Judgment :- (1.) THIS appeal is at the instance of the claimants and is directed against the award dated 30th August, 1999 passed by the Motor accident CJaims Tribunal by which the Tribunal dismissed the application for compensation under Section 163a of the Motor Vehicles Act on the ground that the driver of the vehicle employed by the owner himself being involved in the accident and the death having been caused on his account, the jurisdiction of Motor Vehicles Tribunal was not attracted and the appropriate remedy of the claimants lay before the Commissioner, Workmens Compensation Act. (2.) BEING dissatisfied, the claimants have come up with the present appeal. (3.) THE facts giving rise to filing of the application under Section 163a of the Act may be summed up thus : (a) The victim, namely, one Kalipada Dolui was the driver of the vehicle being tractor No. WB-33/1200. On December 19, 1996 while the deceased was coming from the brickfield of one Amitava sashmal near western side of the brickfield at P. S. Kotwali, district- Midnapore, the said vehicle slipped out of the track and capsized to the west of the road. The driver died on the spot. The claimants are the legal heirs of the deceased who was the only earning member and used to earn a sum of Rs. 2,200/-a month as salary from the owner and accordingly, the claimants prayed for compensation in terms of Section 163a of the Act amounting to Rs. 3,36,000/ -. In the application, both the owner and the insurance Company were made parties. (b) The owner of the tractor appeared in the case but did not file any written statement opposing the claim of the appellants. (c) The Insurance Company contested the case by filing written statement denying the material allegations made in the claim application. According to the Insurance Company, the application under Section 163a of the Act was not maintainable and the compensation as claimed in the application was excess, arbitrary and baseless. It was further claimed that the deceased himself was guilty or responsible for the accident and as such, the claimants took advantage of the wrong committed by the deceased himself. In the written statement, Insurance Company further stated that the trailer being WB-33/1980, which was attached with the tractor being WB-33/1200 on the date of the accident, was not insured with the Company. In the written statement, Insurance Company further stated that the trailer being WB-33/1980, which was attached with the tractor being WB-33/1200 on the date of the accident, was not insured with the Company. (d) The learned Tribunal below, as it appears from the award impugned, by relying upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Minu B. Meheta v. Bal Krishna Ramchandra Nayar reported in 1977 ACJ 118 (SC) as well as in the case of Y. R. Shanbagh v. Mohammad Gouse and Ors. reported in 1991 ACJ 699 came to the conclusion that forum of Motor Vehicles Act was not the appropriate one. The Tribunal, however, on the basis of the materials on record, came to the finding that the vehicle was involved in the accident and that the same was insured with the insurance Company. (4.) BEING dissatisfied, the claimants have come up with the present appeal. (5.) MR. Das, the learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the appellants has attacked the award by contending that the learned Tribunal below refused to exercise jurisdiction vested in law in holding that it had no jurisdiction to entertain the claim by totally misreading the provisions contained in Section 163a of the Motor Vehicles Act which was introduced by the amendment in the year 1994 and according to him, in case of an application under Section 163a of the Act, the fact that the victim was the driver employed by the owner of the vehicle was immaterial. Mr. Das, therefore, prays for setting aside the award and passing a direction for payment of the amount claimed in the application with interest. (6.) NONE appears on behalf of the owners of the vehicle or the insurance Company. (7.) THEREFORE, the only question that arises for determination in this appeal is whether the Tribunal refused to exercise jurisdiction vested in it by law by holding that the appropriate remedy of the claimants lay before the commissioner under the Workmen Compensation Act. (6.) NONE appears on behalf of the owners of the vehicle or the insurance Company. (7.) THEREFORE, the only question that arises for determination in this appeal is whether the Tribunal refused to exercise jurisdiction vested in it by law by holding that the appropriate remedy of the claimants lay before the commissioner under the Workmen Compensation Act. (8.) AFTER hearing the learned Counsel for the appellants and after going through the materials on record including the provisions contained in the Motor vehicles Act, 1988 we find that after the introduction of the provisions contained in Section 163a of the Act and the consequent amendment of Section 147 in the year 1994, the liability of the Insurance Company has been extended even to the case of driver of a vehicle although he is an employee of the insured. To appreciate the question it will be profitable to refer to the provisions contained in Sections 163a and 167 and 147 of the Act as it stands today. Those are quoted below : "163-A. Special provisions as to payment of compensation on structured formula basis.-(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or in any other law for the time being in force or instrument having the force of law, the owner of the motor vehicle or the authorised insurer shall be liable to pay in the case of death or permanent disablement due to accident arising out of the use of motor vehicle, compensation, as indicated in the Second Schedule, to the legal heirs or the victim, as the case may be. Explanation.