Judgment 1. The two appeals in terms of Clause 10 of the Letters Patent of the Patna High Court raise identical issues of facts and law. The two complainants had approached the learned Labour Court, Patna, by preferring separate complaints under Sec. 26(2) of the Bihar Shops and Establishment Act 1953 (hereinafter referred to as the BSE Act), which were disposed by a common order. They preferred separate writ petitions which have been disposed of by a common judgment by a learned single Judge of this Court. In that view of the matter, we dispose of these two appeals by a common judgment. 2. LPA No. 759 of 1999 arises out of the judgment dated 12.4.99, passed in CWJC No. 5013 of 1995, which, in its turn, had arisen out of the order dated 22.5.95, passed in BSE Case No. 5 of 1993. L.P.A.No. 906 of 1999 has arisen out of CWJC No. 5001 of 1995 which, in its turn, had arisen out of BSE Case No. 4 of 1993. The two complaints filed by both the appellants under Sec. 26(2) of the BSE Act were dismissed by the learned Labour Court and affirmed by the learned writ court, inter alia, on the ground that the same are not maintainable because the complainants are sales promotion employees within the meaning of Sec. 2(d) of the Sales Promotion Employees (Conditions of Service) Act 1976 (hereinafter referred to as the SPE Act). 2.1 Aggrieved by the judgment of the learned Labour Court, Pankaj Saran preferred CWJC No. 5013 of 1995 in this Court, and Gautam Banerjee preferred CWJC No. 5001 of 1995. Both the writ petitions have been dismissed by a common judgment on the same grounds. 3. The learned Labour Court found that, on the own showing of the complainants, they were performing functions relating to promotion of sales or business and are, therefore, sales promotion employees within the meaning of Sec. 2(d) of the Act. Therefore, the forum contemplated by Sec. 6(2) of the SPE Act is available to them. In that view of the matter, the complaint petition is not maintainable. Therefore, the forum contemplated by Sec. 6(2) of the SPE Act is available to them. In that view of the matter, the complaint petition is not maintainable. The complainants had advanced an alternative contention during the course of submissions for which the factual foundation is not laid in their own pleadings, and was really based on the pleadings of the respondent company that they are performing managerial or supervisory functions in terms of Clause 5 of the schedule to the BSE Act read with Sec. 4(2). Both the courts have described this contention as an argument of desperation because such a stand, on the part of the complainants, render them in the unenviable position of advancing mutually contradictory and destructive submissions. They are either sales promotion employees under the SPE Act, or discharging managerial and supervisory functions and are, therefore, "employer" within the meaning of the BSE Act. It has further, in substance, been observed by both the courts that the complainants have not made the necessary averments in their complaint petitions, let alone the question of any evidence to this effect. In view of their own case that they were essentially performing duties relating to promotion of sales and business of the respondent company, they have been held to be sales promotion employees within the meaning of Sec. 2(d) of the Act. They cannot, therefore, be permitted to advance the alternative submission that they were discharging managerial or supervisory functions within the meaning of Sec. 4(2) read with Clause 5 of Schedule II of the BSE Act. The submission has, therefore, been rejected as an act of desperation. 4. While assailing the validity of the judgment of the learned writ court, learned Counsel for the complainants submits that, in view of the materials on record, it is evident that they are employees within the meaning of Sec. 2(4) of the Act. He next submits that it has been held by the Supreme Court in its judgment in the case of H.R. Adyanthaya V/s. Sandoz (India) Ltd., , 1994 5 SCC 737 , that sales promotion employees are not workmen under the I D Act and, therefore, they are "employees" within the meaning of Sec. 2(4) of the BSE Act. 5. Learned Counsel for the respondent Company submits in support of the judgments that the cases of the complainants have been decided on their own version. 5. Learned Counsel for the respondent Company submits in support of the judgments that the cases of the complainants have been decided on their own version. In other words, in his submission, the complainants have in their petitions of complaint made unambiguous averments that they are engaged in promotion of sales and business, are not engaged in supervisory, managerial or administrative duties, coupled with their evidence to the same effect. He next submits that the learned Counsel for the complainants have not been able to point out any infirmity in the judgment of the learned writ court. He next submits that the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of H.R. Adyanthaya (supra) entirely destroys the cases of the complainants. He lastly submits that the case of the complainants based on Sec. 11(A) of the SPE Act is wholly misconceived. 