SYED MOHAMMAD AHMAD HASANPetitioner v. SHIA CENTRAL BOARD OF WAKF, U. P.
2008-09-16
A.P.SAHI, ASHOK BHUSHAN
body2008
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT By the Court.—Heard Shri R.K. Jain, learned Senior Advocate, assisted by Shri S. Agarwal, learned Counsel for the petitioner, Shri S.F.A. Naqvi, learned Counsel who has appeared on behalf of respondent Nos. 1 and 2, and Shri M.K. Gupta, who has put in appearance on behalf of respondents. 2. Learned Counsel for the parties agree that the writ petition be finally decided without calling for any further affidavit. 3. By this writ petition, the petitioner has prayed for quashing the order dated 11.11.2005 passed by a Member of Siya Central Board (Annexure 8 to the writ petition). Petitioner’s case in the writ petition is that there is a Wakf namely “Wakf Bibi Sughara Begum, Asgharabad, District Aligarh (Wakf No. 69-Aligarh).” Petitioner was Mutawalli of the said Wakf. Petitioner is aggrieved by Annexure 8 to the writ petition which is an order dated 11.11.2005 passed by respondent No. 2 who is described as “Senior Member Legal Committee and Member In-charge, District Aligarh, Shia Central Board of Wakf, U.P. Lucknow”. By the impugned order, the petitioner has been removed from Mutawalli-ship of Wakf No. 69 and the Committee was constituted under Sayed Mohd. Sajid Hasan, Respondent No. 3 to look after the Wakf. 4. Learned Counsel for the petitioner in support of the writ petition has contended that the removal of the petitioner by one Member of the Board was without jurisdiction. He submits that even though the respondent No. 2 has exercised the delegated power under Section 27 of the Wakf Act, 1995 but a Mutawalli could have been removed only by a majority of not less than two-thirds of the members of the Board as provided under Section 64 (3) of the Act. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that where there is a specific majority provided for a particular action, the said majority cannot be diluted by any kind of delegation provided under Section 27 of the said Act. Before proceeding to consider the submission of learned Counsel for the parties, it is useful to quote Sections 27 and 64 (1, 3 and 4) of the said Act.
Before proceeding to consider the submission of learned Counsel for the parties, it is useful to quote Sections 27 and 64 (1, 3 and 4) of the said Act. Section 27: “Delegation of powers by the Board” The Board may, by a general/special order in writing, delegate to the Chairperson, any other member, the Secretary or any other officer or servant of the Board or any area committee subject to such conditions and limitations as may be specified in the said order, such of its powers and duties under this Act, as it may deem necessary.” 5. Section 27 of the Act contains general/special power of the Board to delegate by general or special order, such of its powers and duties as it may deem necessary.
Section 27 of the Act contains general/special power of the Board to delegate by general or special order, such of its powers and duties as it may deem necessary. The words which needs consideration and interpretation under Section 27 are : "Such of its powers and duties under the Act, as it may deem necessary." Section 64: “Removal of Mutawalli: (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law or the deed of wakf, the Board may remove a Mutawalli from his office if such mutawalli— (a) has been convicted more than once of an offence punishable under Section 61; or (b) has been convicted of any offence of criminal breach of trust or any other offence involving moral turpitude, and such conviction has not been reversed and he has not been granted full pardon with respect to such offence; or (c) is of unsound mind or is suffering from other mental or physical defect or infirmity which would render him unfit to perform the functions and discharge the duties of a mutawalli; or (d) is an undischarged insolvent; or (e) is proved to be addicted to drinking liquor or other spirituous preparations, or is addicted to the taking of any narcotic drugs; or (f) is employed as a paid legal practitioner on behalf of, or against, the Wakf; or (g) has failed, without reasonable excuse, to maintain regular accounts for two consecutive years or has failed to submit, into consecutive years, the yearly statement of accounts, as required by sub-section (2) of Section 46; or (h) is interested, directly or indirectly, in a subsisting lease in respect of any Wakf property, or in any contract made with, or any work being done for the Wakf or is in arrears in respect of any sum due by him to such Wakf; or (i) continuously neglects his duties or commits any misfeasance, malfeasance, misapplication of funds or breach of trust in relation to the Wakf or in respect of any money or other Wakf property; or (j) willfully and persistently disobeys the lawful orders made by the Central Government, State Government, Board under any provision of this Act or rule or order made thereunder; (k) misappropriates or fraudulently deals with the property of the Wakf. (2) ................................