-For the purposes of this sub-section, "permanent disability" shall have the same meaning and extent as in the Workmens compensation Act, 1923 (8 of 1923). (2) In any claim for compensation under subsection (1), the claimant shall not be required to plead or establish that the death or permanent disablement in respect of which the claim has been made was due to any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of the vehicle or vehicles concerned or of any other person. (3) The Central Government may, keeping in view the cost of living by notification in the Official Gazette, from time to time amend the Second Schedule. " "147. (3) The Central Government may, keeping in view the cost of living by notification in the Official Gazette, from time to time amend the Second Schedule. " "147. Requirements of policies and limits of liability.-(1) In order to comply with the requirements of this Chapter, a policy of insurance must be a policy which- (a) is issued by a person who is an authorised insurer; and (b) insures the person or classes of persons specified in the policy to the extent specified in sub-section (2)- (i) against any liability which may be incurred by him in respect of the death of or bodily injury to any person including owner of the goods or his authorised representative carried in the vehicle or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of the vehicle in a public place; (ii) against the death of or bodily injury to any passenger of a public service vehicle caused by or arising out of the use of the vehicle in a public place : provided that a policy shall not be required-(i) to cover liability in respect of the death, arising out of and in the course of his employment, of the employee of a person insured by the policy or in respect of bodily injury sustained by such an employee arising out of and in the course of his employment other than a liability arising under the Workmens Compensation Act, 1923 (8 of 1923), in respect of the death of; or bodily injury to, any such employee- (a) engaged in driving the vehicle, or (b) if it is a public service vehicle engaged as a conductor of the vehicle or in examining tickets on the vehicle, or (c) if it is a goods carriage, being carried in the vehicle, or (ii) to cover any contractual liability. Explanation.-For the removal of doubts,it is hereby declared that the death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party shall be deemed to have been caused by or to have arisen out of, the use of a vehicle in a public place notwithstanding that the person who is dead or injured or the property which is damaged was not in a public place at the time of the accident, if the act or omission which led to the accident occurred in a public place. (2) Subject to the proviso to sub-section (1), a policy of insurance referred to in sub-section (1), shall cover any liability incurred in respect of any accident, up to the following limits, namely :-(a) save as provided in clause (b), the amount of liability incurred ; (b) in respect of damage to any property of a third party, a limit of rupees six thousand : provided that any policy of insurance issued with any limited liability and in force, immediately before the commencement of this Act, shall continue to be effective for a period of four months after such commencement or till the date of expiry of such policy whichever is earlier. (3) A policy shall be of no effect for the purposes of this Chapter unless and until there is issued by the insurer in favour of the person by whom the policy is effected a certificate of insurance in the prescribed form and containing the prescribed particulars of any condition subject to which the policy is issued and of any other prescribed matters; and different forms, particulars and matters may be prescribed in different cases. (4) Where a cover note issued by the insurer under the provisions of this. Chapter or the rules made thereunder is not followed by a policy of insurance within the prescribed time, the insurer shall, within seven days of the expiry of the period of the validity of the cover note, notify the fact to the registering authority in whose records the vehicle to which the cover note relates has been registered or to such other authority as the state Government may prescribe. (5) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force, an insurer issuing a policy of insurance under this section shall be liable to indemnify the person or classes of persons specified in the policy in respect of any liability which the policy purports to cover in the case of that person or those classes of persons. " "167. Option regarding claims for compensation in certain cases.-Notwithstanding anything contained in the Workmens Compensation act, 1923 (8 of 1923) where the death of, or bodily injury to, any person gives rise to a claim for compensation under this Act and also under the workmens Compensation Act, 1923, the person entitled to compensation may without prejudice to the provisions of Chapter X claim such compensation under either of those Acts but not under both." (9.) FROM a plain reading of the aforesaid provisions of the Act, it is clear that with effect from November 14, 1994 after the introduction of the section 163a of the Act based on no fault liability, a driver of the vehicle, in case of death, is automatically protected as provided in proviso i (a) of Section 147 (1) the Act to the limit of the liability incurred and notwithstanding the provisions contained in the Workmens Compensation Act, the heirs of a deceased driver is entitled to proceed under the provisions of the Act but not under the both the Acts. (10.) IN this connection it will not be out of place to refer to the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Smt. Rita Debi and Ors. v. New India Assurance company Ltd. reported in AIR 2000 SC 1930 : 2000 WBLR (SC) 330 where the Apex Court while dealing with a claim of compensation arising out the death of a driver of an auto rickshaw made the following observations : "learned Counsel for the respondents contended before us that since the Motor Vehicles Act has not defined the word death and the legal interpretations relied upon by us are with reference to definition of the word death in Workmens Compensation Act the same will not be applicable while interpreting the word death in Motor Vehicles Act because according to her, the objects of the two Acts are entirely different. She also contends on the facts of this case no proximity could be presumed between the murder of the driver and the stealing of the auto rickshaw. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the respondents. We do not see how the object of the two Acts, namely, the Motor Vehicles Act and the Workmens Compensation Act are in any way different. In our opinion, the relevant object of both the acts are to provide compensation to the victims of accidents. The only difference between the two enactments is that so far as the workmens Compensation Act is concerned, it is confined to workmen as defined under that Act while the relief provided under chapters X to XII of the Motor Vehicles Act is available to all the victims of accidents involving a motor vehicle. In this conclusion of ours we are supported by Section 167 of the Motor Vehicles Act as per which provision, it is open to the claimants either to proceed to claim compensation under the Workmens Compensation Act or under the Motor Vehicles Act. A perusal of the objects of the two enactments clearly establishes that both the enactments are beneficial enactments operating in the same field, hence Judicially accepted interpretation of the word death in Workmens compensation Act is, in our opinion, applicable to the interpretation of the word death in the Motor Vehicles Act also. " (11.) THE finding of the learned Tribunal that there was negligence on the part of the driver and thus, the proceedings under the Act was not maintainable is based on total misreading of the claim application which shows that the same was under Section 163a of the Act where the fault of the driver is immaterial and thus, the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Minu b. Mehta (supra) based on the law before incorporation of the provision of section 163a was not applicable to the facts of the present case. Consequently, the learned Tribunal below erroneously applied the said decision to the facts of the present case. (12.) SIMILARLY in the case of Y. R. Shanbhag v. Mohammed Gouse and ors. reported in 1991 ACJ 699 , a Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court was dealing with a case under Section 110a of the old Motor Vehicles Act. Consequently, the learned Tribunal below erroneously applied the said decision to the facts of the present case. (12.) SIMILARLY in the case of Y. R. Shanbhag v. Mohammed Gouse and ors. reported in 1991 ACJ 699 , a Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court was dealing with a case under Section 110a of the old Motor Vehicles Act. While dealing such an application, it was held that under the said provision, a claimant was required to allege and establish actionable negligence on the part of the driver of the vehicle and only in that event, he could hold the owner of the vehicle vicariously responsible for the actionable negligence on the part of his driver. According to the said decision, when the very action of the driver himself was the basis for a claim under this Section, the driver himself cannot sustain an action under Section 11 OA of the Act against the owner or insurer arising out of his own action. In our view, the said decision cannot have any application to a proceeding under Section 163a of the Act, which authorizes a claimant to lodge a claim without proving the negligence of a driver and, thus, the learned Tribunal below wrongly relied upon the said decision in the fact of the present case. (13.) WE, therefore, find that the Tribunal refused to exercise jurisdiction vested in by law. The fact that the vehicle in question was insured is well established. The owner of the vehicle has given evidence that he used to pay the deceased a sum of Rs, 70/-a day and the P. W.-3, a local inhabitant also corroborated the fact that in that area the driver is given Rs. 70-80/- a day as their remuneration. We, thus, find no reason to disbelieve the evidence of the owner that the income of the victim was Rs. 2,100/-a month which comes to rs. 25,200/-a year. If one third of such amount is deducted as personal expenses, the net annual income comes to Rs. 16,300/ -. The applicants have alleged that the deceased was aged 35 years at the time of accident. The driving licence issued in the year 1981 shows that he was aged 27 years at that time. Thus at the time of the accident the victim was aged about 42 years even according to the documents produced by them. 16,300/ -. The applicants have alleged that the deceased was aged 35 years at the time of accident. The driving licence issued in the year 1981 shows that he was aged 27 years at that time. Thus at the time of the accident the victim was aged about 42 years even according to the documents produced by them. The Insurance Company has produced no evidence contradicting the age of the victim. Therefore, according to the schedule annexed to the Act the multiplier of 15 will be applicable. The amount, thus, comes to Rs. 16,300/-x 15 = 2,54,500/ -. In addition to the aforesaid amount, Rs. 5,000/-should be added as loss of consortium, Rs. 2,500/- as loss of estate and further Rs. 2,000/-as funeral expenses. Thus, the total amount comes to Rs. 2,61,500/ -. The claimants are entitled to get interest on the aforesaid amount at the rate of 12 percent per annum from the date of filing claim application till December 31, 1999 and at the rate of 8 percent per annum from January 1, 2000 till payment. (14.) WE, therefore, set aside the award passed by the Tribunal and hold that in the fact of the present case the claimants are entitled to a sum of rs. 2,61,500/- with interest on the aforesaid amount at the rate of 12 percent per annum from the date of filing the claim application till December 31,1999 and at the rate of 8 percent per annum from January 1, 2000 till payment. Such amount should be paid Within a month from today. The appeal is, consequently, allowed with costs, which we assess at 200 gms.