JUDGMENT Honble S.N.H. Zaidi, J.—Criminal Appeal No. 656/2008 has been preferred under Section 374 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure,1973, in short Cr.P.C., by Dhruv Kumar Tiwari @ Pappu against the judgment dated 6.10.2007 and order of sentence dated 10.10.2007 passed by Addl. Sessions Judge, Court No. 4, Kanpur Nagar in S.T. No. 771 of 2001, whereby he has been sentenced to death under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, for short I.P.C. Criminal Appeal No. 7865 of 2007 has been preferred by the Appellant from the Jail. For the confirmation of the sentence of death a Reference under Section 366 (2), Cr.P.C. has been received from the trial Judge. 2. The aforesaid Appeals and Reference have been connected and are being disposed of together by the present judgment. 3. The case of the prosecution, as revealed from the statements of the prosecution witnesses, in brief, is that on 10.2.2001 at about 8 P.M. the complainant P.W.1 Nishit Kumar Sharma had gone to meet his in-laws, who were residing in a nearby house in Mohalla Shutur Khana of Kanpur Nagar, along with his wife P.W. 6 Smt. Manju Sharma and his 7 years old daughter Km. Medha. In his in-laws house there lived his father-in-law Shyam Bihari Awasthi, mother-in-law Smt. Ram Kishori, unmarried brother-in-law Shailendra Kumar Awasthi @ Pintu, and married brother-in-law Narendra Kumar Awasthi @ Guddu with his wife and daughter. The appellant, who happens to be a distant relative of Shyam Bihari Awasthi, was also residing and taking meals in that house and though he was working in a Pan Masala factory yet, he also worked as a domestic help and was present in the house. On that day, Narendra Kumar Awasthi @ Guddu was not present and had gone for Darshan of Vaishno Devi with his family on 6.2.01 and was to return on 12.2.2001. As Smt. Ram Kishori was not feeling well, therefore, her daughter Smt. Manju Sharma cooked the food and when all the inmates of the house, including the appellant, had taken the dinner, then complainant Nishit Kumar and Smt. Manju Sharma returned to their home at about 11.00 P.M. but their daughter Km. Medha was left with her grand mother (Nani) in the night. During the period when the complainant remained in that house, P.W. 2 Dinesh Tiwari and one Awdhesh Bajpai also came there to meet Shyam Bihari Awasthi. 4. Medha was left with her grand mother (Nani) in the night. During the period when the complainant remained in that house, P.W. 2 Dinesh Tiwari and one Awdhesh Bajpai also came there to meet Shyam Bihari Awasthi. 4. On the next date, i.e., on 11.2.2001, at about 8 in the morning when the complainant visited his in-laws’ house to bring back his daughter Medha for school, he found the main door of the house locked from outside. He got the lock broken with the help of neighbours and then it was found that Ram Kishori and Medha were lying dead on the floor of the bed room of the second floor and Shailendra Awasthi @ Pintu was also lying dead on the double bed in the same bed room and the blood, broken hairs and pieces of bangles were lying scattered on the floor and on the third floor of the house, the dead body of Shyam Bihari Awasthi was lying on a folding bed. All the deceased persons were badly injured. The golden chain and Jhumki of Ram Kishori were missing from her person. On the ground floor blood stained pant, woollen sweater and a vest of the appellant were found hidden behind a box. There were five dogs in that house, of which two dogs were of German Shepherd breed, one of mixed Alsatian breed and the remaining two of Pamerean breed. The dogs were found confined in two rooms whereas one German Shepherd was tied with the railing of the roof. 5. The complainant got the report (Exhibit Ka-1) scribed from Arun Sharma and gave it at Police Station Harbansh Mohal at 9.10 A.M. on the same day. In that report it was also mentioned that Dhruv Kumar Tiwari had absconded after committing the murders with the help of his associates. P.W. 5 H.C.P. Ram Raj Singh wrote down the Chik FIR (Exhibit Ka-6) on the basis of written report and registered the case at G.D. No. 18 (Exhibit Ka-7) under Sections 302/404, I.P.C. against Dhruv Kumar Tiwari and his associates. P.W. 5 H.C.P. Ram Raj Singh wrote down the Chik FIR (Exhibit Ka-6) on the basis of written report and registered the case at G.D. No. 18 (Exhibit Ka-7) under Sections 302/404, I.P.C. against Dhruv Kumar Tiwari and his associates. P.W.10 Inspector Bijendra Singh Tyagi, the then S.H.O. of the Police Station took the investigation of the case in his hands and rushed to the place of occurrence and got the inquest reports (Exhibit Ka-12 to Exhibit Ka-15) and other connecting documents (Exhibit Ka-16 to Exhibit Ka-36) of the deceased persons prepared by P.W. 8 Sub-Inspector R.K. Pandey. The Investigating Officer, for short the I.O., prepared the custody memos (Exhibit Ka-8 to Ka-11) of the blood stained clothes and the articles found at the place of occurrence, including the blood stained clothes of the appellant, in the presence of P.W. 7 Ajay Shukla and also prepared site plan (Exhibit Ka-38) of the place of occurrence and sent the dead bodies for post mortem examination. P.W. 3 Dr. U. K. Srivastava and P.W. 4 Dr. Riyaz Ahmad performed the post mortem examinations of the dead bodies on 12.2.2001 and prepared reports (Exhibit Ka-2 to Ka-5) of deceased Shyam Behari Awasthi, Medha, Shailendra Kumar Awasthi @ Pintu and Ram Kishori respectively. 6. The appellant was arrested on 14.2.2001, at the tip of the informer, from Lucknow and was interrogated by the I.O. The appellant brought the police to his in-laws’ village Kakhua, within P.S. Purwa of district Unnao, on the same day and got recovered currency notes worth Rs. 1,79,900/- , a pair of broken golden Jhumki, a broken golden chain of the neck, another pair of golden Jhumki with chain and nine silver coins from a bag, which was buried under a lemon tree, near the tube well boring in his father-in-laws’ field, in the presence of P.W. 9 Raghunath Prasad Dixit, who had identified the recovered ornaments, bag etc. as those of his deceased sister Ram Kishori and brother-in-law Shyam Bihari Awasthi. The appellant was then brought to Kanpur where he got recovered a blood stained iron rod (Saria) and two long pieces of cable wires from an almirah in a room on second floor of the house of occurrence. This recovery was also made in the presence of PW-9 Raghunath Prasad Dixit. The appellant was then brought to Kanpur where he got recovered a blood stained iron rod (Saria) and two long pieces of cable wires from an almirah in a room on second floor of the house of occurrence. This recovery was also made in the presence of PW-9 Raghunath Prasad Dixit. Recovery memos (Exhibits Ka-36 & Ka-37) of the recovered articles and site plans (Exhibits-Ka-38 & Ka-39) of the places of recovery were accordingly prepared by the I.O. He had also collected the samples of hairs and blood of the appellant in jail and prepared the custody memo (Exhibit Ka-42) and sent it with other recovered articles for examination to the Forensic Science Laboratory (F.S.L.) at Lucknow. The report of F.S.L. is Exhibit Ka-43. After the investigation, a charge-sheet (Exhibit Ka-41) was filed under Sections 302, 394, 404 and 411, I.P.C. against the appellant only. The Magistrate took cognizance thereon and committed the case to the Court of Sessions for trial. 