(2) ................................ (3) No action shall be taken by the Board under sub-section (2), unless it has held an enquiry into the matter in a prescribed manner and the decision has been taken by a majority of not less than two-thirds of the members of the Board. (4) A mutawalli who is aggrieved by an order passed under any of the clauses (c) to (j) of sub-section (1), may, within one month from the date of the receipt by him of the order, appeal against the order to the Tribunal and the decision of the Tribunal on such appeal shall be final.” 6. Section 64 of the Act provides for removal of Mutawalli. Sub-section (1) provides for the ground for removal of the Mutawalli. Sub-section (3) provides that no action shall be taken by the Board under sub-section (1), unless it has held an enquiry into the matter in the prescribed manner and the decision has been taken by a majority of not less than two-thirds of the members of the Board. The question is when sub-section (3) of Section 64 specifically provides for two-thirds of the majority of members of the Board can by exercising the power of delegation under Section 27 the power can be vested in one member which otherwise could have been exercised only by two-thirds members of the Board, as noticed above. The words in Section 27 that “such of its powers and duties under this Act, as it may deem necessary” indicate that delegation is not permissible for all powers of the Board and the Board has to take a decision as to which of powers or duties, it is necessary to delegate. While giving meaningful interpretation of the said words, it is to be assumed that by exercising the power of delegation other provisions of the Act have to be looked into. The delegation cannot be contemplated under Section 27 which may violate other provisions of the Act nor delegation can be substituted in place of specific requirement of a majority. 7. In case the interpretation is accepted that under Section 27, any power which although required to be performed by two-thirds members of the Board can be delegated, the requirement for specific majority under Section 64(3) shall become redundant.
7. In case the interpretation is accepted that under Section 27, any power which although required to be performed by two-thirds members of the Board can be delegated, the requirement for specific majority under Section 64(3) shall become redundant. It is well established rule of interpretation that no words in a statute are used without any purpose nor any words are wasted by legislature. The specific majority of two-thirds as provided under Section 64 (3) has to be given effect to and both the provisions Sections 27 and 64 has to be given a harmonious construction so both may survive without doing violence to any part of any of the provisions. When the statute require a particular thing to be done in a particular manner the said thing is required to be done in a said manner alone. 8. Lord Roche in Nazir Ahmad v. King Emperor, AIR 1936 PC 253 (2) stated the rule in these words : “Where a power is given to do a certain thing in a certain way the thing must be done in that way or not at all. Other methods of performance are necessarily forbidden.” 9. When under Section 64(3) a specific mode of exercise of power i.e. by a special majority is provided said power cannot be delegated to one member of the Board. In view of exercise of such powers by a special mode the power is not capable of delegation. Any other interpretation shall make the requirement provided in Section 64(3) redundant and meaningless. Special majority has been provided for specific object i.e. to make the removal only when 2/3rd of members of Board agree, permitting one member to do, it is to permit a thing to be done in a manner which is not permissible under the Act. 10. Shri S.F.A. Naqvi, learned Counsel for the respondents has submitted that the remedy of the petitioner was to file an appeal under Section 64(4) of the Wakf Act, 1995. It is true that under Section 64 (4) an appeal is provided against an order passed under sub-section (1). However, it is well settled that alternate remedy provided in a statute is not always a bar for entertaining the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution.
It is true that under Section 64 (4) an appeal is provided against an order passed under sub-section (1). However, it is well settled that alternate remedy provided in a statute is not always a bar for entertaining the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. Reference is made to the case reported in (1998) 8 SCC 1 (Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai and others) where it was held that when an order is without jurisdiction, the High Court can well exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. Following is the relevant observation of the Apex Court : 15. “Under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court, having regard to the facts of the case, has a discretion to entertain or not to entertain a writ petition. But the High Court has imposed upon itself certain restrictions one of which is that if an effective and efficacious remedy is available, the High Court would not normally exercise its jurisdiction. But the alternative remedy has been consistently held by this Court not to operate as a bar in at least three contingencies, namely, where the writ petition has been filed for the enforcement of any of the Fundamental Rights or where there has been a violation of the principle of natural justice or where the order or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or the vires of an Act is challenged. There is a plethora of case-law on this point but to cut down this circle of forensic whirlpool, we would rely on some old decisions of the evolutionary era of the constitutional law as they still hold the field.” 11. In view of the above, we are not inclined to throw the petition on the ground of sub-section (4) of Section 64 of the said Act as we are of the view that order passed by respondent No. 2 impugned in the writ petition is an order passed without jurisdiction and was clearly contrary to specific requirement under Section 64 (3) of the Act. 12. In the result, writ petition is allowed. The order dated 11.11.2005 (Annexure 8 to the writ petition) is set aside. It goes without saying that it is always open for the Board to take action in accordance with law. ————