1. Heard Mr. A.R. Malhotra, learned counsel for the appellant and also heard Mr. Vanlalenmawia, learned counsel for the respondent No. 1 and Mr. N. Sailo, learned counsel for respondent No. 3, owner of the vehicle. 2. Feeling aggrieved by the judgment and award dated 13.5.2005 passed by the learned Member, Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Aizawl in MAC Case No. 20 of 2002, this appeal has been filed under section 173 of the M.V. Act, 1988 by which the learned Member, MACT Aizawl has awarded compensation to the tune of Rs. 10, 51, 800 with interest at the rate of 9 per cent per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition until realization, 3. A claim petition was filed under the provisions of section 163A of the M.V. Act by the respondent No.1 herein as claimant before the MACT, Aizawl, on account of death of his wife in a vehicular accident on 22.3.2001, while she was travelling as a passenger in the offending vehicle. The offending vehicle was owned by one Mr. Khenchina, the respondent No. 2 herein which had been insured with the respondent No. 3, United India Insurance Co. Ltd. It is stated in the claim application that the deceased was a school teacher by occupation and her monthly income was Rs. 9, 164 p.m. The age of the deceased was 35 years. It is also contended that the accident occurred due to rash and negligence driving on the part of the driver, for which a Criminal Case was registered under section 279/304(A)/338 of the IPC against the driver. 4. The learned Member, MACT, on filing of this claim petition conducted an enquiry wherein witnesses were examined and documentary evidence received. At the conclusion of the enquiry, the learned tribunal awarded the compensation as stated hereinbefore. 5. Mr. A.R. Malhotra, learned counsel for the appellant at the very outset of his argument submitted that the award so made by the learned member is erroneous and illegal since the same has been passed overriding the provisions of Second Schedule of the M.V. Act. 5. Mr. A.R. Malhotra, learned counsel for the appellant at the very outset of his argument submitted that the award so made by the learned member is erroneous and illegal since the same has been passed overriding the provisions of Second Schedule of the M.V. Act. According to him, the claim petition was made under the provisions of section 163Aof the Act, where the claimant is not required to plead or establish a that the death or permanent disablement in respect of which the claim has been made was due to any wrongful act, or neglect, or default of the owner of the vehicle or vehicles concerned or of any other person. In other words, it is not required for the claimant to proof rash and negligent driving on the part of the driver, owner, etc. The provisions, as incorporated in this particular section is a special provision as to payment of compensation on the structured formula basis. The structured formula is provided in Schedule 2 of the Act wherein the Legislature has incorporated some provisions for allowance of compensation to the deceased or injured by applying appropriate multiplier and income. In the Second Schedule, for the application of this provisions under section 163A, the maximum annual income of the deceased or injured is shown as Rs. 40, 000. If the income of the deceased or the injured exceeds the limit, award under section 163A cannot, however, be made. It is always limited to Rs. 40, 000 annually. Mr. A.R. Malhotra, therefore, in view of the provisions as laid down in section 163Aof the Act and the Second Schedule argues that the award so computed by the learned member is erroneous and illegal, and it cannot be sustained. 6. It is an admitted fact. It is argued by Mr. A.R. Malhotra that the deceased was a school teacher having monthly income at Rs. 9, 164, therefore, the annual income exceeds Rs. 40, 000 as provided in the Second Schedule. But, however, in the face of such facts, the learned member proceeded to dispose of the application under section 163A in the manner of disposal of a claim petition under section 166 of the Act, where it is incumbent on the part of the claimant to prove rash and negligent driving on the part of the driver, owner or other person. From the perusal of the judgment and award, it is noticed that the learned member assessed the loss of income at Rs. 10, 36, 800 by applying multiplier 16 taking into consideration the age of the deceased. That apart, the learned member also calculated a sum of Rs. 10, 000 and Rs. & 5, 000 under the heads loss of consortium and loss of estate respectively. The learned member assessed the monthly income at Rs. 5, 400 such income annually would stand at Rs. 64, 000 which exceed Rs. 40, 000 as provided in Second Schedule of the Act. Therefore, it appears that computation of the award by the learned member which finds place in the judgment itself is, apparently, erroneous and illegal, if an application is made for such compensation by the claimant under section 163A of the Act. 7. Now, the question arises as to whether compensation can be awarded by applying the provisions of Second Schedule where the annual income stand more than Rs. 40, 000. The answer in the humble view of this court is apparently 'No'. In that situation, what would be remedy for the appellant ? In a case in between United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. H. Lalhmingliana and Another, AIR 2006 (NOC) 764 (G&u.) ; 2006 AlHC 1189, the hon'ble High Court held as under :- "The Legislature has provided a claimant with two different schemes for claiming compensation. While the accident itself gives cause of action for relaxation of compensation under section 163A, the cause of action for sustaining a claim under section 166 is not merely the accident, but a tortuous act of failing to take care, which the owner or the driver of the vehicle owes to the injured or the deceased as the case may be. However, in either case the foundation for the claim is the accident, for, even in a claim made under section 166, the accident forms an integral and inseverable part of the cause of action. This apart, the M.V. Act is a benevolent legislation and, hence, this enactment needs to be liberally construed. Construed, thus, it is abundantly clear that the cause of action in both the proceedings, namely, the proceedings under sections 166 and 163A are not whollyalien to each other inasmuch as at the root of both the claims lies the accident. This apart, the M.V. Act is a benevolent legislation and, hence, this enactment needs to be liberally construed. Construed, thus, it is abundantly clear that the cause of action in both the proceedings, namely, the proceedings under sections 166 and 163A are not whollyalien to each other inasmuch as at the root of both the claims lies the accident. Whether in a given case the court shall permit the amendment of a proceeding under section 166 to one under section 163A is a question, which would depend on the facts of the given case, for, there may be case where the injured or the deceased does not fall in the limited income group of Rs. 40, 000 per annum, if a claimant does not fall in the income group of persons for whom the provisions of section 163A are incorporated, the Tribunal may decline to allow the amendment of the proceeding under section 166 to one under section 163A. Since the annual income of the injured was, according to the claim application, less than Rs. 40, 000 per month, there was no impediment, on the part of Tribunal to allow the claimant to amend his claim application from the one made under section 166 to one under section 163A, more so, when insured had agreed to treat the application made under section 166 as an application made under section 163A." In that case, it has been held that the claim petition filed under section 163A can be allowed to be amended by the tribunal. The same principle can also be applied in our present case since the annual income exceeds Rs. 40, 000. It would be in the fitness of things appropriate for this court to make a remand of the case to the learned tribunal after setting aside the judgment and award so passed by the learned member to make an amendment of the application so made by the claimant. 8. In view of the above findings, the judgment and award passed by the learned member is set aside and quashed. 9. Case is remanded back to the learned member to allow the claimant to make an amendment of the petition under section 163A, if so advised and to receive evidence both oral and documentary and to dispose of the same as per law. 10. This MAC appeal is accordingly disposed of with the above directions.