 15.07.1990. The Judgment of the Supreme Court in 2005 (3) S.C.C. 551 (cited supra) places the controversy at rest and it is not in favour of the detenu. The Judgment in the above said case was rendered by H.K.SEMA, J. (for N.SANTOSH HEGDE, S.N.VARIAVA, B.P.SINGH, JJ. and himself). S.B.SINHA, J., partly dissented. The matter was placed before the above Constitution Bench since there was a doubt as to what is the reckoning date for determining an offender as a juvenile offender, whether it is the date of occurrence or the date when he was produced before the Court / competent Authority. 7. In Paragraph7 of the majority judgment, the following two questions were decided by the Constitution Bench: “(a) Whether the date of occurrence will be the reckoning date for determining the age of the alleged offender as juvenile offender or the date when he is produced in the court / competent authority. (b) Whether the Act of 2000 will be applicable in the case a proceeding is initiated under the 1986 Act and pending when the Act of 2000 was enforced with effect from 01.04.2001.” For the purpose of this case, the answer to the second question alone is relevant. 8. The object of both the Juvenile Justice Act, 1986 and The Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 was to provide for the care, protection, treatment, development and rehabilitation of juveniles and both the Acts being the benevolent legislation, they have to be interpreted in the manner as to advance the object of the Act. The Juvenile Justice Act, 1986 was applicable to offenders claiming to be juveniles until the 2000 Act came into force. 9. The Supreme Court in Pratap Singh's case (cited supra), in particular referred to Section 20 of the Act, which is as follows:- “31. Section 20 of the Act as quoted above deals with the special provision in respect of pending cases and begins with a non obstante clause. The sentence “notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, all proceedings in respect of a juvenile pending in any court in any area on the date on which this Act came into force” has great significance. Section 20 of the Act as quoted above deals with the special provision in respect of pending cases and begins with a non obstante clause. The sentence “notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, all proceedings in respect of a juvenile pending in any court in any area on the date on which this Act came into force” has great significance. The proceedings in respect of a juvenile pending in any court referred to in Section 20 of the Act are relatable to proceedings initiated before the 2000 Act came into force and which are pending when the 2000 Act came into force. The term “any court” would include even ordinary criminal courts. If the person was a “juvenile” under the 1986 Act the proceedings would not be pending in criminal courts. They would be pending in criminal courts only if the boy had crossed 16 years or the girl had crossed 18 years. This shows that Section 20 refers to cases where a person had ceased to be a juvenile under the 1986 Act but had not yet crossed the age of 18 years then the pending case shall continue in that court as if the 2000 Act has not been passed and if the court finds that the juvenile has committed an offence, it shall record such finding and instead of passing any sentence in respect of the juvenile, shall forward the juvenile to the Board which shall pass orders in respect of that juvenile. 33. Mr. Mishra placed reliance on Rules 61 and 62 framed by the Central Government. According to him, particularly Rule 62 of the Rules covers the pending cases and the appellant is entitled to the benefit of Rule 62. Rule 62 reads: “62. Pending cases.—(1) No juvenile in conflict with law or a child shall be denied the benefits of the Act and the rules made thereunder. (2) All pending cases which have not received a finality shall be dealt with and disposed of in terms of the provisions of the Act and the rules made thereunder. Rule 62 reads: “62. Pending cases.—(1) No juvenile in conflict with law or a child shall be denied the benefits of the Act and the rules made thereunder. (2) All pending cases which have not received a finality shall be dealt with and disposed of in terms of the provisions of the Act and the rules made thereunder. (3) Any juvenile in conflict with law, or a child shall be given the benefits under sub-rule (1), and it is hereby clarified that such benefits shall be made available not only to those accused who was juvenile or a child at the time of commission of an offence, but also to those who ceased to be a juvenile or a child during the pendency of any enquiry or trial. (4) While computing the period of detention of stay of a juvenile in conflict with law or of a child, all such period which the juvenile or the child has already spent in custody, detention or stay shall be counted as a part of the period of stay or detention contained in the final order of the competent authority.” 34. This rule also indicates that the intention of the legislature was that the provisions of the 2000 Act were to apply to pending cases provided, on 1-4-2001 i.e. the date on which the 2000 Act came into force, the person was a “juvenile” within the meaning of the term as defined in the 2000 Act i.e. he/she had not crossed 18 years of age. 36. We, therefore, hold that the provisions of the 2000 Act would be applicable to those cases initiated and pending trial/inquiry for the offences committed under the 1986 Act provided that the person had not completed 18 years of age as on 1-4-2001. 