6. We have perused the materials on record and considered the submissions of learned Counsel for the parties. A summary of facts may be indicated to the extent essential for the disposal of the issues raised in these appeals. (i) Re - LPA No. 759 of 1999 Pankaj Saran had joined the respondent company on 15.10.86 as a trainee medical representative on a monthly stipend of Rs. 800/-. He was confirmed on the post on 1.9.87. He was thereafter promoted to the post of Area Field Manager with effect from 1.4.90. In view of his performance, he was called upon to submit his resignation on 24.12.92. On 31.12.92 he was terminated from the service. This was followed by his complaint petition before the learned Labour Court under the provisions of Sec. 26(2) of the BSE Act which has been dismissed on the ground that the complaint petition is not maintainable because he is a sales promotion employee within the meaning of Sec. 2(d) of the Act. ii) Re - LPA No. 906 of 1999 Gautam Banerjee had joined the services of the respondent company on 16.8.83 as a Medical Representative on monthly stipend of Rs. 675/-. He was promoted to the post of Junior Field Officer with effect from 1.5.87. He was thereafter promoted to the post of Senior Field Manager with effect from 1.6.87, a position which was later re-designated as Area Field Manager. He was then promoted to the post of Regional Sales Manager on 1.1.91 and was drawing salary @ Rs. 2700/-. 675/-. He was promoted to the post of Junior Field Officer with effect from 1.5.87. He was thereafter promoted to the post of Senior Field Manager with effect from 1.6.87, a position which was later re-designated as Area Field Manager. He was then promoted to the post of Regional Sales Manager on 1.1.91 and was drawing salary @ Rs. 2700/-. He was asked to resign on 24.12.92. In view of his refusal to submit his resignation, he was dismissed from service with effect from 4.1.93. He was at that point of time drawing salary @ Rs. 3000/- per month. He filed an identical complaint petition in terms of Sec. 26(2) of the BSE Act which has been dismissed on the ground that the same is not maintainable because he is a sales promotion employee within the meaning of Sec. 2(d) of the Act. 7. Learned Counsel for the respondent company is right in his submission that the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of H.R. Adyanthaya (supra) does not support the case of the complainants. It has been observed in paragraphs 28 and 29 of the judgment that, in view of the provision of Sec. 6(2) of the SPE Act, the provisions of I D Act are applicable to the sale promotion employees. In other words, the forum and the procedure for redressal of grievances provided under the I D Act are available to sales promotion employees. The SPE Act does not provide a separate forum, nor does it prescribe separate procedure, for redressal of the grievances of the sales promotion employees. 8. Learned Counsel for the respondent company is further right in his submission that Sec. 11A of the SPE Act does not enure to the benefit of the complainants. The same is reproduced hereinbelow for the facility of quick reference: 11A. 8. Learned Counsel for the respondent company is further right in his submission that Sec. 11A of the SPE Act does not enure to the benefit of the complainants. The same is reproduced hereinbelow for the facility of quick reference: 11A. Effect of laws and agreements inconsistent with this Act.-(1) The provisions of this Act or of any rule made thereunder shall have effect, notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law or in the terms of any award, agreement, settlement or contract of service, whether made before or after the coming into force of this Act: Provided that where under any such law, award, agreement, settlement or contract of service, a sales promotion employee is entitled to benefits in respect of any matter which are more favourable to him than those to which he would be entitled to the more favourable benefits in respect of that matter, notwithstanding that he is entitled to receive benefits in respect of other matters under this Act. 9. It is thus manifest that while ensuring benefits to the sales promotion employees, the superior benefits shall always be made available to them either under the SPE Act or to be found under any law, award, agreement, settlement or contract of service etc. This has to be seen in contradistinction to the forum created by Sec. 6(2) of the Act. Law is well settled that no surplusage is attributable to the Legislature. Therefore, meaning and content has to be given to Sec. 6(2) in juxtaposition to Sec. 11A of the SPE Act. As stated hereinabove, Sec. 6(2) provides the forum, and prescribes the procedure, for redressal of the grievances of sales promotion employees. On the other hand, Sec. 11A ensures superior benefits to sales promotion employees. The distinction is really founded on forum and benefits. 10. In view of the foregoing discussion, we respectfully agree with the conclusions arrived at by the learned writ court that the complaint petitions of the two complainants in terms of Sec. 26(2) of the BSE Act were not maintainable. The complainants are really liable to pay costs for this litigation which, however, we refrain from doing so because they are dismissed employees. In the result, we do not find any merit in these appeals which are accordingly dismissed.