7. Charges of Sections 302, 394, 404 and 411, I.P.C. were framed by the trial Court against the appellant, who pleaded not guilty to them. 8. The prosecution has examined PW-1 Nishit Kumar Sharma, PW-2 Dinesh Tiwari, PW-3 Dr. U.K. Srivastava, PW-4 Dr. Riyaz Ahmad, PW-5 H.C.P. Ram Raj Singh, PW-6 Smt. Manju Sharma, PW-7 Ajay Shukla, PW-8 Sub-Inspector R. K. Pandey, PW-9 Raghunath Prasad Dixit and PW-10 Inspector Bijendra Singh Tyagi and has also produced documentary evidence (Exhibit Ka-1 to Ka-43) and Material Exhibits 1 to 17 in support of its case. 9. PW-1 Nishit Kumar Sharma is the complainant. He has supported the entire prosecution story. According to him, appellant Dhruv Kumar was present in the house in the fateful night and had absconded in the next morning and the house was locked. PW-2 Dinesh Tiwari and PW-6 Manju Sharma had also seen the appellant in the house of the deceased persons in the night of 10.2.2001 and have supported the prosecution case. PW-6 Manju Sharma has also said that her brother Shailendra alias Pintu had given about Rs. PW-2 Dinesh Tiwari and PW-6 Manju Sharma had also seen the appellant in the house of the deceased persons in the night of 10.2.2001 and have supported the prosecution case. PW-6 Manju Sharma has also said that her brother Shailendra alias Pintu had given about Rs. 40 or 50 thousands to her mother to keep, in the presence of the appellant, and when she had left her parents’ house, he had closed the main door from inside at about 11 P.M. PW-7 Ajay Shukla is the witness of the custody memos (Exhibits Ka-8 to Ka-11) of various articles found in the house of occurrence,including blood stained clothes (Material Exhibits 1 to 3) of the appellant, taken by the police in its custody. PW-9 Raghunath Prasad Dixit is the witness of recovery of cash and ornaments as well as the alleged weapon of offence i.e. iron rod (Material Exhibit 17) at the instance of the appellant and the recovery memos (Exhibits Ka 36 and 37). He has also supported the prosecution case. Rest are the formal witnesses, who have proved the documents. According to the post mortem reports Ext. Ka-2 to Ka-5, prepared by P.W. 3 Dr. U.K. Srivastava and P.W. 4 Dr. Riyaz Ahmad, the deceased were having the following anti mortem injuries on their persons : I. Shyam Bihari Awasthi, aged about 65 years, (1) Multiple abraded contusions, in an area of 8 x 5 cm, on the front of forehead, just above the bridge of nose. (2) Multiple abraded contusions, in an area of 3 x 2 cm, on the middle of nose. (3) Multiple abraded contusions, in an area of 13 x 6 cm, around the mouth, just below both angles of mouth. (4) Multiple abraded contusions, in an area of 4 x 22 cm, over middle of chin. (5) Abraded contusion, 2.5 x 1.5 cm, on the front of neck, 5 cm below chin, Echymosis was present underneath the injury. On internal examination it was found that his left hyoid bone was fractured and trachea was congested. Cause of death asphyxia as a result of throttling. II. (5) Abraded contusion, 2.5 x 1.5 cm, on the front of neck, 5 cm below chin, Echymosis was present underneath the injury. On internal examination it was found that his left hyoid bone was fractured and trachea was congested. Cause of death asphyxia as a result of throttling. II. Kumari Medha, aged about 7 years, Five abraded contusions, in an area of 6 cm x 5 cm, on the front and left side of neck, 2 cm below chin, largest 2 cm x 2 cm and smallest 1 cm x 0.5 cm, clotted blood was present underneath the injuries. Her left hyoid bone was fractured and trachea was congested. Cause of death asphyxia as a result of throttling. III. Shailendra Kumar Awasthi @ Pintu, aged about 24 years, (1) Incised wound, 7 cm x 2 cm x bone deep, on left side of head 2 cm above left ear. Underlying bone (left parietal) was cut. (2) Incised wound, 3 cm x 1 cm x bone deep, on the right side of forehead 2 cm above the right eyebrow. (3) Incised wound, 2.5 cm x 1 cm x bone deep, on the left side of forehead just above the left eyebrow. (4) Incised wound, 1.5 cm x 1 cm x bone deep, on just level to left eye. (5) Abraded contusion, 2 cm x 1 cm, on right side of forehead, 1 cm above eye brow. Underlying frontal bone fractured. (6) Abraded contusion, 2 cm x 1 cm, on left side of face, 1 cm above the angle of mouth. (7) Abraded contusion, 5 cm x 1 cm, on the left shoulder. (8) Abraded contusion, 4 cm x 2 cm, on the right shoulder. (9) Incised wound, 1 cm x 1 cm. x muscle deep, on the back of index finger of right hand, nail was absent. Incised wound, 1 cm x 1 cm x muscle deep, on ring finger (frontal side) of left hand. (10) Abraded contusion, 2 cm x 1 cm, on the back of left hand. Cause of death coma as a result of anti-mortem injuries. IV Smt. Ram Kishori, aged about 50 years, (1) Incised wound, 3 cm x 1 cm x bone deep on the left side of forehead, just above the left eyebrow. (10) Abraded contusion, 2 cm x 1 cm, on the back of left hand. Cause of death coma as a result of anti-mortem injuries. IV Smt. Ram Kishori, aged about 50 years, (1) Incised wound, 3 cm x 1 cm x bone deep on the left side of forehead, just above the left eyebrow. (2) Incised wound 1 cm x 1 cm x muscle deep, on the right side of face, just lateral to the angle of mouth. (3) Incised wound, 1 cm x 0.5 cm x through & through on the lower part of right pinna. (4) Multiple abraded contusions, in an area of 9 cm x 7 cm on the front of right side of neck, just below chin, largest 5 cm x 3 cm, smallest 1 cm x 0.5 cm. (5) Abraded contusion, 3 cm x 3 cm, on the back of right forearm, 4 cm below elbow. (6) Abraded contusion, 1 cm x 0.5 cm, on the back of right ring finger. Clotted blood and echymosis was present underneath injury No. 4. Hyoid bone fractured on right side and her trachea was congested. Cause of death asphyxia as a result of throttling. 10. The appellant, in his statement under Section 313, Cr.P.C., has denied his involvement in the crime. He has said that he was not present in the house of Shyam Bihari Awasthi in the night of the occurrence and had gone to meet his family at his village Taura of district Unnao, as he used to visit his family on every Saturday and Sunday and the date of occurrence, i.e., 10.2.2001 was a Saturday. He has also said that he was apprehended by the Kanpur police along with his father from his village on 11.2.2001 and was detained for 3-4 days at the Police Station and after showing false recovery of cash, ornaments and iron rod etc., he was implicated in this case falsely. 11. The appellant Dhruv Kumar has examined his father D.W. 1 Ram Piyare Tiwari and himself as D.W. 2 in his defence. 12. D.W. 1 Ram Pyare Tiwari has supported the statement of his son and has said that the appellant used to visit his village to meet his family on every Saturday and after spending Sunday with them go back to his work on Monday. 12. D.W. 1 Ram Pyare Tiwari has supported the statement of his son and has said that the appellant used to visit his village to meet his family on every Saturday and after spending Sunday with them go back to his work on Monday. According to him, during the night of 10/11.2.2001 the appellant was present in the village and at about 7 or 8 A.M. on 11.2.2008, the Kanpur police had come in the village, apprehended him and the appellant, made a search of his house and took away cash worth about Rs. 2 Lakhs, gold and silver ornaments and 25 silver coins, which were kept in the house for his daughter’s marriage, which was to take place on 17.2.2001. He has filed invitation card of the marriage (Exhibit Kha-1). He has further stated that he was detained at the police station along with the appellant for 3-4 days and thereafter he was let of and the appellant was sent to jail. He has also said that he was having about 5 ½ Bighas of agricultural land in his name whereas his father Ganga Charan was also having about 4 Bighas of land and the money for the marriage of his daughter was of his agricultural produce. He has also filed the copies of the extract of Khataunis (Exhibits Kha-2 & Kha-3). 13. D.W. 2 Dhurva Kumar, the appellant, has also supported the statement given by him under Section 313, Cr.P.C. and has corroborated the statement of his father DW-1. According to him, deceased Shyam Bihari Awasthi etc. were murdered by unknown persons and Narendra Kumar @ Guddu, the son of Shyam Bihari, got him implicated in this case in connivance with the police. 14. The learned trial Court found all the charges proved against the appellant and sentenced him to death under Section 302, I.P.C. but did not pass any sentence for the offences of Sections 394, 404 and 411, I.P.C. on the ground that he had already been sentenced to death. The learned trial Judge has then submitted the sentence of death for confirmation to this Court, under Section 366, Cr.P.C. 15. We have heard the learned counsels for the appellant, the complainant and the learned Government Advocate, assisted by Sri R.K. Singh, the learned AGA for the State. 