DILIP GUPTA, J. ( 1 ) -THE petitioner has sought the quashing of the judgment and order dated 4th December, 2007 passed by the learned District Judge, Gorakhpur by which Rent Appeal No. 10 of 2002 filed by the landlord for setting aside the judgment of the learned Judge, Small Causes Courts, Gorakhpur has been allowed and the tenant has been directed to handover vacant possession of the shop to the respondent/landlord within three months. ( 2 ) THE respondent-landlord had filed an application under section 21 (1) (a) of the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the act) for release of the shop of which the petitioner was a tenant. The need that had been set up in the release application was for starting the business for the second unemployed son Vikas Anand. It was stated that the tenanted premises was required so that Vikas Anand could run the shop of General Merchant and Confectionery. The release application was contested by the tenant alleging that the applicant Chandrabhan had no authority to move the release application as the other co-landlords, namely his brother and his mother, had not been impleaded; that Vikas Anand was a minor as he was only about 16 to 17 years of age; that the shop was not bona fide required for establishing the business for the second son; that the landlord had a very big vacant land in Padari Bazaar, Gorakhpur which could be utilized for setting up the business for the second son and that the residential house of the tenant was situated in a gali which could not be utilized for business purposes. ( 3 ) THE Prescribed Authority rejected the release application by the order dated 6th September, 2002 on the ground that the release application lacked bona-fides as the applicant Chandrabhan had concealed facts and the release application was also not maintainable since" it had been moved without the permission of the other co-landlords namely his brother and his mother. The partition amongst the brothers on which reliance had been placed by the applicant-landlord and according to which the disputed shop fell in his share was also discarded. The partition amongst the brothers on which reliance had been placed by the applicant-landlord and according to which the disputed shop fell in his share was also discarded. The Prescribed Authority also observed that the need that had been set up by the landlord was for establishing his second son Vikas Anand in business but as he was a minor he was incapable of doing business from the shop. The Prescribed Authority was also of the opinion that the tenant would suffer greater hardship if he was asked to vacate the shop as the landlord was already doing business with his son Vikas Anand from another shop. ( 4 ) THE landlord filed Rent Appeal which was allowed by the judgment and order dated 4th December, 2007. The Appellate Court found that partition had taken place according to which the disputed shop fell in the share of Chandrabhan who was, therefore, competent to move the release application. The Appellate Court also found that the landlord bona fide required the shop in dispute for establishing his son Vikas Anand who had since attained majority and that the landlord was likely to suffer greater hardship in case the shop was not released. ( 5 ) THE first submission advanced by Sri Arvind Srivastava learned Counsel for the petitioner is that the Appellate Court committed an illegality in holding that a partition had taken place according to which the disputed shop fell in the share of the applicant Chandrabhan. His contention is that the Prescribed Authority had recorded a categorical finding that the partition was a sham transaction but the Appellate Court has recorded a finding to the contrary without reversing the finding of the Prescribed Authority. In support of this contention he has placed reliance upon the decisions of this Court in Vijai Kumar and others v. Ashok Kumar and others, 2007 (69) ALR 473, and in Lal Chand Goyal and others v. IInd Additional District Judge, Saharanpur and others, 1999 (37) ALR 712. ( 6 ) THE proposition of law laid down in these decisions that the Appellate Court has to give cogent reasons for disagreeing with the findings of the Trial Court cannot be disputed but it has to be seen whether in the present case the Appellate Court has given cogent reasons for reversing the aforesaid finding. ( 6 ) THE proposition of law laid down in these decisions that the Appellate Court has to give cogent reasons for disagreeing with the findings of the Trial Court cannot be disputed but it has to be seen whether in the present case the Appellate Court has given cogent reasons for reversing the aforesaid finding. ( 7 ) A perusal of the Appellate Court judgment clearly shows that the Appellate Court found that the entire building was owned by Laxmi Chand who was the father of the applicant Chandrabhan. During his lifetime, Laxmi Chand had given half share of the building comprising the northern portion to his eldest son Mangal Prasad while the remaining half portion comprising the southern portion was retained by him. The disputed shop had been given on rent on 1st May, 1976 to the father of the tenant Sri Sorja Mal Rahuja