JUDGMENT Hon’ble S.U. Khan, J.—Heard learned counsel for the parties. 2. This is tenant’s writ petition arising out of eviction/release proceedings. initiated by respondent No. 1, Girish Kumar Chaturvedi on the ground of bona fide need under Section 21 (1-A) of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent & Eviction) Act, 1972 in the form of P.A. Case No. 15 of 1995. In the release application Gopal Prasad, tenant since deceased and survived by the petitioner was impleaded as opposite party No. 1 and Krishna Kumar Chaturvedi, respondent No. 2, in this writ petition, who is real brother of Girish Kumar Chaturvedi was impleaded as opposite party No. 2. Property in dispute is a house containing several rooms. In the release application it was stated that applicant was employed as Director of a National Channel J.N.U. Delhi and prior to that he was working at Radio Station Delhi and prior to that he had also worked on other Radio Stations as Director. It was stated that applicant landlord had written seven books which had been published and by virtue of his service he was allotted a house in New Delhi. Release application was filed on 9.6.1995 and landlord applicant was to retire on 31.8.1995. During pendency of release application applicant actually retired. It was further stated in the release application that applicant intended to reside at Mathura in the house in dispute which is situate in Mohalla/locality Chhatta Bazar, Mathura and he required the house in dispute for the said purpose. 3. It was further stated that landlord applicant and his brother Krishna Kumar Chaturvedi had inherited two houses from their father, one was house in dispute and the other house was situate in Mohalla Chuna Kankar, Mathura and by mutual arrangement the other house had gone in the share of Krishna Kumar Chaturvedi in which son of Krishna Kumar Chaturvedi was residing. It was stated in the release application that applicant and his brother K.K. Chaturvedi were joint owners of the house in dispute. 4. The tenant pleaded that the other ancestral house of landlords situate in Mohalla Chunna Kankar was quite big and sufficient to accommodate the applicant landlord also. It was also stated that applicant landlord was also having a house at Delhi regarding which power of attorney had been executed in his favour. 4. The tenant pleaded that the other ancestral house of landlords situate in Mohalla Chunna Kankar was quite big and sufficient to accommodate the applicant landlord also. It was also stated that applicant landlord was also having a house at Delhi regarding which power of attorney had been executed in his favour. In that regard landlord applicant asserted that he was only power of attorney holder of the said house and electricity bill was paid in the name of original owner Mohd. Iqbal. 5. In the written statement it was also pleaded that a third house in Mohalla Chunna Kankar bearing No. 31/7 was got vacated by the landlord from its previous tenant on the ground of bona fide need. However, the said house had been sold by landlord applicant on 13.2.1995 for Rs.1,30,000/-. 6. Trial Court/prescribed authority/1st A.D.J. (S.D.), Mathura rejected the release application through order dated 13.9.1996. Against the said judgment and order respondent No. 1 applicant in the release application filed Misc. Civil Appeal No. 125 of 1996. A.D.J. Court No. 3 Mathura, through judgment and order dated 7.2.2003 allowed the appeal set aside the judgment and order passed by the Prescribed Authority and consequently allowed the release application. Tenants have challenged the said order of the lower appellate Court through this writ petition. Section 21 (1-A) of the Act is quoted below : “Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 2, the prescribed authority shall, on the application of a landlord in that behalf, order the eviction of a tenant from any building under tenancy, if it is satisfied that the landlord of such building was in occupation of a public building for residential purposes which he had to vacate on account of the cessation of his employment : Provided that an application under this sub-section may also be given by a landlord in occupation of such public building at any time within a period of one year before the expected date of cessation of his employment, but the order of eviction on such application shall take effect only on the date of his actual cessation.” 7. Tenant had pleaded that son of other landlord Krishna Kumar Chaturvedi who was residing in the other ancestral house of the landlord had been transferred to some other place. 8. Tenant had pleaded that son of other landlord Krishna Kumar Chaturvedi who was residing in the other ancestral house of the landlord had been transferred to some other place. 8. In respect of the landlord’s house at Delhi lower appellate Court held that no transfer deed had been executed and only power of attorney had been executed in favour of the landlord. 9. In the release application it was categorically stated in para 1 that both the brothers i.e. applicant and opposite party No. 2 are joint owners of the house in dispute. In para 3 it was stated that under the mutual arrangement the other ancestral house was earmarked for K.K. Chaturvedi and his family and house in dispute for applicant landlord G.K. Chaturvedi. No formal partition was pleaded. Extent of accommodation in the other ancestral house was not brought on record. Under the aforesaid provision building may be released if landlord has got no other house and he really intends to shift to the tenanted house. 10. In my opinion, the most important circumstance against the landlord was sale of another house situate in the same city just before filing of the release application lower appellate Court illegally brushed aside the said action of the landlord by saying that it was done six months before filing of the release application. Release application under the aforesaid provision can be filed within one year before expected date of retirement. In fact it was filed three months before retirement. If landlord was intending to shift at Mathura then he would not have sold another house just six and half months before his retirement. The sale of the house completely disproves the need of the landlord. 11. Even otherwise the other ancestral house was also available to the landlord. 12. Accordingly in my opinion lower appellate Court committed an error of law by allowing the appeal and release application. Landlord completely failed to prove, his need under the aforesaid provision. 13. Writ petition is, therefore, allowed. Impugned judgment and order by the lower appellate Court is set aside. Judgment and order passed by Prescribed Authority is restored. 14. 12. Accordingly in my opinion lower appellate Court committed an error of law by allowing the appeal and release application. Landlord completely failed to prove, his need under the aforesaid provision. 