16. The learned trial Judge has then submitted the sentence of death for confirmation to this Court, under Section 366, Cr.P.C. 15. We have heard the learned counsels for the appellant, the complainant and the learned Government Advocate, assisted by Sri R.K. Singh, the learned AGA for the State. 16. Undisputedly, there is no direct evidence in this case and the prosecution case is depended on various circumstances which were accepted by the trial Court. In order to prove its case the prosecution has relied upon the following circumstances : (i) The appellant was residing in the house of deceased persons and was present in that house during the night of occurrence, when all the four inmates of that house were murdered, and absconded in the next morning and the house was found locked. (ii) Blood stained pants, sweater and vest of the appellant were found on the ground floor of the house of occurrence on 11.2.2001 and human blood was found on those clothes. (iii) The appellant used to feed and take care of the dogs in that house which were let loose during the night, but after the incidents the dogs were found confined in the rooms and one German Shepherd dog was found tied with the railing of the roof. (iv)The motive of committing the murders was to commit robbery as Golden Jhumki and golden chain were found missing from the dead body of Ram Kishori and the same were subsequently recovered at the instance of the appellant along with cash worth Rs. 1,89,900/-, another pair of golden Jhumki and silver coins, from the field of the father-in-law of the appellant. (v) A weapon of offence, i.e., a blood stained iron rod was got recovered by the appellant from the house of occurrence. 17. It has been consistently laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court that where a case rests squarely on circumstantial evidence, the inference of guilt can be justified only when all the incriminating facts and circumstances are found to be incompatible with the innocence of the accused or the guilt of any other person. 17. It has been consistently laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court that where a case rests squarely on circumstantial evidence, the inference of guilt can be justified only when all the incriminating facts and circumstances are found to be incompatible with the innocence of the accused or the guilt of any other person. [Hukam Singh v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1977 SC 1063 ; Eradu v. State of Hyderabad, AIR 1956 SC 316 ; Earabhadrappa v. State of Karnataka, AIR 1983 SC 446 ; State of U.P. v. Sukhbhasi, AIR 1985 SC 1224 ; Balwinder Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1987 SC 350 and Ashok Kumar Chatterjee v. State of M.P., AIR 1989 SC 1890 ]. 18. The circumstances from which an inference as to the guilt of the accused is drawn have to be proved beyond reasonable doubt and have to be shown to be closely connected with the principal fact sought to be inferred from those circumstances. In Bhagat Ram v. State of Punjab, AIR 1954 SC 621 , it was laid down that where the case depends upon the conclusion drawn from circumstances the cumulative effect of the circumstances must be such as to negative the innocence of the accused and bring home the offences beyond any reasonable doubt. 19. We may also make a reference to a decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in C. Chenna Reddy and others v. State of A.P., (1996)10 SCC 193 , wherein it has been observed : “21. In a case based on circumstantial evidence, the settled law is that the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is drawn should be fully proved and such circumstances must be conclusive in nature. Moreover, all the circumstances should be complete and there should be no gap left in the chain of evidence. Further, the proved circumstances must be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused and totally inconsistent with his innocence.....” 20. Moreover, all the circumstances should be complete and there should be no gap left in the chain of evidence. Further, the proved circumstances must be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused and totally inconsistent with his innocence.....” 20. In Padala Veera Reddy v. State of A.P., AIR 1990 SC 79 , it was laid down that when a case rests upon circumstantial evidence, such evidence must satisfy the following tests : (1) the circumstances from which an inference of guilt is sought to be drawn, must be cogently and firmly established; (2) those circumstances should be of a definite tendency unerringly pointing towards guilt of the accused; (3) the circumstances, taken cumulatively, should form a chain so complete that there is no escape from the conclusion that within all human probability the crime was committed by the accused and none else; and (4) the circumstantial evidence in order to sustain conviction must be complete and incapable of explanation of any other hypothesis than that of guilt of the accused and such evidence should not only be consistent with the guilt of the accused but should be inconsistent with his innocence.” 21. In State of U.P. v. Ashok Kumar Srivastava, 1992 Cri LJ 1104 it was pointed out that great care must be taken in evaluating circumstantial evidence and if the evidence relied on is reasonably capable of two inferences, the one in favour of the accused must be accepted. It was also pointed out that the circumstances relied upon must be found to have been fully established and the cumulative effect of all the facts so established must be consistent only with the hypothesis of guilt. 22. There is no doubt that conviction can be based solely on circumstantial evidence but it should be tested by the touchstone of law relating to circumstantial evidence laid down by the Supreme Court as far back as in 1952 in the case of Hanumant Govind Nargundkar v. State of M.P., AIR 1952 SC 343 , wherein it was observed that : “It is well to remember that in cases where the evidence is of a circumstantial nature, the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should in the first instance be fully established, and all the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused. Again, the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency and they should be such as to exclude every hypothesis but the one proposed to be proved. In other words, there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and it must be such as to show that within all human probability the act must have been done by the accused.” 23. A reference may be made to the decision in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1984 SC 1622 . Therein, while dealing with circumstantial evidence, it has been held that the onus was on the prosecution to prove that the chain is complete and the infirmity or lacuna in the prosecution cannot be cured by a false defence or plea. The conditions precedent in the words of Hon’ble Supreme Court, before conviction could be based on circumstantial evidence, must be fully established. They are : (1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established. The circumstances concerned must or should and not may be established; (2) the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty; (3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency; (4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved; and (5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused. 24. When we analysed the evidence on record in the background of the principles of law highlighted above, the inevitable conclusion we have arrived at is that the learned trial Court has rightly held the alleged circumstances as proved. 25. 24. When we analysed the evidence on record in the background of the principles of law highlighted above, the inevitable conclusion we have arrived at is that the learned trial Court has rightly held the alleged circumstances as proved. 