JUDGMENT 1. - Heard on the misc. application moved under Section 389 Cr.RC. for staying the impugned order of conviction dated 02.04.2008 passed by the Special Judge, Sessions Court, Prevention of Corruption Act, Jaipur in Criminal Case No. 18/99 till the disposal of the appeal. 2. Learned counsel Mr. Kaushik, appearing on behalf of the accused-appellant, in support of his submissions, placed reliance on the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Smt. Akhtari Bi v. State of M.P., reported in JT 2001(4) SC 40 , wherein the accused was guilty of committing murder and the order of conviction and sentence was kept in abeyance by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. 3. He further placed reliance on the judgment rendered by the co-ordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Laxman Lal & Anr. v. State of Rajasthan, reported in 2004(1) R.C.C. 27 , wherein the accused were convicted by the trial Judge under Section 307 IPC and the order of conviction was stayed/suspended by this court. 4. Per contra, learned Public Prosecutor appearing for the State has strongly opposed the stay application and submitted that recently Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the case of State of Punjab v. Deepak Mattu, reported in AIR 2008 SC 35 , in para No.5 has held as under- "5. Section 389 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 reads as under- "389. Suspension of sentence pending the appeal; release of appellant on bail (1) Pending any appeal by a convicted person, the Appellate Court may, for reasons to be recorded by it in writing, order that the execution of the sentence or order appealed against be suspended and, also, if he is in confinement, that he be released on bail or on his own bond : Provided that the Appellate Court shall, before releasing on bail or on his own bond a convicted person who is convicted of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term of not less than ten years, shall give opportunity to the Public Prosecutor for showing cause in writing against such release. Provided further that in cases where a convicted person is released on bail it shall be open to the Public Prosecutor to file an application for the cancellation of the bail. Provided further that in cases where a convicted person is released on bail it shall be open to the Public Prosecutor to file an application for the cancellation of the bail. (2) The power conferred by this section on an Appellate Court may be exercised also by the High Court in the case of an appeal by a convicted person to a subordinate thereto. (3) Where the convicted person satisfies the Court by which he is convicted that he intends to present an appeal, the Court shall (i) where such person, being on bail, is sentenced to imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years, or (ii) where the offence of which such person has been convicted is a bailable one, and he is on bail, order that the convicted person be released on bail, unless there are special reasons for refusing bail, for such period as will afford sufficient time to present the appeal and obtain the orders of the Appellate Court under sub-section (1), and the sentence of imprisonment shall, so long as he is so released on bail, be deemed to be suspended. (4) When the appellant is ultimately sentenced to imprisonment for a term or to imprisonment for life, the time during which he is so released shall be excluded in computing the term for which he is so sentenced." Further the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para No.7 has observed as under "7. While passing the said Order, the High Court did not assign any special reasons. Possible delay in disposal of the appeal and there are arguable pointed by itself may not be sufficient to grant suspension of a sentence. The High Court while passing the said Order merely noticed some points which could be noticed some points which could be raised in the appeal. The grounds so taken do not suggest that the respondent was proceeded against by the State, mala fide or any bad faith. In K.C. Sareen, 2001 AIR SCW 3339 , this Court opined : "11. The legal position, therefore, is this though the power to suspend an order of conviction, apart from the order of sentence, is not alien to Section 389(1) of the Code, its exercise should be limited to very exceptional cases. Merely because the convicted person files an appeal in challenge of the conviction the court should not suspend the operation of the order of conviction. Merely because the convicted person files an appeal in challenge of the conviction the court should not suspend the operation of the order of conviction. The court has a duty to look at all aspects including the ramifications of keeping such conviction in abeyance. It is in the light of the above legal position that we have to examine the question as to what should be the position when a public servant is convicted of an offence under the PC Act. No doubt when the appellate court admits the appeal filed in challenge of the conviction and sentence for the offence under the PC Act, the superior court should normally suspend the sentence of imprisonment until disposal of the appeal, because refusal thereof would render the very appeal otiose unless such appeal could be heard soon after the filing of the appeal. But suspension of conviction of the offence under the PC Act, de-hors the sentence of imprisonment as a sequel thereto, is a different matter. 12. Corruption by public servants has not reached a monstrous dimension in India. Its tentacles have started grappling even the institutions created for the protection of the republic. Unless those tentacles are intercepted and impeded from gripping the normal and orderly functioning of the public offices, through strong legislative, executive as well as judicial exercises the corrupt public servants could even paralyse the functioning of such institutions and thereby hinder the democratic polity. Proliferation of corrupt public servants could garner momentum to cripple the social order if such men are allowed to continue to manage and operate public institutions. When a public servant is found guilty of corruption after a judicial adjudicatory process conducted by a court of law, judiciousness demands that he should be treated as corrupt until he is exonerated by a superior court. The mere fact that an appellate or revisional forum has decided to entertain his challenge and to go into the issues and findings made against such public servants once again should not even temporarily absolve him from such findings. If such a public servant becomes entitled to hold public office and to continue to do official acts until he is judicially absolved from such findings by reason of suspension of the order of conviction, it is public interest which suffers and sometimes, even irreparably. If such a public servant becomes entitled to hold public office and to continue to do official acts until he is judicially absolved from such findings by reason of suspension of the order of conviction, it is public interest which suffers and sometimes, even irreparably. When a public servant who is convicted of corruption is allowed to continue to hold public office, it would impair the morale of the other persons manning such office, and consequently that would erode the already shrunk confidence of the people in such public institutions besides demoralising the other honest public servants who would either be the colleagues or subordinates of the convicted persons. If honest public servants are compelled to take orders from proclaimed corrupt officers on account of the suspension of the conviction, the fallout would be one of shaking the system itself. Hence it is necessary that the court should not aid the public servant who stands convicted for corruption charges to hold only (sic) public office until he is exonerated after conducting a judicial adjudication at the appellate or revisional level. It is a different matter if a corrupt public officer could continue to hold such public office even without the help of a court order suspending the conviction." 5. He further placed reliance on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court rendered in the case of Union of India v. Atar Singh And Another, reported in (2003) 12 SCC 434 , wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court has categorically held that "though such a discretion is undoubtedly granted, yet the Supreme Court can always weigh the correctness of the discretion exercised and pass appropriate orders in the event it comes to a contrary conclusion-On facts held, the High Court erred in suspending conviction only on the ground that non-suspension may entail removal of the delinquent public service from office." 6. I have heard rival submissions of the respective parties and carefully gone through the impugned judgment as also the relevant record. I also minutely gone through the judgments referred by the learned counsel for the accused-appellants as also the judgments rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India v. Atar Singh and Another (supra) and in the case of State of Punjab v. Deepak Mattu (supra), referred by the learned Public Prosecutor. 7. I also minutely gone through the judgments referred by the learned counsel for the accused-appellants as also the judgments rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India v. Atar Singh and Another (supra) and in the case of State of Punjab v. Deepak Mattu (supra), referred by the learned Public Prosecutor. 7. The case in hand is in relation to Prevention of Corruption Act in which the accused-appellant has been convicted under Sections 7 and 19(1 )(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. 8. Having heard rival submissions of the respective parties and looking to the overall facts and circumstances of the case, this Court do not fine any merit in the present application for staying the impugned order of conviction dated 2.04.2008. 9. Consequently, the stay application stands rejected. 10. However, the accused-appellant is at liberty to move application for seeking early hearing of the appeal.Application rejected. *******