ORDER 1. These appeals have been filed against the impugned judgment of the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court dated 17-8-2001 passed in GAs Nos. 8384 and 3774 of 2000, APO No. 509 of 2000 and APO/T No. 629 of 2000 in Writ Petition No. 2346 of 1993 whereby the Division Bench has upheld the judgment of a learned Single Judge of that Court dated 30-8-1989 passed in Writ Petition No. 2346 of 1993. 2. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. It appears that Suit No. 431 of 1987 was filed by Respondent 1 against the Socialist Republic of Romania, M/s Ice Chimica, formerly known as M/s Exportlemn and the State Trading Corporation of India Limited (for short "STC"). The respondent sought permission from the Central Government to h file a suit under Section 86( I) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short "CPC"), which was granted on 28-4-1987. The said permission was later on revoked by the Central Government on 17-7-1987. However, Respondent I challenged the said revocation order by filing Writ Petition No. 879 of 1988 before the Calcutta High Court and the High Court quashed the revocation order by the judgment dated 12-10-1988 which became final. 3. Subsequently, a suit was filed by Respondent 1 which was decreed and that judgment/decree has also become final. Subsequent to the said judgment decreeing the suit, Respondent 1 sought permission from the Central Government to execute the decree under Section 86(3) CPC. Permission to execute the decree was refused by the Central Government by Order dated 23-3-1992. The said order was challenged by Respondent I by way of Writ Petition No. 2346 of 1993 in the Calcutta High Court. That writ petition was allowed by a learned Single Judge on 30-8-1999 which judgment was upheld by the Division Bench of the High Court by the impugned judgment dated 17-8-2001. Aggrieved against the judgment of the Division Bench, the Union of India has filed these appeals by special leave. 4. A perusal of the judgment of the learned Single Judge shows that the• learned Single Judge has, while allowing the writ petition, directed the Ministry of External Affairs, Union of India to give consent under Section 86(3) CPC for executing the decree. That judgment has been upheld by the Division Bench of the High Court. 4. A perusal of the judgment of the learned Single Judge shows that the• learned Single Judge has, while allowing the writ petition, directed the Ministry of External Affairs, Union of India to give consent under Section 86(3) CPC for executing the decree. That judgment has been upheld by the Division Bench of the High Court. We are of the considered opinion that even if the High Court was of the view that the Order of the Central Government dated 23-3-1992 refusing to give consent to execute the decree was arbitrary or illegal, at most what the High Court could have done was that it could have remanded the matter to the Ministry of External Affairs, Union of India to reconsider the matter in accordance with law instead of itself directing the Central Government to give consent under Section 86(3) CPC. 5. It may be mentioned that there is a distinction between "judicial review" and "appellate jurisdiction". The High Court in a writ petition when examining an administrative order is not exercising the appellate power but exercising the power of judicial review which is much narrower than the appellate power. Such judicial review can only be exercised on Wednesbury principles. 6. It is well settled by a series of decisions of this Court that the High Court cannot itself perform the functions of a statutory authority. Thus in G. Veerappa Pillai v. Raman and Raman Ltd. it was held that the High Court. under Article 226 of the Constitution of India cannot direct the Regional Transport Authority to grant bus permits as the grant of the permit is entirely within the discretion of the Regional Transport Authority. Of course, If the Regional Transport Authority rejects the application for grant of permits arbitrarily or illegally, the High Court can set aside the order of the Regional Transport Authority and direct the Regional Transport Authority to pass a fresh order in accordance with law, but the High Court cannot itself order grant of permits, in that case it will be taking over the function of the a Regional Transport Authority. 7. In Muni Suvrat-Swami Jain S.MP. Sangh v. Arun Nathuram Gaikwadl this Court held that the power under Section 351 of the Mumbai Municipal Corporation Act to order demolition of unauthorised constructions has to be exercised only by the Municipal Commissioner and it cannot be exercised by the High Court. 8. 7. In Muni Suvrat-Swami Jain S.MP. Sangh v. Arun Nathuram Gaikwadl this Court held that the power under Section 351 of the Mumbai Municipal Corporation Act to order demolition of unauthorised constructions has to be exercised only by the Municipal Commissioner and it cannot be exercised by the High Court. 8. In State of MP. v. Srikant Chaphekar3 this Court held that the Madhya Pradesh Administrative Tribunal cannot substitute itself for the Departmental Promotion Committee in deciding the matter of promotion. The Tribunal could have only directed that the matter be reconsidered by the Departmental Promotion Committee in accordance with law if it was of the view that the c Departmental Promotion Committee had not decided the matter regarding promotion legally, but the Tribunal could not have itself decided the matter. 9. In State of UP. v. Raja Ram Jaiswal4 this Court held that the High Court cannot issue a mandamus directing a statutory licensing authority to grant a licence. 10. In UP. SRTC v. Mohd. Ismail this Court held that the court cannot d dictate the decision of the statutory authority, and cannot direct the statutory authority to exercise its discretion in a particular manner not expressly required by law. The court can only command the statutory authority to perform its duty by exercising its duty in accordance with law. 11. In the circumstances, we allow these appeals; set aside the judgments e of the Division Bench and the learned Single Judge of the High Court and remand the matter to the Central Government to reconsider the prayer of Respondent 1 under Section 86(3) CPC for giving consent to execute the decree in accordance with law expeditiously. There shall be no order as to costs. 12. We leave all questions of fact and law open to be considered by the f Central Government, including the questions whether M/s Ice Chimica was a separate legal entity distinct from the State of Romania, and whether even if it is a limb of the State of Romania, its properties enjoy immunity under international law.