25. So far as the first circumstance that the appellant was residing and was present in the house during the night of occurrence and had absconded on the next morning is concerned, P.W-1 Nishit Kumar and P.W-6 Manju Sharma have stated that when in the night of 10.2.2001 they had visited the house of the deceased persons at about 8 p.m. the appellant was present and had opened the main door. According to them, the appellant remained present in that house and when at about 11 p.m. they had returned, he had closed the main door from inside. P.W. 2 Dinesh Tiwari has also stated about the presence of the appellant in the house of occurrence in that night. P.W. 1 and P.W. 6 have also said that, on 11.2.2001, the house was found locked from outside and the appellant was not present and when the lock was broken then it was found that all the four inmates of the house were lying dead. They have also stated that prior to the incident the appellant, who happened to be a distant relative, used to live and take meals in that house and was working as a domestic help. P.W. 6 has also stated that she was treating the appellant as her god brother and used to tie Rakhi to him and the relations of the inmates of the house with the appellant were cordial. No previous enmity of any of the deceased persons or the complainant with the appellant has even been suggested to these witnesses. Even the fact of the presence of the appellant during the night of occurrence in that house has not been disputed in the cross-examination of these witnesses. The witnesses had been subjected to lengthy cross-examination but nothing could have come in their depositions which could make it unworthy of credit. We have, therefore, no reason to disbelieve them as these witnesses have successfully stood the test of cross-examination and their testimony inspire confidence. 26. The witnesses had been subjected to lengthy cross-examination but nothing could have come in their depositions which could make it unworthy of credit. We have, therefore, no reason to disbelieve them as these witnesses have successfully stood the test of cross-examination and their testimony inspire confidence. 26. The appellant, however, in his cross-examination as D.W. 1 has tried to say that he used to stay in the night in his factory where he was working and come to that house whenever Narendra Awasthi, the son of deceased Shyam Bihari, called him. This statement cannot be believed as it does not find support even from ground (J) of his Memo of Appeal, in which it has been admitted that the appellant was residing in the house and his status was that of a servant. The F.I.R. Ext. Ka-1,which was promptly lodged with the police, i.e., after about an hour of the recovery of the dead bodies, fully corroborates the testimonies of P.Ws. 1, 2 and 6. 27. The contention of the appellant that he was not present in the house during the night of occurrence and had gone to meet his family in his village, though supported on oath by his father D.W. 1 Ram Piyare Tiwari and the appellant himself as D.W. 2, yet cannot be accepted because, according to them, on 11.2.2001 at about 7 or 8 a.m., the Kanpur police had come in their village Taura in district Unnao and apprehended them and took them to Kanpur, but the Chik F.I.R., Ext. Ka-6, shows that the dead bodies were found after 8 a.m. on 11.2.2001 and the report of the incident was lodged at 9.10 a.m. and it is nobody’s case that F.I.R. was ante-timed. The I.O. appears to have remained present on the place of occurrence at least up to 3.00 p.m. on that day when the last inquest report, Ext. Ka-14, of deceased Shyam Bihari was concluded, as is evident from it. In such circumstances neither the I.O. could visit the appellant’s village at 7 or 8 a.m. on 11.2.2001 nor the appellant and his father could be apprehended from there. 28. The presence of appellant Dhruv Kumar during the night of occurrence i.e. on 10/11.2.2001 in the house of occurrence is, therefore, fully proved and there appears no doubt regarding this circumstance. 28. The presence of appellant Dhruv Kumar during the night of occurrence i.e. on 10/11.2.2001 in the house of occurrence is, therefore, fully proved and there appears no doubt regarding this circumstance. It is also sufficiently proved from the evidence on record that the murders of the inmates of the house were committed during that night and their dead bodies were recovered after 8.00 a.m. on the next morning and at that time the appellant was not present and had absconded. 29. The second circumstance, as stated above, is that appellant’s clothes, namely, pant, sweater and vest, Material Exts.1 to 3, which were stained with blood, were found hidden behind an iron box on the ground floor of the house, when the lock of the house was broken and in the examination of these clothes by the Forensic Science Laboratory, at Lucknow, human blood was found on them. According to P.W. 2 Dinesh Tiwari, the pant Mat. Ext.1 and sweater Mat. Ext. 2 were worn by the appellant in the night of 10.2.2001 when he had visited the house to meet Shyam Bihari. P.W. 1 Nishit Kumar and P.W. 6 Manju Sharma have also corroborated this fact in their statements on oath. We found the evidence of the witnesses on this point trustworthy and as the appellant was residing in that house, therefore, it was easy for him to change the blood stained clothes before making good his escape. P.W. 1 has also said that the ground floor of the house was being used as a godown and nobody was residing in it, therefore, it was a suitable place to hide the clothes. Although the appellant has denied the alleged recovery in his statement under Section 313, Cr.P.C., yet neither P.W. 1 Nishit Kumar nor P.W. 2 Dinesh Tiwari or P.W. 6 Manju Sharma has been suggested in their cross-examination that the appellant was not putting on the recovered clothes when these witnesses had visited the house of the deceased persons in the night of occurrence. The I.O. had also sent these clothes for examination to the Forensic Science Laboratory and according to its report Ext. Ka-43, human blood was found on the pant, sweater and vest of the accused. This circumstance is, therefore, fully established. The I.O. had also sent these clothes for examination to the Forensic Science Laboratory and according to its report Ext. Ka-43, human blood was found on the pant, sweater and vest of the accused. This circumstance is, therefore, fully established. The presence of human blood on the clothes of the appellant not only proves his presence at the time and place of occurrence but also shows his active involvement in the crime and is consistent with the hypothesis of his guilt. 30. In respect of third circumstance, as indicated above, P.W. 1, 6 and 9 have stated that there were 5 dogs in the house of occurrence which were fed and taken care of by the appellant and inmates of the house and were let loose during the night but when the lock of the house was broken and the people went inside, one of the dogs, which was of German Shepherd breed and was the most ferocious amongst all, was found tied with the railing of the roof whereas the other four dogs were confined in two rooms. P.W. 6 has also said that on 10.2.2001 when she had visited her parents’ house in the evening, the dogs were set at liberty. She has further stated that during the night of incident she did neither hear the barking of the dogs nor any Mohalla people had also told her about that. P.W. 9 who is the brother-in-law (Sala) of deceased Shyam Bihari has stated in his cross-examination that the dogs were quite dangerous and the appellant used to tie those dogs. We are of the view that since the appellant was residing in that house, therefore, it is natural that the dogs would have been familiar with him and it is quite probable that during the night of occurrence the dogs would have been tied and confined by the appellant. The dogs of German Shepherd breed are quite ferocious and it is highly improbable that any stranger would have dared to go near them or would have tied or confined them. This circumstance clearly indicates that none other than the appellant had tied the German Shepherd dog with the railing and confined other dogs in the rooms. 