37. The net result is: (a) The reckoning date for the determination of the age of the juvenile is the date of the offence and not the date when he is produced before the authority or in the court. (b) The 2000 Act would be applicable in a pending proceeding in any court/authority initiated under the 1986 Act and is pending when the 2000 Act came into force and the person had not completed 18 years of age as on 1-4-2001.”. 10. (b) The 2000 Act would be applicable in a pending proceeding in any court/authority initiated under the 1986 Act and is pending when the 2000 Act came into force and the person had not completed 18 years of age as on 1-4-2001.”. 10. In the minority Judgment rendered by S.B. SINHA, J., there is disagreement only with regard to the applicability of Rules as can be seen from Paragraph 112, which is as follows:- “The upshot of the aforementioned discussions is: (i) In terms of the 1986 Act, the age of the offender must be reckoned from the date when the alleged offence was committed. (ii) The 2000 Act will have a limited application in the cases pending under the 1986 Act. (iii) The Model Rules framed by the Central Government having no legal force cannot be given effect to. (iv) The court, thus, would be entitled to apply the ordinary rules of evidence for the purpose of determining the age of the juvenile taking into consideration the provisions of Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act. Therefore, this minority view also concurs with the majority view as regards the extent of applicability of the 2000 Act to a case where enquiry / trial commenced when the 1986 Act was in force. Some of the paragraphs which are relevant are as follows:- “90. In terms of the 1986 Act, a person who was not juvenile could be tried in any court. Section 20 of the Act of 2000 takes care of such a situation stating that despite the same the trial shall continue in that court as if that Act has not been passed and in the event, he is found to be guilty of commission of an offence, a finding to that effect shall be recorded in the judgment of conviction, if any, but instead of passing any sentence in relation to the juvenile, he would be forwarded to the Board which shall pass orders in accordance with the provisions of the Act as if he has been satisfied on inquiry that a juvenile has committed the offence. A legal fiction has, thus, been created in the said provision. A legal fiction as is well known must be given its full effect although it has its limitations. (See Bhavnagar University ..Vs.. A legal fiction has, thus, been created in the said provision. A legal fiction as is well known must be given its full effect although it has its limitations. (See Bhavnagar University ..Vs.. Palitana Sugar Mill (P) Ltd., ( 2003 (2) S.C.C. 111 ), ITW Signode India Ltd., -Vs- CCE ( 2004 (3) S.C.C. 48 ) and Ashok Leyland Ltd., Vs.. State of Tamil Nadu (2004 (3) S.C.C.1)). 92. Thus, by reason of legal fiction, a person, although not a juvenile, has to be treated to be one by the Board for the purpose of sentencing which takes care of a situation that the person although not a juvenile in terms of the 1986 Act but still would be treated as such under the 2000 Act for the said limited purpose. The Act provides for beneficent consequences and, thus, it is required to be construed liberally. 94. However, as would appear from the provisions of the Act of 2000 that the scheme of the 2000 Act is such that such a construction is possible. The same would also be evident from Section 64 which deals with a case where a person has been undergoing a sentence but if he is a juvenile within the meaning of the 2000 Act having not crossed the age of 18, the provisions thereof would apply as if he had been ordered by the Board to be sent to a special home or an institution, as the case may be. 95. Section 20 of the Act of 2000 would, therefore, be applicable when a person is below the age of 18 years as on 1-4-2001. For the purpose of attracting Section 20 of the Act, it must be established that: (i) on the date of coming into force the proceedings in which the petitioner was accused were pending; and (ii) on that day he was below the age of 18 years. For the purpose of the said Act, both the aforementioned conditions are required to be fulfilled. By reason of the provisions of the said Act of 2000, the protection granted to a juvenile has only been extended but such extension is not absolute but only a limited one. It would apply strictly when the conditions precedent there for as contained in Section 20 or Section 64 are fulfilled. The said provisions repeatedly refer to the words “juvenile” or “delinquent juveniles” specifically. It would apply strictly when the conditions precedent there for as contained in Section 20 or Section 64 are fulfilled. The said provisions repeatedly refer to the words “juvenile” or “delinquent juveniles” specifically. This appears to be the object of the Act and for ascertaining the true intent of Parliament, the rule of purposive construction must be adopted. The purpose of the Act would stand defeated if a child continues to be in the company of an adult. Thus, the Act of 2000 intends to give the protection only to a juvenile within the meaning of the said Act and not an adult. In other words, although it would apply to a person who is still a juvenile having not attained the age of 18 years but shall not apply to a person who has already attained the age of 18 years on the date of coming into force thereof or who had not attained the age of 18 years on the date of commission of the offence but has since ceased to be a juvenile”. 