13. Writ petition is, therefore, allowed. Impugned judgment and order by the lower appellate Court is set aside. Judgment and order passed by Prescribed Authority is restored. 14. I have held in Khursheeda v. A.D.J., 2004(2) ARC 64 and H.M. Kichlu v. A.D.J., 2004(2) ARC 652 that while granting relief against eviction to the tenant in respect of building covered by Rent Control Act or while maintaining the said relief already granted by the Courts below, writ Court is empowered to enhance the rent to a reasonable extent. 15. In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda (supra), I placed reliance upon the Supreme Court authority of M.V. Acharya v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1998 SC 602 , where it was held that it was essential to provide for periodical enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Acts. The Supreme Court has further held that frozen rents are giving rise to lawlessness and landlords out of frustration are approaching muscle man to get the premises vacated and Courts of law are becoming redundant in this sphere. This authority has recently been followed by the Supreme Court in Satyawati Sharma (dead) by L.Rs. v. Union of India, (2008) 5 SCC 287 : 2008 (71) ALR 499, part of Para 29 & Para 34 of which are quoted below : “29. It is trite to say that legislation which may be quite reasonable and rationale at the time of its enactment may with the lapse of time and/or due to change of circumstances become arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of the doctrine of equity and even if the validity of such legislation may have been upheld at a given point of time, the Court may, in subsequent litigation, strike down the same if it is found that the rationale of classification has become non-existent. 34. 34. In Malpe Vishwanath Acharya and others v. State of Maharashtra and another (supra), the Court found that the criteria for determination and fixation of rent by freezing or by pegging down of rent as on 1.9.1940 or as on first date of letting, had, with the passage of time become irrational and arbitrary but did not strike down the same on the ground that extended period of Bombay Rent Act was coming to an end on 31.3.1998.” 17. Under U.P. Rent Control Act, there is no provision of enhancement of rent after October, 1972 [Except where landlord is public charitable or public religious institution (Section 9-A) or government is tenant (Section 21 (8)]. In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I have also placed reliance upon the authority of Supreme Court reported in AIR 1996 SC 2410 , Shangrila Food Products Ltd. v. Life Insurance Corporation of India, paragraph-11 of which is quoted below : “lt is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. This jurisdiction of the High Court, being extraordinary, is normally exercisable keeping in mind the principles of equity. One of the ends of the equity is to promote honesty and fair play. If there be any unfair advantage gained by a party priorly, before invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court, the Court can take into account the unfair advantage gained and can require the party to shed the unfair gain before granting relief.” 16. Thereafter in Para 8 of the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I held as under : “Rent Control Act confers a reasonable advantage upon the tenant of protection against arbitrary eviction. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bonafide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. This advantage is also coupled with the advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent. The latter advantage cannot be said to be either reasonable or equitable. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid authority of S.F.P. v. L.I.C., ( AIR 1996 S.C 2410 ). This advantage is also coupled with the advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent. The latter advantage cannot be said to be either reasonable or equitable. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid authority of S.F.P. v. L.I.C., ( AIR 1996 S.C 2410 ). has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ Court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. By slightly extending the said doctrine it may safely be held that while granting the reasonable advantage to the tenant conferred upon him by the Rent Control Act the tenant may be asked to shed the un-reasonable arbitrary advantage conferred upon him by the said Rent Control Act. The writ Court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the un-reasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him in the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be. Tenant will have to shed the undue advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Act to barter his protection from arbitrary eviction provided for by the said Act.” 17. Thereafter in H. M. Kitchlu v. A.D.J., 2004 (2) A.R.C. 652, I have held that the same principle of enhancement of rent to a reasonable extent may be made applicable while dismissing the writ petition of the landlord for the reason that by doing so writ Court approves the protection of Rent Control Act granted to the tenant by the Courts below. 18. Accommodation in dispute consists of five rooms and one big hall, existing rent of which is Rs. 250/- per month. Through an interim order passed in this writ petition on 11.10.2006 rent was enhanced to Rs. 7500/- per months Against the said order tenant petitioners filed S.L.P. before the Supreme Court being S.L.P. Civil No. 4499 of 2002. On 19.3.2007 following order was passed by the Supreme Court : “Issue Notice. In the meantime the petitioner shall keep on depositing rent at the rate of at which he was paying earlier. This order, however, would not preclude the High Court to dispose the writ petition expeditiously.” 19. Rent may be enhanced to a reasonable extent as condition of stay in tenant’s writ petition. In the meantime the petitioner shall keep on depositing rent at the rate of at which he was paying earlier. This order, however, would not preclude the High Court to dispose the writ petition expeditiously.” 19. Rent may be enhanced to a reasonable extent as condition of stay in tenant’s writ petition. Rent may also be enhanced to a reasonable extent while granting relief against the eviction to the tenant as mentioned above. However, the enhancement must be reasonable. Enhancement of rent from Rs. 250/- per month to Rs. 7500/- per month appears to be quite high. However, looking to the fact that accommodation in dispute contains six rooms out of which one is ,big hall alongwith other amenities and is situate in Mathura, it is directed that w.e.f. October, 2008, onward tenant shall pay rent to the landlord respondent No. 1 @ Rs. 2000/- per month. No further amount over and above Rs. 2000/- per month as water tax etc. shall be payable. ————