31. The dogs of German Shepherd breed are quite ferocious and it is highly improbable that any stranger would have dared to go near them or would have tied or confined them. This circumstance clearly indicates that none other than the appellant had tied the German Shepherd dog with the railing and confined other dogs in the rooms. 31. We are also of the view that in the presence of German Shepherd and mixed Alsatian dogs it is highly improbable for any stranger to enter into the house of the occurrence without the active assistance of the appellant. This circumstance also fully establishes the involvement of the appellant in the incident. 32. The fourth circumstance, as alleged by the prosecution, is that the motive for the commission of these murders was to commit robbery of cash and golden ornaments, as the golden Jhumki and golden chain were missing from the dead body of Ram Kishori which were subsequently got recovered by the appellant along with cash and other ornament. P.W. 9 Raghunath Prasad and the I.O., P.W. 10 have proved the recovery of one pair of broken golden Jhumki, one broken golden chain of the neck, another pair of golden Jhumki with chain, cash worth Rs.1,79,900/- and nine silver coins from a bag buried under a lemon tree in the field of appellant’s father-in-law in village Kakhua of district Unnao, at the instance of the appellant. Their evidence is corroborated by the recovery memo Ext. Ka-36. We found no circumstance in their cross-examination which could make their testimony unacceptable. Learned counsel for the appellant has, however, drawn our attention towards the contradiction in the statements of P.W. 9 and P.W. 10 in respect of preparation of the recovery memo Exhibit Ka.36, that the I.O., P.W. 10 has stated that the recovery memo was prepared at the place of recovery, whereas P.W. 9 has stated that the recovered gunny bag was taken to the police station where it was opened and recovery memo was prepared. Since these witnesses have proved the factum of recovery of cash and ornaments at the instance of the appellant from the field of his father-in-law and their testimony appear believable, it is immaterial whether the recovery memo was prepared at the place of recovery or elsewhere and it does not cast any doubt in respect of the factum of recovery. Since these witnesses have proved the factum of recovery of cash and ornaments at the instance of the appellant from the field of his father-in-law and their testimony appear believable, it is immaterial whether the recovery memo was prepared at the place of recovery or elsewhere and it does not cast any doubt in respect of the factum of recovery. The learned trial Court has, therefore, rightly held as proved the recoveries of golden ornaments of deceased Ram Kishori and cash etc. at the instance of the appellant, from the evidence and circumstances on record. 33. The appellant and his father Ram Piyare, in their examination as D.Ws., have also stated that when the police had arrived in their village on 11.2.2001 and apprehended them, it had also made the search of their house and had taken away cash worth about Rs. two lacs, gold ornaments and silver coins, which were kept for the marriage of Lakshmi, the daughter of D.W. 1 and the sister of the appellant, to be solemnized on 17.2.2001. According to D.W. 1, the money was earned from agricultural farming. In support of these contentions a marriage invitation card Ext. Kha-1 and copies of extracts of Khataunis Exts. Kha-2 and Kha-3 have been filed. Both these D.Ws. are highly interested witnesses, as their main goal is to get the appellant acquitted from the charges. Their testimony shall, therefore, be tested in that backdrop. It is revealed from Khatauni Ext. Kha-2 that the entire land of the appellant’s father was mortgaged with Punjab National Bank in respect of a loan of Rs. 60,000/-. That land or any portion thereof could, therefore, not be sold to meet out the expenses of the marriage of appellant’s sister. The appellant and his father appear to belong to lower strata of the society. There is also nothing on record which could show that as to wherefrom the appellant or his father could manage to collect a sum of about Rs. 1,80,000/-. P.W. 9 Raghunath Prasad and P.W. 10, the I.O., have also stated that one of the recovered pairs of golden Jhumkis and chain were broken. This fact has not been disputed in the cross-examination of these witnesses. Normally the ornaments for the marriage are made new and it is not probable that broken ornaments would have been kept for the marriage. This fact has not been disputed in the cross-examination of these witnesses. Normally the ornaments for the marriage are made new and it is not probable that broken ornaments would have been kept for the marriage. No safe reliance can, therefore, be placed upon the testimony of the D.Ws. The allegation that the cash and ornaments etc. were taken away by the police from the appellant’s house, as stated above, therefore, cannot be accepted. 34. P.W. 6 Smt. Manju Sharma has also said that her brother deceased Shailendra had given about Rs. 40,000/- or Rs. 50,000/- to her mother to keep and at that moment the appellant was also present in the room. This fact has not been disputed by the defence in her cross-examination. As the marriage of the sister of the appellant was forthcoming on 17.2.2001, as is evident from the invitation card, Ext. Kha-1, therefore, there was every probability that the appellant had planned to steal that money and in accomplishment of this design the murders of the inmates of the house were committed and after having laid his hands on the money given by deceased Shailendra to his mother deceased Ram Kishori, he had also laid his hands on other cash and ornaments available in the house and also taken away golden Jhumki and chain of Ram Kishori from her dead person. The alleged motive for committing the murders of the inmates is, therefore, fully established from the evidence and circumstances on record. 35. The fifth and last incriminating circumstance against the appellant, as pointed out by the prosecution, is that the appellant also got recovered a blood stained iron rod (Saria) and two long pieces of cable wires from the almirah of the house of occurrence. P.W. 9 Raghunath Prasad and the I.O., P.W. 10 have proved the recovery of an iron rod Mat. Ext.17, as alleged by the prosecution. Although the appellant had denied the same, yet we do not find the alleged recovery doubtful. There appears no reason for P.W. 9 Raghunath Prasad to depose falsehood against the appellant and, as observed earlier, he is a reliable witness. The testimony of P.Ws. 9 and 10 is fully corroborated by the recovery memo Ext. Ka-37. We are thus satisfied that the prosecution has succeeded in establishing this circumstance also. As per report Ext. There appears no reason for P.W. 9 Raghunath Prasad to depose falsehood against the appellant and, as observed earlier, he is a reliable witness. The testimony of P.Ws. 9 and 10 is fully corroborated by the recovery memo Ext. Ka-37. We are thus satisfied that the prosecution has succeeded in establishing this circumstance also. As per report Ext. Ka-43 of the Forensic Science Laboratory, blood was found on that iron rod. This circumstance establishes its use in the crime as some of the deceased persons were having anti mortem injuries in the nature of abraded contusions, which could be caused with it. 36. Learned counsel for the appellant has also submitted that there is yet another contradiction in the statements of P.Ws. in respect of the fact of breaking of lock of the house. According to P.W. 1, he got the lock of the house broken with the help of the neighbours and, after the recovery of the dead bodies, the incident was reported at the police station and the police visited the place and prepared the custody memo Ext. Ka. 8 of the broken lock. P.W. 7 Ajay Shukla, the witness of custody memo Ext. Ka-8 has, however, said that the lock of the house was broken by the police. It appears that the statement of P.W. 7 was recorded in July, 2005 i.e. after more than 4 years of the incident. Keeping in view the long gap between the incident and the testimony of P.W. 7, we are of the view that unless the witness is tutored, appearance of certain contradictions in the statements of witnesses is quite natural. Moreover, looking to its nature, the contradiction is not material and does not make the prosecution case doubtful. 