11. In the present case, the detenu had completed 18 years on 11.02.1991. Therefore, he was well past 18 years on 01.04.2001, when the 2000 Act came into force. Further, Section 20 of the 2000 Act makes a special provision only with regard the pending cases. In the case on hand, with regard to the detenu, no case is pending. The Criminal Appeal itself had been dismissed even on 21.12.2000. After eight years, this petition has been filed alleging illegality in the detention. 12. Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that it is not necessary for the case to be pending since Section 7-A of the 2000 Act provides that the claim of juvenility may be raised before any Court and it shall be recognized at any stage, even after final disposal of the case. 13. It is true that Section 7-A of the 2000 Act protects juvenile even after final disposal of the case. But, when the 2000 Act is intended to protect only those persons, who have not attained 18 as on 01.04.2001, the fact that Section 7-A permit a person to raise an issue of juvenility at any stage will not help. Section 7-A too can be invoked only by a person who had not attained 18 as on 01.04.2001. But, when the 2000 Act is intended to protect only those persons, who have not attained 18 as on 01.04.2001, the fact that Section 7-A permit a person to raise an issue of juvenility at any stage will not help. Section 7-A too can be invoked only by a person who had not attained 18 as on 01.04.2001. The Judgment of the Supreme Court as extracted above is very much clear and therefore, this Habeas Corpus Petition will have to be dismissed. It would be illogical and contrary to the above Judgment of the Supreme Court to hold that the person who is crossed 18 years on 01.04.2001 and therefore dis-entitled to the protection of Section 20 of the 2000 Act will stand on a different footing in respect of the proceedings which have reached finality merely because Section 7A of the 2000 Act says that it can be raised at any stage. 14. We find that Habeas Corpus Petitions are filed by persons invoking the provisions of Tamil Nadu Borstal Schools Act, 1925, The Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 long after the trial is over, conviction has been imposed and the appeals themselves are disposed of. The Advocates, committal Magistrates, Trial Judges and the Prosecution Agency should be aware of the protection given to juveniles. To extract from the Judgment of the Supreme Court referred to above, the Act was enacted for the following reasons:- “48. The purpose of the juvenile justice legislation is to provide succour to the children who were being incarcerated along with adults and were subjected to various abuses. It would be in the fitness of things that appreciation of the very object and purpose of the legislation is seen with a clear understanding which sought to bring relief to juvenile delinquents. 49. The problem of juvenile justice is, no doubt, one of tragic human interest so much so in fact that it is not confined to this country alone but cuts across national boundaries. In 1966 at the Second United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and Treatment of Offenders at London this issue was discussed and several therapeutic recommendations were adopted. To bring the operations of the juvenile justice system in the country in conformity with the UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice, the Juvenile Justice Act came into existence in 1986. To bring the operations of the juvenile justice system in the country in conformity with the UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice, the Juvenile Justice Act came into existence in 1986. A review of the working of the then existing Acts both State and parliamentary would indicate that much greater attention was found necessary to be given to children who may be found in situations of social maladjustment, delinquency or neglect. The justice system as available for adults could not be considered suitable for being applied to juveniles. There is also need for larger involvement of informal system and community-based welfare agencies in the care, protection, treatment, development and rehabilitation of such juveniles. 50. The provisions of the Juvenile Justice Act, 1986 (hereinafter referred to as “the 1986 Act”) and the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 (56 of 2000) (hereinafter referred to as “the 2000 Act”) are required to be construed having regard to the aforementioned Minimum Standards as the same are specifically referred to therein”. Even at the time of questioning of the accused under Section 313 Cr.P.C., the age is mentioned. It is possible to discontinue the criminal prosecution of the juvenile if the Court is satisfied that he is a juvenile as defined in the Act. If this is done, we can avoid the illegal incarceration of the juveniles. 15. This Habeas Corpus Petition deserves to be dismissed and accordingly, the same is dismissed.