by the applicant and his father Laxmi Chand as is clear from the agreement. After the death of his father in 1979 partition had taken place between the two brothers namely Chandrabhan and Mangla Prasad and the respective portions were clearly demarcated in the map annexed along with the application. The disputed shop fell in the share of the applicant and after the death of Sojra Mal Rahuja, his sons Sri Rajesh Kumar Rahuja and Sri Vinod Kumar Rahuja became the tenants. The Appellate Court also found that the tenants had also given some portion of the tenanted shop measuring 4 feet x 15 feet to the applicant Chandrabhan who started business with his son Sri Santosh Anand from the shop and, therefore, Chandrabhan was the actual landlord of the shop in dispute. The Appellate Court also noticed that the tenants had been depositing the rent under section 30 of the Act in favour of the landlord Chandrabhan as was clear from the various documents that had been filed by the parties. Thus, from the documents on record, the Appellate Court found as a fact that the applicant Chandrabhan was the sole landlord of the shop in dispute. The Prescribed Authority had merely expressed doubts about that partition that had taken place between the two sons of Laxmi Chand after his death merely on the ground that the exact date of partition had not been mentioned. The Prescribed Authority had merely expressed doubts about that partition that had taken place between the two sons of Laxmi Chand after his death merely on the ground that the exact date of partition had not been mentioned. A tenant cannot question the partition that had taken place between the landlords particularly when Mangla Prasad, the other brother had not raised any objection regarding the partition. The Appellate Court has given cogent reasons for reversing the finding recorded by the Trial Court. There is no infirmity in the finding recorded by the Appellate Court that Chandrabhan was the sole landlord. ( 8 ) THE second contention advanced by the learned Counsel for the petitioner is that the need of the landlord was not bona fide as he had not filed the application with clean hands and had concealed material facts in the release application and in support of his contention he has placed reliance upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Messrs. Karta Ram Rameshwar Dass v. Ram Bilas and others, 2006 (62) ALR 141 (SC)=2006 (37) AIC 318. and upon the decision of this Court in Anjum Ara (Smt.) v. XIth ADJ, Gorakhpur and others, 2001 (44) ALR 147. Elaborating his submissions, learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the landlord did not mention the age of the second son for whom the need was set up in the application and he also concealed the fact that the second son was studying as a regular student. He also submitted that the landlord did not also mention in the application that he was doing business with his son from another shop. ( 9 ) THE contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner cannot be accepted as the facts alleged to have been concealed in the application filed by the landlord are not relevant for the purposes of the controversy involved. Even according to learned Counsel for the petitioner, the second son Vikas Anand was involved in the business with his father from another shop. The need that was set up in the release application filed by the landlord was for setting up an independent business for his second son. The fact whether his son was a regular student or a private student is not material at all. The need that was set up in the release application filed by the landlord was for setting up an independent business for his second son. The fact whether his son was a regular student or a private student is not material at all. The landlord had also mentioned about the partition that had taken place between the brothers after his fathers death and the fact that the disputed shop fell in his share and merely because the date of partition was not mentioned would not result in the dismissal of the release application on the ground that material facts have been concealed. ( 10 ) IT was also contended by learned Counsel for the petitioner that the second son was a minor and, therefore, his need could not have been considered. ( 11 ) IN support of this contention learned Counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance upon the decision of this Court in Hari Shankar and another v. Additional District Judge, Etah and another, 1996 (1) ARC 39. ( 12 ) SRI K. M. Tripathi learned Counsel for the respondents, however, submitted that section 21 (1) (a) of the Act does not require that the application can be filed only when the son is a major on the date of application and in support of his contention he has placed reliance uponthe decisions of this Court in Shiv Narain Lal v. Vth Additional District Judge, Fatehpur and another, 1997 (29) ALR 36. , and in Jai Prakash v. Devendra Kumar Sharma and another, 2006 (65) ALR 229. ( 13 ) IN Hari Shankar and another (supra) on which reliance has been placed by learned Counsel for the petitioner, this Court observed that the Appellate Court had taken into consideration the fact