37. All the above circumstances incriminating the appellant, as alleged by the prosecution are, therefore, cogently and firmly proved beyond any reasonable doubt. In our opinion, these circumstances are conclusive in nature and when taken cumulatively they form a complete chain with no gap in it and clearly point towards the guilt of the appellant. We are also of the view that the circumstantial evidence established against the appellant is incapable of explanation of any other hypothesis than that of his guilt. 38. It appears from the post-mortem reports Exts. Ka-2 and 3, as detailed above, that all the anti-mortem injuries on the persons of Shyam Bihari Awasthi and Km. We are also of the view that the circumstantial evidence established against the appellant is incapable of explanation of any other hypothesis than that of his guilt. 38. It appears from the post-mortem reports Exts. Ka-2 and 3, as detailed above, that all the anti-mortem injuries on the persons of Shyam Bihari Awasthi and Km. Medha were in the nature of abraded contusions and could, therefore, be caused by some blunt object. The anti-mortem injuries of deceased Shailendra Kumar Awasthi alias Pintu and Smt. Ram Kishori, as revealed from their post-mortem reports Ext. Ka-4 and 5, are mostly in the nature of incised wounds besides a few abraded contusions. Incised wounds could not be caused by any blunt object and could be the result of attack with only sharp edged weapons. It is thus apparent that two types of weapons, namely, blunt object and sharp edged weapon were used in inflicting the injuries to the deceased persons. This circumstance is indicative of the involvement of more than one person in the commission of crime, as it appears highly improbable that the appellant was having two types of weapons at the same time and for two persons he had used the blunt object whereas for the remaining two a sharp edged weapon was used. In the written report, Ext. Ka.1, the complainant had mentioned about the involvement of the accomplices of the appellant in committing the murders and accordingly the case was registered against the appellant and his companions, but the I.O. did not seem to have taken any hint from the report or made any effort to trace out the appellant’s accomplices. However, this lapse on the part of the I.O. does not raise any doubt in respect of the involvement of the appellant in the commission of crime, as all the incriminating circumstances stood proved against him. 39. We are also of the view that the circumstance of confinement and tying of the dogs clearly suggests that to facilitate the entry and the free movement of the strangers into the house, the dogs were tied and confined in the room by the appellant. This circumstance, therefore, further supports the view of participation of the accomplices of the appellant in the incident. This circumstance, therefore, further supports the view of participation of the accomplices of the appellant in the incident. Besides that, as the dead bodies of Ram Kishori, Medha and Shailendra alias Pintu were found in a bed room of the 2nd floor of the house, therefore, in all probabilities they would have been attacked in that room and even if they were sleeping at the time of attack, it appears highly improbable for a single person to attack all the three persons at one time without any resistance from the others. This circumstance also indicates that the appellant was actively assisted by his companion or companions in causing injuries as well as throttling the deceased. As deceased Ram Kishori was aged about 50 years and Medha was aged only 7 years, therefore, it can be said that they could not have put in sufficient resistance to their attackers, but deceased Shailendra was aged about 24 years and according to his post-mortem report Ext. Ka-4, he was having an average built body, therefore, in all probability he would have resisted the attack. These circumstances again confirm that the appellant was actively assisted by his unknown companions in committing these murders. We are thus of the view that the I.O. had not properly investigated the case, otherwise other participants in the crime could have also been detected. 40. From what we have stated above, we hold that all the incriminating circumstances against the appellant, as pointed out by the prosecution, are fully established and these circumstances and the evidence on record make a complete chain leaving no ground to suggest the innocence of the appellant. We are also of the view that these circumstances are conclusive in nature and exclude every possible hypothesis of the innocence of the appellant. We, therefore, hold that the appellant had committed the murders of four inmates of the house with the active assistance of his associates in order to commit the robbery of cash and gold ornaments and had stolen the ornaments from the dead body of Smt. Ram Kishori and the stolen cash and ornaments were recovered from his possession. The trial court has, therefore, rightly held the accused appellant guilty of the charges of Sections 302, 394, 404, and 411 of the I.P.C. In this view of the matter, we confirm the conviction of appellant Dhruv Kumar Tiwari @ Pappu under the aforementioned sections. The trial court has, therefore, rightly held the accused appellant guilty of the charges of Sections 302, 394, 404, and 411 of the I.P.C. In this view of the matter, we confirm the conviction of appellant Dhruv Kumar Tiwari @ Pappu under the aforementioned sections. 41. So far as the sentence part of the impugned judgment is concerned, the appellant has been awarded death sentence under Section 302 of the I.P.C. Learned Counsel for the appellant has, however, submitted that it is not a rarest of the rare case to warrant the extreme penalty of death to the appellant. According to him, the circumstantial evidence relied upon by the trial Court, even if sufficient to convict the appellant, it is not safe enough to act upon such circumstances for putting out a life. He has relied upon the decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the cases of Prakash Dhawal Khairnar (Patil) v. State of Maharashtra, 2002(2) SCC 35 and Ram Anup Singh and others v. State of Bihar, AIR 2002 SC 3006 . 42. In the case of Prakash Dhawal Khairnar (Patil) v. State of Maharashtra (supra) the condemned appellant had committed the murders of his brother, their mother and four members of his brother’s family because the deceased brother was not partitioning the property which the appellant claimed to be a joint family property. In the totality of circumstances the Apex Court set aside the death sentence awarded to the appellant, but directed that for the murders committed by him he would suffer imprisonment for life and further that he would not be released from prison until he had served out at least 20 years of imprisonment including the period already undergone by him. 43. In Ram Anup Singh and others v. State of Bihar (supra), there were a father and his two sons before the Supreme Court. They had killed the father’s brother, the brother’s wife, his daughter and his son-in-law. On conviction for the murders the father was sentenced to life imprisonment but the two sons were given the death penalty. 43. In Ram Anup Singh and others v. State of Bihar (supra), there were a father and his two sons before the Supreme Court. They had killed the father’s brother, the brother’s wife, his daughter and his son-in-law. On conviction for the murders the father was sentenced to life imprisonment but the two sons were given the death penalty. The Supreme Court once again interfered and set aside the death sentence awarded by the trial Court and confirmed by the High Court to the two sons and instead sentenced them to suffer rigorous imprisonment for life with the condition that they would not be released before completing the actual term of 20 years including the period of imprisonment already undergone by them. 44. In Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, 1980(2) SCC 684 as well as in Machhi Singh and others v. State of Punjab, 1983(3) SCC 470 the Supreme Court had indicated the guidelines which are to be kept in view when considering the question whether the case belongs to the rarest of the rare category for awarding death sentence. 45. The Constitution Bench in Bachan Singh’s case (supra) has said : “....It is, therefore, imperative to voice the concern that Courts, aided by the broad illustrative guidelines indicated by us, will discharge the onerous function with evermore scrupulous care and humane concern, directed along the high road of legislative policy outlined in Section 354(3), viz. that for persons convicted of murder, life imprisonment is the rule and death sentence an exception. A real and abiding concern for the dignity of human life postulates resistance to taking a life through law’s instrumentality. That ought not to be done save in the rarest of the rare cases when the alternative option is foreclosed.” 46. The Bachan Singh principle of ‘rarest of rare cases’ came up for consideration and elaboration before the Supreme Court in the case of Machhi Singh (supra). It was a case of extraordinary brutality. On account of a family feud Machhi Singh, the main accused in the case, along with eleven accomplices, in course of a single night, conducted raids on the number of villages killing seventeen people, including men, women and children for no reason other than they were related to one Amar Singh and his sister Piyaro Bai. On account of a family feud Machhi Singh, the main accused in the case, along with eleven accomplices, in course of a single night, conducted raids on the number of villages killing seventeen people, including men, women and children for no reason other than they were related to one Amar Singh and his sister Piyaro Bai. The death sentence awarded to Machhi Singh and two other accused by the trial Court and affirmed by the High Court was also confirmed by the Supreme Court. In this case the Supreme Court put itself in the position of the ‘Community’ and observed that though the ‘Community’ revered and protected life because ‘the very humanistic edifice is constructed on the foundation of the reverence for life principle’ it may yet withdraw the protection and demand death penalty. The Apex Court held that “It may do so ‘in rarest of rare cases’ when its collective conscience is so shocked that it will expect the holders of the judicial power centre to inflict death penalty irrespective of their personal opinion as regards desirability or otherwise of retaining death penalty. The community may entertain such a sentiment when the crime is viewed from the platform of the motive for, or the manner of commission of the crime, or the antisocial or abhorrent nature of the crime, such as for instance : I. Manner of commission of murder : When the murder is committed in an extremely brutal, grotesque, diabolical, revolting or dastardly manner so as to arouse intense and extreme indignation of the community. For instance, (i) when the house of the victim is set aflame with the end in view to roast him alive in the house, (ii) when the victim is subjected to inhuman acts of torture or cruelty in order to bring about his or her death, (iii) when the body of the victim is cut into pieces or his body is dismembered in a fiendish manner. II. Motive for commission of murder : When the murder is committed for a motive which evinces total depravity and meanness. II. Motive for commission of murder : When the murder is committed for a motive which evinces total depravity and meanness. For instance when : (i) a hired assassin commits murder for the sake of money or reward, (ii) a cold blooded murder is committed with a deliberate design in order to inherit property or to gain control over property of a ward or a person under the control of a murderer or vis-a-vis whom the murderer is in a dominating position or in a position of trust, or (iii) a murder is committed in the course for betrayal of the motherland. III. Anti-social or socially abhorrent nature of the crime : (a) When murder of a member of a Scheduled Caste or minority community etc., is committed not for personal reason but in circumstances which arouse social wrath. For instance when such a crime is committed in order to terrorise such persons and frighten them into fleeing from a place or in order to deprive them of, or make them surrender, land or benefits conferred on them with a view to reverse past injustices and in order to restore the social balance. (b) In cases of bride burning and what are known as dowry deaths or when murder is committed in order to remarry for the sake of extracting dowry once again or to marry another woman on account of infatuation. IV. Magnitude of crime : When the crime is enormous in proportion. For instance, when multiple murders say of all or almost all the members of a family or a large number of persons of a particular caste, community, or locality are committed. V. Personality of victim of murder : When the victim of the murder is, (a) an innocent child who could not have or has not provided even as an excuse, much less a provocation for murder, (b) a helpless woman or a person rendered helpless by old age or infirmity, (c) when the victim is a person vis-a-vis whom the murderer is in a position of domination or trust, (d) when the victim is a public figure generally loved and respected by the community for the services rendered by him and the murder is committed for political or similar reasons other than personal reasons.” 47. In Machhi Singh’s case the Court also held that for practical application the rarest of rare cases principle must be read and understood in the background of the five categories of murder cases enumerated above. The Supreme Court, though relying upon the observations in Bachan Singh yet, observed in Swami Shraddananda @ Murli Manohar Mishra, JT 2008 (8) SC 27 that “we respectfully wish to say that even though the categories framed in Machhi Singh provide very useful guidelines, nonetheless those cannot be taken as inflexible, absolute or immutable. Further, even in those categories, there would be scope for flexibility as observed in Bachan Singh itself.” 48. In Shraddananda (supra) the Court looked at the matter from another angle. It has observed that “In Bachan Singh it was held that the expression “special reasons” in the context of the provision of Section 354(3) obviously means “exceptional reasons” founded on the exceptionally grave circumstances of the particular case relating to the crime as well as the criminal. It was further said that on conviction for murder and other capital offences punishable in the alternative with death under the Penal Code, the extreme penalty should be imposed only in extreme cases. In conclusion it was said that the death penalty ought not to be imposed save in the rarest of rare cases when the alternative option is unquestionably foreclosed. Now, all these expressions “special reasons”, “exceptional reasons”, “founded on the exceptional grave circumstances”, “extreme cases” and “the rarest of the rare cases” unquestionably indicate a relative category based on comparison with other cases of murder. Machhi Singh for the purpose of practical application sought to translate this relative category into absolute terms by framing the five categories. (In doing so, it is held by some, Machhi Singh considerably enlarged the scope for imposing death penalty that was greatly restricted by Bachan Singh).” 