that the landlord son would be married in near future and separate accommodation would be required for his family. It was held that this was an incorrect approach and future necessity cannot be taken into consideration. It was held that this was an incorrect approach and future necessity cannot be taken into consideration. However, in Shiv Narain Lal (supra) this Court specifically dealt with a case where the landlord had filed an application for the need of his minor son aged about 17 years and 4 months and in this connection it was observed as follows: "under the Act or the Rules framed thereunder, there is no provision that the landlord or the member of his family for whose need the shop is sought to be released should be major on the date of application. Therefore, the only thing which is to be seen in the cases of release or allotment of commercial building is as to whether the landlord or the member of his family, for whose need the building (shop) is required to be released, was capable of doing the business that too on the date of the order. On the date of application for release, Sri Krishna Chandra was only aged 17 years and four months and on the date of decision of the said application he was more than 18 years and on the date when the appeal was decided he was more than 21 years old and today he is more than 31 years old. The authorities below under the Act will have to take into consideration the facts and circumstances on the date when they are going to pass the orders as under the law, they are entitled to take subsequent events into consideration. Thus, the ground on which the need of the respondent No. 2 was held to be not bona fide or genuine, was non-existent, on the date the appeal was allowed. What to say today, when the son of the petitioner is 31 years old, therefore, the Appellate Authority was not justified in holding that the son of the petitioner Krishna Chandra did not attain the majority on the date of application, therefore, his need could not be held as genuine and bona fide and also in holding that the hardship of the tenant will be greater than the landlord, because the son of the landlord did not attain the majority. " (Emphasis supplied) ( 14 ) IN Jai Prakash (supra) this Court accepted the bona fide need of the landlord for establishing his son who was soon going to attain majority. " (Emphasis supplied) ( 14 ) IN Jai Prakash (supra) this Court accepted the bona fide need of the landlord for establishing his son who was soon going to attain majority. ( 15 ) THUS, in view of the aforesaid decisions of this Court, it has to be held that the need of the landlord for establishing his son who was soon going to attain majority can be taken into consideration. This apart, when the application was decided, the son had already attained majority. ( 16 ) LEARNED Counsel for the petitioner also contended that the findings in respect of the bona fide need and comparative hardship that have been recorded by the Appellate Court are perverse. In this connection, he submitted that the landlord had available with him the residential accommodation at Hanuman Chowk and an open piece of land at Padri Bazaar from where he could establish the business for his second son. ( 17 ) LEARNED Counsel for the respondents, however, submitted that the findings in respect of bona fide need and comparative hardship have been given after appraisal of evidence and do not require any interference under Article 226 of the Constitution. He also submitted that the landlord cannot be compelled to convert the residential accommodation into a commercial one and cannot also be compelled to construct a shop on the open piece of land from where his second son could carry on business and in support of his contention he has placed reliance upon the decisions of this Court in Mahmood Khan and others v. District judge, Kanpur and others, 2004 (55) ALR 621. ( 18 ) THE contention advanced by the learned Counsel for the petitioner cannot be accepted. The Appellate Court has given cogent reasons based on appraisal of evidence while recording the findings in respect of bona fide need and comparative hardship. The Supreme Court in Munni Lal and others v. Prescribed Authority and others, AIR 1978 SC 29 =1981 ARC 470, clearly observed that while examining the findings of bona fide need and comparative hardship of landlord and tenant it is not for the High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution to reappraise the evidence and come to its own conclusion which may be different from that reached by the District Judge or the Prescribed Authority. ( 19 ) IN the present case, the landlord was justified in asserting that he bona fide required the tenanted shop for setting up the business for his second son Vikas Anand. The tenant cannot also ask the landlord to convert the portion of the residential house of the landlord into a commercial one for establishing the second son and likewise the landlord cannot be asked to raise construction on the open piece of land. ( 20 ) THUS, none of the contentions advanced by the learned Counsel for the petitioner have any force. The writ petition is, accordingly, dismissed. Petition Dismissed. .