49. It can, therefore, be noted from above that Bachan Singh laid down the principle of the rarest of rare cases and Machhi Singh, for practical application, crystallised the principle into five definite categories of cases of murder and in doing so also considerably enlarged the scope of imposing death penalty. The Supreme Court in Shraddananda (supra) has further held that, "But the unfortunate reality is that in later decisions neither the rarest of rare case principle nor the Machhi Singh categories were followed uniformly and consistently. The Supreme Court in Shraddananda (supra) has further held that, "But the unfortunate reality is that in later decisions neither the rarest of rare case principle nor the Machhi Singh categories were followed uniformly and consistently. In Aloke Nath Dutta v. State of West Bengal, 2006 (Supp. 10) SCR 662, Sinha, J. gave some very good illustrations from a number of recent decisions in which on similar facts this Court took contrary views on giving death penalty to the convict. He finally observed that ‘courts in the matter of sentencing act differently although the fact situation may appear to be somewhat similar’ and further ‘it is evident that different benches had taken different view in the matter’.” 50. The Supreme Court following the dictum of the cases of Rajendra Prasad v. State of U.P., (1979) 3 SCC 646 and Vishnu Deo Shaw v. State of West Bengal, (1979) 3 SCC 714 had observed that “counting the casualties is not the main criterion for sentencing to death; nor recklessness in the act of murder. The sole focus on the crime and the total farewell to the criminal and his social personal circumstances mutilate sentencing justice. The Court thus reduced the sentence of death to life imprisonment. 51. In the case of Prakash Dhawal Khairnar (supra) the Apex Court had reduced the sentence of death following the law enunciated in the case on Rajendra Prasad (supra). The Apex Court taking the cue from the English legislation on abolition of death sentence by suggesting that life imprisonment which strictly means imprisonment for the whole of the man’s life, but in practice amounts to incarceration for a period between 10 and 14 years, may at the option of the convicting Court, be subject to the condition that the sentence of imprisonment shall last, as long as life lasts, where there are exceptional indications of murderous recidivism and the community cannot run the risk of the convict being at large. According to the Court this may take care of the judicial apprehension that unless physically liquidated the culprit had some remote time to repeat murder. In that case also the accused appellant had gun down his own brother, 4 members of his brother family and his mother. 52. In the case of Ram Anup Singh and others v. State of Bihar (supra) 4 innocent life were lost in the incident. In that case also the accused appellant had gun down his own brother, 4 members of his brother family and his mother. 52. In the case of Ram Anup Singh and others v. State of Bihar (supra) 4 innocent life were lost in the incident. The Court observed that there is no evidence on record to suggest that appellants are the menace to society as is evident by their past deeds. It is not possible to conclude that they cannot be reformed or rehabilitate and they constitute a continuing threat to the society. The Hon’ble Court therefore did not find it safe to confirm the sentence of death awarded by the High Court to some of the appellants, instead sentenced them to suffer rigorous imprisonment for life with the condition that they shall not be released before completing the actual term of 20 years including the period already undergone by them. 53. Coming now to the facts of this case, it is undoubtedly proved that the appellant killed four inmates of the house with the active assistance of his accomplices in a cold blooded manner. The circumstances of the case, however, reveal that he had committed the murders to steal cash and ornaments, probably for the marriage of his sister. No doubt, it is a heinous and brutal crime but at the same time it will be difficult to hold that it is rarest of rare case and death sentence is the only option and the alternative of awarding the life imprisonment is unquestionably foreclosed. It is also difficult to say that the appellant is a menace to the society or that he is likely to continue criminal acts of violence as would constitute a continuing threat to the society. There is nothing on record which could suggest that the appellant was having any criminal antecedent prior to this incident or he is a hardened criminal. He is married with small children and was aged about 26 years on the date of occurrence, per his statement under Section 313, Cr.P.C. We, therefore, feel hesitant in endorsing the death penalty awarded to him by the trial Court. 54. But this leads to a more important question about the punishment commensurate to the appellant’s crime. The sentence of imprisonment for a term of 14 years, that goes under the euphemism of life imprisonment is equally, if not more, unacceptable to us. 54. But this leads to a more important question about the punishment commensurate to the appellant’s crime. The sentence of imprisonment for a term of 14 years, that goes under the euphemism of life imprisonment is equally, if not more, unacceptable to us. The Supreme Court in the cases of Subhash Chandra v. Kishan Lal and others, 2001(4) SCC 458 ; Shree Bhagwan v. State of Rajasthan, 2001 (6) SCC 296 ; Prakash Dhawal Khairnar (Patil) v. State of Maharashtra (supra); Ram Anoop Singh and others v. State of Bihar (supra); Mohd. Munna v. Union of India, 2005(7) SCC 417 ; Jayawant Dattatraya Surya Rao v. State of Maharashtra, 2001(10) SCC 109 and Nazir Khan and others v. State of Delhi, 2003(8) SCC 461 has substituted death penalty by life imprisonment or in some cases imprisonment for a term of 20 years with the further direction that the convict would not be released for the rest of his life or until the 20 years term was actually served out, mainly on two premises; one, an imprisonment for life, in terms of Section 53 read with Section 45 of the I.P.C. meant imprisonment for the rest of life of the prisoner and two, a convict undergoing life imprisonment has no right to claim remission. 55. In the light of the discussions made above, we are clearly of the view that there is a good and strong basis to substitute the death sentence by life imprisonment with the direction that the appellant shall not be released from prison for the rest of his life. 56. In this view of the matter the Appeals and Reference are decided as under : (i) Capital Criminal Appeal No. 656 of 2008 preferred by appellant Dhruva Kumar Tiwari alias Pappu and Capital Criminal Appeal No. 7865 of 2007 preferred by the appellant from Jail are dismissed subject to the modification that the sentence of death awarded to the said appellant under Section 302, I.P.C. is reduced to imprisonment for life and a fine of Rs. 10,000/- with the condition that the appellant Dhruva Kumar Tiwari alias Pappu will not be entitled to be released from the imprisonment for the rest of his life. In default of payment of fine, he shall further undergo imprisonment for one year. He is further sentenced to five years imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 10,000/- with the condition that the appellant Dhruva Kumar Tiwari alias Pappu will not be entitled to be released from the imprisonment for the rest of his life. In default of payment of fine, he shall further undergo imprisonment for one year. He is further sentenced to five years imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 2000/- under Section 394, I.P.C., three years imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 2000/- under Section 404, I.P.C. and three years imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 2000/- under Section 411, I.P.C. In default of payment of fine, he shall further undergo imprisonment for six months under each of the aforesaid Sections. All the sentences shall run concurrently. He is in jail. He shall remain in jail to serve out the sentence awarded to him. (ii) Criminal Reference No. 27 of 2007 under Section 366 (2), Cr.P.C. for confirmation of the death sentence awarded to the appellant Dhruva Kumar Tiwari alias Pappu is rejected. ————